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Abstract
The purpose of this work has been to consider the 
three major constitutional breakdowns which took place in 
Pakistan, viz,, the dissolution of the first Constituent 
Assembly by Ihe Governor-General in October, 1954# the 
abrogation of the Constitution of 1956 and declaration of 
martial law by the President in October, 1958# and the 
abrogation of the Constitution of 1962 and declaration of 
martial law by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in March, 
1969* In order to put them in proper perspective.a general 
survey of the constitutional development in Pakistan since 
independence till about the middle of 1971 had to be made*
But the main focus of the deliberations, however, has been 
on the background of the actions taken on those three 
occasions and the consequent constitutional and legal 
implications in the subsequent development.
In the first chapter a general introduction describes 
the constitutional position of Pakistan at independence, 
followed, in Chapter II, by a discussion on the composition 
and function of the first Constituent Assembly and its 
endeavour to draft a constitution for the country. Chapter 
III deals with the dissolution of the Assembly by the 
Governor-General and his attempt to promulgate a constitution 
by decree, and the Courts1 views of the Governor-General*s
• # ♦ XIX
action. In Chapter IY an analysis of the crisis has been 
made with a view to identifying the real grounds that led 
the Governor-General to act, as he acted.
The circumstances preceding the abrogation of the 
Constitution of 1956 and martial law in 1958 have been 
discussed in Chapter V f followed, in Chapter VI, by consi­
deration of the functioning of the martial law administra­
tion and the Courts1 view of the situation. Chapter YII 
deals with a reflection on the President's action and the 
extent of his responsibility for the breakdown. The statutory 
and constitutional progress made during the martial law 
period (1958-1962) have been dealt with in Chapter VIII.
The promulgation and working of the 1962 Constitution 
have been discussed in Chapter IX, while Chapter X discusses 
the reaction and political movement against that Constitu­
tion. Chapter XI deals with the abrogation of the Constitu­
tion and the declaration of martial law in 1969, together 
with the measures taken by the military regime to restore 
constitutional rule.
In Chapter XII, cases arising out of the similar 
situations in other Commonwealth countries as decided by 
their Courts, where leading Pakistani cases were cited, have 
been discussed. In the concluding chapter justification i>fy
and objections to, the actions have been considered, and 
the prospect of democracy and constitutional rule, in the
iv
Conditions, pro-failing before tbe India-Pakistan war in 
Beoembtf, 1971# bas been generally disemesed.
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Chapter I 
Introduction
1
For the last twenty-four years of its existence 
Pakistan has been in the search of a stable and viable 
constitution# The country's leaders have so far failed to 
find an acceptable foundation on which a united nation can 
be built# The pre-independence hopes that, once indepen­
dence was achieved everything would go smoothly have been 
shattered by experience# Since its inception the country 
has been faced with one crisis after another, enjoying 
scarcely a moment's freedom from internal or external tensions 
Leaving aside the impact of outside events, Pakistan has 
been constantly suffering internally from the lack of agree­
ment among its leaders on the basic political and consti­
tutional arrangement of the State.
On August 15> 194*7 many of the inhabitants of the 
Indian sub-continent felt that now that their destiny was 
in their own hands they could shape it according to their 
hearts' desire, others, destined ever to be ruled and never 
to rule, accepted the withdrawal of the imperial power with 
comparative indifference, and still others, finding them­
selves on the wrong side of the new frontiers, faced a 
doubtful future and, in many cases, death and disaster#
But on independence day India's prospects were brighter than
2
Pakistan's, though the latter had not only escaped imperial 
bondage but also the prospect of Hindu domination, and 
Pakistanis generally looked forward to creating a country in 
which Muslims could live in accordance with the precepts 
laid down in the Koran and the Sunna. It was only too 
obvious that this was to be no easy task* The persona of 
British India was regarded as having survived in the new 
India, while Pakistan was a new creation. India retained 
the capital and most of the instrumentalities; Pakistan 
had to create its own instrumentalities and it had hardly 
come into existence before it was confronted with the 
problems created by the influx of refugees from India. That
Pakistan survived in the initial period in the face of 
massive problems was regarded by many as a miracle.
Pakistan, due to wholesale migration of non-Muslim 
civil servants and other professional men to India, inherited 
only a few members of the old civil service. The govern­
ment departments had to be staffed with less experienced 
indigenous officials and a few British civil servants who 
agreed to remain and serve in the new dominion. The all- 
out dislocation following partition put a tremendous strain 
on the whole governmental machinery, resulting in inevitable 
delay and, at times, inappropriate action on important 
matters. In the early days of its existence, Pakistan lost 
the ablest of its politicians. Its activities, at indepen­
dence, were largely dominated by Jinnah, whose preoccupation
- ....... 3
with the refugee problem probably accelerated his death in 
September, 1948* Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister, on 
whom the mantle of leadership fell after Jirmah, was assas­
sinated in October, 1951* After Liaquat Ali Khan there 
emerged no-one with the head and heart of a national leader 
to lead the people in building up the new State. The gap
in the leadership, following the deaths of Jinnah and 
$
Liaquat Ali Khan, has never been filled, and Pakistan has 
suffered from a lack of sound political leadership more than 
anything else.
The imperial power before its departure from the 
Indian sub-continent, had made provisions to cover the 
period of transition before the transfer was complete.
The Indian Independence Act, 194*7 and the Government of India 
Act, 1935* constituted a provisional constitution and each 
of the new dominions had a Constituent Assembly, entrusted 
with the task of creating a new constitution. The Consti­
tuent Assembly of India had drafted a new constitution in 
just over two years. This constitution, which came into 
force on January 26, 1950, put an end to all political ties 
with the United Kingdom and created the instrumentalities 
necessary for the government of the Indian republic. In 
one sense, however, the task was incomplete, for, in 1956, 
the states boundaries were redrawn and consequential consti­
tutional amendment had to be made. Other minor amendments 
also had to be adopted, but India found no difficulty in
4adapting the main provisions of the Government of India Act, 
1955* to the purposes of the republic* The main dif­
ferences between the Indian Constitution of 194-9 and the 
Government of India Act, 1935 are the abolition of all pro­
visions providing for external control and the insertion 
of a bill of rights, enforceable by the Courts. Indian 
politics had been dominated by Jawaharlal Nehru, just as 
Jinnah had dominated Pakistan in its early days, but Nehru 
outlasted Jinnah and he had more competent lieutenants*
It was India's good fortune that Nehru lived long enough 
after independence to establish a democratic pattern in 
Indian politics, based on popular support* Though India 
has had its difficulties, the Constitution has worked and 
there is not and has not been any political movement to 
abolish or seriously alter it.
Pakistan has had more difficulties* In particular, 
it has a unique geographical difficulty, which poses the 
question whether it can be a viable political unit* It 
has two languages; India has far more, but they do not 
create the problems which arise in Pakistan. Pakistan had, 
in the British period, the same political experience as 
India under the Constitution Acts of 1919 an<l 1935» but it 
has not been able to adapt the Act of 1935 to suit its needs 
in the way India has done* In the course of seven years 
since 194-0, when the Muslim League first put forward its 
Specific demand for a separate state for the Muslims as a
' ........5
solution to the constitutional dispute in British India, 
till the time Pakistan was in fact achieved in 19^7> the 
Muslim leaders had little scope to think about the consti­
tutional set up of the future state. Their minds did not 
see beyond the political demand for a Muslim state. Thus, 
when the State actually came into existence, all sorts of 
political and constitutional issues appeared which had to 
be sorted out. There was, therefore, a delay of over 
seven years before any constitution was drafted, but its 
enactment was prevented by the dismissal of the first Con­
stituent Assembly in October, 1954-• A second Assembly in 
1956 enacted a Constitution, not fundamentally different 
from the draft constitution of the first Assembly. Both 
resembled the Indian Constitution of 194-9 * except that they 
purported to create an Islamic State.
But contrary to general expectation, the poli­
ticians were unable to work the Constitution which they had 
adopted. It is arguable that the politicians, who were 
entrusted to work the Constitution of 1956, were lacking in 
ability and merit. The Constitution did not give uni­
versal satisfaction. While East Pakistan complained of 
too much centralization of power, maintaining that pro­
vincial autonomy had no significant meaning, the politicians - 
of West Pakistan, other than those of the Punjab, com­
plained that the territories they represented were not fairly
*  6
treated. However, without attempting to handle these 
problems within the constitutional framework, the President 
abrogated the Constitution itself in October, 1958*
Before that, Pakistan had suffered from strong 
men, who had acted on the assumption that might was right. 
Governors-General Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza (later 
President under the 1956 Constitution) exercised power 
without a semblance of regard for democratic practices.
Their actions were designed to establish personal rule, 
and the Courts had been obliged to keep the ship of the 
State on an even keel by finding excuses for some of their 
unconstitutional activities and refusing to countenance 
others. After the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956 
in October, 1958 the country had been governed by a "martial 
law" regime for nearly four years; then came an authori­
tarian Constitution in 1962, which was brought to an end by 
widespread refusal of the people of Pakistan to be governed 
by it. Since March, 1969 the country has again been put 
under martial law, which became inevitable after the total 
collapse of the then existing political system. The last 
thirteen years have been a struggle for political power 
between the landed proprietors and officers of the armed 
forces on the one hand and the political intelligentsia on 
the other. It seems certain now that any futuxe consti­
tution of Pakistan will provide for Westminster type of
government and a judicially enforceable bill of rights#
But there are many questions still unresolved, which include 
the crucial question of the extent of autonomy to be granted 
to the units in the future arrangement*
It is impossible for a Pakistani to regard without 
dismay the existing political scene in Pakistan and this 
thesis has been written with a view to throwing light on 
some of the problems, by going over the constitutional 
history and searching for the causes of errors. Pakistan 
is not the only country to have attained freedom since the 
end of Hitler*s war, which has not been able to work the 
constitution left behind by the imperial power or a con­
stitution based on it. Strong men have seized power else­
where and if Pakistan can claim no expertise in constitution- 
making, its courts have found a way to exert some control 
over the strong men, while avoiding direct conflict with 
them. The courts in other countries have been glad to 
follow the precedent established by Pakistan courts. The 
relevant cases in Pakistan and in other countries have been 
analysed and discussed.
If political erros have been pointed out and dis­
cussed, it must be conceded that it has not proved possible 
to suggest solutions for many of the outstanding problems.
But a thesis like this can only provide material for thought 
on these matters. The solutions, it is submitted, must be
8
sought through mutual persuasion and agreement among the 
leaders of the country on basic issues.
It may be noted that the work having been com­
pleted before the de facto emergence of the nation of 
Bangladesh, all narratives, observations and comments made 
in this thesis are in relation to the State of Pakistan as 
it existed before the surrender of the Pakistan army in 
East Pakistan in December, 1971* But in course of the 
examination and analysis of the major constitutional break­
downs which occurred during the short history of the nation 
an attempt has been made to point to the tension on the 
basis of regional demands that had been ever present in 
Pakistan. It was the disagreement over the question of 
regional autonomy among the military rulers and West 
Pakistani leaders on the one hand and East Pakistani leaders 
on the other that led to the army action in East Pakistan 
in March, 1971> which ultimately resulted in the separation 
of the two wings. Pakistani leaders failed to find an 
acceptable constitutional formula which would ensure a 
strong central government after satisfying the demands of 
the regions.
Chapter II
The First Constituent Assemhly
Plans and composition of the Assembly
The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was established
primarily under the provisions of the Mountbatten Plan* But
the Assembly had its origin for the purpose of its composition
and functions to another famous document known as the Cabinet
2
Mission Plan. The Cabinet Mission, while rejecting the Muslim
League demand for &a separate and fully independent State of
Pakistan",also disapproved of the Congress scheme for a united 
■3
India. The Mission in its plan recommended an independent 
fUnion of India, embracing both British India and the States1 
with a single central government administering allotted sub­
jects but the Provinces v/ere to be "free to form groups with 
executives and legislatures1.Indicating the basic form for 
the future constitution,the Plan provided for the establish­
ment of the Union Constituent Assembly as the constitution 
-making machine, the members of which were also entrusted 
with the framing of constitutions for the Provinces and for 
the Groups or Sections. The Union Constituent Assembly was
1 The Plan for transferring power in British India announced 
on 3 June 1947 by the Viceroy,Lord Mountbatten.
2 Statement by the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy,16 May 1946 
See A.C.Banerjee: The Making; of the Indian Constitution 
PP.169-!71. The Cabinet Mission,announced by the Secretary 
of State for India in the House of Lords on 19 February 1946 
was to consist of the Secretary of State for India, Lord 
Pethick Lawrence,the President of the Board of Trade, Sir 
Stafford Cripps and the First Lord of the Admiralty,Mr.A.V.. 
Alexander.
3 Ibid. Para 13-
10
to-be composed of members elected indirectly by the existing
Provincial Assemblies, each province having a quota of members
proportional to its total population, roughly in the ratio of
one to a million. The total provincial seats were to be
divided between the main communities, according to their
numbers. The Mission was aware of- the desirability of direct
elections, based on adult francise, for the Constituent
Assembly. But the method was discarded as it "would lead to
a wholly unacceptable delay in the formulation of the new
constitution.In their eagerness to expedite the process
of transfer of power in British India, the members of the
Delegation recommended the less satisfactory method of indirect
representation for the Constituent Assembly.
The All-India Muslim League Council, "in the hope that
it would ultimately result in the establishment of a complete
sovereign Pakistan", accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan on
6 June 1946. The Congress Working Committee also accepted
the scheme on 26 June. But Pandit Nehru, the new President
of the Congress Party, in a press conference in Bombay on
10 July 1946, explained the basis of Congress acceptance in
which he stressed the ’sovereign status’ of the Constituent
Assembly, expressed doubts about ’grouping’ and forecasted
c
increased powers for the centre. .Nehru’s interpretation 
of the Plan resulted in a sharp and adverse reaction in Muslim
4 Ibid. Para 18.
5 A.C.Banerjee, The Making of the Indian Constitution pp.175-76
6 Ibid. pp.241 -’7BT
"  11
League circles. The leaders were particularly worried about
the ’sovereign1 status of the Constituent Assembly and what
Nehru said about the ’grouping’. They held that the cov
sovereign powers of the Assembly was to be exercised subject
to the basic-form upon which the whole scheme stood. Mohammad
Ali Jinnah,commenting on Nehru’s statement, said "Pandit
Nehru’s interpretation of the Congress acceptance of the
Cabinet Mission’s proposal of 16 May is a complete repudiation
of the basic form,upon which the long-term scheme rests and
all its fundamentals and terms and obligations and rights of
7parties accepting the scheme." It may be noted that the 
Muslim League interpretation was in line with the British 
Government’s statement, which on 6 December 1946,confirmed 
the intentions,expressed in the statement of the Cabinet 
Mission, that the basic framework would have to be accepted 
and stressed the need for an agreed procedure fop the func-
g
tions of the Constituent Assembly.
The Muslim League,therefore,on the direction of Jinnah,
withdrew its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan and by
a separate resolution called upon the Muslims of India to
9"resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan."*^ The elections 
to the Constituent Assembly were held in July and the Muslim
7 Ibid. p.246.
8 Ibid. pp.309-312.
9 "Proceedings of the Muslim League Council,Jul# 29*1946". 
A.C.Banerjee, The Making of the Indian Constitution
pp.260-264-
'*....12
League captured nearly all the Muslim seats but they did not
10participate in the Assembly proceedings.
The attitude of the Muslim League and its decision not
to participate in the Constituent Assembly,created a deadlock
in the progress towards independence. In early December 1946
just before the first session of the Constituent Assembly,
the British Government invited the leaders of the Congress,
Muslim League and the Sikh community to London in a last-
minute attempt to break the deadlock.But the attempt failed.
On 20 February 1947,the British Prime Minister made a policy 
11statement in the House of Commons. Mr.Attlee declared that 
the power in British India would be transferred to Indian 
hands by June 1948 and that His Majesty’s Government was 
considering "to whom the powers of the Central Government in 
British India should be handed over,on due date,whether as a 
whole to some form of Central Government for British India, 
or in some areas to the existing Provincial Governments,or in 
such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best 
interest of the Insian people." The Prime Minister also 
announced the appointment of Lord Mountbatten as the new 
Governor-General and Viceroy of India.
Lord Mountbatten took over from Viscount Wavell in March 
1947* After strenuous negotiations with the leaders of the
10 Sir Ivor Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan p.9
11 Statement of the British Government,20 February 1947. See 
A.C.Banerjee, The Making of the Indian Constitution
pp.401-405.
" . . 1 3
major Indian parties and with the approval of His Majesty’s 
Government in England,Mountbatten announced on 3 June 1947 
the British Government’s plan to transfer power in British 
India.^ ^
The Mountbatten Plan,as it was popularly known,provided
for a new and separate Constituent Assembly,consisting of
representatives of those areas which were unwilling to parti-
1 3cipate in the existing Constituent Assembly. To ascertain 
their views,the Provincial Assemblies of Bengal and Punjab 
were to meet in two parts,one comprising members of the Muslim 
majority districts and the other those of the non-Muslim 
majority districts,to decide whether the Provinces were to be 
partitioned. In the event of their deciding in favour of 
partition,division would take place and arrangements would be 
made accordingly,and each part would decide whether to join 
the existing or the new Constituent Assembly. Next,the 
Legislative Assembly of Sind would,at a special meeting,take 
its own decision on these alternatives. In view of the 
geographical situation of the North West Frontier Province, 
if Punjab were to decide not to join the existing Constituent 
Assembly,a referendum among the electors was to decide the 
issue. British Baluchistan would be given the opportunity of 
re-considering its own position. If Bengal were to be
12 The Mountbatten Plan, 3 June 1947. See A.C.Banerjee, The 
Making of the Indian Constitution pp.437-443.
13 Mountbatten Plan, Para 4.
14
*
partitioned,a referendum was to be held in the district of
Sylhet in Assam,to decide whether the district should be
amalgamated with the new province of Eastern Bengal. It was
also provided that,once the decisions for partition of Bengal
and Punjab were taken,fresh elections would be held to choose
new representatives to join the new and separate Constituent
Assembly,on the scale of one for every million of population
in accordance with principle outlined in the Cabinet Mission
Plan of 16 May 1946.^
The Mountbatten Plan of 3 June 1947 had,in effect,paved
the way for the establishment of two independent sovereign
States in the Indian sub-continent,with two Constituent
Assemblies to decide their future constitutions. The Plan was
announced in a special broadcast and Nehru and .Jinnah
1 5commended it to the nation in their broadcast speeches m
the same night.
According to the Plan,elections to the new Constituent
Assembly were held and the Governor-General by an announcement 
1 6ment set up the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and 
declared the names of the members elected thereto. By a
14 Para 14* The numberrof representatives to which each area 
would be entitled were as follows:
Province G-eneral Muslims Sikhs Total
Sylhet district 1 2 nil 3
East Bengal 12 29 nil ’ 41
West Punjab 3 12 2 17
15 A.C.Banerjee, The Making of the Indian Constitution 
pp.446 & 450,
16 Announcement of the Governor-General dated 26 July 1947 
A.N.Aiyar, Constitutional Law's of India and PakistanCparti) 
Madras 1947,p.24*
17subsequent announcement the names of the members elected 
from the district of Sylhet were declared.
The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, thus set up met on 
10 August 1947 in Karachi for its inaugural session,when it 
was ceremonially addressed by the Governor-General, Lord 
Mountbatten. The total number of members,as authorised at that 
time,was sixty nine. The territorial distribution of membership 
was as follows:
Province General Muslims Sikhs Total
East Bengal 
(including Sylhet) 13 31 Nil 44
West Punjab 3 12 2 17
Sind 1 3 Nil 4
N.W.F.P. Nil 3 Nil 33
British Baluchistah Nil 1 Nil 1
17 50 2 69
This total number included a number of persons ,who, a:
1 8partition, either left the country or resigned their seats.
To give representation to the refugees,who had come from India
19five Muslim seats were given to West Punjab  ^ and one 
on
Sind. Pour additional seats were created for the princely 
states,which hdd acceeded to Pakistan. At the end of its life, 
in October 1954,the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
17 Governor-General1s announcement, 4 August 1947♦Ibid. p. 26.
18 See K.Callard, Pakistan : A Political Study p.79.
19 Constituent Assembly for Pakistan (Increase and Redistribu­
tion of Seats) Act 1949,P.L.D.(1949)Central Statutes 179.
20 Constituent Assembly for Pakistan (Increase and Redistribu­
tion of Seats) Act 1950,P.L.L.(1950)Central Statutes 34.
16
21had seventy nine seats,territorially distributed as follows:
East Bengal *•*.., 44
Punjab •••*** 22
Sind **♦**# 5
N.V/.F.P. *#*♦** 3
Baluchistan *,*•#* 1
Baluchistan States 1
Bahawalpur * * * * * * 1
Khairpur •*•••• 1
N.W.F.States •••••• 1
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The Interim Constitution
Though the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was born
22'without the formal blessing of law1,'it was given statutory
23recognition by the Indian Independence Act, 1947, which
defined its powers and functions. The main function of the
Constituent Assembly was to prepare a constitution for
Pakistan*^ and in addition to this constituent power the
Assembly was to exercise,during the interim period,the powers,
25and discharge the functions of the Federal legislature, 
which was to have full powers to make laws for the Dominion, 
including laws having extra-territorial operation.
The Indian Independence Act,1947,which was passed by the
21 Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan,
Karachi, 1959, p#9i*
22 K. Callard, Pakistan : A Political Study p«77*
23 10 &;11 Geo.VI. C.30.
24 Section 8 ,sub-section (1) of the Indian Independence Act, 
1947, "In the case of each of the new Dominions, the powers 
of the legislature of the Dominion shall, for the purpose 
of making provision as to the Constitution, be exercisable 
in the first instance, by the Constituent Assembly of that 
Dominion...."
25 Section 8(2), para (e) of the Act of 1947-
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British Parliament and received royal assent on 18 July 1947,
gave effect to the Mountbatten Plan,setting up two independent
Dominions from 15 August 1947. The Act made provisions for the
government of the dominions till the respective Constituent
Assemblies had framed their own Constitutions. Section 8(2)
of the Act provided that each of the Dominions should be
governed,as nearly as might be,in accordance with the Goverment
of India Act,1935, with such omissions, additions,adaptations
and modifications as might be specified in the orders of the
Governor-General who,by section 9 of the Act,was empowered
to make such orders. As noted above,the Constituent Assembly
was to exercise the powers of the federal legislature,and no
Act of the British parliament or Order-in-Council made on or
after 15 August 1947, was to have effect in the new Dominion,
unless it was extended thereto by a law of the legislature of
27the Dominion. Section 5 of the Act provided for the appoint­
ment of a Governor-General by His Majesty for the purpose of 
government of the Dominion. The Governor-General was to "have 
full power to assent in His Majesty's name1 to laws made by
the Legislature of the Dominion and all powers of His Majesty
28relating to laws of the Dominion were made inoperative.
The Governor-General,in exercise of the powers under 
section 9 of the Independence Act,made twenty three orders up 
to 14 August 1947,including the Pakistan (Provisional
26 26 Geo.V.c.2.
27 sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 6 of the Act of 1947.
28 sub-sections (3; of section 6 of the Act of 1947.
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Constitution) Order,1947,^  by which the Government of India
Act,1935, was modified to suit the changed situation. After
the transfer of power,the Governor-General of Pakistan and the
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan also made amendments to and
modifications of the Act,as and when deemed necessary. In
adapting the Act of 1935,the federal structure of the state,
as provided for in that Act,yas retained, with a parliamentary
form of government both at the centre and in the provinces.
The Governor-General and the Provincial Governors were to act
in accordance with the advice of their respective Council of
Ministers and the provisions empowering them to act in their
discretion and individual judgments were deleted. The distribu
tion of powers between the centre and the provinces was
effected by three lists of subjects enumerating the central,
provincial and concurrent matters, the residual powers being
30vested in the Governor-General. But the federal legislature, 
under section 102 of the Act,could make laws with respect to 
provincial and unenumerated subjects when a "Proclamation of 
Emergency", declared by the Governor-General" was in force.This 
section was amended from time to time ultimately to include 
in the scope of 'emergency' circumstances arising out of the 
mass movement of population. In the case of repugnancy
29 Notification No. G.G.0.22 dated 14 August 1947.
See A.N.Aiyar,(ed.) Constitutional Laws of India and 
Pakistan. Part I pp.164-191*
30 Section 104(1), Government of India Act 4935. Sub-section 
(2) of the section was omitted by the Pakistan(Provisional 
Constitution) Order 1947.
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between a federal lav; and a provincial law, with respect to
matters in the concurrent list,the former was to prevail and
31the latter,to the extent of repugnancy,was to be void*
The executive authority of a province was to he so exer­
cised as to secure respect for the federal laws (section 122). 
The G-overnor of a Province, in choosing, summoning or dismiss­
ing his ministers, was under the general control and direction
32of the Governor-General. Section 93 of the Act,which had 
been condemned in pre-independence days as an instrument 
hampering responsible government in the provinces,was at first 
omitted,but re-enacted as section 92A in 1948 by an order of
■7 *7
the Governor-General, which provided for the suspension of
the Provincial constitution by a proclamation of the Governor-
General in an emergency threatening the peace or security of
the country or in a situation in which the Government of a
Province could not be ca.rried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Act.
In the' judicial sphere,apart from retaining the High
Court of Lahore,the Chief Court of Sind and the Judicial
Commissioners in North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan,
34a new High Court for East Bengal and a new Federal Court of ,
31 Section 107, Government of India Act,1935-
32 Section 51(5), as adapted by the Pakistan (Provisional 
Constitution) Order,1947.
33 The Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) (Third Amendment) 
Order, 1948. (G.G.0.13 dated 19 July 1948) P.L.D.1948 
Central Statutes 428 .
34 The High Courts (Bengal) Order, 1947?
(G.G.0.4 dated 11 August 1947,),
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3SPakistan were established. Section 208 of the Government of 
India Act,1935,providing for appeal to the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council,though originally retained with modifica­
tions, was subsequently made ineffective by the Federal Court 
(Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act,1950 and the Privy Council 
(Abolition of Jurisdiction) Act,1950,which transferred all 
appellate jurisdiction of the Privy Council to the Federal 
Court of Pakistan.
The interim constitution,as outlined above, comprising 
the Indian Independence Act,1947 and the Government of India 
Act,1935,as adapted and amended up to the promulgation of the 
first Republican Constitution in 1956,was designed to provide 
for a quasi-federal structure of the state with a strong 
weightage in fovour of the centre. The limitations on respon­
sible government were all removed and the form of Government, 
which was introduced both at the centre and in the Provinces, 
were of the Westminster model, in which the Governor-General 
or the Governor of a Province,as the case might be,would enjoy
the status and position as their counterparts in other parts
36of the Commonwealth. But it must be noted,hov/ever,that the 
Governor-General of Pakistan,since its birth,exercised powers 
and authority,which are not normally exercised in the older 
Commonwealth countries. This phenomenon has its historical
35 G.G.0.3 dated 23 February 1948. The Federal Court of 
Pakistan Order,1948, P.L.D.1948. Central Statutes 398.
36 G.V/.Choudhury, Documents and Speeches on the Constitution 
of Pakistan, p.2.
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background. Mohammad Ali Jinnah,the top leader of the Muslim
League Party,became the first Governor-General of Pakistan*
Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam,commanded enormous respect and
admiration as the father of the nation. There was no one in
the Muskim League,who could equal the extra-ordinary status
which he held in the eyes of the nation. The cabinet,that was
formed at the centre,with Liaquat Ali Khan as the Prime
Minister was Jinnahfs creation. The Governor-General took the
initiative in the formulation of cabinet policies and used to
preside over its regular meetings,as well as over its Emergency
Committee,of which he was the Chairman. He even called and
conducted the cabinet meetings in the absence of the Prime
Minister. He created the Ministry of States and Prontier
37Regions and retained its control in his own hands.
After the death of Jinnah in September 1948,things changed, 
Liaquat Ali Khan,as the head of the government,became the 
repository of power and authority,and the Governor-General 
Khawaja Nazimuddin was content with the conventional power, 
dignity and respect usually attached to the high office. But 
his successor Ghulam Muhammad was an ambitious man,to whom 
constitutional practices had little value. At least twice he 
exercised extra-ordinary powers most uncommon in recent 
Commonwealth constitutional history. The first occasion was 
his dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin and his cabinet in April
37 See Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan, 
pp.5-6. :
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1953 and the second was the dismissal of the Constituent 
Assembly itself in October 1954.
While the circumstances leading to,and the consequences 
that followed on,the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly 
will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapters 
of this work, Ghulam Muhammad’s action against the Nazimuddin 
Ministry needs a brief discussion. The Nazimuddin Ministry, 
with all its defects and weaknesses was ruling the country 
with the support of the legislature. Only a few days before 
his dismissal,the Prime Minister had his budget approved by 
the Assembly and there was no sign of lack of confidence;on 
the contrary the Ministr^learly had the confidence of the 
House. 'When he was dismissed,the Governor-General took the 
view that the institutions of the Cabinet and the office of 
the Prime Minister had no legal sanction behind them and their 
existence could not be justified by conventions, wrongly "read 
into the text of the existing Constitution (Government of
70
India Act,1935) as if they were a part of it." The Governor- 
General relied on section 10(1) of the Constitution Act which 
says that, "The Governor-General *s ministers shall be chosen 
and summoned by him,shall be sworn in as members of the 
Council,and shall hold office during his pleasure". It may 
be pointed out that almost all the constitutions of the 
Westminster type contain similar provision in respect of ! I;
38 Comments of an official spokesman quoted.in Mushtaq Ahmad, 
Government and Politics in Pakistan, pp.30-31.
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the relationship between the Head of the State and the r -..- !, 
39Cabinet, But nov/here in the Commonwealth in recent times 
has the Governor-General of a self-governing Dominion exerci-rq 
sed such a power under the pretext of legal authority. The 
Constitution,which is intended to provide for a parliamentary 
type of government, cannot be read to give the G-overnor-G-eneral 
powers to dismiss a Cabinet,which had the confidence of the 
legislature. In that event, the G-overnor-G-eneral,who is not 
responsible to anybody,and not the Parliament,would become 
the real ruler of the country,striking at the very root of 
responsible government. The phrase Muring pleasure* had been 
interpreted by the Governor-General and his advisers as the 
'whim* of the Governor-General and it was argued that the 
cessation of the Governor-General *s pleasure was a legal 
equivalent of the termination of appointments as such ministers 
"A proposition more destructive of the parliamentary system 
could not be advanced,as it meant that no administration 
could survive the displeasure of the Governor-General,however 
much it might enjoy the confidence of the Parliament or the 
people,It made the Governor-General an arbiter of the fate 
of governments,which he could dismiss or appoint at his will
39 The Commonwealth &f Australia Constitution Act,1900,
Section 62 reads, ’’There shall be a Federal Executive 
Council to advise the Governor-General in the government 
of the CommonwTealth, and the members of the Council shall 
be chosen and summoned by the Governor-General and sworn 
in as Executive Councillors, and shall hold office during 
his pleasure.”
-....24
or whim."^ This extra-ordinary action of the Governor-General, 
Ghulam Muhammad,was never challenged either legally or politi­
cally and so we need not make a further examination of the 
matter. But this episode has been regarded by many as the 
beginning of the succession of improper executive actions, 
which were to follow in the same decade of the constitutional 
history of Pakistan.
In centre-province relationship,the conventional practioe 
of non-interference in each other’s spheres was not followed 
by Pakistan’s rulers. Though the Provinces under the Constitu­
tion were to make their own laws and exercise executive
authority over the subjects enumerated in the Provincial list,
41the Centre by some specific provisions was given overriding 
and supervisory authority and in certain circumstances powers 
of direct interference in provincial affairs. The Muslim 
League leaders,who had struggled during the pre-independence 
period for unhindered provincial autonomy,after the achievement 
of Pakistan did not consider it inconsistent to vest in the 
Centre powers which negated the fundamental principles of 
regional autonomy,and even adopted almost similar provisions 
in the first Republican Constitution. These powers were, 
however,to be used in exceptional and emergent circumstances. 
But in practice they were frequently used by the Centre and
40 Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan,p.1
41 See particularly sections 92A, 122 and 126 of the 
Government of India Act,1935.
25
it has been alleged that interference in the provincial
affairs was often made to enhance personal and party interests.
This allegedly undue interference,which greatly hampered the
growth of a healthy political atmosphere in the country so
essential for the working of a democracy,is regarded to be a
4-2m a m  cause of the "failure" of the parliamentary system of 
government in Pakistan.
Constitution Acts and the Draft Constitutions
The Constituent Assembly, by the Indian Independence
Act,1947,was entrusted with the task of making provision for
43the constitution of Pakistan. In the course of its delibera­
tions on different complicated issues and aspects of the " 
future constitution and the enormous delay which occurred in 
finding agreed solutions to these problems,the Assembly, during 
its life of over seven years passed forty-four constitution 
Acts^ to meet necessities as and when they arose. These Acts 
were passed by the Assembly in its capacity as ’Constituent 
Assembly’ and, when adopted, werejdeclared to become law, on
being signed by the President of the Assembly and published
45under his authority in the official gazette. The fundamental 
nature of these constitution Acts had a tremendous effect on
42 Report of the Constitution Commission(Pakistan) 1961, p.13.
43 Sub-section (1) of Section 8, Independence Act,1947*
44 Sir Ivor Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan,p.5.
45 Rule 62 of the "Rules of Procedure of the Constituent 
Assembly." See Jennings, Ibid. p.135*
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Pakistan*s political life and their validity in the absence
of the Governor-General1 s assent was successfully challenged
in the legal battle that was to ensue after the Governor-
General had dissolved the Constituent Assembly* Before we
discuss the draft constitutions that were produced by the
Assembly,it is necessary, therefore,to discuss in brief the
more important Acts passed by the Constituent Assembly.
One of the early Acts passed by the Constituent Assembly
was the Indian Independence (Amendment) Act,1948,^ which
amended section 9 of the Independence Act,extending to
31 March,1949 (in place of 31 March 1948 in the original Act)
a provision under which the Governor-General, by order could
modify or alter the provisions of the Government of India Act,
1935, and remove difficulties arising out of the transitional
circumstances. Under'the authority of this Amendment Act the
Governor-General by order inserted section 92A in the 1935 Act,
providing for the suspension of a provincial constitution in
a grave emergency.
Acts were passed affecting the composition of the
Constituent Assembly itself. The Indian Independence(Amendment) 
4-7Act, 1949, was passed, authorising the Constituent Assembly 
to increase the number of its seats; subsequently the 
Constituent Assembly for Pakistan (Increase and Redistribution
46 P.L.D. 1949 Central Statutes 57.
47 P.L.D. 1949 Central Statutes 176.
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48of Seats) Act,1949, and the Constituent Assembly for 
Pakistan (Increase and Redistribution of Seats) Act,1950,^ 
were passed providing six more Muslim seats for the Assembly, 
allotting five to West Punjab and one to Sind.
To eradicate the vices of corruption,nepotism, bribery 
etc. from public life, the Public and Representative Offices 
(Disqualification) Act,1949,^was passed.It provided 'for the 
debarring from public life for a suitable period of persons 
judicially found guilty of misconduct in any public office or 
representative capacity or in any matter relating thereto.T 
Under this Act the Governor-General or the Governor of a 
Province could refer to the courts or to a special judicial 
tribunal any charges of misconduct in public office. If the 
report of the court or tribunal proved to be adverse, the 
Governor-General might, by order,impose a penalty of disquali­
fication from public office for a period not exceeding ten
years, and, in making such order, the Governor-General was
51to act in his discretion. This Act, it was alleged, had been
applied against those politicians who had,for some reason or
other,incurred the displeasure of the Central Government and
the Act was attacked for its possible use as a political 
52weapon. In 1954 in the final stages of the show-down between
48 P.L.D. 1949 Central Statutes 179-
49 P.L.D. 1950 Central Statutes 34*
50 P.L.D. 1949 Central Statutes 177*
5.1 Several politicians were disqualified under this Act,viz.
1.1.A.Khuhro, Kazi Fazlullah,Agha Ghulam Dabi Khan Pathan of 
Sind and Hamidul Haq Choudhury of East,Bengal.
52 K. Callard, Pakistan : A Political Study p.103.
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the Governor-General and the Constituent Assembly,the Act was
repealed by the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualifi­
es 'Z
cation) (Repeal) Act,1954, but the disqualification orders
which were in force were allowed to remain. The Governor-
/ 54General,however,bya proclamation announced the termination
/
of disqualification in all cases and dropped the proceedings
under the Act against a Punjabi leader. The announcement relied
on the contention that,as action was taken by the Governor-
General in his discretion,it could be abandoned similarly. It
was also argued that,if the Act was mis-used,there could be
no justification for continuing penalties imposed under it.
But the most important and controversial Acts,which were
challenged legally and politically and which resulted in the
constitutional crisis in 1954-155,were passed by the Assembly
5 5in 1954* The Government of India (Amendment) Act,1954, 
inserted a new section 223A in the Government of India Act, 
1935,giving writ jurisdiction to the superior courts. The 
last but most politically controversial Act,the Government of 
India (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1954, ^  ^ was pafeseii by the 
Constituent Assembly in September of that year, just over one 
month before it was dissolved by the Governor-General. This 
Act,which amended sections 9 and 10 of the Government of India
53 P.L.D. 1954 Central Statutes 173*
54 Gazette of Pakistan extraordinary,20 October 1954,referred 
in K. Callard, Pakistan : A Political Study p.105.
55 P.L.D. 1954 Central Statutes 152.
56 P.L.D. 1954 Central Statutes 172,
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Act,1935,severely curtailed the Governor-Generalrs power and 
authority in appointing and dismissing ministers and obliged
1b
him^act in accordance with the advice of the cabinet* The 
provisions of this Act will be discussed in more detail in 
the latter part of this chapter.
Turning now to the principal task of the Constituent 
Assembly - framing of the Constitution for the country - the 
Assembly, during its long life of over seven years, considered 
and adopted an "Objective Resolution,1 the report of the 
Committee on Fundamental Rights and matters relating to 
Minorities; it also considered three reports of the Basic 
Principles Committee and adopted the last one. But before the 
Assembly could finally pass the constitution, drafted on the'1 
basis of the recommendations, the Governor-General dissolved 
it, thus leaving the task of the Constituent Assembly unful­
filled.
The first big step in constitution-making was taken by 
the Constituent Assembly, when it passed the Objective 
Resolution^ ' in March 1949. The Resolution,attributing the 
sovereignty of the universe to God, pronounced thajs the country 
was to be governed by the principles of democracy, freedom, 
equality and social justice as enunciated in Islam.Fundamental 
rights were to be guaranteed to all and non-Muslims were to 
freely profess and practice their own religions. The judiciary
57 See G.W.Choudhury, Documents and Speeches on the
Constitution of Pakistan, pp.23-24*
was to be independent and Pakistan was to be a federal state
with autonomous units.
The Objective Resolution passed by the first Constituent
Assembly was, with minor modifications, adopted in the 1956
Constitution as the Preamble to the Constitution and it found
the same place in the 1962 Constitution. While the Hindu
members expressed their opposition and concern about the
58position of Islam in the Constitution, , and the Ulema attacked
59its emphasis on the rights of the non-Muslims, the Objective
Resolution was received by the Muslim masses with acclaim.
The Constituent Assembly, on the same day that it passed
the Objective Resolution, appointed a Basic Principles
Committee to report on the fundamental principles and detailed
recommendations as to the future constitution. The first
report of the Basic Principles Committee was presented to the
Constituent Assembly by Prime Minister Liqquat Ali Khan in
6 0November 1950. But it had most unfavourable reception in
East Bengal. It was attacked,on various aspects, particularly
on the question of East Bengalfs representation in the^legisla-
ture and the provision for making Urdu the only official
61language of Pakistan. The Ulema were also unhappy, as the 
report contained very little regarding the Islamic character
58 Speech by the leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party, 
G-.W.Choudhury, Documents and Speeches on the Constitution 
of Pakistan, p.965*
59 G-.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan.p.57.
60 H.Eeldman, A Constitution for Pakistan(0 .U.P.1956) p.28.
61 G.W.Choudhury, Documents and Speeches on the Constitution 
of Pakistan, p.30.
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Of the proposed Constitution* Consideration of the report 
was, therefore, postponed till 31 January 1951 and the public 
was invited to send proposals to the Special Committee appoin­
ted for the purpose of receiving and considering such proposals 
The second report o£ the Basic Principles Committee was 
submitted to the Constituent Assembly on 22 December 1952, by 
Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin, who had succeeded to the 
office after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 
1951-This report was remarkable for its emphasis on the Islamic
provisions, which gave power to the Ulema to pronounce on the
63Islamic nature of any bill. Its recommendation that the 
Central Legislature, consisting of two houses having equal 
powers, should have equal representation from the East and 
West wings, attracted severe criticism from Punjab, Punjabi 
leaders complained that the Province had not been given 
adequate representation in proportion to her population and 
that East Bengal, which was only one of the units, was shown 
particular favour, putting it on the same level as all the 
other units of the west wing taken together. While the Ulema 
hailed the Islamic provisions in the recommendations, other
65sections of the society expressed serious disapproval of them. 
The public, except the Ulema, were opposed to the idea of
62 Ibid.
63 Report of the Basic Principles Committee (1952),Chapter III 
Part I, Paras 5 & 6.
64 H.Peldman, A Constitution for Pakistan, p.35*
65 G.W.Choudhury, Documents and Speeches on the Constitution 
of Pakistan, Introduction, p.iv.
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of giving a particular group the privilege of having the 
final say in the making of lav/s.
In April 1953 Khawaja Nazimuddin was dismissed hy the 
Governor-General, who appointed Mohammed Ali of Bogra as 
the Prime Minister. The new Prime Minister, within six months 
of his assumption of office, presented to the Constituent 
Assembly the last report of the Basic Principles Committee 
on 9 October 1953. The draft proposals envisaged Pakistan as 
a federation with autonomous units, the form of government 
both at the centre and in the provinces being parliamentary, 
the cabinet exercising power and the Head of the State 
acting on the advice of the cabinet, which was to be collec­
tively responsible to the legislature. The federal legislature 
was to be composed of two houses with equal powers in respect 
of votes of confidence or no confidence in the Ministry and 
the election of the Head of State. In case of dispute, 
a joint session of both houses should decide by a majority,
which should include thirty per cent of the members from 
66each zone. If such a special majority was not forthcoming, 
the measure would fail but if it involved matters essential 
for carrying on state activities, the security of the 
country or stability of the federal credit, the Head 
of the State could, on the advice of the Ministry,
66 Report of the Basic Principles Committee, Para 65.
See G .V/• Choudhury, Documents and Speeches on the
Constitution of Pakistan, pp.197-271.
dissolve both houses and order fresh elections,
68The Head of the State was to he a Muslim, the State was
68to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and no law
was to ^ repugnant to the Koran and Sunna. But the Supreme Court
was to decide questions of repugnancy raised by any person
70within a prescribed period.
The distribution of powers between the centre and the 
provinces was to be effected by three lists of subjects and 
the Head of the State, in consultation with the Provincial
71Governments, was to decide about the unenumerated subjects.
The federal law was to prevail over any provincial law in the
event of inconsistency between the two on a concurrent ;
72subject.
The judiciary was to be independent and the judges of the
Supreme Court and the High Courts were to be removed by a
special judicial procedure in the Supreme Court on the ground
73of misbehaviour or infirmity of body or mind.
The intricate question of representation at the centre 
v/as to be solved by what is known as the TMohammad Ali Formula 
It provided for the equal representation of each unit to the 
upper house and representation on the population basis in the
67 Mohammad Ali Formula, as contained in Prime Minister
Mohammad Alifs speech in the Constituent Assembly on
9 October 1953, See G.V/,Choudhury, Documents and Speeches 
on the Constitution of Pakistan,p,142.
68 Ibid. Para 15*
69 Ibid, Para 12*
70 Ibid, Para 6 *
71 Ibid, Para 147’
72 Ibid, Para 152*
73 Ibid. Paras 182 and 213-
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lower house. Thus East Bengal, with a larger population, was 
to have ten seats in the upper house, consisting of fifty 
members and 165 seats in the lower house consisting of three 
hundred members, .In a joint session, therefore, each zone 
would have equal strength. The requirement of a special 
majority, including thirty per cent from each zone, was meant 
to check domination of one zone over the o.ther. To meet the 
Bengali grievance 'over their language, the draft proposed 
that Urdu and Bengali should be the official languages of the 
State,^
The Basic Principles Committee report, presented by 
Mohammed Ali, was considered by the Constituent Assembly for 
thirteen days and on 14 November 1953 a. drafting sub-committee 
was appointed. The draft constitution was adopted by the 
Assembly on 6 October 1954* It wras reported that the Constitu­
tion Bill was now awaiting formal enactment. "The Prime 
Minister Mohammed Ali had even set the date 25 December,1954,
which was the anniversary of Quaid-i-Azamrs birthday, for
1 R
implementing the Constitution,” But that was never to happen. 
The first Constituent Assembly could not, or rather was not
rj S’
allowed to, complete its task. The Governor-General by a 
Proclamation on 24 October 1954 dissolved the Assembly,
74 Report of the Basic Principles Committee, Para 276.
75 G.W.Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan,
P.137.
76 G ,W ,Choudhury, Documents and Speeches on the Constitution 
of Pakistan, Introduction, p.vii.
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Difficulties in constitution-making ‘
Pakistan, since its birth on August 1947, has suffered
tremendously from lack of political leadership. Mohammad Ali
Jinnah, as the head of the Muslim League Party, which struggled
for and created Pakistan, became the first Governor-General
and President of the Constituent Assembly.During the initial
period, Jinnah, commanding the highest respect and prestige
as the father of the nation, exercised enormous powers and '
authority. The Cabinet, which was his creation, used to take
directions and guidance from him. It was not that Jinnah
unduly imposed his will on the Cabinet, but every one looked
to him for proper guidance. It has been remarked that "as long
77as Jinnah was alive, he was Pakistan.”
Put the nation did not enjoy the leadership of Jinnah
for long. In- September 1948, just over a year after the nation
was born, Jinnah died. After his death the mantle of leadership
fell on Liaquat Ali Khan, who then was the Prime Minister.
V/ith Khawaja Nazimuddin as Governor-General, the Prime Minister
and Cabinet began to wield real power. Liaquat Ali Khan was,
at first, in effective control of the Government, the Muslim
League Party and Constituent Assembly. Put by the time of his
assassination in October 1951, he had not been able to solve
any- of the main problems facing the country viz. Kashmir, 
canal water,evacuee property,the state of the economy and
77 K.B.Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston 1967)
p.62.
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refugees. His constitutional proposals estranged the Bengalis
79and the Ulema, Lacking in qualities that Jinnah possessed,
Liaquat Ali Khan failed to give the nation the proper lead that
circumstances called for,
Khawaja Nazimuddin, who stepped down from the Governor-
Generalship to succeed Liaquat Ali Khan after the latterrs
death, lacked the prestige and popularity enjoyed by Jinnah
and Liaquat Ali Khan, He did not prove a capable leader. His
administration not only failed to solve the existing problems
but was faced with new ones, like the food shortages and
economic depression that followed the boom created by the
Korean Y/ar, He was caught up in an intricate religious conflict
in Punjab and the mis-handling by the local authorities of the
80situation led to wide-spread religious riots in Lahore, 
Nazimuddin1s constitutional proposals provoked vehement 
opposition from the Punjab leaders and his views on the state: 
language issue were strongly condemned by the Bengalis, 
resulting in general discontent in the country. The Governor- 
General Ghulam Mohammad dismissed him and his Ministry on 
17 April 1953*
Mohammed Ali of Bogra was appointed Prime Minister to
78 X. Callard, Pakistan : A Political Study, p,21.
79 Chaudhri Muhammed Ali in his Emergence of Pakistan a.t 
p,384 observed, "Of course he[Liaquat Ali Khan]was not 
the Quaid-i-Azam."
80 Por details see Report of the Court of Inquiry on the 
Punjab Disturbances,1953> Lahore,1954.
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succeed Khawaja Nazimuddin, Not only was the new Prime Minister 
not equipped with the qualities of leadership which were needed 
at the time, hut his appointment, when he was not the leader 
of the majority in the Constituent Assembly, proved an added 
weakness. By the time Mohammed Ali took over, the Muslim League 
Parliamentary Party in the Constituent Assembly had split into 
several factional groups and strong regional sentiments 
prevailed among its members. Mohammed Ali could neither bring 
together the factions within the party nor could he evolve any 
effective formula to thwart regional deviation. He was opposed 
on the one hand by the effective Punjabi group, supported by 
the civil servants and the army and even patronised by the
Q 4
Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, and on the other hand by 
the Bengali group in the Constituent Assembly. Thus, though 
he was able to get a draft constitution adopted by the 
Constituent Assembly in early October 1954, he could not put 
a stop to the deterioration in the political process, which 
had started much earlier and culminated in the constitutional 
crisis, following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly 
by the Governor-General.
Pakistan has a unique geographical situation on the world 
map, having two different wings separated by over one thousand 
miles of a foreign country. Because of this geographical 
anomaly, the two wings often had different problems and the
81 K.B.Sayeed: The Political System of Pakistan, p.71*
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attitude of the people towards.them differed substantially,
Even among the people of the western wing, comprising four 
units, the differences in language, culture and outlook on life 
were conspicuous. Consequently, from the very beginning, the 
people and the provincial leaders became suspicious of one 
another and a bitter feeling grew. The feeling of unity, which 
had been remarkable during the struggle for independence had 
vanished with the achievement of independence and the death of 
Jinnah, whose towering personality had been a great unifying 
force,
In East Bengal the feeling soon developed that the Bengalis
8 2were not being given their due share in the administration,
that the industrial development of the Province was being
neglected, and after Jinnahfs declaration about the state
83language in March 1948, the Bengalis felt that their language
82 The East Bengal Chief Minister Nurul Amin spoke in the 
following terms : "..,1 should mention another point, that 
is the anxiety on the part of the Central C-overnment to 
encroach on every field of provincial activities.,,. After 
achivement of freedom there has been a race for centralisa­
tion of powers both in India and in the Central Government 
of Pakistan, I consider this to be the most unsound and 
short-sighted policy. The provinces must be allowed to enjoy 
the full autonomous position,must be^free from the Central 
Government as it is thought practical. But particularly this 
province of East Bengal which is so far flung from the 
capital of the Central Government must enjoy the fullest 
autonomy.” Quoted in K.Callard, Pakistan : A Political Study 
at p.175 from East Bengal Legislative Assembly Procdddings 
Vol.Ill p.263 (18 March 1949).
83 ”... But let me make it clear to you that the State language 
of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language...” 
Jinnahfs speech at a public meeting at Dacca on 21 March 
1948, Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Speeches and V/ritings of Mr.Jinnah 
Vol.II p.490.
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and culture were not safe. The interim report of the Basic 
Principles Committee presented by Liaquat Ali Khan enraged
the Bengalis on questions of representation in the Central
84Legi S1 cX ture . and provincial autonomy. There was always in
the Bengali minds a fear of Punjabi domination, v/hich had
85the support of the civil servants and the army.
In the Punjab/i regional feeling was aroused by the second 
Basic Principles Committee Report, 1952, regarding the quan­
tum of representation at the centre. The Punjabi leadership 
apprehended Bengali domination in the Central Assembly and 
so opposed the composition of the central legislature, as 
recommended in the R e p o r t . ^  In the other units of V/est 
Pakistan there was not only a general dislike of the Bengalis, 
but also a strong feeling against the Punjabis, But on most 
occasions the smaller units allied themselves with Sa.st Bengal 
to oppose Punjabi influence. The Pacca-Karachi-Peshawar axis 
against the Punjabis was the result of this common fear
o n
against Punjabi influence.
From the brief outline of the roots of the regional
84 ’’...Sir, in East Bengal there is a growing belief - I must 
say that it is wrong impression - that there are principles 
in the Report which, if adopted, will reduce the majoritty 
of East Bengal into a minority and will turn East Bengal 
into a colony of Pakistan..," Nur Ahmed, 0. A. Debates 
Vol.VIII p.183 (1950) Quoted by Callard at p.92.
85 See K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan,pp.66-68.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid. .
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Conflicts it may be easily surmised that the lack of mutual 
trust, added to the.growth of suspicion among the leaders, 
was one of the main reasons why the Muslim League leaders at 
the national level failed to give a constructive lead, either 
in the constitution-making or in defining national policies. 
It may be noted that the charges of one group against another 
were not always unfounded. But the truth is that the leaders, 
who had the responsibility to give the country a national 
outlook and purpose, failed miserably to rise above the 
interests of themselves, their groups, or their localities.
At the time of independence, the Muslim League was the 
only political party in Pakistan, But it was, in fact, a 
movement accommodated heterogenous Muslim leaders of India 
for the common purpose of achieving'Pakistan. Haying achieved 
its sole goal of a separate state for the Muslims of India, 
the party lost its sense of purpose. As the party in power 
the Muslim League had no specific programme except the 
carfying on of the general administration of the country.
Most of its able leaders assumed governmental positions and 
were no more interested in the party. There was virtually no 
opposition, either in the Assembly or outside it, except the 
moribund Pakistan Congress Party, whose pre-independence 
role, as advocated for a united India, was an embarrassment 
In the altered circumstances.
But the absence of any substantial opposition and the
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monopoly of state authority proved to he the greatest weak­
ness of the Muslim League party, for the attack on party 
solidarity came from within* Factionalism, due to personal 
or group interest, soon showed its headt*and the Muslim League 
Parliamentary Party in.the Constituent Assembly had to fight 
within itself* In all the legislatures of the west wing, 
though the Muslim League had an absolute majority, faction-
88alism, group and personal interests dominated party politics.
In East Bengal the Muslim League party was routed in fohe
provincial elections held in March 1954. The opposition,the
United Front, v/hich defeated the Muslim League was, as the
89name suggests, a coalition of various political partyes, 
with varying programmes, combined on a compromise 21-point 
pf ogramme, v/ith the sole aim of ousting the Muslim League 
from power. In this they succeeded but soon after the elections 
differences within the coalition developed and the United 
Front fell apart. The Awami League, a prominent partner in 
the coalition, withdrew its support from the coalition leader 
A.K. Faslul Haq. Interference from the Centre and internal 
quarrels in the United Front in a very short time rendered 
it ineffective and created a vacuum in the political field.
In the absence the Muslim League these parties, which had 
been powerless up to the middle of 1954, did not fare any
88 G.\V.Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan,p.155.
89 Composed mainly of Krishak Sramik Party, Awami League, 
Ganatantri Dal, Nizam-i-Islam and Khilafat Rabbani parties.
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better when.called upon to discharge responsible political 
obligations,
The existence of well-organised political parties is
regarded as a pre-requisite for working of a democratic
political system. But unfortunately Pakistan lacked such
parties, lack of leadership, resulting in lack of well-
90organised and disciplined parties has been the main cause 
for the chaos and crises that Pakistan has experienced since 
its inception.
The demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims of 
the Indian sub-continent was mainly based on the assumption 
that in Pakistan the Muslims would be enabled, to order their 
lives in accordance with the tenets of Islam. While there v 
was a general agreement among the Muslims of Pakistan that 
the stajbe should be based on the Islamic principles, there 
were, and they exist even today after twenty three years of 
independence, sharp differences over its details and the 
degree to which those principles should be paramount. The 
modernist elements believe that Islam is a dynamic and 
progressive religion, which can be given a liberal interpre­
tation, to fit within their concept of a democratic state. 
"Thus modernist leaders argue that, if the Islamic character 
of Pakistanrs polity is incorporated in the preamble to the 
constitution, there need be no fear of the country’s becoming
90 Report of the Constitution Commission (Pakistan) 196l,p.13*
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q i
a theocratic state, dominated by the Ulema*1’ The Ulema, on 
the other hand, wished to revert to the fgolden age1 of the 
Phil afat - 1,to reproduce a society which no longer exists
92and a polity which was suited to the early days of Islam.1
This view has been vehemently opposed by all others on the
ground that strict adherence to early Islamic principles
cannot meet the needs and requirements of a twentieth century
society and state,. There is another opinion among the Muslims,
supported by the non-Muslims, who would like to see Pakistan
a secular and progressive state, based on western democratic
principles. They very often refer to the famous speech of 
93Jinnah that politically there would he no difference 
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim in the state of Pakistan.
They further argue that any form of Islamic state was bound 
to give control of the state to the Mullahs.^
This controversy is still going on. At one time it became 
so acute that in 1952 and 1953 religious groups in Punjab 
launched a serious campaign against the Ahmadis - a religious 
sect among Muslims - that the Ahmadis "should be declared 
an official minority and that all members of the sect should 
be removed from positions of public importance. Their demands
91 K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, pp.161-162,
92 C-.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, p. 66,
93 JinnahTs inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly 
on 11 August 1947, C. Allana(ed.), Pakistan Movement: 
Historic Documents ,pfr 542-546,
94 Gr.Y/. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan,p.76«
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were not met and in February 1953 wide-spread rioting occurred
95in Punjab, martial law being declared in Lahore.1’
This controversial issue, the place of religion in the
political structure of the State, had, therefore, to be
discussed and defined. Besides the secularists, western-edu
educated liberals maintain that, while the Koran and Sunna
provide for most things, there are fields where the individual
may exercise his own judgment and those should cover most
political issues. The traditionalists, however, are not
prepared, to give such freedom of conscience to the ordinary
citizens. The former believe that unresolved matters might
be decided by a free expression of opinion, the latter insist
that the learned and religious men must propound new law. In
one case it is the authority of the majority, in another it
is the authority of the pious and the learned few. Pakistani
leaders had to attempt to find an Islamic foundation for the
modern concept of democracy, without revoking the customary
law too much. With the lead given by the first Constituent
Assembly in adopting the Objective Resolution and recommending
other Islamic provisions, the second Constituent Assembly
provided a more or less agreed formula. The Constitution of
1956 was not regarded by the Ulema as anti-Islamic or un-
. 9 6
Islamic. Even Maulana Maududi,accepted the broad outlines.
95 A. Gledhill, Pakistan (2nd.ed.) p.75.
96 K.B. Callard, Political Forces in Pakistan,1947-1959>
pp.17-18.
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As has been said earlier, after twenty three years of 
independence, the issue is still very much alive. The orthodox 
religious groups led by Maulana liaududi, the Chief of the 
Jamat-i-Isiam party, is regarded as a strong force in P a k i s t a n i  
political arena. But from what has happened in Pakistan in 
the struggle for democratic ideals, one may say that the 
democratic forces operating in the country should be able to 
accommodate the religious aspirations of the people, which 
derive their support from the orthodox school. The religious 
issue is a matter for concern no doubt, but the solutions 
provided for in the two late Constitutions should, prove 
adequate.
Conditions on the eve of dissolution of the Assembly.
Puring the period 1947-54 political manoeuvring in the 
provincial capitals, sometimes under the encouragement of the 
centre, was not at all conducive to the growth and development 
of the ^parliamentary system of government in the country. In 
the North West Frontier Province, just after independence, 
the Congress Chief Minister Pr. Khan Sahib, and his Ministry 
was removed under the directions of Jinnah. Khan Abdul 
Qayyum Khan was appointed to replace him. But his auto­
cratic rule and intolerance alienated the provincial 
leaders. His Ministry was also accused of jobbery, bribery
46
97and nepotism. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan in 1953 was taken to
the central cabinet and in his place the Inspector General
of Police, Sardar Abdur Rashid, was appointed to continue as
the Chief Minister of the Province till his dismissal in July
1955 for his opposition to the integration of West Pakistan 
98provinces.
Sind was notorious for its political instability even
before independence. Factionalism in the Assembly and even
inside the cabinet led to mutual recriminations. In April
1948 on the direction of Jinnah, Muhammad Ayub Khuhro and
99his Ministry were dismissed. A judicial tribunal, appointed 
to inquire into the charges of maladministration and corrup­
tion against Khuhro, found him guilty on a few counts. The 
Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act 
was applied and he was later disqualified by the Governor- 
General for public office for three years. Ilis successor,
Pir Ilahi Baksh, was also disqualified by an Election 
Tribunal. Yusuf Haroon succeeded Pir Ilahi Baksh but soon 
resigned. After him came Kazi Fazlullah and then Khuhro, 
again to be dismissed by the Governor. A special tribunal 
found both Khuhro and Fazlullah guilty on some charges. 
Governor’s rule under section 92A of the Constitution Act
97 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Emergence of Pakistan, p.368,
98 H.Feldman, A Constitution for Pakistan, p.82.
99 K.B.Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p.63*
1 G.W.Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, p.63.
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followed. Provincial elections were held in May 1953 and
Pirzada, Ahdul Sattar became Chief Minister but was dismissed
2
in November 1954 for his opposition to the one unit scheme.
In Punjab things were not different. Rivalries within 
the cabinet developed at a very early stage and Jinnah him­
self tried to sort out the tangle. But soon Mumtaz Daultana 
and Xhizir Hayat Khan resigned; the former became President 
of the West Punjab Muslim League, and organised a strong 
opposition against the Ministry of the Khan of Mamdot. In the 
beginning of 1949 the Ministry was dismissed and the Province 
was put under Governorfs rule. Elections were held in 1951 
and Mumtaz Paultana formed a government. Eut he was made to 
resign in early 1953 in the wake of serious religious riots 
in the province. Eiroz Khan Noon, who was then the Governor 
of East Bengal, was brought back to head the Ministry, which 
continued till Noon was removed for his differences with 
the central authority on elections to the second Constituent 
Assembly.
In East Eengal, when Khawaja Nazimuddin, who was the 
first Chief Minister of the Province, became the Governor- 
General after the death of Jinnah in September 1948, Nurul 
Amin was appointed in his place under instructions from 
the Governor-General. The Muslim League Parliamentary Party
2 K.B.Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p.78.
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3
was not given a chance to elect its leader. Ministers were 
accused of corruption and maladministration and one Minister 
was. charged and disqualified under the Public and Representa­
tive Offices (Disqualification)Act.In March 1954 provincial 
elections wei?e held and the Muslim League v/as swept away from 
the provincial political scene. The United Pront, which won 
in the elections, came to power in April, with Pazlul Huq as 
the Chief Minister. Differences within the United Pront soon 
developed and the Ministry, during its life of fifty-seven 
days, was faced with serious industrial labour troubles and 
the law and order situation deteriorated. Chief Minister 
Pazlul Ruq visited Calcutta, where he was alleged to have 
pleaded for greater cooperation between East and West Bengal 
and later made an alleged seditious statement to the corres­
pondent of the TTew York Times.^ The United Pront Ministry 
v/as dismissed on 29 May 1954 and Governor’s rule under section 
92A wa.s imposed in the Province.
The political situation in the provinces had its effects 
on the centre and vice versa. "These political developments 
in the country had their undesirable effects on the progress 
of constitution-making. The Muslim League continued to have 
its majority in the Constituent Assembly, but it v/as no 
longer a unified party. It v/as divided into factions and
3 K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p,65.
4 H. Peldman, ojd. cit. pp. 58-59 . . . . . .
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groups which "began to judge issues not from national point
5
of view but from a narrow provincial outlook." The whole 
political atmosphere was vitiated by intrigues and uncertain­
ty; the behaviour of the politicians, who were busy striving 
for office and vilifying one another, paved the way for 3bhe 
break-down of the governmental system itself, giving provoca­
tion and encouragement to the executive to strike against 
the very foundation of the democratic structure of the state.
The period under review (1947-1954) witnessed serious 
public disorders in the country. The East-West controversy, 
the language issue and the religious question gave rise to 
extreme animos ity bet ween the people, which led to violent 
demonstration and riots in several cities.
The language issue led to a demand by the Bengalis that 
Bengali along with Urdu should be a state language of Pakistan, 
In February 1952 violent demonstrations were organised in 
Dacca,^ the capital of East Bengal, where students were 
killed in police firing. In March 1954 ill-feeling between 
Bengali workers and non-Bengali management caused serious 
riots in the Karnaphuli Paper Mills near Chittagong. In May 
of the same year serious riots broke out in the Adamjee Jute 
Mills near Dacca. "The central government - issued directions 
to the East Benga.l. government, which it showed reluctance
5 G.U. Choudhury.Constitutional Development in Pakistan, p.136
6 A. Cledhill, Pakistan ( 2nd“T ed.) p .75.
50
to implement, and public men made statements indicating ques­
tionable loyalty to the central government. In May the centre
suspended the provincial constitution under section 92A of
7
the Constitution Act."
As has been mentioned earlier, religious controversy led 
to grave riots in Punjab and martial lav/ had to be declared 
in Lahore in March 19 53. When in April 1954 the Muslim League 
Parliamentary Party in the Constituent Assembly agreed to 
adopt Bengali as one of the state languages, violent riots 
and organised hooliganism reigned in the city of Karachi on
22nd and 23rd April. Urdu newspapers came out with black
8margins. ' All these disturbances and disorders were manifesta­
tions of the problems and issues facing the nation. Politici­
ans could not rise above their regional and group interests 
to tackle them. Their'failure in this respect was exploited 
by those who wished to see the growth and development of 
democratic institutions in the country jeopardised.
In the later part of 1954 the political atmosphere in 
Pakistan was heavy with rumours of possible actions and 
counter-actions. Pactional struggle in the political power- 
structure reached its crisis point and each group became 
desparate in its designs. Giving a picture of the political 
situation prevailing in Pakistan at that time, The Times
7 A. Gledhill, Pakistan,(2nd, ed.) p.75.
8 H. Feldmen, A constitution for Pakistan, p.54.
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(London) wrote in October 1954 : "Seldom can a political 
crisis have rippled more tranquilly towards dangerous rapids 
t h a n  in Karachi now. Pakistan is moving towards a showdown 
in the hitter struggle for power between two irreconcilable 
factions and the Constituent Assembly when itsmeets on O c t  
October 27, will have to take decisions which will make or 
mar the whole future of the country* At the moment the initia 
tive lies with what is known as the East Bengal Group ©.. 
opposed to the East Bengal Clique is the so-called Punjab 
clique. They are supported by the able but ailing Governor-
9
General, Ghulam Mohammed.’1
The Constituent Assembly, having adopted the draft
constitution in September 1954, passed in the same session
two very significant Acts, which curbed the Governor-General*
power severely. The first of these Acts was the Public and
Representative Offices (Disqualification) (Repeal) Act, which
repealed the Act of 1949. This repeal Act v/as passed in
unprecedented haste, when a number of proceddihgs under the
1 0statute were in contemplation. "There was suggestion m  
some quarters that the hasty repeal of this Ant v/as effected 
in order to favour some members of the Constituent Assembly, 
Whatever might be the motive, the repeal of this Act lowered
9 Quoted in G.7.’. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in 
Pakistan at p.143.
10 A. Gledhill, Pakistan,(2nd.ed.) p.78.
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the dignity of the Assembly which v/as supposed to be the
11sovereign organ of the country."
The second Act, The Government of India (Fifth Amendment) 
Act, 1954, was passed to deprive the Governor-General of his 
powers in respect of appointment and dismissal of the Minis­
ters and asserted the Assembly’s right in making and sustain­
ing the Government, Under it the Prime Minister, who was to 
command the confidence of the majority in the legislature, 
and other Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister, 
were to be appointed by the Governor-General from among the 
members of the legislature. The Ministers were to be collec­
tively responsible to the federal legislature and were to
<LXpuS&xL
vacate office only on want of confidencej^m the Assembly,
The Prime Minister v/as given the authority to uall upon any
Minister to resign and the Governor-General was to act in
accordance with the advice of the Ministers.
The Act, which in Bill form v/as accompanied by a
'Statement of Objects and Reasons', v/hich maintained that
its object was to "give legislative sanction to certain
accepted principles and conventions connected with the
formation and working of the Government in Parliamentary
1 2system of Government", drastically curbed the powers of
11 G.U. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, 
p.142.
12 Quoted in IC. Callard, Pakistan,: A Political Study, p.107.
the Governor-General, making him literally a titular head.
It is true that the principles incorporated in the Act were
the constitutional practices followed in the countries with
Westminster type constitutions. But the procedure that was
1 3followed and the haste in which it was passed naturally 
provoked criticism. The measure has been termed as a C o n s t i ­
tutional coupf.^  The Assembly's endeavours to assert its
position as the guardian of democracy in Pakistan, were by
1 5and large interpreted a.s the negation of democracy. And
this "put the Governor-General in an intolerable situation,
because there was no provision in the interim constitution
for the dissolution of the federal legislature and so no
means whereby the Governor-General, when at issue with the
Assembly, could appeal to the electorate. Had he accepted
the position, he might have been indefinitely subservient
to the will of a perpetual legislature, which was losing the
1 6
confidence of the people."
The move, which was definitely aimed at the Governor- 
1 7General, was taken by the anti-Ghulam Huhamma.d group in 
the Constituent Assembly to deprive him of the powers which
13 K.Callard, Pakistan : A Political Study, nr.. 1 c H 
pp.105-113.
14 G.W.Choudhury, Constitutional Develppment in Pakistan, 
p.143*
15 PI.Feldman, A Constitution for Pakistan, p. 64.
16 A.Gledhill, Pakistan (2nd.ed.), p.78.
17 M .MUnir, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
p. 30.
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he had used in 1953 in dismissing 3bhe Nazimuddin government.
It was also feared in some quarters that G-hulam Muhammad
might again exercise these powers to dismiss the existing
Ministry. The Cabinet was now to be independent of the
clutches of the Governor-General and solely dependent on the
Assembly. But Ghulam Muhammad, who v/as av/ay at the time,
was certainly not the man to swallow such a snub. His reaction
18
was Tswift and sharp.* By a Proclamation on October 24, 1954, 
he struck: at the very root of the Assembly by dissolving 
it.
18 iM. Munir, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
p.30.
Chapter III ■
Dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly
The Governor-General1s Proclamation
On October 24, 1954 the Governor-General,Ghulam
1
Muhammad, issued a Proclamation by which a state of emergency 
was declared throughout Pakistan, The Governor-General observed 
in the proclamation that the country was faced with a political 
crisis and that the constitutional machinery had broken down*
The Constituent Assembly had lost the confidence of the people 
and could no longer function. The representatives of the people 
would be elected afresh to decide all issues, including constitu­
tional issues* Until the elections were held, the administration 
would be carried on by a reconstituted cabinet. The proclamation 
asserted that the security and stability of the .country were of 
paramount importance and that all personal, sectional and prov­
incial interests must be subordinated to the supreme national
2
interests.
As promised in the proclamation, the cabinet was re­
formed under the same Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali of Bogra.
Pour of the former Ministers retained their offices. General 
Mohammed Ayub Khan, Commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, 
became Minister of Defence, while Major-General Iskander Mirza
1. Gazette of Pakistan, October 24, 1954 
P.L.D. 1954, Central Statutes, 202.
2. Por full text of the Proclamation see Appendix I.
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then Governor of East Bengal was appointed Minister of the 
Interior. Newcomers to the administration were Dr. Khan Sahib, 
brother of Ked Shirt leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Suhrawardy and 
Abu Hassain Sarkar from the new East Bengal leadership. The 
new cabinet did not consist of members of one political party 
but of persons holding a wide variety of political views. Con­
sequently it was styled by the Prime Minister the ’cabinet of 
Talents'.
The Proclamation also put an end to the Constituent
Assembly, which had been set up under the Independence Plan
* , 
seven years previously to give the country a constitution, and
which, until that task was completed, was to act as the Federal 
Legislature under the adapted Government of India Act, 1955*
The Proclamation did not refer to any power by virtue of which 
the Governor-General professed to act, nor did it spell out the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in so many words. It 
simply said that the Constituent Assembly, as then constituted, 
had lost the confidence of the people, so that it could no lon­
ger function. Though in the mind of the average man there was 
no doubt that what had been done amounted to the dissolution of 
the Assembly, Dawn of Karachi posed the question whether the 
Constituent Assembly had been dissolved de,jure or whether it 
had merely ceased to function.
3. Prime Minister's statement, Dawn, October 31? 1954-
4. G.W.Choudhury, Constitutional Develppment in Pakistan 
pp. 141-142
5. Dawn, October 27? 195^.
" . . .  5 7
It was then officially declared that, following the Governor-
General 's proclamation, the Constituent Assembly stood dissolve§
It may be recalled at this stage that the Indian Independence
Act, 1947? while authorising the Constituent Assembly to make
provision for the constitution of the country, did not fix any
period for the purpose. There was also no provision regarding
the life of the Assembly nor any method for its dissolution.
It was presumed, as in fact happened in India, that the Assembly
would frame the constitution and then dissolve itself, and that
fresh elections to the central legislature would be held under
the new constitution. This assumption was justified by events 
7
in India; in Pakistan the events proved otherwise. Executive 
action had to intervene before the Assembly could fulfil its 
prime responsibility.
The Constituent Assembly, when it was dissolved, had 
been irjfexistence for over seven years. In its endeavour to 
frame the constitution, it had considered various proposals, 
which had involved serious differences of opinion. Demands 
had been made for its dissolution, in some parts of Pakistan, 
particularly in East Bengal, where dissatisfaction was wide­
spread and the proposals for a strong centre and the adoption 
of Urdu as the only state language were vehemently resented. 
After the provincial elections in March 1954-, when the Muslim
6 . Dawn, October 28, 1954.
7* A. Gledhill, 'The Constitutional Crisis in Pakistan* P.l.
Reprinted from the Indian Year Book of International
Affairs 1955*
- . . .  5 8
League was almost completely eliminated from the provincial 
political scene, there was "almost an unanimous demand,..., 
voiced by;the new members of the Provincial Assembly, that the 
East Bengal representatives should resign, as they had lost the 
confidence of the people, and any constitution framed by them
o
would not receive the backing of the masses". A resolution
to this effect was passed at a meeting of the United Pront
9
Parliamentary Party held on April 2, 1954-.
Consequently most political leaders in East Bengal 
and the people at large approved the Governor^General's action. 
The United Pront leaders welcomed the action taken against the 
Constituent Assembly because it was an ’unrepresentative1 body 
and one of the components of the Pront - the Ganatantri Dal - 
passed a resolution approving the action. ^  Even Suhrawardy, 
the Awami League chief and one of the United Front's top three, 
who was convalescing in Zurich, welcomed the Governor-General's 
action and said: "Governor-General had accepted my contention 
that the Constituent Assembly was not a representative body.1,11 
The support for the Governor-General's action did not end in 
those statements. The leaders of the United Pront vied with 
each other in protesting their loyalty to and support of the
8 . K.J.Newman, Essays on Constitution of Pakistan, p.XXXV.
9. A.N. Ahmad, Rajnitir Panchash Bachar, p.263 
10. Dawn, October 26, 195^
11 Dawn, October 27? 195^
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Governor-General, when he paid a visit to East Bengal in the
following month and a grand public reception was organised in
his honour. ^
But this support for the Governor-Generalfs action
in East Bengal was not based on any conscious political think­
ing or on any solid principle. It was observed by Abul Mansur 
Ahmad, who was a United Front Minister in East Bengal, and later 
a centr&L Minister in the Suhrawardy Cabinet, that it was merely 
the expression of the crude satisfaction of politicians, prev­
iously out of office, at seeing the downfall of their political 
13opponents. ^ He admits that most of the politicians realised 
that the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was outside 
the constitutional powers of the Governor-General. But the 
coterie which had been in power at the centre was regarded as 
consisting of the persons responsible for the sufferings of 
Bengal and in particular for the denial of the rightful claim 
of the United Front to rule the Province. The Assembly had 
become an instrument in the hands of this clique for furthering 
its own designs. A strike against this clique and its instru­
ment would, therefore, naturally get the support of the Bengali 
politicians. A further immediate cause for their jubilation 
was that the exit of most Muslim League members from the central 
administration might result in the termination of Governorfs 
rule in the Province and an opportunity of the United Front to
12. Ibid. November 17, 1954-
13. A.M. Ahmad, op.cit. p.272
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to capture power in East Bengal.
In the Punjab, political leaders readily supported 
the Governor-General1s action as they had only contempt for
t
the constitution which the Constituent Assembly intended to
adopt at its next session, fixed for October 27? 1954-. The
members of the Punjab Muslim League Assembly Party, under the
leadership of Chief Minister Malik Firoz Khan Noon, endorsed
the Governor-General1s action. In a resolution it said: "we
give assurance of our whole-hearted support to the Governor-
General and Prime Minister in their endeavour to give the
14-country a stable Government."
The main objection of the Punjab political leaders
to the proposed constitution was directed to the 'Mohammed Ali
Formula1 adopted by the Constituent Assembly for representation
in the central legislature. They were apprehensive of the
Bengali 'domination' in the central Assembly with the help and
support of members from the smaller Nest Pakistani provinces.
A Zonal Federation for the provinces of West Pakistan was,
therefore, proposed to enable the West wing to balance Bengal.
. . 15This was not acceptable to the Frontier and S m d  politicians. 
When the Muslim League Parliamentary Party had adopted the 
Basic Principles Committee Report, a party press release said 
that the door for a Zonal Federation of the West wing provinces 
was left open. A comprehensive plan, acceptable to all the
14. Dawn, October 25? 1954- 
15* Dawn, September 16, 1954-
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provinces when presented,might he considered and adopted.
From what transpired later, it appears that the
Punjabi leaders favoured some sort of . .union amongst the
Western provinces. Many would regard the non-acceptability
of the Zonal Federation plan by the Constituent Assembly as
one of the reasons for its dissolution by the Governor-General,
17who, allegedly, ’’symbolised the Punjab”. f The quick action 
taken after the Constituent Assembly had been dissolved, to­
wards the integration of West Pakistan into ’One Unit* gives 
some support to this view. The Punjab leadership naturally 
gave its ’’whole-hearted” support to the Governor-General1 s 
action.
In North-West Frontier Province and Sind, though no 
such attitude was apparent before the dissolution of the Con­
stituent Assembly, as soon as this was done the politicians in 
power welcomed it. The Frontier Chief Minister, Sardar Abdur 
Hashid, said that he was convinced that the step taken by the
Governor-General 'in consultation with the Prime Minister'
18had saved the country from a catastrophe. In Sm d the new 
Chief Minister, Khuhro, who had replaced Abdul Sattar Pirzada, 
dismissed on the direction of the Governor-General for mal­
administration, hailed the Governor-General1s action as the
16. Ibid. September 15, 195^ 
17* Pawn, October 7, 195^
18. Ibid. October 26, 195^
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only 'appropriate one1 taken in the prevailing circumstances,
« /V
The President of the Jinnah Awami League of S$id also welcomed
iq
the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. y The Working
Committee of the Stiid Provincial Muslim League approved the
dissolution of the Assembly, which, according to its resolution,
had ceased to be a representative body, and congratulated the
20Governor-General on his action. Till its dismissal, it may 
be noted, the Frontier and Sm.d politicians had fully supported 
the Constituent Assembly and the constitution it had devised.
But on its dissolution they declared the Assembly overnight 
to be 'unrepresentative* with no authority to frame the Con­
stitution. This change of attitude shows how easily Pakistani 
politicians changed their political allegiance and gave their 
support to those who assumed power and office. This has been 
the practise of most Pakistani politicians throughout the 
political history of the country.
Mohammed Ali of Bogra, the Prime Minister, formerly 
a stanhch upholder of the Constituent Assembly, who had main-
21tained that it should not be subject to any outside pressure, 
now came out openly in condemnation of its activities. In a 
nation-wide radio broadcast he said: "Certain actions of the 
Constituent Assembly have provoked a storm of indignation 
throughout the country. Recently, by far the majority of
19. Ibid.,
20. Lawn, January 6, 1955
21. Sec. G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in 
Pakistan, p. 144
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you have seriously questioned its competence to speak for
them (sic) with the end result that its decisions have ceased
to command that general acceptance hy people which is the
PPsine qua non of a workable and stable Constitution."
Describing the recent events, the Prime Minister said that he 
had been watching the development while abroad and "on my 
return I found that a situation had developed in which the 
Governor-General had to take the action he has taken in the 
larger interest of Pakistan. The destiny of the country could 
no longer be left to the caprices of an Assembly, which, in­
stead of safeguarding the interests of Pakistan, was becoming 
increasingly subject to internal strains and bickerings. 
Constitution-making is important. But more important byihr 
is the security and stability of our country. These must at 
all times be fully assured."
All these public exhibitipns can only be explained 
in terms of the pattern of politics obtaining in Pakistan.
The support of the leaders and of the press would unhesitatingly 
be forthcoming for the actions of the executive which, with 
the support of the bureacracy and armed forces, was the re­
po sit ary of all powers and authority, Analysing the situation, 
the Constitution Commission (I960) attempted to show that every 
executive action and every interference by the executive would 
be supported without the slightest opposition. On this part-
22. Dawn, October 25* 1954
23. Ibid.
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icular occasion the Commission observed that, although every­
one was surprised, there was no organised opposition.^
wControlled Democracy"
By October, 1954- the Pakistani rulers seem to have
were
become convinced that two things/essential for the effective 
administration of the country. The first was that the terr­
itories of West Pakistan should be merged into a single West 
Pakistan Province, the details of which we will discuss later; 
the second was that democracy in its existing form, had failed 
to give an effective form of administration to the country. 
After the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly the failure* 
of democracy was loudly proclaimed and the British system of 
Parliamentary Government was declared 'unsuitable1 in Pakistan.
Major-General Iskande Mirza, the Minister of the
25Interior and the 'strong man' ^ of the new regime, came out 
openly against the existing democratic system. Supporting 
the Governor-General1s action, Mirza commented that the people 
of Pakistan were illiterate and not interested in politics.
They were bound to act foolishly sometimes and there should be 
somebody to rectify their blunders. He maintained that the 
Governor-General was justified in his action, because "somebody
20
had to save the country from 'political scalawags". He said
24-. Constitution Commission Report (1961) p*8 , Para. 16.
25* G.V. Choudhury, op.cit. p. 14-7 
26. Dawn, October 51? 1954*
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that the people of Pakistan had had little training in dem­
ocracy. "They could not he expected to work successfully 
political institutions and forms of democratic government, 
evolved in a highly developed society like England, The att­
empt to work a democratic system in this country during the 
last seven years had led to disastrous results." The right
to elect even wrong representatives was a "luxury" which could
27not be conceded in the circumstances prevailing in Pakistan. r 
General Iskandar Mirza would strongly disagree with 
the view that democracy had not been given a chance in 
Pakistan; according to him "Democracy had run riot during
p o
seven years in Pakistan." Referring to East Bengal, he said
that the M.L.A.s (Members of the Legislative Assembly) had
made a mess of the whole thing when they were in power for
four to six weeks; they had even deprived the District Mag-
29istrates of their powers. J Mirza was convinced that 
"Pakistan is obviously not yet ripe for the practice of dem­
ocracy, as the term is understood in Britain or America.
There must be some measure of control to prevent flagrant
abuses" In the General's view: "People of this country
31need 'controlled democracy' for some time to come".
27* Ibid 
28. Ibid. November 19? 1954* 
29 • Davjn, November 18, 1954-
50. Interview with Daily Telegraph's (London) correspondent 
published in Dawn, November 15? 1954-
51. Dawn, October 51? 1954-
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He would recommend a Unitary form of Government for Pakistan 
and *one unit1 for the West Pakistan provinces# Governors,' 
and Provincial Assemblies were "paraphernalia", involving 
heavy cost, which could be dispensed with by dividing the 
country into "commissionaries.General Mirza reiterated 
thid view time and again during this period and explained 
that by "controlled democracy" he meant that "the Head of the 
State should have adequate powers to control an abnormal 
situation, whenever necessary.
Such, then, was the constitutional structure which 
this regime would like for Pakistan. Prom Mirza1s statement 
it is evident that the regime had concluded that parliamentary 
democracy had failed in Pakistan and that a system, more akin 
to the American system in which an"executive irremovable for 
four years was grafted on to a British system of representation 
would suit Pakistan. Commenting on the situation Professor 
Alan Gledhill said, "In February 1955> after the dissolution of 
the Assembly, a plan for a new constitution on the American 
model was foreshadowed, and it was suggested that this would
be more in keeping with Islamic tradition, as it would ensure
the Head of the State and his advisers a fixed tenure of 
office, independent of parliamentary s u p p o r t . T h e  Defence
32. Dawn, November 15 > 1954-
33- Ibid, November 16, 1954-
34. Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, p.18.
35. A.Gledhill/The Constitutional Crisis in Pakistan/7 
op.cit. p.4
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Minister, General lyub Khan, who had his own ideas of a sol­
ution to the country's constitutional problems, presented the
36outline of a constitution to the Cabinet, which apparently 
approved of the official line.
In order to devise a constitution on the above lines 
the services of Sir Ivor Jennings was employed. Dawn, on 
January 2, 1955 published a news item, saying that the con­
stitutional plan for Pakistan had taken some shape. It was 
likely to be finalised and published by the end of the month. 
The constitution was to be of the presidential type, and the 
President would have wide powers. Suhrawardy, the Law Minister 
announced in February, 1955 that the drafting of the Constitu­
tion was complete, but it would not be enforced before the
37decision of the Federal Court in Tanizuddin Khan1 s case.
But Suhrawardy did not say what type of Constitution had been 
drafted. Sir Ivor Jennings says that the idea of an Imerican 
type constitution was later abandoned. He states, "The con­
clusive argument, which led to the rejection of the scheme 
was, however, that the people of Pakistan were so familiar
with the British Constitution that any fundamental departure
38from it would be regarded with profound suspicion."^
It is difficult to say with certainty what dissuaded
56. M. ^yub Khan, Friends Hot Masters, p.192
37. Dawn, February 23* 1955
38. Sir Ivor Jennings, op.cit p.19
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the regime from pursuing its declared aim of having an 
American type of constitution. The presence in the cabinet of 
Suhrawardy and other politicians, who favoured a Westminister 
system might have had a moderating effect on Mirza and his 
supporters* It is, however, certain that the decision of 
the Federal Court in Usif Patels' case^y and in the Special
Zm
Reference case definitely deterred the regime from fraking 
and enforcing any type of constitution whatsoever on the 
country. The task of constitution making had to be left to 
the Second Constituent Assembly, which was to be summoned 
shortly by the Governor-General.
The Integration of West Pakistan
The plan to integrate the provinces and other ter­
ritories of West Pakistan into a single province was first
officially announced by the Prime Minister in a broadcast on
41
November 22, 1954. It had its statutory foundation in the
42Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1955* and, in accordance with 
its declared intention, the Government proceeded to set up 
machinery for the reorganisation. The final phase, however, 
had to be delayed till the second Constituent Assembly had
39. P.L.D. 1955 E.C. 387
40. P.L.D. 1955 E.G. 435
41. Dawn, November 23* 1954
42. Ordinance IX of 1955
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passed the necessary Act.
The One Unit plan,apart from its obvious admin-
strative advantages, had some political motive behind it.
It has now been revealed that the scheme was conceived and
put forward by the Punjab leaders, with the support of the
Governor-General, to enable the West Pakistan members in the
central legislative to speak as one entity, vis-a-vis the
43East Bengal members. The plan was skillfully drafted by 
the former Chief Minister of Punjab, Mumtaz DaUtbana, suggesting 
the process by which the opposition to the plan was to be over­
come. It recommended the dismissal of the Pirzada Ministry 
in Sihd and support for the forces which would give approval 
to the scheme. To avoid suspicion, Punjab was to remain quiet, 
but Baultana hoped that, at a later stage, Punjab would take
the lead and effective and intelligent Punjab politicians
44
would be put in power both at the centre and at Lahore.
Following this secret plan, the Pirzada Government, 
which was opposed to 'One Unit1, was dismissed and M.A.Khuhro 
was installed as the Chief Minister of Sind. The Sfnd Legis­
lative Assembly voted in favour of one unit on December 11th, 
1954^ How the Assembly, which had previously opposed the 
scheme, could change its views so quickly might seem a pol-
43. K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p.77
44. Ibid.
45. Dawn, December 12, 1954.
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itical miracle. But for Khuhro, who excelled in political
subtlety, it was not difficult. Opposition was stifled either
46by threat and arrest of members of the Assembly or by promise
of patronage and favour. The dismissed Chief Minister claimed
that he was dismissed, solely because he was opposed to the
47One Unit scheme. '
In the North-West Frontier Province the Government
of Sardar Abdur Rashid gave its support to the merger scheme.
The Frontier Assembly passed a resolution on November 25i1954
48approving the One Unit scheme, and it was widely thought 
that Dr.Ehan Sahib was taken into the Central Cabinet, to get 
his support for the scheme. But for some unknown reasons, 
though it has been suggested that it was local sentiment and 
Pathan patriotism, Sardar Abdur Rashid later opposed the in­
tegration plan. Though no clear ground was given, it is
49
thought that he was dismissed in July, 1955* for this reason.
The Bahawalpur State Government and State legislature also
50became victims of "the rock of the one unit". Even the Noon 
Ministry in the Punjab, which had earlier given its full 
support to the scheme, allegedly became suspicious of the
46. Dawn, December 12, 1954.
47. Feldman, A Constitution for Phis tan p#77
48. Dawn, November 26, 1954 
49* H. Feldman, op.cit. p.82
50. Ibid, p.84
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motives of some of the central Ministers and of the speed with 
which the merger was intended to be implemented* It was dis­
missed in May, 1955
In East Bengal the fsone unit* issue did not arouse 
much concern at that time. Suhrawardy^. as the Law Minister 
responsible for the parliamentary draftsmanship involved in 
the scheme could count on the support of his Awami League*
The: United Front, under Fazlul Huq had, by this time, entered 
into a deal with Prime Minister Mohammed Ali* It also did not 
think: it wise to oppose the Centre's move:* Moreover the 
Bengali leaders at that time were busy with their own provin­
cial problems* Thus an important step to obstruct East Bengalis 
numerical majority went almost unnoticed in the Province.
After the integration of West Pakistan, equal representation 
on the basis of the 'two units' in the central legislature 
was only a. logical demand*
Despite the Central Government's bid for support for 
its plan, voices were raised in Sind and North-West Frontier
Provinces against integration. 'Sind Day' was observed
52throughout Sind with processions and protest meetings . Mem­
bers of the Sind Legislative Assembly issued statements; against 
the scheme. In the Frontier Province the Pin of Manki Sharif, 
a prominent public leader, called for a referendum on the 
issue. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan said that he was not opposed
51. H* Feldman. A Constitution for Pakistan p.,82 
52* Dawn. November 23, 1954
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to the idea, of having one administration for the whole of
West Pakistan, but the time and the political atmosphere were;
not opportune. He warned that, if the scheme was imposed in
an unfavourable atmosphere, without consulting the people,
53integration might do more harm than good. ^
The Government,however, went ahead with the scheme 
and the Establishment of West Pakistan Act,1955, was passed by 
the second constituent Assembly in September. One Unit for 
West Pakistan certainly had some advantages. It would result 
in a drastic reduction of administrative expenses, and uniform 
development of the Province as a whole would bring benefit to 
the less developed regions. Geographically, economically and 
culturally the scheme seemed viable and sound. But the tactics 
followed in achieving integration and the ulterior political 
motive behind it have not escaped criticism by the neutral- 
observers. Many would be inclined to think, that one of the 
reasons why the 'Punjabi1 Governor-General dissolved the Con­
stituent Assembly, which was opposed to the integration of 
West Pakistan,was his strong desire, prompted by Punjabi pol­
iticians, to unite West Pakistan to Punjab's advantage. It 
has been remarked that, among the many causes, of the breakdown
of constitutional government in Pakistan, one was the inte-
54*
gration of West Pakistan at the point of the pistol. The
55* Xbid, November 19, 1954-• 
54*. K.B. Sayeed, oo.cit. p.79
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'one unit* involved pressure on all the Provincial and State 
Governments in West Pakistan before it could be implemented. 
Integration was not willingly accepted; it produced political 
upheavals in West Pakistan and was the main cause of govern­
mental instability in the years 1956-5S both in the Province 
and at the Centre. After fifteen years of its existence, for 
good or for worse, the West Pakistan Province had to be diss­
olved in 1970 and the pre-1955 provincial entitles were res­
tored. ^
The S'ltid Chief Courtis view of the Governor-General1 s Action
The Proclamation of the Governor-General dissolving 
the Constituent Assembly was challenged in the Chief Court of 
Sind by the Assembly's President, Maulw Tamizuddin Khan^, who. 
applied to the Court under section 223A. of the Government of 
India Act, 1935 for the issue of writs of mandamus and quo 
warranto with a view to : (i) restrain the Federation from 
giving effect to the proclamation and obstructing the peti­
tioner in the exercise of his functions and duties as President 
of the Assembly; and (ii) to determine the validity of appoint­
ment of the recently appointed Ministers, who were not members 
of the legislature. The respondent raised, the preliminary
55* Province of West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order 1970, 
(President's Order No.l of 1970),
P.L.D. 1970 Central Statutes 218.
5&. Maftlui Tamizuddin Khan v. Federation of Pakistan and 
others P.L.D. 1955 Sind.96.
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objection that section 223A of the Act of 1955? which gave 
powers to superior courts to issue writs, was, in the absence of 
the assent of the Governor-General, not a valid law* The Court, 
therefore, had no jurisdiction to issue the writs to the res­
pondent* The same objection applied to new section 10 of the 
Government of India. Act, 1935? which purported to limit the 
Governor-General1s discretion in his choice of Ministers to 
members of the Constituent Assembly* The Chief Court of Sind.  
unanimously held that to constitutional laws passed by the 
Constituent Assembly the assent of the Governor-General was not 
necessary and therefore the amended section 10 and section 
223A. of the Government ofIndia Act, 1955? were valid constitu­
tional laws enforceable without the assent of the Governor- 
General *
57Interpreting sub-section (3) of section 6 ‘yf of the 
Indian Independence Act, 194-7? Constantine, C.J. said that 
"the Governor-General1s full power to assent is accompanied by 
deletion of disallowance , reservation and suspension, and in 
my opinion the purport of the section is to provide that the 
Governor-General1s power of assent is not to be controlled by 
Her Majesty: this is in keeping with the key to interpretation
provided by the preamble - the declaration of independence -
57* "The Governor-General of each of the new Dominions shall 
have full power to assent in His Majesty's name to any 
law of the legislator e of that Dominion and so much of any 
Act as relates to the dis-allowance of .laws by His Majesty 
or the reservation of laws for the signification of His 
Majesty's pleasure thereon or the suspension of the op­
eration of laws until the signification of His Majesty's 
pleasure thereon shall not apply to laws of the Legisla- 
 tuye of either of the new Dominions."
7 5
and with the purport of sections 5*6 and 7 - the abdication of 
all control by Crown, Parliament, and Government of the United 
Kingdom, Agha, J. held^ that subsection (3) does not provide 
that assent is necessary, but that, if assent is necessary, the 
Governor-General shall have full power to accord it. The nec­
essity of assent was retained in the; Government of India Act. 
in respect of the Federal Legislation; no corresonding pro­
vision necessitating consent in respect of Constituent Assembly
59was inserted in the Independence Act.”*^ To the same effect 
were the findings of other Judges of the Court on the question 
of assent, Sub-section (5) of section 6 , read as a whole, 
provided unrestrained power of assent by the Governor-General 
whenever necessary, and “the intent is not to create the nec­
essity of assent when none has been prescribed. What sub­
section (3 ) does is to shed the existing statutory limitations 
to the Governor-General1s power to assent,”
The Court also held that the Governor-General had no 
power under the Independence Act, 194-7 to dissolve the Con­
stituent Assembly, which had no prescribed period of duration, 
and could only be dissolved by the Assembly itself. The Act 
contained no express provision for dissolution of the Assembly, 
”VZhere legislatures have been created by statute, dissolution
58.. In M.A. Khuhro v. Federation of Pakistan. 
F.L*D. 1950., Sind 4-9
59. P*LJB.1955, Sind 96, at p.104-.
60. Per V@llani,J. at p.115•
has been provided for by statute* (Hence the contrasting om­
ission in the Independence Act appears deliberate)* There is 
no case throughout the Commonwealth outside England, where 
dissolution of a. legislature talces place except by express 
provision in the constitution, whether granted by statute or 
Order-in-Council. The prerogative of dissolution in my 
opinion extends only to the parliament of the United Kingdom: 
elsewhere dissolution is dependent upon statute, or order-in-
/*■ i * p
council." The argument that, apart from section 5 of the 
Independence Act, the Governor-General, had and could exercise 
His Majesty's prerogative to dissolve the Assembly, because 
the Constituent Assembly was a Legislature and the Independence 
Act left that prerogative unaffected by provisions, was, acc­
ording to Vellani,J., untenable. The learned Judge held that 
"if the Governor-General has that prerogative, he has it by 
virtue only of being His Majesty's representative. That rep­
resentation has been limited by express words'!for the purpose: 
of the government of the Dominion', and the limitation shuts 
the door to further i m p l i c a t i o n s . 11^  At this stage the learn­
ed Judge referred to Bonanza Creek Gold Mining; Co.Ltd v The 
King«^  Attorney-General v Be. Kevser' s Hotel and Moore v
61. Her Constantine, C.J. at p.106-
62. 11 ....there shall be a Governor-General who shall be appoint 
ed by His Majesty and shall represent His Majesty for the 
purposes of the government of the Dominion...."♦
63* at 110.
64. (1916) 1 A.C. 566*
65* (1920) A.C. 508.
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Attorney-General for the Irish Free: State and concluded that 
"where there is legislation covering a field of prerogative and 
it is desired to make the prerogative, still available, it 
becomes necessary to reserve in the legislation, the power to 
use the prerogative concurrently with the legislation, as other­
wise the legislation, so long as it is in force, precludes the 
exercise of the prerogative.11^ 7 The prerogative to dissolve 
was governed by the express provision of section 5 of the 
Indian Independence Act and that section did not enable the 
Governor-General to dissolve the Constituent Assembly.^
The Federal Court's view of the Constituent Assembly's Powers
The Federation and other respndents filed an appeal 
to the Federal Court against the judgment of the Chief Court of 
Si'ftd.^ The Federal Court, by a majority of four to one 
(Cornelius,J.dissenting), reversed the findings; of the Court 
below. It held that all Acts passed by the Constituent Assembly 
including constitutional Acts, required the assent of the 
Governor-General for their validity. Since section 223A. of the 
Government of India Act, under which the Chief Court assumed 
jurisdiction to issue writs; did not receive such assent, it was
66. (1935) A.C. 484.
67* per Vellani J. at 113-
6 8. Per Vellani J. at p.lll.
69. Federation of Pakistan v Maulyj Tamizudiin Khan 
PJL.D. 1955 F.C.240.
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not yet a. law, and therefore, that court had no jurisdiction to 
issue the writs. In view of this conclusion the Court did not 
go into the other issues.
The principal judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Munir,G.J. who argued that Pakistan, being a Dominion and a 
member of the Commonwealth, its constitutional structure and 
practice were like those of the United Kingdom aid the Dominions, 
Legislation was the exercise of a high prerogative power add 
even where it was delegated by statute or charter to a leg­
islature, in theory it was always subject to assent, whether 
that assent be given by the King or a person nominated by the 
King. That necessity was enjoined in the case of Pakistan so 
long as it continued to be a Dominion, though it was open to 
that Dominion, if the Governor-General gave assent to a Bill of 
secession, to repudiate its Dominion Status.^ The Constituent 
Assembly was to exercise the power of the Legislature of the 
Dominion in making provisions for the Constitution of the 
Dominion under section 8(1) of the Independence Act, which 
laid down:
11 In the case of each of the new Dominions, the 
powers of the Legislature of the Dominion shall, 
for the purpose of making provision as to the 
constitution of the Dominion, be exercisable in 
the first instance by the Constituent Assembly 
of that Dominion....11
So, according to the Chief Justice, when the Assembly was not
exercising the restricted powers of the Federal Legislature
70. P.L.D.1955 F.C. 240, at p*289.
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under the adapted Act of 1935* which the Assembly was enjoined 
to exercise by proviso (e) of subsection ( 2 ) of section 8 of 
the Independence Act, it was acting as the Legislature of the 
Dominion under section 6 (1) , ^  exercising powers under section 
8(1) quoted above. Rejecting the contention that the Con­
stituent Assembly, though it exercised, the powers of the Leg­
islature of the Dominion, was not itself the Legislature of 
the Dominion, His Lordship observed:
"This to my mind is tantamount to a. refusal to read 
subsection (!) of section 8 , the only purport of 
which can be that the Constituent Assembly shall 
be the first Legislature of the Dominion, compe­
tent to exercise all the powers. given to that leg­
islature by section 6 , including the power to make 
laws as to the constitution of the Dominiom.
Learned counsel for the appellants therefore rightly 
contended that the plain words of sub-section Cl) 
of section 8; that *reference in this Act to the 
Legislature of the Dominion shall be construed 
accordingly* have the effect of substituting the 
Constituent Assembly for the words *the Legislature 
of each of the new. Dominions,1 in subsections (l) 
and (3) of section 6 * That being the position, 
there can be no. escape from the conclusion that 
the Governor-General*s assent to the laws made by 
the Constituent Assembly is as, necessary as his 
assent to any future. Legislature of the Dominion 
brought into existence by the constituent Assembly 
to- replace itself."72
The Chief Justice, interpreting section 5 of the. Act; 
of L94-7 held that ’government1 necessarily included administra­
tion as well ep making of constitutional laws. He observed:
"If the Governor-General represents the Crown for the purposes
71. "The Legislature of each of the new Dominions shall have 
ful! power ta make laws for that Dominion...”
72.. FJLJX. 1955 F.C. 240, at p*289.
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of the government of the: Dominion when he gives, assent to the 
laws passed by the Federal Legislature, it must a fortiori 
fallow that he represents the Grown for the same purpose when 
he assents to constitutional laws, because in a State like 
ours: it is impossible to concieve of a government without there 
being a: Constitution11 The. learned Chief Justice declined 
to consider the fact that the various organs of government 
had previously acted on the assumption that assent to con­
stitutional laws was not necessary. He argued that the prin­
ciple of Contemooranea Expositia would only be applicable if 
there was any doubt as to the meaning of the provisions of the 
statute. The. Constituent Assembly was the sovereign legisla­
tive, body of the Dominion, but the Governor-General was a. part
of the Legislature. Every Act passed by the Assembly, there;-
74.fore, required the assent of the. Governor-General. r
Cornelius J., as he then was, in a. dissenting judg­
ment said that Pakistan, though a. Dominion within the Common­
wealth, was different in status from the older Dominions. The 
Acts, of the Imperial Parliament, giving Dominion status to 
older Dominions, contained restrictions on the powers of the; 
Dominions. The; existence of such restraints clearly differ­
entiated between the status of the older Dominions and. that of 
1 independent1 Dominions of India; arid Pakistan. The fact that 
His Majesty^ Government and the British Parliament admitted
73* Ibid. at p.2.94*
74. P.L.D. 1955 F.C. 240, at p.298.
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that the constitution of the new Dominions were to. be framed 
by Indians (or Pakistanis) themselves., without any restriction 
whatsoever, had no precedent in commonwealth history* So, 
other Dominions were, not ’independent1 Dominions, in the same 
sense as India and Pakistan became Independent in August ,194-7?^ 
According to his Lordship, the Constituent Assembly was not a. 
body created by the British Parliament; it was a body created 
by a. "supra-Iegal" power to discharge the "supra-legal11 func - 
tion of preparing a. constitution for P&Maban, having inherent 
power in this respect by virtue of its being a. body represen­
tative of the will of the people in relation to their future 
mode of Government.^ Ihe Constituent Assembly was not syno­
nymous with the Legislature of the Dominion. But the Assembly 
was given all the powers to provide a constitution for Pakistan 
in which there might or might not be a. ’’Legislature of the 
Dominion", and, if there were such a. legislature, to prescribe 
its powers add functions. Xt was, therefore, difficult to 
identify the Constituent Assembly"clothed with sovereign power 
to provide a new constitution for the country, with an entirely
different and as yet notional body, whose constitution and
77powers were yet to be shaped by the Constituent Assembly1*"
On the question of assent, His Lordship held that
75. P.L.D. 1955 F*C. 24*0, at p*332.
76. Xbid p.351.
77. Xbid p.353*
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the Governor-General*s power to assent under section 6(3) 
could not be enlarged by applying section 5 of the Independence 
Act; as the representative of the Crown, his prerogative power 
was regulated by the statute. Constitution-making was distinct 
from government and the Constituent Assembly, being designed 
to be a. sovereign body exercising sovereign power including 
power to alter the constitution subject to which the Governor- 
General was to act, it would be inconsistent to suppose that 
it was to act subject to the "qualified negative" of assent by 
the Governor-General.^ Cornelius J. further observed that 
all, the great organs of the State had acted on the assumption 
that the assent of the Governor-General to constitutional laws 
was not necessary so that unassented legislation of the con­
stituent Assembly had changed the position of innumerable in­
dividuals, affecting their rights and interests. Hot only 
had the SVrtd Chief Court in M.A. Khuhro v Federation^  decided 
in 1950 that no assent was necessary, but the Federal Court
O A  0 - 1
also in Khan of Mamdot v Crown and in Akbar Khan v Crown 
accepted by implication, that assent was not necessary for the
op
validity of a>. constitutional law.
78. E^L.D. 1955 5.0-. 240, at p.568.
79.. P.I.D.. 1950 Sind 49.
80. E.L.D. 1950 P.O. 15.
81. EJ..D. 1954 P.O. 87.
82. P.L.D. 1955 P.C. 240, at. 562..
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It may be noted here:, regarding the contention that 
the constituent Assembly was not the Legislature of the Dom­
inion, Professor Gledhill has pointed out that "Legislature11 
under section 18A. of Interpretation Act 1889, which was app­
licable to the Indian Independence Act 194*7, meant any body 
other than the Imperial Parliament, competent to make laws for 
British India or the relevant part of it, so it would seem that 
the Constituent Assembly, being a. body competent to make con­
stitutional laws for what had been part of British India, was 
the Legislature of the Dominion* Reference to this argument 
might have had some effect on Cornelius J's contention on this 
point. But it was never raised.^
The Federal Court's view of the Governor-General's Powers
As a: result of the Federal Court's decision in
Tamizuddin Khan|;s case, forty four constitutional Acts became,
by implication, invalid for want of assent of the Governor-
General. The. Governor-General, thereupon, purporting to act
under section 102 of the Government of India Act,, proclaimed a.
grave emergency throughout the country on April 27, 1955* On
the same day puporting to act under section 42.(1) of the Act of
841935, the Energency Powers Ordinance, 1955 was issued and 
promulgated. The Ordinance, after narrating in the preamble
83. A. Gledhill, Pakistan (2nd ed.) p.8Q*
84. Ordinance IX of 1955, P*.L.L.1955-Central Statutes 63*
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that the Federal Courtfs judgment by invalidating certain con­
stitutional Acts, had caused a. breakdown of the constitutional 
machinery, purported to validate retrospectively thirty five
of the Acts, listed in the Schedule to the Ordinance.
85The Federal Court, however, held ^ that the Governor- 
General could not, by Ordinance, validate any of the laws, which 
had become invalid for want of his assent. The judgment of 
Munir C J V  held, on the authority of Tamizuddin Khan1 s case, 
that the power of the Governor-GeneraX to make Ordinances: did 
not go beyond the Federal Legislature l:s power to make laws*
The power of the Legislature of the Dominion to; make provision 
for the constitution of the Dominion could, under section 8Cl) 
of the Independence Act,; 19^7 be exercised only by the Con­
stituent Assembly and that power could not be exercised by the
Assembly, when it functioned as the Federal Legislature under 
the Act. of 1935* Therefore, if the Federal Legislature, in
the absence of a provision expressly authorising it to do so,
was incompetent to amend the Indian Independence Act or the
Government of India Act, 1935* the. Governor-General, possessing
no larger powers than those of the Federal Legislature, was
equally incompetent to: amend either of the constitution Acts
by Ordinance; The Governor-General could give or withhold
his assent to the legislation of the Constituent Assembly but
he himself was not the Constituent Assembly end, on its dis-
85- Usif Patel v The Crown. PJGJD..1955 387,
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appearance, he could neither claim power which he never poss­
essed nor could he claim to succeed to the powers of that 
Assembly.*^
The Chief Justice referred to the statement made by 
counsel for the Federation in Tamisaddin Khanrs case, regarding 
the constitutional position consequent upon the dissolution 
of the Constituent Assembly. His Lordship cited a port/on 
which implied that immediate steps were; being taken to hold, 
elections to a new Assembly. The Chief Justice observed that 
it might have been expected that the first concern of the 
Government would be to bring into existence another represent­
ative body to exercise the power of the Constituent Assembly. 
But his Lordship regretted that events showed that other 
counsels had' since prevailed. The Ordinance (IX of 1955) 
contained, no reference to elections, and all that the learned 
Advocate-Genefal could say was that they were intended to be 
held.87
Following the judgment in Usif Patel1s case and 
paying heed to the strong observations made by the chief 
Justice, the Governor-General bn April 15, 1955 issued the 
Constituent Convention Order, 1 9 5 5 providing for the setting 
up of a. Convention to meet on May 10, to make the Constitution 
£or the country, and to exercise all the powers of the Con­
stituent Assembly under section 8 of the Indian Independence
ikl- V 3^ 2..
87. Ibid, p.4-01.
88. GJjt. 1 s O. VIXI of 1955, P *1*1.1955 Central Statute 118.
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Act, 194-7. O*1 "the following day, the Governor-General made an
89Ordinance - the Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1955? ■*- assuming
to himself, until other provision was made by the Constituent 
Convention, such powers as were necessary to: validate the 
invalid laws in order "to avoid a possible breakdown in the 
constitutional and administrative machinery of the country and 
to preserve the state and maintain the government of the 
country in its existing condition"* In exercise of those power 
the. Governor-General retrospectively validated and declared 
enforceable the laws mentioned in the Schedule to the Emergency 
Powers Ordinance 1955 (££ of 1955)* These powers were exer­
cised by the Governor-Gbneral, subject to- any report of the 
Federal Court on the constitutional position referred to it by 
the Governor-General under section 215 of the Government of 
India Act, 1935-
90The question referred to the Federal CourtJ covered 
the scope of the Governor-General1s powers and responsibilities 
in governing the country before the proposed convention passed 
the necessary legislation; and whether, in view of the Federal 
Court1 s decision in Usif Patell:s case, the Governor-General 
had any power under the constitution or any rule of law, to 
declare the invalid laws to be part of the law of the land, 
until their validity was determined by the Constituent Con­
vention* But at the instance of the Federal Court, during the
89. P*IuD. 1955 C-entral Statutes 115.
90. Reference by H J ,  the Governor-General.
P.L.D. 1955 F.C. 455.
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hearing of the Reference, two more questions were added* One 
was whether the Constituent Assembly was rightly dessolved 
by the Governor-General, and the other, whether the Constituent 
Convention would be competent to exercise powers conferred on 
the Constituent Assembly by section 8 of the Indian Independ­
ence Act, 194*7*
The majority opinion of the Court, given by Munir 
C,J#/held that the first of these two questions was too genera] 
and need not be answered* On the second question the Court 
said that “in the situation presented by the Reference, the 
Governor-General has, during the interim period, the power, 
under the common law of civil or state necessity, of retros­
pectively validating the laws listed in the Schedule to the 
Emergency Powers Ordinance 1955? and all. those laws, until 
the question of their validation is decided upon by the Con­
stituent Assembly, are during the aforesaid period valid and 
enforceable.11^  In expounding the doctrine of necessity the
Chief Justice referred to Lord Mansfield's address to the Jury
92in George Stratton's case and said at page 485:
“The principle clearly emerging from this add­
ress of Lord Mansfield is that, subject to the con­
dition of absoluteness, extremeness and imminence, 
an act which would otherwise be illegal becomes 
legal if it is done bona, fide under the stress of 
necessity, the necessity being referable to an in­
tention to preserve the Constitution, the State or 
the Society and to prevent it from dissolution,and
91* P*L*D. 1955 455, at PP.5S0-21
92* 21 Howard's St. trial 1046
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affirms Chitty*s statement that necessity knows no 
law and the maxim cited by Bracton that necessity 
makes lawful that which otherwise is not lawful*
Since the address expressly refers to the right of 
private: persons to act in necessity, in the case 
of the Head of the State justification to act must 
a fortiori be. clearer and more imperative."
'The Chief Justice then considered, the conditions
the>i : prevailing, following the Courtfs decision in Samizuddin
Khan|:s case and Usif Patelvs case and held that "'the Governor-
General must, therefore, be held to have acted in order to
avert an impending disaster and to prevent the State and the
qz
Society from dissolution,11
On the all-important question of the dissolution of 
the Constituent Assembly, the Chief Justice, examining the 
scheme of the Indian Independence Act, held that the absolute 
and unqualified prerogative: right of the Crown and of the
Governor-General as representative of the Crown to dissolve
94the Assembly had clearly been taken away* Accepting the 
principle enunciated by the House of Lords, in the Attorney- 
General v. De Keyser*s Boyal Hotel^^ that 1 where a prerogative 
matter has been legislated upon, the prerogative as to that 
matter must be deemed to have been merged in the statute to 
the extent that it has been legislated upon1, His Lordship 
said (at page 454) that when this principle is applied to the 
present case,- it must be held that "sub-section Cl) of section 
8 of the Indian Independence Act, 194-7, took, away from the
95. 1955 E.-C. 435,:. at p.486.
94. Ibid.* at p*452.
95. C0920) A*.C*. soa.
89
Crown by necessary implication the prerogative of dissolution 
to this extent, that the Crown was bound to give to the Con­
stituent Assembly a. reasonable opportunity to frame the Con­
stitution”. He further said, that the instances of the power 
to dissolve, unqualified.in law but strictly restricted by con­
ventions, as vested in the Governor-General of other Dominions, 
were not relevant, because that power was expressly recognised 
by the constitution of those Dominions. In the case of Pakistan 
the Constitution Act contained no provision as to the dissolu­
tion nor was there any express reference to this power in the 
warrant of the Governor-General^ appointment.
The Chief Justice, however, said that, where a 
statute made provisions for a, particular situation, it excluded 
the. common law.. But if the situation was entirely outside 
the contemplation of the statute, it would be governed by com­
mon law (p.A6A).„ The: Constitution Ants assumed that the Con­
stituent Assembly would frame a Constitution within a, reasonable 
time; it was not given power to function as long as it liked 
aid assume the form of a. perpetual or indissoluble legislature. 
The prerogative to dissolve could be held to have been taken 
away, only if the Constituent Assembly performed the duty ass­
igned to it. If the Assembly failed to perform its. duty or 
functioned illegally i.e. in a. manner different from the one 
in which it was intended to function, the prerogative, which 
was in abeyance, must be held to have revived, when it became
96. P*L.D. 1955 4-35* atp4-55.
apparent to the Governor-General that the Constituent Assembly 
was unable or had failed to provide a constitution for the 
Country^
The Qourt considered the facts stated in the Refer­
ence (1) that the Constituent Assembly had failed to frame a 
constitution in seven years of its; existence, which was a, world- 
record for framing any constitution, (2) that in view of the 
repeated representations that the Assembly had. become, accord­
ing to the Governor-General, unrepresentative of the people,
(5) that for all practical purposes the Constituent Assembly 
assumed the form of a. perpetual legislature and (4) that 
throughout its existence, it had asserted illegally that laws 
passed under section 8(1) of the Independence Act were valid 
without the assent of the Governor-General, On the basis of 
these facts the court came to the conclusion that "the Governor-
General had under section 5 of the Indian Independence Act,
98legal authority to dissolve the Constituent Assembly.
Dealing with the question of the competence of the 
propsed Constituent Convention summoned by the Governor-General 
Munir C.J. following the same principle that ’where th^prer- 
ogative had not been excluded by shatute, the common lav; would 
apply1, held that ,so far as the Independence Act, 194*7? &Ld not 
provide for a Convention or composition of a fresh Constituent 
Assembly, the Governor-General, as representative of the Crown, 
had the same power as was exercised by the Governor-General in
97. E.L.D. 1955 F.C. 455, at p.465.
98. E.L.D. 1955 E-~G.. 455, at p.486.
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Assembly was set up by an executive order and not under any 
law; the new Constituent Assembly could also be set up by a 
similar order. But the Governor-General was not only entitled 
but bound to take cognizance of the altered conditions* The 
only legal requirement in setting up a new Assembly was that it 
should be a.representative body* The Gourt held that under the 
Indian Independence Act the Governor-General had the authority 
to issue the Constituent Convention Order 1955 &&& that the 
Convention called by that Order would have all powers of the 
Constituent Assembly. The term "convention”, being misleading, 
the new Assembly should be called the Constituent Assembly*
It */as further held that the Governor-General had no right to 
nominate members, though he could prescribe the electorate add 
the Independence Act required that arrangements for representa­
tion of States and tribal areas should be made by the Constitu-
X
ent Assembly and not by the Governor-General*
Dissenting from the majority, Cornelius and Sharif, 
JJ. held that the Governor-General had no authority to valid­
ate the invalid laws, whether temporarily or permanently. On 
the application of the*doctrine of necessity1 Sharif J* 
observed:
"These have been sometimes, invoked in times of 
war or other national disaster to infringe private 
rights or commandeer private property, but we have 
not been referred to any authority or reported case
99* Ibid., at p.472.
1 . P.L.D. 1955 F.C. 455, at p*475-
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where, under the stress of circumstances created 
by some interpretation of law, these were extended 
to embrace changes in constitutional law* It might 
on occasions lead to dangerous consequences if in 
any real or supposed emergency of which the head of 
the State alone must be the Judge, the constitutional 
structure itself could be tampered with.ft2
I n  the Special Reference case, the federal Court 
gave its opinion in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction. 
The. Governor-General* s authority temporarily and retrospective^ 
to validate the invalid laws was subsequently recognised by 
the Federal Court in a contentious case. Fallowing the 
majority opinion in the Special Reference, the Court held that 
the Privy Council (Abolition of Jurisdiction) Act, 1950, which 
had been retrospectively validated by the Gcv ernor-General by 
his proclamation of Emergency of April 16, 1955, was now a
Ll
valid law. Munir, G.J. distinguished Usif Patel* s case, 
where validation by the Governor-General was. held to be beyond 
his power "because by the validating Ordinance, the Governor- 
General claimed for himself the power to validate, without any 
reference to, and in the absence: of, the legislature, whereas, 
in the present case, the validation is only providonal and 
subject to legislation by the Constituent Assembly*"^ Ihe end 
result of these judgments of the Federal Court was that status
2. P*1 *U. 1955 F.C# 455, at p.519-
5* Federation of PaMstan v Ali Ahmad.. Shah.
P*luB. 1955, E.G. 522,
4. POuB. 1955 E.C. 387,
5- PJUDh 1955 F.O. 522, at p.529-
quo in the legal structure was to be maintained till the new 
Constituent Assembly decided on the issue*
The Second Constituent Assembly
The lomg battle that commenced, with the dissolution 
of the Constituent Assembly by the Governor-General at last 
came; to an end. From the judgments it becomes obvious that 
the Court strove hard to, find legal bases to uphold the 
apparently unconstitutional actions of the Governor-General. 
After the Federal Court had held that, under the express con­
stitutional provisons, the Governor-General had no power to 
dissolve the Constituent Assembly, it had to consider the 
facts set out by the Governor-General in his Reference and 
concluded, on the basis of those facts, that the Constituent 
Assembly had failed in its primary duty to provide a constit­
ution for the country, and by its composition and illegal 
actions, ^ad ceased to be: avi assembly contemplated by the 
Indian Independence Act, 1947, aafil as such was liable to be 
dissolved by the Governor-General. The Court here appfi&cL _ 
the common law, in the absence of any express statutory prov­
isions to bridge the gap between the law and the facts of 
political life. It was clear, according to Erofessor de Smith 
that the decisions were a, not very well disguised act of 
'political judgment'* But it was to the credit of the Court
6 . S*A,# de Smith, "Constitutional Lawyers in Revoluntionary 
situations", C1968)7 Western Ontario Law Review. 93*
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that it did not give the Governor-General carte blanche, for
he was not permitted to change, the existing constitutional
structure. The Governor-General was compelled to "re-establish
n
the legislature.11
The jjidgment. of the Federal Court in Usif Patel's 
case led to a complete breakdown of the constitutional aabci 
administrative machinery. The Emergency Powers Ordinance 
1955 (IX of 1955), promulgated by the Governor-General after 
Tami&uddin Khanfs case, had not only given retrospective 
validity to laws declared invalid, but it also attempted to 
vest in the Governor-General power to make, by order, provision
o
as to the constitution of the country. The Court clearly 
could not recognise such power as vested in the Governor- 
General; and passed remarkes tantamount to a. direction to sum­
mon a representative body to replace the dissolved Assembly.
The decision "put an end to the Governor-General's endeavour 
by himself to restorethe constitutional machinery to life and 
to his intention to make the future constitution of Pakistan. 
The only alternative left to him was to rely on the army or 
to call a new Constituent Assembly”./ For obvious reasons 
the Governor-General chose the latter and proceeded to summon 
a new Assembly.
7 . G. Sawer, "Political Questions”
(1963) 15 University of Toronto Lax? Journal. 49,
8 . see Preamble and section 10, Ordinance IX of 1955,.
P*L.B. 1955 Central Statutes 63*
9^ Munir, Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan p.41 •
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It has been said earlier in the chapter that on 
April 15, 1955 the Governor-General issued the Constituent 
Convention Order summoning a Convention to meet on May 10, 
to make provisions for the constitution of the country. But in 
view of the remarks made by the Federal Court in hearing the 
Special Reference, suggesting the advisability of submitting 
to the Court the question relating to the powers and functions 
of the proposal convention, the Governor-General issued the 
Constituent Convention (postpor^ient of Election) Order,1955^°, 
postponing elections to the Convention, until the receipt of 
the report from the Federal Court on the Reference. Now, on 
the basis of the report of the Federal Court, the Constituent 
Assembly order, 1955^, was issued on .May 28, 1955* This order 
superseded the earlier Constituent Covention Order and provided 
for the setting up of a new Constituent Assembly, with all 
powers under the Independents Act• Section 3 of the Order, how­
ever, enpowered the Governor-General to summon, prorogue and 
also dissolve the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly was to 
have eighty members, including eleven non-Muslims, divided 
equally between the two wings of the country. Seventy two 
members were to be elected by the members of the existing 
Provincial Assemblies and other representative bodies by the 
method of proportional representation with the single trans-
IQ. G #G fsO. XL of 1955, P.L.D. 1955 Central Statutes 14-3*
11. G.G'sO. XEI of 1955, P.L.B. 1955 Central Statutes 161.
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ferable vote. Eight were to be selected according to the 
arrangements made by the Constituent Assembly.
The composition of the second Constituent Assembly 
was to be similar to its predecessor, except that East and 
V/est Pakistan were to have equal representation in it. As the 
Government had already announced its plan to merg£ the terri­
tories of V/est Pakistan into a single Province, equal represen­
tation in the Central legislature was provided to allay the 
fears of Bengali 'domination1 in the legislature in the minds 
of Punjab leaders. East Bengal, with a majority of population, 
was to have the same number of representatives in the Central 
legislature as the province of West Pakistan. This naturally 
arounsed resentment in East Bengal. The United Front, under 
the leadership of Fazlul Huq threatened to boycott the Assembly 
But the Prime Minister paid a visit to the eastern Province 
and, in exchange for a. promise of restoration of Parliamentary 
government in East Bengal, secured the United Front's consent. 
The Awami League, under their leader -Suhrawardy, the Law
Minister, in the central cabinet, had already accepted the
12parity formula.
Elections to. seventy two seats in the Constituent 
Assembly were heBd in June 1955* The Assembly met on July 5 
at Muree. It passed, the Representation of States and Tribal 
Areas Act, 1955^ making arrangement for the selection of
12. G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan
p.155.
13. P.L.D. 1955 Central Statutes 174.
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eight members for those areas. The Assembly then adjourned to 
meet in Karachi to undertake its primary task of making a 
Constitution for the country.
Chapter IV 
Analysis of the Breakdown
98
"Failure" of the Constituent Assembly*
The dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly 
by the Governor-General was held valid by the Federal Court, 
on the basis of facts supplied by the Governor-General in his 
Beference. The main reason given was that the Assembly, in 
apite of its existence for over seven years, which was a world 
record for framing any constitution in any country, had failed 
to prepare a constitution for the country. In the subsequent 
pages of this chapter we shall attempt an examination of the 
circumstances in which the Constituent Assembly had to function 
and an evaluation of its work. Later, the reasons given for 
the Governor-General*s action will be analysed and an endea­
vour made to identify what might be the real reasons for the 
dissokution of the Assembly.
On August 15, 194-7 > when Faddist an was created an 
independent state, the Constituent Assembly was entrusted 
with the task of making provision for the immediate govern­
ance of the country, in addition to its main function of 
preparing a permanent constitution for the nation. This sit­
uation compelled the Assembly to grapple first with the pro­
blems facing the new administration. These problems were 
enormous and, in tackling them, the Assembly had to postpone 
constitution-making for some time at leadt.
99
The immediate consequence of the creation of 
Pakistan was that muddle and discord prevailed in the Indo- 
Pakistan subcontinent during the years 1946-4-7• Pakistan was 
born in chaos and confusion.'1' While the new India suffered 
in the period of transition, Pakistan was virtually shattered. 
India inherited a working federal capital and instrumentali­
ties, but Pakistan bad to create a new federal capital and a 
provincial capital for East Bengal. Not only had a new 
Central Government to be created but in East Bengal a Pro­
vincial Government had to be organised.. The communal bitter­
ness that preceded, independence led all non-Muslim civil 
servants and other employees to opt for India and leave the 
country. This migration of state employees-created a complete 
vacuum, leading to serious disorganisation in the administra­
tion.
The economic structure was in a- state of disruption. 
With the end of the economic unity that had prevailed before 
independence, trade, commerce and communications had to be 
evolved anew, in conformity with the new political boundaries. 
To this desperate economic condition was added the burden of 
refugees, who came from India, in millions, most of them 
empty handed. They had to be given food, shelter and employ­
ment. The plight of refugees moving in both directions be­
tween the two dominions imposed a heavy burden on the resources
1. see E. Callard, Pakistan: A. Political Study, pp.18-20.
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of the new state*
In the face of the difficulties, relations with 
India were already strained over the partition arrangements*
It became tense over the issue of accession of native states 
like Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad. Over Kashmir the armies 
of both countries were engaged in war, until the cease fire 
in 194-8. Then came the canal water dispute. These protracted 
disputes between India and Pakistan, which started soon after 
independence, went on for years. While the canal water dispute 
was settled in I960 by an agreement reached under the auspices 
of the I fo r ld Bank, the Kashmir issue is nowhere in sight of 
settlement, even five years after the suicidal Indo-Pakistan 
war of September, 1965*
These problems would be difficult for any established 
government to tackle in normal situation. But the Pakistan 
authorities had to deal with them in anabnormal circumstance 
created by unprecedented events in the sub-continent. Both 
internally and externally the new state was threatened with 
disintegration. The first duty of the government under such 
conditions was to organise itself, and constitution-making
3
had to be postponed. And, in facing these intractable 
problems, Pakistan leaders cannot be said to have failed in 
the initial period. One American political scientist in this 
connection, observed, "Somehow through those early months 
Pakistan survived, and it is impossible to deny that this
2. A.Gledhill: Pakistan,The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution, p.?r.
3. G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan,
p.134.
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simple fact was a major achievement.tT
The Constituent Assembly had to provide leadership 
both in running the government of the country as well as in 
constitution-making* In .the initial period the Muslim League 
leaders, under the guidance of Jinnah, succeeded in establish­
ing an effective administration* But after Jinnah's death a
5
leadership crisis ensued* Liaquat Ali Khan, who succeeded 
Jinnah, nowhere approached Jinnah in personality and ability; 
the gap created by Jinnah's death could not be filled* Since 
then there has been no-one on Pakistan's political horizon 
capable of giving the country the much-needed national lead­
ership.
This state of political leadership, created a spec­
ial problem for the constitution-ijiakers. The Muslim leaders 
before independence had no time to think about the future 
constitution of the country and after independence they dev­
eloped no clear ideas. While in India the Government of
India Act, 1935 > provided a satisfactory basis for the new
6Constitution, in Pakistan, it was not expected to prove 
appropriate, Not only was it necessary to determine the place 
of the Sharia in the Constitution, but Pakistan leaders were 
faced with a peculiar problem of their own, caused by the
4. K* Callard, op.cit* p.14.
5* See Chapter II pp.3o-37.
6 . JU Gledhill, "The Constitutional Crisis in Pakistan
1954-55"9 Reprinted from Indian Year Book of International 
Affairs 1955 p.l.
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country’s geography* "It is therefore no matter for surprise
that the Indian Constituent Assembly was reaching the end of
its labours when, in March, 194-9* the Constituent Assembly
/ o f  Pakistan/ produced its first blue-print, the Objectives
7
Resolution. * . . " (
It may also be noted that prominent members of the 
Constituent Assembly had become members of the Government and 
among other members were most of the Provincial Chief Ministers, 
at least three Governors, two state rulers and even ambassadors
o
who were out of the country for years. These office-holders 
were pre-occupied with immediate problems, to which they gave 
more attention than to their functions as members of the 
A ssembly. Undoubtedly one of the reasons for the weakness of 
t£ie Constituent Assembly was that a high proportion of its 
members found themselves pre-occupied with important functions
9
not directly related to its main task of constitution-making.y
Those members who were left without any official 
post were the least able members, who filled the back-benches 
and were not expected to take any initiative in constitution- 
making. Moreover there was no wortji-while Opposition in the 
the Assembly. Persons capable of forming a good opposition 
group were deliberately precluded from participating in the 
proceedings. Suhrawardy was unseated in 194-8 on grounds of
7* Ibid. p.2.
8 . K. Callard, op.cit. p.81.
9. Ibid. p.83.
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non-residence and Abdul Ghaffar Khan was in gaol for the 
greater part of the duration of the Assembly.1^ Only the 
Pakistan Congress Party seemed capable of creating an opp­
osition which would make the government act* But its members 
with their inherited political views found agreement on policy 
difficult, so that they were inhibited from asserting them­
selves. Their loyalty to the country was suspect and even 
sincere efforts in the Assembly by them were not treated 
seriously. In the absence of any effective opposition 
factions soon developed among the members of the Muslim League 
Parliamentary Party in the Assembly. They were divided into 
different groups, opposed to each other, each group striving 
to shape the future constitution according to the interest of 
the group or the region it represented. This group-rivalry 
and lack of national outlook among politicians seriously 
hampered constitution-making in Pakistan.
The Constituent Assembly, in its endeavour to frame 
a constitution for the country, had to find solutions for 
such complicated issues as (a) the place of Islam in the fut­
ure constitution; (b) the State Languages; (c) the dist­
ribution of powers between the centre and the units; and 
(d) representation of the units in the future central legisl­
ature. As has been stated earlier,for these problems because 
of Pakistan's raison d'etre and geographical position, it was 
difficult to find acceptable solutions.
10. K. Callard, op.cit. p.85«
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It must, however, be noted that,, at the time when the 
Assembly was dissolved, it seemed to have found reasonable 
solutions for these problems.11 The draft Constitution of 1954* 
was accepted by the Ulema as sufficiently Islamic in charac­
ter and the Jamaat executive passed a resolution in favour of
12its adoption forthwith. Other provisions did not provoke
much controversey at the time, and the Prime Minister announced
in the Constituent Assembly their unanimous acceptance by
13members representing all regions. ^
But within a short time, the same old group-rivalry 
appeared again. The prospect of the immediate exercise of 
political power led to a breach in the unanimity on the question 
of ; representation in the central legislature. The 1Mohammed 
Adi Pormula', which had formed the basis of agreement on this
intricate issue, was condemned by the same groups which had
14been parties to it. The Punjabi group put forward a proposal 
for consolidating the Uest Pakistan provinces in a single unit. 
The Governor-General gave his support to this move and even 
threatened with PBODA /“The Public and Bespresentative Offices 
(Disqualification) Act7 proceedings those members from the
smaller provinces of West Pakistan, who would not support the
15integration scheme. ^ Bepresentation to the centre was a
11. See Chapter II pp. 32.-34.
12. Dawn, October 15» 1954-
13. Bee K. Callard, op.cit. pp.97-98 .
14-. G.U. Choudhury; Constitional Development in Pakistan p. 137
15. K.B. Sayeed. The Political System of Pakistan,p.73;
See also Chapter III supra.
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burhing issue in September^October, 1954-• Because of Ghulam 
Muhammad's known support for the Punjabi group, which con­
demned the ’Mohammed Ali Pormula1 one is inclined to hold that 
the disagreement on this issue materially contributed to the 
crisis leading to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.
The Achievements of the first Constituent Assembly.
The first Constituent Assembly, in fact, failed to 
give a constitution to the country. As constitution-making 
was the main function the Assembly was intended to perform, 
failure in this respect might lead one to conclude that it 
had failed utterly. But this would be a conclusion hastily 
drawn, without going into the activities of the Assembly 
during its long life of over seven years. It would not be justtc 
say that it lost interest in constitution-making. The Assembly 
due to adverse circumstances, had to start late and once it 
did so the Assembly was involved in other complicated problems, 
which had to be solved before the constitution could be dealt 
with. In the previous pages we have made an attempt to give a 
picture of the conditions and circumstances in which the first 
Constituent Assembly had to strive to make a constitution for 
the country.
The Assembly adopted the Objectives Resolution as 
late as March 194-9* and in the following year the first Basic 
Principles Committee Report was produced. But the Report pro­
voked grave resentment in East Bengal and the Ulema were not 
happy about it. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan did not live
\ I#6
to take any further step in constitution-making. He was 
assassinated in October, 1951 aad replaced by Khawaja Nazimuddin 
This change in the Government had an inevitable effect on 
everything and constitution-making was no exception. But 
Nazimuddin presented the second Basic Principles, Committee 
Report in December 1952. This time opposition to the Report 
came from Punjab and, before it could be fully considered, 
Khawaja Nazimuddin was dismissed by the Governor-General, 
Ghulaen Muhammed. This change again broke the continuity and 
caused delay. In fact, it has been alleged that the main rea­
son for Nazimuddinfs removal was that his constitutional pro­
posals were disliked by the Governor-General and the Punjabi 
politicians.
The last attempt at constitution-making by the first 
Constituent Assembly was made under the leadership of Mohammed 
Ali of Bogra, who had succeeded Khawaja Nazimuddin. The Prime 
Minister submitted the third Basic Principles Committee Report 
in October, 1953* and, after prolonged deliberations, it was 
adopted by the Assembly in September, 1954-. The draft Constit­
ution was to be submitted to the Assembly at its next session, 
fixed for October 27. The problems which had previously de­
layed agreement seemed to have been solved and, according to 
the Prime Minister*s announcement, the nation was going to have 
the constitution in the new year. But again the same group
that had opposed the Nazimuddin proposals started assailing the
16new proposals, although they had accepted them earlier. The
16. Por details of the proposals, see Chapter II, pp.3i-3J4*
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Governor-General) this time, did not take action against any 
individual. Because of the Assembly1s constitutional proposals 
and its move directed against Ghulam Muhammed himself, the 
Constituent Assembly itself had to be dissolved. The work of 
the first Constituent Assembly will be properly appreciated if 
it is realised that almost all the basic solutions it gave to 
complete constitutional issues were adopted by the second 
Constituent Assembly without much change. The only major 
changes in the state structure provided by the Constitution of 
1956 were the establishment of the West Pakistan Province and 
representation at the centre on the basis of parity between 
the two units. But it may be pointed out that the 1Mohammed 
Ali Formula1 had also envisaged the principle of parity in a 
joint session of the two chambers of Parliament which was to 
decide major issues and controversies. Possibly the unifica­
tion of West Pakistan was the one thing desired by the power­
ful group that caused the disruption of the first Constituent 
Assembly*s work. The object of the unification of West 
Pakistan was to counterbalance East Bengal. The Punjabi group, 
with the support of the Governor-General, was successful in 
its design.
The brief discussion above would show that it was 
not the first Constituent Assembly itself that failed to give 
the country a constitution; it had sbLI but completed this 
task; it was not allowed to complete it. Commenting on the 
subject, Professor G.W. Choudhury observed that "The compari­
son between the draft Constitution of the first constituent
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Assembly and that finally adopted by the second Constituent
Assembly reinforced the conclusion that the first Assembly
failed to fulfil its mission, not because of any inherent
defects in the proposals which it made but because a group of
politicians deliberately sabotaged its attempts to give the
17country a Constitution”. 1
*fcs
Grounds given forAdissolution
The Proclamation of October 24-, 1954- said that serious 
political crises had "convinced” the Governor-General that the 
constitutional machinery had broken down; the Constituent 
Assembly had lost the confidence of the people, and could no 
longer function. There was, therefore, according to the Govern­
or-General^ assessment, a serious 'political crisis' raging 
in the country in September-October, 1954-• It is proposed here 
to discuss the political situation in the country prevailing at 
the relevant time.
In East Bengal, after the provincial elections in 
March, the United Pront Party formed a Government, but within 
two months that Government was dismissed and Governor's rule 
under section 92A of the Act of 1935 was imposed. During the 
tenure of the United Pront Government serious industrial trouble 
took place in the Province. The Central Government sent dir­
ections, which the Provincial Government was, reportedly rel­
uctant to obey. The reason for the suspension of the provin-
17• G.W. Choudhury, op.cit. p. 14-0.
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cial constitution was the 1 serious political crisis in the 
Province'* Major-General Iskander Mirza, then Secretary in 
the Ministry of Defence, was appointed Governor of East Bengal* 
Under the strong rule of General Mirza 'normaley* was claimed 
to have been soon restored and there was no sign of trouble 
whatsoever in the Province. The component Parties of the 
United Pront were, however, engaged in mutually accusing each 
other, of misconduct, and a visible break in the polarisation
1 o
within the Pront was taking place.
It has been alleged that the central ruling clique
and its Muslim League Party, which had been routed in the East
Bengal elections, could not readily accept the United Pront
victory. Industrial trouble and problems for the Provincial
Government were, therefore, fomented, and, on the pretext of
its failure to tackle these problems, the Provincial Government
was dismissed. This allegation may not be the whole truth.
19But after General Mirza's clearing up of the "mess" y the Prov­
incial administration certainly improved and there was no app­
arent political crisis in East Bengal. As for the suspension 
of the provincial constitution, it may be said that, when Gov­
ernor's rule was imposed in May, it was not expected that par­
liamentary government would be restored in the Province till 
a team of East Bengal legislators acceptable to the Centre had 
been found.
18. See Chapter II pp.ifM*-
19* See Mirza1s statement, Dawn November 18, 1954*.
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In the V/est Pakistan Provinces of the Punjab, Sind 
and North-West Frontier the Provincial Governments were exer­
cising control of their respective provincial administrations. 
There was no sign of instability in any of the Provinces. A 
crisis, however, came, when, after the dissolution of the Con­
stituent Assembly, the Centre wanted to impose its 'One-Unit1 
plan. The Pirzada Ministry of Sirud had to go first, for its 
opposition to the 'one-unit' plan; Firoz Khan Noon in the
Punjab and Sardar Abdur Rashid in the Frontier met the same
20fate for a similar reason.
At the Centre the Mohammed Ali Government, after its 
unconventional appointment in April 1953* had already $&<HAred
i
the support of the Assembly. There was no known move against 
the Cabinet. Even those who would question the rationale of 
the Mohammed Ali Government were beginning to appreciate its 
apparent success in constitution-making. The nation was eager 
to have a constitution as early as possible, not because it 
was expected to give solutions to all problems, but because 
people were weary of the wrangling over constitutional issues. 
Any Constitution would, it was believed, put an end to this 
wrangling, and elections j under the new Constitution would 
enable the nation to return representatives who would deal 
with other pressing problems. The country was, therefore, 
preparing itself to receive the Constitution at the end of 
December, when, on the ground of a hypothetical political
20. See Chapter III pp. £$-7/.
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crisis, the Constituent Assembly was dissdyed and the nation1s 
wish disappointed.
Demands for the dissolution of the Constituent Ass­
embly were not altogether absent. From time to time on diff­
erent constitutional issues one or other of the opposition 
groups would express lack of confidence in the Assembly. Opp­
osition to the Assembly was particularly intensified in East 
Bengal after the provincial elections, when a. call for the 
resignation of East Bengal Members of the Assembly was made, 
as it was evident from the election results that, being members 
of the Muslim League Party, they did not represent the people 
of the Province. But no heed was paid to such demands. It 
was said that the result of a provincial election was no 
ground for the dissolution of the national legislature; prac­
tices of other countries, specially Commonwealth countries, 
were cited. Not only did the Members of the Assembly assert 
their duty to frame a constitution under the Mandate1 given 
by the nation but even the Governor-General as 'the guardian
21
of the Constitution' did not feel that any action was necessary
The Constituent Assembly went ahead with constitution 
making and adopted the draft constitution only a month before 
its dissolution. The constitutional proposals, when published 
did not provoke much opposition from any quarter* Complete 
unanimity on all constitutional proposals was, however, not to 
be expected. The mood of the nation at that time indicated
21. G.W. Choudhury: Constitutional Development in Pakistan
p.144.
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that the people at large were prepared to accept the Constitu­
tion. But when the Constituent Assembly, adopted the draft 
Constitution and passed Acts curtailing the Governor-Generalrs
powers, it lost the confidence of the Governor-General, who
22summarily dismissed it.
Background of the Governor-General*s attitude and Action.
From the analysis of the grounds given for dissolu­
tion of the Constituent Assembly, it becomes apparent that the 
real grounds were not the so-called 'political crisis' or the 
'non-confidence of the people in the Assembly*, but something 
else. Xn order to identify those causes, we shall, first of all, 
consider Ghulam Muhammad's career and his attitude towards the 
democratic processes.
Ghulam Muhammad succeeded Khawaja Nazimuddin as the 
third Governor-General of Pakistan, following the assassination 
of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October, 1951* Ghulam 
Muhammad, started his early career as a civil servant in the j  
pre-independence Indian Audit and Accounts Service. He later 
served in the autocratic Court of the Nizam of Hyderabad.
After independence he was co-opted by the Muslim League Party an 
and was appointed a Minister in the first Pakistan Cabinet as 
an expert in Finance. He had no association with democratic 
politics or representative institutions. He was "...active, 
ambitious and somewhat given to intrigue, but he was also the
22. See Ibid. p.145
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product of the Indian Civil Service, with all its traditions
of vigorous executive action, especially in times of crisis or
23failures of political leadership*n  ^ By training and tempera­
ment Ghulam Muhammad had little respect for democratic prin­
ciples or the politicians* Like most pre-independence civil 
servants, he did not like the political processes and inter­
ference with the administration by politicians. As Governor- 
General he found it difficult to recognise the politicians* 
claim to rule the country, particularly when, in Ghulam Muh­
ammad's opinion, the country was suffering from mal-administ- 
ration.
Factionalism within the ruling Muslim League Party 
gave Ghulan Muhammad the opportunity to exercise executive 
powers. The indecisiveness and inept policies of the Nazim­
uddin Cabinet on various national issues caused a steady dec­
line of the authority of the politicians, so that the civil 
servants, led by the Governor-General himself, were in actual 
control of the Government. In such circumstances Ghulan Muh- 
amrned could display his power by summarily dismissing the
Nazimuddiu Cabinet in April,1955» which "demonstrated without
24-doubt who exercised effective power". In his action against 
the Cabinet the Governor-General had the support of the civil 
service and the army. The dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin and
25* K.J. Newman, "Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and its 
Causes". (1959)52 Pacific Affairs 18.
24* K #B. Sayeed, "The Political Hole of Pakistan's Civil 
Service" * (.1958)31 Pacific Affairs 131.
114
the appointment of Mohammed Ali, as the Prime Minister showed 
Ghulam Muhammad1s utter disregard for any democratic conven­
tions. He himself selected the members of the new Cabinet and 
distributed portfolios among them and even "... ./d7ecisions in 
the Mohammed Ali Cabinet were often made by the Governor-Gen­
eral in consultation with its more powerful members; he was
no longer a figure-head but an active participant in the form-
25ation of Cabinet policies and decisions." ^ After this dis­
play of force, power in Pakistan rested not with the politic­
ians belonging to Muslim League::Party, but with the civil 
servants under the control of the Governor-General. There was 
no possible alternative government.
Ghulam Muhammad*s idea of government was perhaps best 
suited to such a set-up. This view gains support from the 
statements and utterances of Iskander Mirza about the nature 
of the future constitution, which he untiringly propagated as
the spokesman of the regime after the dissolution of the Con-
26stituent Assembly. The regime favoured a unitary form of 
Government for Pakistan, the Head of the state having adequate 
powers to act whenever necessary. The Governor-General re­
jected the idea of becoming a titular head, as proposed in the 
draft Constitution. His training and his intense love for 
power made him a. miserable misfit as the Head of the State in 
a, parliamentary system of government.. All his actions and mea­
25. G.&. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan. p.A7
26. See chapter III pp.6ty-£6*
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sures prove that 11 he scorned the idea of any parliamentary
government in Pakistan, He pretended to favour the American
system of executive but his real model was the viceregal system
27of the British period.,.n ( Even occupation of the highest 
office in the state could not change Ghulam Muhammad's attitude 
and philosophy, which had been ingrained in him during his 
career as a civil servant.
The background of Ghulam Muhammad was not the only 
reason for his actions during the period 1955-1954-• ^he motive 
behind his executive actions was possibly the cumulative effect 
of his lust for individual power and his strong support for 
a particular group of politicians and their political designs# 
Ghulam Muhammad, while Finance Minister in the Liaquat Ali Khan 
Cabinet, was regarded as the leader of the 'Punjabi Group*. 
"Although the apparent unity of the Cabinet system was manifest­
ed during the life-time of Liaquat, and the.worst form of fac­
tionalism inside the Cabinet had not yet been manifested, yet 
the Punjabi-Bengali rift inside the Cabinet could be traced 
even in Liaquat*s Cabinet. One group was headed by the Fin­
ance Minister, Ghulam Muhammad, the other by Mr.Fazlur Rahman,
p Q
the Commerce Minister." After the assassination of Liaquat
Ali Khan, Ghulam Muhammad's nomination for the office of the
Governor-General had received the support of the Bengali group, 
which wished to weaken the Punjabi group both in the Cabinet
27# G.W. Choudhury, op.cit. p.4-5 
28. Ibid. p.42.
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and in the Assembly*
The Bengali group also thought that the appointment
of Ghulam Muhammad as the Governor-General would deprive its
rival, the Punjabi group, of his services but that it would
be required of the person holding the high office of Governor-
General that he would maintain neutrality and rise above
group policies* But this expectation proved futile* As
Governor-General, Ghulam Muhammad gave his support to his
2Q
former group whenever it was needed* J The dismissal of the 
Nazimuddui Government in April 1953 might be regarded as typical 
of his authoritarian attitude, his disregard for constitution­
alism, and his allegiance to a particular group of politicians. 
Khawaja Nazimuddui had already earned the wrath of the Punjabi 
politicians for his constitutional proposals made in the Basic 
Principles Committee Report of 1952* Be further antagonsied 
them by effecting the resignation of Mumtaz Daultana's Govern­
ment in the Punjab for its mishandling of the relgious distur- 
bances in Lahore. These two issues must have combined to 
cause disaffection to the Prime Minister in the Punjabi group. 
Mushtaq Ahmad in describing the incident quoted from Ghulam 
Muhammad's. address to the Karachi Rotarians on 8th April, 1953 
where he strongly defended the Government's policies, and 
observed: "There were no differences between the Prime Mini­
ster and the Governor-General on matters of domestic or for-
29* Ibid* p.4-6.
30. See Chapter II p.43
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eign policy*, Ghulam Muhammad's public statement and speeches 
throughout this period did not give even the faintest hint of 
a rift between him and Khawaja Nazimuddin* It is impossible 
to suggest what impelled the Governor-General:to dismiss the 
Prime Minister only ten days after he had put up a. vehement 
defence of the policy of the Nazimuddin Government1 The 
press communique issued on April 17, 1953 stated that "the 
Cabinet of Khawaja Nazimuddin has proved entirely inadequate 
to grapple with the difficulties facing the country*” The 
Governor-General did not mention any facts in support of this 
assertion. His action can, therefore, only be explained in 
terms of his strong alignment with the Punjabi group, which 
wanted Nazimuddin's removal. His dismissal seems to have been 
ai^act of political revenge, manipulated by the Punjabi group 
led by Mumtaz Haultana. Once Ghulam Muhammad was convinced by 
the reasoning of the group, he was expected, because of his 
authoritarian training and attitude, to act and he did act.
Ghulam Muhammad*s appointment of Mohammed Ali of 
Bogra, then Ambassador to the United States, as the Prime Min­
ister also indicates the authoritarian traits in his character, 
as well as his group alighment. Mohammed Ali was not a member 
of the legislature at the time of his appointment, nor had he 
any close association with the Muslim League Parliamentary
Party in the Constituent Assembly. But these facts carried no 
weight with Ghulam Muhammad. He and his group wanted a. Prime
31. Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan 
(1959), p.11.
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32Minister from Bengal., who would be acceptable to them. So
strong was the influence of the Governor-General over the
members of the Assembly that he took for granted their support
for his nominee. As Governor-General of an independent Dom­
inion, with a parliamentary form of government, Ghulam Muh­
ammad acted on these occasions in total disregard of all par­
liamentary rules and coventions.
Behaviour of the Assembly.
Immediately before its dissolution, the Constituent 
Assembly passed the two important Acts - the Public and Rep­
resentative Offices (Disqualification) (Repeal) Act, 1954, 
and the Government of India. (Fifth Amendment)Act, 1954, - 
drastically curtailing the powers of the Governor-General. ^
The first Act repealed an Act of 1949, which had hitherto been 
regarded as an effective weapon in the hands of the executive 
for keeping the politicians under control. The repealing Act 
was passed in unprecedented haste when a number of proceedings 
under it were contemplated. Not only had some members of the 
smaller Provinces of West Pakistsgi been, reportedly, threatened
with PRODA proceedings, simply because they were opposed to the
34-Qne-unit scheme, but it was also rumoured that “the Governor-
32. See K. Callard, Pakistan. A. Political Study, p.138 
35« See Chapter II pp.si-£*3 .
34. See K.B. Sayeed: The Political System of Pakistan ,fp.73-74.
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General was actually considering twenty-two PRODA petitions, 
most of them against members' Prom Bengal• tl^  The hasty removal 
of this powerful weapon from the hands of the Governor-General 
naturally enraged Ghulam Muhammad.
The second Act - the Government of India (Fifth 
Amendment) Act 1954- - amended the original sections 9 and 10 
of the Act of 1955, severely curtailing the Governor-General *‘s 
power in respect of appointment and dismissal of the Prime 
Minister and other Ministers. It also required him to act 
strictly in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet. In 
defence of this Amendment Act, it was said that Ghulam Muh­
ammad was contemplating action against the Mohammed Ali Gov­
ernment, and Binder is inclined to assign some credibility to 
this assumption. He argues, "Had there been no danger that 
the Governor-General might use his wide powers again to dismiss 
the Prime Minister, and somehow prevent the adoption of the 
draft Constitution, there would have been no need to pass this
legislation in such haste, and with such little regard for
56the usual procedure in the House.
But whatever might be the reason for the enactment of 
these two Acts in September 1954-, it was quite clear that the 
Governor-General, who was at that time away from Karachi, ccmld 
not accept these measures with good grace. These measures of
35* Binder, Beligion and Politics in Pakistan p.557 
36. Ibid.
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the Constituent Assembly obviously aggravated the situation.
But the Constituent Assembly had already earned the displeasure 
of the Governor-General by adopting the draft Constitution, which 
was to be finally adopted by the Assembly on October 27# The 
draft Constitution, incorporating conventions regarding resp­
onsible cabinet government, provided for a. Head of the State 
who was merely a constitutional figure-head. Being thoroughly 
bureaucratic in background and in temperament, Ghulam Muhammad 
never liked the ideas of a parliamentary form of government, 
which would seriously jeopardise his position as Head of the 
State. He believed in vigorous and efficient administration 
and so preferred the pre-independence Viceregal system. The 
provisions in the proposed constitution relating to the Head 
of the State - shorn of all effective powers - were, therefore, 
unacceptable to Ghulam Muhammad, whose authoritarian attitude
was further indicated by his desire to promulgate a constitution
37by order or decree of the Governor-General. ( In the Proc­
lamation dissolving the Constituent Assembly, fresh elections 
were promised. But once the Governor-General received the sup­
port of the Federal Court in Tamizuddin Khan!s case, Ghulam 
Muhammad apparently wanted to forget about elections and in­
tended to frame and promulgate the Constitution himself.
A. further possible reason for the Governor-General1s
displeasure towards the Constituent Assembly was its refusal 
to accept a scheme of sub-federation in West Pakistan. This
37* see Chapter III pp. 93-9^.
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scheme was put forward by the Punjabi leaders to counter­
balance the * united' Bengali group in the future central leg- 
38islature. Ghulam Muhammad gave his support to this plan. But
after the curtailment of the Governor-General1s powers by the
Constituent Assembly, Ghulam Muhammad found himself without
any coercive power in his hands to emable him to exert any
pressure on the Members.
Not only were the existing position of the Constituent
Assembly and the future provisions of the draft Constitution
scorned by the Governor-General, but the transitional arrange-
i>£-fcrfe
ments for the period^the Constitution came into force made 
his own position uncertain and insecure. These arrangements 
provided for the continuance of the Constituent Assembly till 
the first meeting of the Parliament elected under the new 
Constitution. But the Governor-General would not serve aut­
omatically as the first President. The provisional President 
would be elected by the Constituent Assembly, and it was pos­
sible that Ghulam Muhammad would be dropped by a hostile 
Assembly. "This was an open threat on the one hand to remove 
the Governor-General, and on the other to extend the transit- 
ionaH period. The central and provincial ministers would all. 
continue in office as before.... everyone, in fact, except His 
Excellency Mr. Ghulam Muhammad was assured of staying on under 
the new regime.11^  In these transitional provisions and the
38. Ibid. pp.
39. L. Binder, Religion ad Politics in Pakistan, p.356*
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political manoeuvring that was going on, Ghulam Muhammad read 
a threat to his own position. He therefore decided to act 
and struck at the Assembly, which he regarded as the base for 
launching attacks against him.
Prom the above discussion it is evident that several 
factors combined to make the political atmosphere of Pakistan 
tense and volatile during the later part of the year 1954*
There were moves and counter-moves before the final showdown 
between the Governor-General and the Constituent Assembly.
The repeal of PRODA and the amendments of section 10 of the 
Government of India Act, 1935? were the most immediate causes. 
But the temporary provisions in the event of the Constitution 
coming into effect and the provisions relating to the powers 
of the Head of the Stare in the draft Constitution were also 
strongly disliked by the Governor-General. Being a supporter 
of the Punjabi group, Ghulam Muhammad also did not like the 
provisions in the draft Constitution for representation in the 
central legislature. He gave his support to the integration 
of West Pakistan.* The adoption and promulgation of the Con­
stitution, as promised, would have frustrated Ghulam Muhammad's 
plans on all these issues. With the support of the civil 
service and the armed forces^- the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army General Ayub Khan became Minister of Defence in the re­
constituted. Cabinet - Ghulam Muhammad, by dissolving the Con­
stituent Assembly, prevented it once and for aid from adopting
40. See K.B. Sayeed; The Political System of Pakistan, p*74#
the draft constitution. There has been a political struggle 
between the Constituent Assembly, dominated by the Bengali 
group and the Governor-General and his Punjabi group. The 
Governor-General and his supporters, being in possession of the 
coercive powers of the State, emerged victorious.
Reflections
In considering the events and Court’s decisions set 
out in this and the previous chapter, one is disposed to ask 
whether Muslims regard other laws as having the same validity 
as the Sharia and whether Pakistan politicians recognise that 
stable government demands that the views of political opponents 
should not be ignored and that deadlock should be avoided by 
compromise]
Pakistan politicians almost from the very beginning 
divided themselves into different groups with uncompromising 
attitudes on constitutional and other issues, conduct part­
icularly reprehensible, when one considers the geographical 
position of the country. Mutual suspicion between individuals 
and groups made agreements on important issues impossible.
In advancing the group or regional interest these politicians 
seemed to have forgotten that politics was the art of the pos­
sible and rigid adherence to one’s views would not lead to any 
solution. It is unfortunate that the incumbent of the highest 
office also could not remain aloof from this curse of group 
alignment. Absence of goodwill and an attitude of accommoda­
tion and lack of national outlook in the political leaders
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were responsible for aggravating a situation which, even in 
normal conditions, would have been difficult to tackle.
In the conflict between the Governor-General and the 
first Constituent Assembly, it must be recognised that the 
latter, by its:, dilatory behaviour and incompetence, had not 
acted in accordance with the spirit of the Independence Act 
and it was deliberately provocative in its attempt to fetter 
the hands of the Governor-General* It had taken advantage of 
a lacuna in the Independence Act to exercise powers not con­
templated when the Act was passed and it deliberately brought 
about a crisis. But instead of seeking a less spectacular sol­
ution the Governor-General precipitated a trial of strength 
with the Assembly.
Though the federation eventually succeeded in esta­
blishing that the Assembly's constitutional legislation re­
quired the assent of the Governor-General, it is to be noted 
that all the judges of the SiywI Chief Court and one judge of 
the Federal Court thought otherwise. Assent was not regarded 
as necessary in India and the same view had been taken in 
Pakistan until the Federal Court heard lamiz.udditi Khanfis case 
on appeal. When in that case it was contended that the doc­
trine of contemporanious exposition should be applied, the 
Chief Justice held that it could not be applied, because there 
was no doubt as to the meaning of the statute. It is submitted 
that the interpretation of the relevant provision until 
Tamizuddin Khan's case reached the Federal Court, shows clearly 
that there must at least have been a doubt.
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To validate the dismissal of the Assembly, the Fed­
eral Court held that notwithstanding the absence of any pro­
vision in the Independence Act, the Governor-General could, by 
relying on the prerogative, dismiss the Assembly. One cannot 
dismiss the thought that no such argument would have been 
heard, if it had been raised when there was no constitutional 
crisis and the constitutional crisis was created by the Gov­
ernor-General. It is unusual for a Court to allow a person to 
take advantage of his own wrong. If the politicians of 
Pakistan are disposed to give allegiance to those who hold 
power, it would seem that in Pakistan the Courts are sensitive 
to the difficulties of Government.
As already stated, while supporting the Governor- 
General, the politicians generally regarded his conduct as 
illegal. They do not seem to have regarded the constitutional 
law as a basic fundamental law, the law-creating machinery 
under which laws are made. It was to be pleaded when conveni­
ent, ignored when it was not. If, from the inception of 
Pakistan, the public men adopted such an attitude is it a 
matter of surprise that it proved impossible to find a con­
stitution which they were able and willing to work?
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Chapter V
Circumstances Preceding "Martial Lawrt in 1958
Constitution-Making - A Fresh Start
The second Constituent Assembly started to 
function in earnest as soon as the formalities with 
regard to its composition were complete. There were 
substantial differences between the membership of the 
first and the second Constituent Assembly. 11 Only
fourteen persons who were members of the first Con­
stituent Assembly at dissolution were returned."^* 
Significant changes were particularly visible in the 
representation from East Bengal; Fazlul Huq and 
Suhrawardy, representing the two powerful political 
factions in the new leadership of the province, Mohammad 
Ali, the Prime Minister, and Fazlur Rahman, the veteran 
Muslim Leaguer, were returned from East Bengal. From 
West Pakistan, though changes occurred, veterans like 
Daultana, Gurmani, Mamdot, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Feroz 
Khan Noon and Khuhro were the leading figures. Iskandar
Mirza, the Interior Minister in the 'Cabinet of talents1
2
and Br Khan Sahib were new members from West Pakistan.
1. K# Callard, Pakistan; A Political Study, p. 119*
2. Ibid.
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Whereas in the first Assembly the Muslim
League was the strongest party, it was a minority in
the second Assembly, with only thirty-three out of
eighty members. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali was elected
leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party in
August, 1955 and, as Prime Minister, formed the Muslim
League - United Front coalition government.
"Plans for a coalition with the 
Awami League, on the basis that 
Mr Suhrawardy, then Law Minister, 
should be Prime Minister, that 
there should be joint electorates 
and that Bengali should be a state 
language, gave way to a coalition 
between the Muslim League and the 
United Front, on the basis that Mr 
Suhrawardy should be excluded,
Vest Pakistan should be integrated 
into a single unit and there should 
be provincial autonomy." 4
Suhrawardy and his Awami League, therefore, moved into
opposition.
The Assembly, under the leadership of the new 
Prime Minister, was anxious to provide constitutional 
machinery for the country. Its first task, therefore, was 
to validate constitutional legislations, declared invalid
3. A. Gledhill, Pakistan, The Development of its Laws 
and Constitution, p. 119• Other tarty strength:
United Front - 16; Awami League - 13; Minorities 
11; Independents - 7; See Ibid., p. 81.
4. Ibid., p. 82.
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by the Federal Court hut given temporary validity 
subject to the Assembly’s decision* The Assembly 
passed the Validation of Laws Act, 1955^ in October,
1955 validating retrospectively thirty-eight of the 
Acts passed by its predecessor* This measure formally 
restored the legal and constitutional continuity of 
the administrative machinery of the State, which had 
been threatened ominously by the Federal Court's judg­
ment in Tamizuddin Khan's case. It may be noted that 
the list of validated Acts did not include those designed 
to curtail the arbitrary and discretionary powers of 
the Governor-General. For instance, the Government of 
India (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1954* which thoroughly 
amended sedtbns 9 and 10 of the Government of India Act, 
1935 seriously restricting the Governor-General's 
powers in respect of appointment and dismissal of 
ministers was not included in the list.
The next constitutional measure enacted by 
the second Constituent Assembly integrated the terri­
tories of West Pakistan into a single province. The 
regime was convinced that the removal of political
5* P*L.D* 1955* Central Statutes 289*
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boundaries between the provinces and other territories 
of West Pakistan would not only entail economic and 
administrative advantages, but would also simplify the 
question of provincial representation at the Centre#
With only two units - East and West Pakistan - repre­
sentation could be on the basis of parity between the 
two units. (The Establishment of West Pakistan Act,
1955 was passed in September, 1955* creating the new 
province of West Pakistan, administered by a single 
government. Existing laws were to continue in force 
till legally amended, but the administration of the 
Special Areas'7 was to remain unchanged; legislation 
would only apply there if the Governor, with the 
Governor-General's approval, so directed.
According to the provisions of the Act, the 
Interim Provincial Assembly for West Pakistan was to 
consist of three hundred and ten members, ten seats 
being reserved for women. Por a period of ten years, 
representatives from Punjab were not to exceed forty 
per cent, of the total membership. The Interim Assembly
6. P.L.D. 1955» Central Statutes 273*
7. Special Areas comprised the Tribal Areas of 
Baluchistan, N.W.P.P. and States of Amb, Chitral, 
Dir and Swat; see Section 2(5) of the Act.
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was to exercise all powers and functions of a provincial 
assembly under the Government of India Act, 1935*
There was to he a single High Court of West Pakistan, 
in which the High Court of Lahore, the Chief Court of 
Sind and the Judicial Commissioners1 Courts of North- 
West Frontier Province and Baluchistan were merged.
The new High Court was to have territorial jurisdiction 
over the whole Province of West Pakistan, and to 
exercise such powers and authority as were previously 
exercised by the High Court at Lahore. The principal 
seat of the Court was to be at Lahore, with Benches at 
Karachi and Peshawar. The Karachi Bench was to exercise 
the same original civil and criminal jurisdiction as
Q
the former Chief Court of Sind. By an Order of the 
Governor-General of October 5* 1955*^ th e new Province 
came into being on October 14, 1955*
Outline of the Constitution of 1956
The Constituent Assembly then proceeded to 
its main task of constitution-making. Unlike its
8 . High Court of West Pakistan (Establishment) Order,
1955 G-G's 0 XIX of 1955; P*L.D. Central Statutes, 298.
9. Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955 (Order 
under Section 2); P.L.D. 1955 Central Statutes, 295*
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predecessor, the second Constituent Assembly did not 
appoint any committee to prepare a draft. Instead, 
the government prepared its own draft, which was pub­
lished in January, 1956. ^  The government, it appears, 
with the tacit understanding of the House, wanted to 
frame the constitution without much fuss; taking notice, 
of course, of the agreements and understandings reached 
by the first Constituent Assembly. Except on the 
matters of provincial autonomy and the constitution of 
the legislatures, the Constitution Bill was not very 
different from the draft constitution of 1954-•
After some amendments and lengthy deliberations, during 
which the Opposition walked out, when Suhrawardy!s
appeal for a round table conference to discuss the
12contentious issues was turned down, the Bill was 
passed on February 17 and the Constitution came into 
effect on March 23> 1956*
The 1956 Constitution in its general frame­
work was a logical continuation of the Government of 
India Act, 1935* The State of Pakistan was to be a
10. K. Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, p. 121.
11. A. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 83.
12. K. Callard, op.cit♦, p. 121.
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federal Republic, with the Whitehall form of government
both at the centre and in the provinces* It was a
quasi-federal constitution, with a strong centre,
having power to give directions to the provincial 
1-5governments, ^ and to suspend the provincial constitution
14-in an emergency* The legislative powers were dis­
tributed by three lists - Federal, Concurrent and
Provincial - leaving the residuary powers with the 
1*5provinces* ^ The federal list took priority over the
other two, but a law on an exclusive provincial subject
passed by a provincial legislature could "travel” on
the federal field* If a central law on a concurrent
matter conflicted with a provincial lav/ on the same
subject, the former would prevail and the latter, to
the extent of inconsistency, would be void, unless it
16had received the assent of the President* The 
executive authority of the Federation extended to all 
matters on which Parliament had power to make laws and 
that of the provinces to all matters on the provincial
13* Constitution of Pakistan, 1956, Article 126(2). 
I4-. Ibid., Article 193*
15. Ibid*, Article 109*
16. Ibid., Article 110.
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and concurrent list, but Parliament could etolude the
provincial executive power on any matter on which it
could legislate for a province.
The executive authority of the Federation
vested in the President, acting on the advice of the
Cabinet except in cases where he was empowered to act
17in his discretion, ( which covered the appointment and 
dismissal of the Prime Minister, the appointment of the 
Chairman and other members of the Election Commission,
the Delimitation Commission and the Federal Public
(
Service Commission. .The President was to be elected 
by an electoral college consisting of members of the 
National Assembly and the two Provincial Assemblies; 
he had to be a Muslim and not less than forty years of
no
age. The normal term of office of the President 
was five years, but the President could resign and be 
impeached and removed by a resolution passed by the 
National Assembly on a charge of violation of the Con­
stitution or gross misconduct.*^ The Supreme Command
17. Ibid., Article 37(7)-
18. Ibid., Article 32.
19. Ibid., Article 35*
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of the Armed Forces vested in the President, who
appointed the Commande^in-Chief of the Army, Navy
and Air Force# The President was to make rules for
the allocation and transaction of business of the
federal government; and the Prime Minister had the
constitutional duty to keep the President informed on
all affairs of the administration of the Federation and
20legislative proposals*
The real executive powers of the Federation
was, however, to be exercised by the Cabinet with the
Prime Minister at its head. The Prime Minister was to
be appointed by the President from amongst the members of
the National Assembly, who, in the opinion of the
President, was likely to command the confidence of the
majority, other Ministers being appointed by the President
on the advice of the Prime Minister# The Cabinet was
collectively responsible to the National Assembly and
the Prime Minister was not to be removed unless the
President was satisfied that the former had lost the
21confidence of the majority in the Assembly# What the
20# Ibid*, Article 42#
21. Ibid*, Article 3 7•
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Constitution contemplated was cabinet government, with 
the Westminster conventions and a constitutional head 
of State*
The same pattern was followed in the provinces.
The executive authority of a province was vested in
the Governor, who was to act in accordance with the
advice of the Cabinet, with the Chief Minister at its
head. The Governor was to be appointed by the President
to hold office during his pleasure, though the normal
tenure of office was five years. He had to be a
22citizen and not less than forty years of age, but need
not be a Muslim. The Chief Minister was to be appointed
by the Governor from amongst the members of the Provincial
Assembly; it was necessary that he should command the
confidence of the majority. Other Ministers were
appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief 
23Minister. y The Governor occupied in relation to the 
Chief Minister and his Cabinet a position similar to that
PZL
of the President in relation to the federal cabinet. 
Subject to directions from the federal government under 
Article 126, and the provisions for suspension of the
22. Ibid., Article 70.
2J. Ibid., Article 71*
24. M. Munir, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, p . 43.
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provincial constitution under an emergency, the Con­
stitution of 1956 provided for representative and 
responsible government in the provinces, where the 
peoplefs representatives, forming the Cabinet, were 
to exercise real executive powers.
The federal legislature consisted of the 
President and a single chamber hnown as the National 
Assembly with three hundred and ten members, ten seats
being reserved for women. One half of the total
25members were to be elected from each wing. ^ The
President was to summon, prorogue and dissolve the
National Assembly; the normal life of the Assembly was
five years. The President could address the National
27Assembly and send messages to it. f The Assembly was 
empowered to frame its own rules of procedure; the 
proceedings and utterances of the members within the 
Assembly were immune from judicial proceedings and
PSParliament was entitled to determine other privileges. 
Bills passed by the National AssemMy required the
25* Constitution of Pakistan, 1956, Article 4-4-.
26. Ibid., Article 50.
27* Ibid., Article 52.
28. Ibid., Article 56.
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29assent of the President to become law. '
Following the fundamental financial procedure
in the Commonwealth, the Constitution provided for
-50the initiation of money Bills by the executive,
51but taxes were to be levied only by an Act of Parliament.
The Annual Financial Statement was to be divided into
two parts, enumerating "charged" and "voted11 beads of
expenditure, and in respect of the "charged" expenditure
52the Assembly had no voting power. But all appro­
priation of moneys out of the Federal Consolidated Fund
was to be effected by an Appropriation Bill passed by
55the National Assembly. ^ The legislature was thus 
given complete control over public revenue and public 
finance, which is generally regarded as the strongest 
control which a legislature can have over the executive.
The same structure was provided for the 
provinces. A provincial legislature consisted of the
29. Ibid,, Article 57
30. Ibid., Article 59
31. Ibid., Article 60
32. Ibid., Article 65
33. Ibid., Article 66
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34-Governor and an Assembly of three hundred and ten members.
The relationship between the Governor and the Provincial
Assembly was similar to that of the President and the
National Assembly, except that the Governor could reserve
35a Bill for consideration of the President.^ The Assembly
was to be summoned, prorogued or dissolved by the Governor;
36the normal life of an Assembly being five years.
The members of the National and Provincial
Assemblies were to be elected directly by the people on
the basis of universal adult franchise. But the question
whether there should be a joint electorate or Hindus and
Muslims should have separate constituencies was left to be
decided by Parliament,after consulting the provincial
37legislatures. This issue proved controversial and 
affected governmental stability. The details will be 
discussed later in this chapter.
The President and the Governors, following 
previous practice, were given power to legislate by Ordi­
nance, but the National Assembly or the Provincial Assem­
blies, as the case might be, had the right either to approve
34-. Ibid., Article 77* 
55* Ibid., Article 90. 
36. Ibid., Article 83. 
37* Ibid., Article 14-5*
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38or disapprove of an Ordinance. The Ordinance-making 
powers of the President and the Governor were subject to 
the same constitutional limitations as the powers of Parlia­
ment and the Provincial Assembly to make law*
The judicial hierarchy under the Government of 
India Act, 1935> was left unchanged. The existing 
Federal Court becdme the Supreme Court under the Consti­
tution with orginal, appellate, advisory and special 
jursidictions. To ensure independence of the judiciary, 
the Constitution provided for the salaries of the judges, 
officers and servants of the Supreme Court and its adminis­
trative expenses to be charged on the federal consolidated
fund, and those of the High Courts on the provincial con-
50
solidated fund. y The judges of the Supreme Court and 
the High Courts were to be appointed by the President to 
hold office till they attained the ages of sixty-five and
Il Q
sixty years respectively. They could be removed from
office only on the ground of proved misbehaviour or 
infirmity of mind or body. While a judge of the Supreme 
Court could be removed by the President on an address by
38. Constitution of Pakistan, 1956, Article 60 and 102 
respectively.
59• Ibid., Articles 64 and 97 respectively.
40. Ibid., Articles 150 and 166 respectively.
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4-1the National Assembly, a judge of the High Court could
be removed on an adverse report by the Supreme Court on a
reference by the President.
The Supreme Court was given, apart from its
normal jurisdiction, power to issue writs for the enforce-
43ment of the fundamental rights ^ and to grant special leave
to appeal from any judgment, decree, order or sentence of
any court or tribunal in Pakistan except of a court or
tribunal constituted under any law relating to the Armed 
44Forces. The law declared by the Supreme Court was
45binding on all courts in Pakistan. ^ The High Courts were 
given, under Article 170 of the Constitution, power to 
issue writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights 
and for "any other purpose". Each High Court had power 
of superintendence and control over all courts subject to 
its appellate or revisional jurisdiction; it had power 
to withdraw from a subordinate court any case involving a 
substantial question of constitutional law and either dis­
pose of it or decide the question and return the case for
41. Ibid., Article 151 •
42. Ibid., Article 169.
43. Ibid., Article 22.
44. Ibid., Article 160.
45. Ibid., Article 163.
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iLf,
disposal. Both, the Supreme Court and the High Courts 
were courts of record with power to make rules regulating 
the practice and procedure of the courts.
Special features of the Constitution
A special feature of the Constitution of 1956
was that the fundamental rights of the subject were enumerated
and they were made justiciable. These rights appear to
have been taken from the Indian and the United States
tin
constitutions. ( They included equal protection of the
la;*, safeguards as to arrest and detention, freedom of
speech, assembly, association and vocation. Eights to
property and safeguards against discrimination in any form
were ensured. It was provided that any existing law was
void to the extent of its repugnancy to a fundamental
right; no law in violation of any fundamental right should
be enacted; any law violating this rule would be void to
4-8the extent of the repugnancy. The Supreme Court and 
the High Courts were given adequate powers to enforce these 
rights. It may be noted, however, that the right to move
46. Ibid., Article 171.
4-7. M. Kunir, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, p. 46.'
48. Constitution of 1956, Article 4.
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any court for the enforcement of any of these rights
ZLO
could he suspended by the President J during a Proclamation
of Emergency declared under Article 191* Purther they
were not exempted from the general process of amendment
of the Constitution under Article 216.
The Preamble to the Constitution began "In the
name of Allah •.." who had sovereign authority "over the
entire Universe" and declared that the people of Pakistan,
exercising authority within the limits prescribed by Him,
had declared Pakistan to be a democratic State based on
Islamic principles of social justice. It was to be known
50as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan^ and steps were to
be taken to enable Muslims to order their lives in accor-
51dance with the Holy Quran and the Sunnah. An insti­
tution for Islamic research and instruction was to be set
up, to assist in the reconstruction of Pakistan society on
52a truly Islamic basis. It was also provided that no 
law repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam was to be enacted 
and a Commission was to make recommendations for bringing 
existing laws into conformity with the principles of Islam
49* Constitution of 1956, Article 192.
50. Ibid., Article 1.
51. Ibid., Article 25*
52. Ibid., Article 197*
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and to enunciate such principles for the guidance of the
53National and Provincial Assemblies. ^ The personal laws 
and status of non-Muslim citizens were, however, not 
required to comply with these principles. Though the 
provisions relating to enforcement of Islamic principles 
were vague, the fact that the Head of the State had to he 
a Muslim and the provisions regarding Islamic principles 
mentioned above led the Ulema to accept the Constitution 
as sufficiently Islamic.
Part XI of the Constitution was devoted to the 
Emergency Provisions. The President could issue a Pro­
clamation of Emergency, if the security or economic life 
of Pakistan were endangered by war or external aggression
or internal disturbance beyond the power of a provincial
54-government to control. During such an emergency Parlia­
ment could legislate on any matter for a province and the 
federal executive authority would extend to giving directions 
to a province as to the manner in which the provincial 
executive authority was to be exercised; all or any of 
the functions of the government of the province could be
53* Ibid., Article 198. Effect to repugnancy clause was 
to be given only after the Commission had submitted its 
report and Parliament had considered the recommendations. 
' The proposed Commission was never appointed.
54-. Ibid., Article 191.
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assumed by the President or on his behalf by the Governor.
In the case of failure of constitutional machinery in a
Province the President, on a report from the Governor,
could impose central rule in the province for a maximum
period of six months during which Parliament could be
55empowered to legislate for the p r o v i n c e . P r o v i s i o n s  
were also made for a Proclamation of financial emergency, 
when the centre could take various measures to ensure 
financial stability in the country.^
The emergency powers were to be exercised subject 
to Parliamentary control. Hot only had a Proclamation 
to be laid before the national Assembly, but the President 
had to act on the advice of the Cabinet, which, in its turn, 
was responsible to the Assembly. This was thought to be 
an adequate guarantee against abuse of these provisions.
But the record during the two and a half years in which 
the Constitution of 1956 remained in force does not leave 
an observer free from doubts as to whether the exercise 
of the powers under Article 195 by the centre was bona 
fide.57
55* Ibid,, Article 195*
56. Ibid., Article 194*
57* Governor's rule was imposed in West Pakistan early in 
1957 to keep the Muslim League out of power. See 
G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, 
pp. 255-256.
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Political Instability
The Constitution came into force on March 23» 
1956. Under its temporary and transitional provisions 
the Governors, the Prime Minister, other Ministers, pro­
vincial cabinets and other state organisations and function
58aries continued to function under the new Constitution*
Only the provisional President had to be elected by the
Constituent Assembly* Iskandar Mirza, then Governor-
General, being the sole candidate, was elected unanimously
as the first President of the Republic. It has been
alleged that support for his nomination was extorted by
Mirza from the members of the Constituent Assembly as the
price for his assent to the Constitution and for his
support to the Government, which, as Governor-General, he
59was m  a position to dismiss• ' Mirza would not sign the 
Constitution Bill without the prior assurance of his being 
elected as the first President*
But nthe Constitution which emerged nine years 
after independence the product of so much turmoil and 
strife"^ did not give the country the expected political
58* Constitution of Pakistan, 1956, Article 226.
59* Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan, 
p. 173; and also G.W. Choudtiury, Constitutional 
Development in Pakistan, p. 110.
60. A. Gledhill, Pakistan, The Development of its Laws 
and Constitution, p. 101.
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stability. While the 1956 Constitution remained in force,
political instability was manifest both at the centre and
in the provinces. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, to whom credit
must go for framing the Constitution of 1956, continued
as Prime Minister at the head of the coalition government.
But soon differences cropped up between the Prime Minister
and his party. After the elections to the West Pakistan
Assembly, the Muslim League, which had an overwhelming
majority in the House, refused to support Dr Khan Sahib
as the Chief Minister. The Prime Minister accused the
party of bad faith and tendered his resignation in
61September, 1956. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali could probably 
have carried on with the support of the newly formed 
Republican Party of Dr Khan Sahib and President Mirza but 
he preferred to resign when his own party had disowned 
him.62
The leader of the Opposition, H.S. Suhrawardy, 
was called upon to form the government. His Awami League 
entered into a coalition with the Republican Party. 
Suhrawardy was unquestionably a capable man and "probably
61. Mushtaq Ahmad, op.cit., p. 63.
62. Ibid., p. 64-.
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the only politician who exhibited skill in working a
65constitution of the Westminster type”. ^ But soon he was
in trouble with the Rpublican Party, the senior partner of
the coalition, over the issue of "one unit" in West 
Pakistan. Suhrawardy, who favoured the scheme, condemned 
the Republicans for their resolution to balkanise the 
Province. The Republicans thereupon withdraw their 
support and President Mirza called on the Prime Minister 
to resign. It may be noted that Suhrawardy, once in
power, was able to build a national image for himself.
64-He was gradually assuming the role of a national leader, 
which the President did not like. Mirza, therefore, took 
the first opportunity to get rid of the potentially poitferful 
Prime Minister.
After Suhrawardy a coalition was formed between 
the Muslin League and the Republican Party and Ismail 
Ibrahim Chundrigar, the leader of the Muslim League, 
became Prime Minister on October 18, 1957* But the coa­
lition broke up on the electorate issue. Chundrigar 
resigned after only two months and was succeeded by Peroz
65. A. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 102.
64-. See Kamruddin Ahmad, The Social History of East
Pakistan, p. 14-9.
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Khan Noon, who, as leader of the Republican Party, formed
a government with the support of the Awami League* The
Cabinet had to be expanded to an unprecedented size to
ensure the continuing support of the two factions. The
Noon Government was not successful in tackling the
problems facing the country and it is not likely that it
would have been an efficient administration but it came
with a ray of hope for future political stability. The
Government was committed to hold general elections in
early 1959 and an election alliance was formed between
Suhrawardy1s Awami League and the Punjabi politicians,
Noon and Daultana. It was hoped that this alliance would
win the election and would be able to form administration
65at the centre as well as in the provinces. ^ President 
Iskandar Mirza, however, did not like such alliances and, 
on the pretext that there was a political crisis, dis­
missed the Noon Ministry and abrogated the Constitution.
Thus in the course of about thirty months after 
the promulgation of the Constitution of 1956, four Prime 
Ministers came and went, with the formation and dissolution
65* See G.W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, p. 115; 
also K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan,
p. 91.
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of coalitions. In the provinces the picture was no better.
In East Pakistan the United Pront Ministry under A.H.
Sarkar continued in office up to August 30, 1956, with a
short spell of Governor's rule, without facing the Assembly
for about fifteen months. In September the Awami League
Ministry, under Ataur Rahman Khan, remained in power till
March 31» 1958 when thirty-two members withdrew their
support from the Ministry. Apprehending a defeat on the
floor of the House, the government advised the Governor
to prorogue the Assembly but the Governor, A.K. Pazlul
Huq, dismissed the Ministry and installed a United Pront
Ministry. But the central government of Peroz Khan Hoon
dismissed the Governor and the Acting Governor dismissed
the United Pront Ministry within hours of its assumption
of office and restored the Awami League government. The
dismissal of the United Pront Ministry was challenged in
the Dacca High Court, which held that the Governor had
66discretionary power in this regard. The government of
Ataur Rahman Khan was, however, defeated in the Assembly 
in June, 1958 and replaced by the Sarkar Ministry, which 
also fell within three days! flTwo Ministries were overthrown
66. The case has not been reported. But see G.W.
Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, p. 119.
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by the legislature in less than a week.11^ 7 The result 
was that Governor's rule was imposed on the province for 
about two months and in August the Awami League again 
came to power. In September political bickerings; and 
rivalry between the two contending factions went so far 
as to lead to riots in the Assembly Hall itself, resulting 
in the beating of the Speaker, a motion declaring him 
insane and a violent assault on the Deputy Speaker which 
proved fatal.
In West Pakistan Dr Khan Sahib and his Ministry
were in power when the Constitution came into force. But
trouble began when the Muslim League wanted to oust the
1nominated' Chief Minister and demanded that the leader
of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party be appointed in
place of Dr Khan Sahib, who was a non-Leaguer and had
earlier, on March 19> 1956 announced his intention to form
a new political party. In this he had the support of
non-Punjabi members of the provincial legislature of West
Pakistan. The demand of the Muslim League was therefore
directed against Dr Khan Sahib and was not acceptable to
£ 8
Governor Gurmani and the centre.0 On April 23> 1956
67* G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan,
p. 256.
68. D.IT. Banerjee, East Pakistan, p. 86.
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Dr Khan Sahib announced the formation of the Republican 
Party and many Muslim Leaguers deserted their party to 
join it. This caused an open split between the Muslim 
League and the Chief Minister, which came to a head when 
the election of the Speaker of the Assembly took place on 
May 20, 1956, and the Republican candidate was declared 
elected by the casting vote of the Chairman. The 
election was challenged in the High Court which, on the 
basis of the facts, upheld the election.^ The Court, 
however, asserted that it had jurisdiction under Article 
170 of the Constitution to examine the propriety of a 
proceeding of the Assembly; only proper proceedings were 
excluded from the Court*s jurisdiction and a proceeding 
was "not an Assembly proceeding, if it is founded on 
coercion, fraud or bad faith.”^^
The Muslim League, in its determination to oust 
the Republican Ministry, sought the support of the 
national Awami Party members in the Assembly by agreeing to 
break up the ’one unit1 ♦ Some thirty members from the 
Republican Party also joined the opposition, leaving the 
government with a minority in the Assembly. On March 21,
69• Ahmad Saeed Kirmani v. Pazal Elahi, P.L.D. 1956,
L a h o r e '"807.-----------  ---------------
70. Ibid., per Kayani, J. at p. 821.
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Governor's rule was imposed to save the government from 
defeat and the Opposition was not called upon to form a 
Ministry. After about three months of Governor's rule,
71the Republican Party was restored to power in July, 1957*
On account of the chaotic state of provincial politics, the 
Republicans advised the Governor to dissolve the Assembly. 
The question was referred to the Supreme Court by the 
President under Article 162 of the Constitution. The 
advice of the Supreme Court was that the Governor had no 
power to dissolve the Interim Provincial Assembly function­
ing under Article 225? and it must continue to function
72till a new Assembly was elected under the Constitution.
A new government was formed under the leadership 
of Sardar Abdur Rashid, Dr Khan Sahib having willingly 
given up the post of Chief Minister. The ruling party 
now tried to get the support of the Rational Awami Party 
by promising the break-up of the 1 one unit'. Governor 
Gurmani who had supported the Republican party with the 
aid of the centre, was removed from office for his alleged 
anti-Republican attitude on the 'one unit' question. The 
controversy over the one-unit, as noted earlier, also led
71. See D.N. Banerjee, op.cit., p. 95*
72. Reference by the President of Pakistan, P.L.D. 1957 
S.C. 2i9. ”
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to the fall of the Awami League - Republican coalition 
government at the centre. When, in December, 1957 Feroz 
Khan Moon became Prime Minister, Sardar Abdur Rashid 
joined the central cabinet and Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash 
succeeded him as the Provincefs Chief Minister. The 
above is a brief account of the governmental changes that 
took place between the time when the Constitution was 
promulgated and its abrogation in October, 1953.
The Parliamentary System - An Appraisal
It is clear from the above account that parlia­
mentary democracy in Pakistan both at the centre and in 
the provinces was not functioning smoothly, even after the 
promulgation of the Constitution. During the two and a 
half years for which the Constitution was allowed to remain 
in force, political manoeuvring and governmental instability 
at all levels appeared in their worst form. Politicians 
and political parties miserably failed to give the country 
a viable administration, concerning itself with the 
problems facing the country. The hope that, once the 
Constitution was adopted and elections were held, the 
parties would concentrate on practical measures was dashed 
to the ground. Instead "... though the Constitution was 
proclaimed and elections announced, the factional
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manoeuvring "became more and not less pronounced,M (y 
During this short period, as many as four 
governmental changes took place at the centre, and in 
the provinces Ministries came and went at the will of the 
central authority* Coalition after coalition failed to 
remain in office for any considerable period of time.
It is significant that the Constitution Commission held 
that the main cause for the failure of parliamentary 
government in the country was lack of leadership, accom­
panied by the absence of well-organised and disciplined
nh
political parties, ( There were other factors, said the
Commission, which contributed to the failure, but it
argued that, if the politicians and parties were conscious
of their obligations and functions, then other factors
would have been automatically eliminated. The politicians,
however, do not agree with this view. They, including a
former Prime Minister, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, would put
almost all blame on the President, who, supported by the
bureaucracy, deliberately set out to discredit and destroy
75the parliamentary system, ^ The question whether
73. K.B, Callard, Political Forces in Pakistan, p. 15.
74. Report of the Constitution Commission, 1961, p. 13*
75* E.A, and K.R. Schuler, Public Opinion and Constitution 
Making in Pakistan, p. 70.
parliamentary system failed in Pakistan or was not given 
a chance to function evokes different answers. Whatever 
may have been the role of President Mirza, which we shall 
discuss in a subsequent chapter, there is no denying the 
fact that the politicians were mostly responsible for 
bringing about a situation which could be easily exploited 
by the enemies of parliamentaiy democracy to their own 
advantage.
When the Constitution came into force, coalition 
governments were in office both at the centre and in the 
provinces. No political party, and there were many such 
parties, had an absolute majority in any of the legis­
latures. Coalition governments are, by their very nature, 
weak governments. In Pakistan the situation was made 
worse by f,the policies and actions of the self-seeking 
politicians, who had dominated the political scene since 
the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan" reducing 
"parliamentary institutions under both the interim and 
the late constitution [of 1956] into a farce. The con­
stitutional forms and trappings of democracy had only 
provided a cloak for rule by the few, who had been able to 
draw power into their own hands.
76. G.W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, p. 126.
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After the rout of the Muslim League in East 
Bengal in March, 1954-> there was no political party with 
an all-Pakistan following. The parties were formed on 
regional bases and even then had no popular foundation.
The Republican Party owed its birth to the Muslim League’s 
refusal to support Lr Khan Sahib’s government in 1956.
This party had no organisation and no support outside the 
legislatures. The National Awami Party was launched in 
1957i following a split within the Awami League, as a 
reaction against Suhrawardy’s foreign policy. The 
Ganatantri Dal had merged with the National Awami Party.^ 
None of the parties had any popular support and their 
members had no steadfast allegiance to the party to which 
they belonged. In fact the shifting allegiance of the 
legislators, to secure appointment to office and other 
advantages, was one of the main reasons for the rapid 
governmental changes during this period. Again, the 
shifting alliance of the National Awami Party to the 
Krishall Sramik Party of the Awami League in East Pakistan,
and with the Muslim League, or the Republican Party in West
\
Pakistan, was responsible for the fall of Ministries and a 
state of uncertainty in the political atmosphere from the
77. X). N . Banerq ee, East Pakr stan, p . 96.
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birth of this party to the end of parliamentary government 
in October, 1958* The aim of this "leftist" party 
"appeared to be to create chaos and confusion"
During this period at least three main issues 
seem to have determined the behaviour of the politicians 
in their attitude towards government. The first was 
foreign policy. The Awami League, as a constituent party 
of the United Front, was committed to a "neutral" foreign 
policy. But Suhrawardy, the leader of the Awami League, 
proved himself, as Prime Minister, to be a staunch suppor­
ter of the west and his pro-west policy during the Suez 
crisis of September, 1958 provoked a vehement attack on 
him by members of his party. It requirec^vigorous efforts 
by the Prime Minister to induce his party to endorse his 
foreign policy in June, 1957* But x^hile the controversy 
proceeded Maulana Bhashani resigned from the Presidentship 
of the Awami League and announced the formation of a new 
party. In July a convention of "democratic forces" was 
held in Dacca, under the auspices of Bhashani, ivhich was 
attended by some leftist leaders from West Pakistan.
"The outcome was the formation of the national Awami Party
79of Bhashani with Ganatantris merging with it."'^ Thus
78. G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan,
p. 256.
79* D • N. Banerjee, op.cit., p. 96.
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the controversy over foreign policy led to the formation 
of this new party, which caused serious governmental 
instability in both the provinces.
The next was the "one unit" issue. Though
opposition to the scheme never died down after its
inception, no party openly advocated the disintegration
of West Pakistan till the National Awami Party was founded.
This party was prepared to support anyone who would agree
to split the Province into its former constituent parts.
Since the party held the balance in the West Pakistan
Assembly, both the Muslim League and the Republican Party
were forced to seek its support in order to command a
majority in the house. In March, 1957 the Republican
Ministry lost its majority in the Assembly, when the
opposition Muslim League agreed to the Awami Partyfs
demand for breaking up the West Pakistan province. The
result was "the intervention of President Mirza, who
SOimposed Governor1s rule on the province". Later in
July, when the Republicans were restored to power, with 
Sardar Abdur Rashid as the Chief Minister, they agreed to 
support the N.A.P.’s demand. Consequently in September 
the West Pakistan Assembly passed a resolution recommending
80. K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 85*
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dismemberment of West Pakistan* This attitude of the
Republicans towards the ,!one unit" issue provoked serious
criticism from Prime Minister Suhrawardy, who was for
continuing the unit, at least until the general elections.
of
His opposition to the break upjWest Pakistan cost him 
his premiership. As has been said earlier, the issue 
probably was responsible for the dismissal in August, 1957 
of Governor Gurmani, who also disliked the Republican 
party’s attitude on this issue. The National Awami Party 
thoroughly exploited the rivalry between the Republican 
Party and the Muslim League, and made the "one unit11 
issue a subject for political manoeuvres leading to 
political instability in West Pakistan and the fall of at 
least one central government in October, 1957*
The other important issue which affected political 
stability was the electorate. The Constitution, as has 
been noted earlier, left the question of joint or separate 
constituencies to be decided by Parliament after consulting 
the two Provincial Assemblies. The East Pakistan Assembly 
was for a joint electorate, while West Pakistan favoured 
separate electorates. The Republican Party, entering 
into coalition with Suhrawardy*s Awami League at the centre,
81. D.N. Banerjee, opycit., p. 97*
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agreed for a compromise formula and the National Assembly 
passed The Electorate Act, 1956,^ providing for a joint 
electorate in East Pakistan and separate electorates in 
West Pakistan. The question of joint or separate elec­
torate was more important in East Pakistan, where the 
non-Muslim population formed a substantial part of the 
total population. Once a .joint electorate had been con­
ceded to that Province, the retention of separate elec­
torates in West Pakistan lost its meaning. Parliament, 
therefore, under the leadership of Suhrawardy, removed 
this anomaly by passing the Electorate (Amendment) Act, 
1957» providing for a joint electorate for the whole 
country.
The Muslim League, adhering to its pre-indepen­
dence two-nation theory, opposed the introduction of joint 
electorates. Along with the Nizam-i-Islam, the League 
promised to reverse the system, when it achieved power. 
After the fall of Suhrawardy1s cabinet, Chundrigar 
became the Prime Minister, at the head of the Muslim 
League - Republican coalition. Though the Republican 
Party had given its pledge to support separate electorate,
82. Act XXXVI of 1956, P.L.D. 1956 Central Statutes, 482 
85. Act XIX of 1957* P.L.D. 1957 Central Statutes, 276.
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in less than two months it changed its opinion and 
Chundrigar had to resign as "the Republican Party went
back on their pledges and promises on the electorate
n 84- lssue".
While the politicians and parties remained busy 
with power politics and controversy over these issues, 
the country*s economy and general administration deter­
iorated. There was an acute food shortage in both the
provinces, the rate of industrial production fell due to
85strikes and general industrial unrest. ^ Smuggling of 
food grains across the border was rampant and measures
or
taken to stop it were withdrawn under political pressure. 
Reckless spending resulted in an adverse balance of 
payments and the complete breakdown of the monetary and 
banking system was in sight the government seemed to 
have neither the will nor the capacity to put a stop to 
this continuous process of deterioration.
The general election under the Constitution,
84. G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, 
p. 255.
85. See Hushtaq. Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan, 
pp. 184-185.
86. P.I1. Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, p. 177*
87. M. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 56.
after being postponed more than once, was fixed for
oo
February, 1959. In the autumn of 1958 politicians
were mainly concerned with the coming election. Vigorous
campaigns of abuse and innuendo were in full swing.
Some political leaders, like Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan of the
Muslim League, threatened "rivers of blood" and the party
resolved in September to dislodge the government "if need
8Q
be by extra-constitutional methods". J On the other 
hand an alliance was in the offing between Suhrawardy*s 
Awami League and Feroz Khan Noon*s Republican Party, and 
it was rumoured that Suhrawardy had also reached an under­
standing with the powerful Mumtaz Paultana. It was 
if
believed that*these alliances were effected, Suhrawardy 
would be the Prime Minister and Feroz Khan Noon would be 
the next President. President Mirza, anxious for his 
own re-election, saw a clear danger to his own position. 
The Muslim League and the Awami League had already con­
demned his political activities; now the Republican 
Party, Mirza*s main support, was about to abandon him.
The President, therefore, grew determined to frustrate the 
hopes of the political parties and perpetuate his own
88. G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan,
P. 255. ~
89. M. Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 57.
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position.^
In such a tense political atmosphere, an
actual threat to the territorial integrity of the.State
came in October, when the ruler of Kalat state revolted
and declared the secession of his state from Pakistan.
It was suggested that the Khan was instigated by President
91Mirza nwho was setting the stage for his final action”.
The Khan of Kalat was arrested on October 6, 1958 an<l the 
rebellion was put down.
It would appear from the above discussion that 
the conditions prevailing in Pakistan during the autumn 
of 1958 were not such as to justify confidence in the 
continuation of democratic government in Pakistan.
People became disillusioned by the political intrigues and 
all-round inefficiency, corruption and mismanagement.
They were stunned by the assault of the Speaker and the 
fatal injury caused to his Deputy in the East Pakistan 
Assembly in September. In all these incidents the 
politicians were directly involved. People apparently 
lost all faith in them and would support any step to 
prevent the politicians from adding to Pakistanfs difficulties
90. See K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, 
pp. 90-91*
91. M. Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 57*
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Whether the abrogation of the Constitution and the impo­
sition of martial law throughout the country would provide 
a solution to all problems, was a different matter, but 
the politicians had, in the eyes of the people, forfeited 
the right to control the affairs* They were held res­
ponsible for bringing about the lamentable condition of 
the country*
Position of the Armed Forces
Any discourse on the circumstances prevailing
in Pakistan on the eve of ”Martial Law” in 1958 would be
incomplete without a brief discussion of the position
in Pakistan of the armed forces at that time end their
attitude towards national affairs* The armed forces in
Pakistan, following the tradition prevailing during the
British period, were kept out of politics and maintained
a rigid neutrality towards the political upheaval during
Pakistan's early years. "In the political crises before
October, 1954- the armed forces played no discernible
role. The army, or at least the officer corps, had been
92taught that its duty was to stay out of politics."*'
When in January, 1951 General Ayub Khan became the
92. K.B. Callard, Political Forces in Pakistan, p. 20.
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Commander-in-Chief of the Army he advised his troops
"to keep out of politics" although they could and should
93take an intelligent interest in national affairs.
The prime duty of the armed forces was to 
defend the country against external aggression. They 
were to be fully equipped with arms and training and to 
remain in constant readiness to repel any attack on the 
land. But "the armed forces were willing to back up
OIL
any administration that would govern effectively" . J
In East Pakistan the army was called in to restore order
in Dacca during serious riots on language issue in
February, 1952, and in 195^ - to quell disturbances in the
Kahaphuli Paper Hills near Chittagong and in the Adamjee
Jute Hills, about nine miles from Dacca. The army was
also employed to stop smuggling of jute, foodgrains and
other goods across the border in 1952 and 1957 * and to
arrange food distribution, the inequality in tyhich had
93led to a crisis in 195&* In Karachi, when civil
commotion and student discontent led to extensive violence 
and hooliganism in January 1955 > troops were deployed in
95* See H. Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, p. 35*
94-. K.B. Callard, Political Forces in Pakistan, p. 21.
95• See F.H. Khan, The Stoiy of the Pakistan Army, 
pp. 170-173*
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the city. In March of the same year, during the anti-
Ahmadiya riots in Lahore, martial law was declared and
continued till May 15; the army took over full control
of the city. Without giving further instances of army
aid to civil authority, it can he said that the Pakistan
army was 11 [a] completely non-political army [which] could
be depended upon to assert the authority of any legitimate
government in the centre and the provinces, and to restore
96law and order wheri required.*1^
But it must be noted that, within four years of 
Pakistan*s independence, there occurred the first instance 
of military interference in civil affairs. "The affairs, 
known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy case, occurred early 
in April, 1951 ••• [it] was confined to a small group
of serving officers and a few civilians, led by a major-
97 .g e n e r a l . T h e  conspiracy was alleged to be aimed at
the overthrowing of the government headed by Prime
Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan. Information leaked out;
the plot was foiled and the persons involved were convicted.
The move to sieze power, however, was not regarded as a
reflection of the attitude of the forces as a whole,. and
96. Ibid., p. 188.
97* H. Feldman, op.cit., p. 37*
the arrest, trial and conviction of the officers took
place without any fear of adverse effects upon the loyalty
98of the remainder of the officer corps. J
After this incident, early in 19515 dramatic 
political developments took place in the country. Liaquat 
Ali Khan was assassinated, Khawaja Nazimuddin was dis­
missed and the Governor-General dissolved the Constituent 
Assembly in October, 1954-• The military for the first 
time was invited by the civilian authority to play a 
political role. Ghulam Muhammad appointed the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Army, General Ayub Khan, his Minister for 
Defence. Ayub Khan claims that the Governor-General 
asked him to take control of the country in October,
1954*, which the General declined to do but he agreed to
qq
join the Cabinet as Minister of Defence. y This appoint­
ment was interpreted as "a gesture to the country that 
the army was supporting the Governor-General”.^ But it 
was more than that. Though, while he remained a minister 
there was not much to suggert that he was playing a 
prominent part in policy-making, as soon as the new Con­
stituent Assembly came into being, Ayub Khan relinquished
98. K.B. Callard, Political Forces in Pakistan, footnote,
p. 21.
f
99• M. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 55*
1. K.B. Callard, op.cit., p. 21.
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his cabinet post and facts revealed by him show that he
then began to take an active interest in politics and the
constitutional set up of the country.
It is now known that Ayub Khan, even before he
became a member of the cabinet, had given considerable
thought to the constitutional problems of the country.
He prepared a rough outline of a future constitution
and submitted constitutional proposals to the cabinet on
2
the basis of this outline. One of the important 
measures which he suggested was the integration of West 
Pakistan, which was accomplished in 1955* Tbe Con­
stitution which Ayub Khan promulgated in 1962, appears 
to be the logical expression of his political thinking.
It is evident, therefore, that, though the 
armed forces were supposed to remain neutral and apparently 
followed a policy of non-interference in the country’s 
politics, they in fact took a keen interest and observed 
closely the country’s plight at the hands of the poli­
ticians. As citizens, they would naturally observe 
things that happened around them and, by their frequent 
involvement in aid to the civil authority, they realised 
that the entire political life of Pakistan was riddled
2. H. Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 53*
3. See 11A short appreciation of present and future 
problems of Pakistan”, ibid., pp. 186-191*
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with graft and corruption. They would maturally think of 
possible remedies. It has been observed that initially "the 
military forces are called in to control situations of emerg­
ency; but soon they feel constrained to stay on, wishing to 
remove the chronic national maladies in order to build a
Zl
secure base for economic development and national security." 
Their training and professional work gave the men in the 
armed forces a patriotic outlook and, as members of a profess­
ion with strict discipline, they would despise political 
manoauvrings. This interest in national affairs and contempt 
for the politicians on the part of the officers of the armed 
forces were easily exploited by President Mirza, when he 
abrogated the Constitution.
It has been suggested that the military take over of 
the country in October,1958, was initiated by the Army, and 
President Mirza was compelled to act.® But what has transpired 
later from the revelations of Ayub Khan himself and other 
army sources, one is inclined to conclude that the Army acted 
on the definite invitation of the President himself. Mirza 
was instrumental in creating a situation in the country 
where the Army was expected to give its support to the 
President's design.
4. Aslam Siddiqi, "The Role of Military in Asia", in 
Guy Wint (ed), Asia, A Handbook, p.410.
5. See Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan, p.182.
6. See Chapter Vll.
170
"Martial Law"
Proclamation of the President
On the night of October 7* 1958 President Iskandar 
Mirza issued a proclamation,^* the general effect of which was 
that:
(i) the Constitution of the 23rd March, 1956 was abrogated 
(ii) the central and provincial governments were dismissed; 
(iii) the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies 
were dissolved;
(iv) all political parties were abolished; and 
(v) until alternative arrangements were made Pakistan 
would come under Martial Law.
The President appointed General (as he then was) Mohammad 
Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, as 
the Chief Martial Lav/ Administrator with supreme command over 
all the armed forces.
In a long statement the President explained the 
reasons for his action, touching almost all spheres of state 
activity, accusing the politicians of bringing the country on 
the verge of a catastrophe. The ruthless struggle for power,
1. P.L.D. 1958 Central Statutes 577; for full text of the 
proclamation see Appendix II.
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and corruption among the politicians, their exploitation of 
the simple masses and their "prostitution of Islam for poli­
tical ends" had led to "a dictatorship of the lowest order". 
While there was a serious shortage of food and no positive 
action was being taken to increase production, in East 
Pakistan there was an organised "smuggling of food, medicines 
and other necessities". Import of food had become a regular 
feature in a country "which should really have a surplus", 
and valuable foreign exchange earnings were being spent on 
importation of food.
The President said that some politicians lately 
had been talking of "bloody revolution" while others com­
mitted "high treason" by directly aligning themselves with 
foreign countries. The foreign policy of the country was 
subjected to "unintelligent and irresponsible" criticism, 
with a view to creating bad blood and misunderstanding between 
Pakistan and important foreign countries; these people were 
screaming for war with India. "In no country in the world, 
do political parties treat foreign policy in the manner it 
is done in Pakistan". ■
The proclamation of the President referred to the 
recent "disgraceful scene" in the East Pakistan Assembly 
resulting in the beating up of the Speaker, killing his 
deputy and desecration of the national flag. This was an 
indication of the depth to which political activities had 
sunk and it was inconceivable that elections would improve
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the situation or lead to the formation of a strong and stable 
government, capable of dealing with the innumerable problems 
facing the nation. The election would not be free or fair; 
it would definitely be rigged, and, after the election, the 
same old methods would be applied to make a Mtragic farce of 
democracy” and create greater unhappiness and disappointment, 
leading ultimately to a ,1really bloody revolution”. Civil 
disobedience had been threatened to break up one unit and 
to retain volunteer organisations; such conduct indicated 
the length to which the politicians would go to achieve 
their parochial aims.
The President's attempts to work the Constitution 
by bringing about coalitions had been described as ’’Palace 
intrigp.es”. It had become fashionable to put the blame on 
the President for everything that went wrong. The vast 
majority of the people had lost confidence in the parlia­
mentary system of government. The Constitution was 
unworkable, because it was full of dangerous compromises, 
likely to bring about Pakistan's internal disintegration.
Por all these reasons and to rectify them, the President . 
said, "the country must first be taken to sanity by a 
peaceful revolution", and then a Constitution "more suitable 
to the genius of the Muslim people” would be devised which, 
when ready, would be submitted to the referendum of the 
people. The President said, "It is said that the Consti­
tution is sacred. But more sacred than the Constitution or
- . 1 7 3
anything else is the country and the welfare and happiness 
of its people.” To ensure the safety of the country and 
the welfare and happiness of its people, the President had 
abrogated the Constitution with the "utmost regret" and with 
the promise that the patriots and the law-abiding would, 
henceforth, be "happier and freer".
Thus the Constitution, which came into force just 
over thirty months ago, after "so much turmoil and strife" 
was abrogated by the person who was elected to, and held 
office as the first President under it and who had taken a 
solemn oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Consti­
tution". The activities of the politicians described by 
the President in his statement were substantially true.
While the politicians were mostly responsible for the 
situation which Mirza intended to exploit, the fact remains 
that Mirza himself was instrumental in encouraging many 
politicians to behave in so reprehensible a manner. We shall 
discuss the role played by Mirza during his Presidency in a 
later chapter. Suffice it to say here that Iskandar Mirza, 
as the President, was, as much as any other politician, 
responsible for the situation, which led to the abrogation 
of the Constitution, and the proclamation of a kind of 
"martial law" hitherto unknown in the constitutional history 
of the Commonwealth.
Simultaneously with the President's proclamation, 
General Ayub Khan, as the Supreme Commander and Chief Martial
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2Lav/ Administrator, issued the "proclamation of Martial Law"* 
The proclamation stated that Martial Law Regulations and 
Orders would be issued, the contravention of which would be 
punished v/ith penalties stated therein. Special Courts 
would be appointed to try contraventions of the Regulations 
and Orders, as v/ell as offences under the ordinary law.
It is significant that Ayub Khan's proclamation did not 
make any mention of any delegation of power to him nor was 
"it anywhere said that he was issuing this declaration by 
virtue of any presidential appointment".
On the following day Ayub Khan addressed the
h.
nation over the Radio. In his message to the nation the 
General described the abrogation of the Constitution and 
declaration of martial lav/ as a "drastic and extreme step", 
which was talien v/ith "great reluctance", as the only means 
to save "disintegration and complete ruination of the 
country". He also, like the President, blamed the political 
leaders for the chaos and confusion the country was in, and 
referred to their "bitter war against each other, regardless 
of the ill-effects on the country, just to v/het their appe­
tites and satisfy their base motives". They shifted from
2. P.L.D. 195S Central Statutes 4-99*
3. H. Peldman, Revolution in Pakistan, p.2.
4-. Full text: M. Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements,
Volume I, p.l.
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one party to another without turning a hair or feeling any 
pangs of conscience, resulting in total administrative, 
economic, political and moral chaos in the country. The 
people had become sick of these unscrupulous politicians, 
and the army felt the same way. The former Governor-General 
had requested him to take over the government of the country 
on several occasions but for valid reasons the General had 
refused the offer.
General Ayub Khan assured the people that the talcing
over by the army did not mean the suppression of democracy.
Pie declared:
"Let me announce in unequivocal terms that our 
ultimate aim is to restore democracy but of 
the type that people can understand and work.
P/hen the time comes, your opinion will be freely 
asked. But when that will be, events alone can 
tell. Meanwhile, we have to put this mess right 
and put the country on an even keel." 5
In administering martial law, Ayub Khan said, the 
civilian agencies would be used to the maximum, utilising 
the armed forces as little as possible. Martial Law Regu­
lations would be issued to tighten up the existing laws on 
matters like "malingering or inefficiency amongst officials, 
any form of bribery or corruption, hoarding, smuggling or 
black-marketing or any other type of anti-social or anti- 
state activity". The General sounded a warning against
3• Ibid., p . 3•
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the smugglers, black-marketeers and ’’other such social vermin, 
sharks and leeches”, advising them to behave ’’otherwise 
retribution will be swift and sure”.
From the address of the Chief Administrator of 
Hartial Law the nature of things that were to come could be 
anticipated. Politicians were dislodged from power; 
veteran leaders like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, G.M. Syed and 
Kaulana Bhashani were arrested on security grounds and 
politicians who had held office under the former regimes, 
such as Mohammad Ayub IQiuhro, Hamidul Huq Choudhury, Abul 
Mansur Ahmed, Abdul Khalique and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were
ri
arrested on corruption charges. The country was to be
ruled by the regime, relying on the army and the civil
service. The civil administration was geared to the regime
from the start and the civil servants, under cover of the
armed forces, implemented policies formulated by the regime.
General Ayub Khan claimed that the Martial Lav; Regime was
’’benign and intended to help the civil power to clear up the
7
existing mess ...”r
To continue with the events that took place at the 
top level, a significant but not unexpected change occurred 
within three weeks of martial law being declared. Whereas
6. H. Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, p.9*
7* Ibid., p. 10.
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the armed forces under General Ayub Khan might have acted 
with the intention of clearing up the mess created by the 
politicians and of providing remedies for grievances, President 
iiirza apparently had a different object in his mind. As 
has been observed in the previous chapter, his motive in 
declaring martial lav/, xrns to get rid of the politicians 
with the help of the armed forces and then to perpetuate his 
ovm personal rule. Within a week of the imposition of 
martial law, Iiirza was thinking of withdrawing martial law
c
and even mentioned this possibility to foreign correspondents.
But in a press statement made on October 17* General Ayub
Khan stated that martial lax-/ would no.t be lifted until it
had served its purpose, which was "the clearance of the
political, social, economic and administrative mess” that
q
had been created in the past. Mirza had misjudged his 
capacity. Finding it difficult to get rid of the military 
in a straight forward method, he resorted to his old game of 
intrigue and tried to create suspicion and misunderstanding 
among the officers of the armed forces by playing one against 
the other.^ Mirza's duplicity made the situation intolerable
for General Ayub Khan and his associates. He was therefore 
compelled to resign on October 27? 1958* when General Ayub 
Khan assumed the Presidency. It is possible, though unlikely,
8. A. Gledhill, Pakistan, The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution, p. 107*
9* M. Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Yol.I, p.6.
10. See M. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 75-75*
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that Ayu.h IChan might have been willing to share power with 
Iskandar Iiirza* But Iiirza1 s intrigues gave the General 
excuse to remove him.
"Hartial Law"Administration
On October 9 the first instalment of Hartial Law
Regulations'^ was published. The country was divided into
three territorial Zones, each under a military officer of
high rank as Zonal Administrator with power to issue Hartial
Law Orders and Regulations subject to Hartial Lav/ Regulations
12issued by the Chief Hartial Lav; Administrator. Punishments
for contravention of Hartial Law Regulations and Orders were
enumerated. The word "recalcitrant" v/as defined to include
"any external enemy of Pakistan and mutineers or rebels or
I 7)rioters and any enemy agent". ^ Helping or assisting in 
the operations of "the recalcitrants" and persons joining 
or attempting to join "the recalcitrants" were to be punished
1ZL
with death. In this connection Herbert Feldman commented
that "the fact that the word ‘recalcitrant* was used in Regu­
lations 6 and 7 with the definite, rather than indefinite 
article, raised a supposition that there must be some recal­
citrants around somewhere, but nobody could quite make out who
11. ‘Typical Hartial Law Regulations and Orders are quoted in 
Appendix III.
12. Hartial Law Regulation (H.L.R.) Ho. 1.
13. H.L.R. Ho. 3.
14• H.L.R. Hos. 6 and 7«
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those were. It is now a matter of history that no specific
accusation of any person, to this effect, was ever made and
15so no one was ever charged v/ith being such.’1 ^
Pre-censorship of matters affecting ’’Hartial Law” 
was imposed and omission to comply v/ith this Regulation was 
punishable v/ith a maximum sentence of seven y e a r s ’ imprison­
ment."^ Disobedience or neglect to obey any Hartial Law 
Order or obstructing or interfering in the execution of 
martial law or making a false statement in order to obtain a
pass or permit were to be punished v/ith fourteen y e ars’
17imprisonment. f Spreading reports to create alarm or des­
pondency amongst the public or disaffection towards the armed
forces or the police was punishable by imprisonment of up to
18fourteen years. Failure to give a correct name and
19address when required ' and giving false evidence or refusal
20to give evidence carried the maximum sentence of death.
As is evident, these Regulations were aimed at consolidating 
the regime’s own position. Severe punishments were prescribed
15* H. Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, p.5*
16. H.L.R. Ho. 4.
17. H.L.R. Ho. 16.
18. H.L.R. No. 24.
19* H.L.R. Ho. 18; maximum punishment later reduced to
five years by reconstituted H.L.R. Ho* 33*
20. H.L.R. Ho. 19.
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for acts and omissions designed to challenge in any manner 
the effectiveness of the regime.
To deal with, the shortage and lack of supply of 
food grains and other essential commodities stringent Regu­
lations were issued. Hoarding of foodgrains carried the
21maximum penalty of death, while adulteration of food was
punishable v/ith up to fourteen years1 rigorous imprisonment.
Hoarding of necessities and refusal to declare stocks of
commercial commodities when required, were punishable v/ith
22fourteen years’ imprisonment. The sale of import licences
or permits and imported raw materials by industrial consumers
was prohibited; non-compliance was to be punished with
23imprisonment up to fourteen years. Price control of all
imported goods, manufactured goods and selected foodgrains 
was taken over by the central government. Detailed rules 
provided for fixing the retail prices of foodgrains, textiles, 
drugs and medicines, cement, nev/sprints, sugar, tea, cigar­
ettes and books. The prices determined under these regu­
lations v/ere maximum prices and contravention was to be 
considered as violation of specific Regulations providing
24-maximum sentences of fourteen years1 imprisonment and death.
21. H.L.R. No. 21.
22. H.L.R. No. 25.
23. H.L.R. No. 4-1; reconstituted Regulation provided for
seven years' rigorous imprisonment.
24-. H.L.R. No. 4-2.
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Smuggling of goods in or out of the country, helping a
smuggler or failure to report snuggling were punishable v/ith 
25death ^ while blackmarketing was punishable with fourteen
ye ars1 impri sonment♦^
Hartial Lav/ Regulations were issued to deal with
corruption and other vices among officials. Bribery,
illegal gratifications of any kind, misuse of official
position and nepotism could be punished v/ith imprisonment
27for fourteen years. ' In early November a Regulation 
required persons, who had submitted incorrect tax returns 
since the assessment year 1954— 55* to submit revised returns 
by December 31; if this was done, no action v/ould be taken 
for previous incorrect returns, but for submitting a state­
ment, as required by any tax lav/, which was false a penalty
29of seven years1 imprisonment and fine could be imposed. 
Holdings of foreign exchange in foreign countries were to be 
declared; anyone found holding undeclared foreign exchange 
v/as liable to suffer imprisonment up to seven years and 
confiscation of the whole or part of his property.^ Taking
25. H.L.R. No. 27.
26. H.L.R. No. 26.
27. H.L.R. Nos. 30 and 31.
28. H.L.R. No. 4-3.
29. H.L.R. No. 44.
30. H.L.R. No. 4-5.
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Pakistan currency out of Pakistan and conversion of Pakistan 
currency into foreign currency without a permit were made 
punishable with up to ten years1 imprisonment.
Strikes, lockouts and agitation in industrial 
concerns and educational institutions were prohibited. 
Contravention was to be visited with ten years' imprison­
ment.^ Organising, convening or attending a meeting of a 
political nature was to be punished with seven years' 
imprisonment. ^ Other Martial Lav; Regulations were issued
to ensure that evacuee property and refugees were properly
and
dealt with. Unlawful possession, occupation/ disposal of 
evacuee property were to be declared; false claims were to 
be rectified, and evacuee property in unauthorised occu­
pation was to be surrendered by December 51; non-compliance 
was punishable v/ith a prison sentence of seven years, with 
confiscation of the whole or part of the offender's property. 
The Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) 
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1959^  was promulgated authorising 
the Chief Settlement Commissionerto eject unauthorised persons 
from evacuee property. Presh rules were framed for disposal
31. Il.L.R. No. 58.
32. ii.L.R. No. 29 as reconstituted by H.L.R. No. 60.
33. H.L.R. No. 55.
34. H.L.R. No. 49.
35. Ordinance No. 1 of 19591
P*L.D. 1959 Central Statutes 74.
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of claims, petitions and payment of compensation.
To enforce these Regulations, special courts of
criminal jurisdiction, namely, Special Military Courts and
36Summary Military Courts were set up. A Special Military 
Court was to he constituted in the same manner, to have 
the same powers and to follow the same procedure as a Bield 
General Court Martial convened under the Pakistan Army Act, 
1952. A Magistrate of the first class or a sessions judge 
could he appointed a member of such a court. The court 
was empowered to pass any sentence authorised hy law or hy 
Martial Law Regulations. A death sentence was, however, to 
he confirmed hy an Administrator of Martial Lav;. A Magis­
trate of the first class or any military, naval or air 
force officer could he empowered to hold a Summary Military 
Court, with the same powers as a Summary Court Martial under 
the Army Act. A Summary Military Court could pass any 
sentence authorised hy lav; or the Regulations, except a sen­
tence of death, transportation, imprisonment exceeding one 
year, or whipping exceeding fifteen stripes. The proceedings 
of the Summary Military Courts were to he forwarded for 
review to the area Administrator of Martial Law. Besides 
these special courts the ordinary criminal courts, as hy law 
established, were to continue to exercise jurisdiction over
36. M.L.R. ITo. 1-A.
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offences under ordinary law and also under Martial Law 
37Regulations. {
The publication of these Hartial Law Regulations, 
affecting all spheres of activity were soon having effect 
and, "where it was discovered that there was a reluctance 
to enter into the spirit of the times, police and others 
were on duty to remind merchants and shopkeepers of the 
necessity for compliance. Within ninety-six hours of the 
initiation of these great changes, the citizens of Pakistan 
were beginning to experience some very tangible consequences. 
Information Receiving Centres were set up in Karachi and 
other places and members of the public were invited to give 
information about anti-social and anti-regime activities. 
Prices of goods came down, hoarded foodgrains and other 
articles were promptly declared, foreign exchange was 
surrendered; and it was estimated that the government had 
collected a sum of rupees twenty-four crores by way of taxes 
on excess income, and hidden wealth, which amounted to one 
hundred and thirty four Grores of rupees. y
It must be noted, however, that, while the Regu­
lations prescribing severe punishments were drafted in 
stringent terms, the Hartial Lav; Regime generally took a
37. H.L.R. Ho. 2.
38. H. Peldman, op.cit., p. 5-
39. Ibid., p.52.
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lenient view of the cases which, were detected and prosecuted 
during this period* This applied even to offences carrying 
the severest punishments. In August, 1959 nine persons
were convicted under Hartial Law Regulations 24 and 51? 
which dealt with the spread of alarm and despondency among 
the public and creation of dissatisfaction with the armed 
forces; they were sentenced to terms of imprisonment 
ranging from seven to ten years. But the convicts in the 
case, which came to be known as "Poster case", were 
released after only a portion of the sentence had been 
served by them. In a somewhat similar case in which two 
former West Pakistan provincial Ministers and a Deputy 
Speaker of the National Assembly were involved, the convicted 
persons were released a few months after their conviction.
An officer of the All-Pakistan civil service cadre, sen­
tenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment for illegal 
gratification and abuse of official power, was released 
after a few months. Even a person sentenced to life 
imprisonment for smuggling was released after he had served 
only a portion of his sentence. Giving details of these 
cases Herbert Feldman observed:
"Throughout 1959? there was a series of sen­
sational smuggling, hoarding and food adulter­
ation cases, in which substantial terms of 
imprisonment, along with fines involving lakhs 
of rupees were awarded, but it appears that 
most of the convicted people were released after 
serving in jail for a time and that the fines 
imposed were not recovered." 40
40. Ibid., p.128.
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In the initial stage it appeared that the authorities had 
been successful in putting a stop to the lamentable deter­
ioration in public life and in "inducing and teaching a 
greater sense of civic responsibility, a greater regard for 
cleanliness, hygiene, and civic well-being"• The swift and 
apparently stern measures did not, however, have any lasting 
effect on society. After a brief lull, the old vices 
appeared again, bribery and corruption being more cautiously 
practised and higher rates of gratification being demanded 
to cover the enhanced risk of punishment by martial law. 
Feldman mentions a gold smuggling case in October, 1961,
"three years after Martial Law had begun its anti-smuggling 
41activities".
The Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1956
On October 10, three days after the abrogation of
the Constitution of 1956, the President issued the Laws
42(Continuance in Force) Order, 1956, which "must be
regarded as the principal constitutional document for the
43'martial law1 period".  ^ The Order was deemed to have 
taken effect immediately upon the making of the proclamation
41. Ibid.
42. President's Order (Post-Proclamation) No. 1 of 1956. 
P.L.D. 1956 Central Statutes 497; Full text of the 
Order is in Appendix IY.
43. A. Gledhill, Pakistan, The Development of its Laws 
and Constitut ion , p.lOS.
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of October 7> abrogating the Constitution and declaring 
nartial law throughout the country*
The Laws (Continuance in Porce) Order, 1953? 
provided that, subject to any Order of the President or 
Regulation made by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, 
the country was to be governed as nearly as possible in 
accordance with the abrogated Constitution. The adjective 
"Islamic" v;as omitted from the title of the Republic, which 
was henceforward to be known simply as "Pakistan". All 
courts existing immediately before the proclamation would 
continue to function, exercising the same jurisdiction, 
except that they could not call in question the President’s 
proclamation of October 7* u^cy Order made under the pro­
clamation or Hartial Law Order or Regulation or finding or 
judgment of a military court. The Supreme Court and the 
High Courts retained their power to issue writs, but no 
writ was to be issued against the Chief Hartial Law Adminis­
trator or his Deputy or any person exercising power or juris­
diction under the authority of either of them. Where a 
civil authority had been superseded by a martial lav/ 
authority, a court could send "its opinion on a question of 
law raised" in lieu of a writ. All orders and judgments 
made or given by the Supreme Court before October 10 were 
valid and binding on all courts and authorities in Pakistan, 
but saving those, no other oi'der or writ made or issued 
after October 7 would be valid, unless permitted by the
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Order, and all applications and proceedings in respect of 
any writ, which was not retained hy the Order, would ahate.
All laws in force, except the late Constitution 
and certain orders made under it, and subject to the Orders
r
of the President and Regulations made hy the Chief Hartial 
Law Administrator, would continue in force until altered, 
repealed or amended. Any provision in any law providing 
for the reference of any detention order to an Advisory 
Board would have no effect.
A Governor of a province was to have the same 
powers as he would have had under a proclamation made hy 
the President, suspending the provincial constitution, 
under the late Constitution, including power to make Ordi­
nances. But he was to exercise these powers, subject to 
any directions from the President or the Chief Administrator 
of Hartial Law. Hartial Law Regulations made hy the 
Chief Administrator were to operate unaffected hy any 
Ordinance made hy a Governor and in the case of conflict 
or repugnancy, the Regulation was to prevail.
All persons in the service of Pakistan or holding 
certain offices under the late Constitution immediately 
before the proclamation were continued in such service or 
office on the same terms and conditions and v/ith the same 
privileges as before. By an amendment of the Order, the 
President assumed the power of suspending, in consultation
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with, the Ghief Justice of Pakistan, any judge, whose conduct 
was under reference to the Supreme Court for report.
By a subsequent amendment any person in the service of 
Pakistan, if found inefficient or guilty of misconduct, was 
made liable to be removed or dismissed from the service. ^
The Laws (Continuance in Porce) Order, as has been 
noted earlier, was the principal constitutional document 
promulgated by the new regime and henceforward formed the 
legal basis for the exercise of power by all organs of the 
State. All actions of the regime were examined in the 
light of this Order along with the President's proclamation 
of October 7* It, therefore, came under judicial scrutiny 
in the cases before the superior courts during the "Martial 
Law" period. We shall discuss the status and impact of 
this Order later in the Chapter.
In conformity with the authoritarian and unitary
nature of the regime, some re-arrangements in the law-making
power of the centre and the province were made. The
46Legislative Powers Order, 1959» was made in March, 1959» 
giving the President exclusive power to make laws relating
44. President's Order (Post-Proclamation) ITo. 4 of 1958, 
P.L.D. 1959 Central Statutes 5«
45. President's Order No. 1 of 1959}
P.L.D. 1959 Central Statutes 99*
46. President's Order No. 2 of 1959}
P.L.D. 1959 Central Statutes 151.
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to military camps, cantonments and administration of canton­
ments, and, "by an amendment of the Order, mines and matters 
relating to mines were also brought under the exclusive law- 
mailing power of the President. By another amendment all 
matters enumerated in the Provincial List of the late Con­
stitution and any matter not enumerated in any list were
47placed in the Concurrent List. ' But all provincial laws 
not in conflict with any order made by the President since 
the proclamation were to continue to be valid. Thus all 
conceivable subjects were brought under the legislative and 
executive authority of the centre. The provincial govern­
ments were essentially made subservient to the central 
authority, whose writ reigned supreme throughout the whole 
country.
Measures relating to Public Life and Public Services
President Mirza and General Ayub Khan in their 
first speeches had accused the politicians of all kinds of 
: misconduct, which, they alleged, had created an intolerable 
situation in the country. It was, therefore, expected that 
some extraordinary measures, besides arrest and detention 
under the existing laws, would be adopted to deal with them.
47. President's Order No. 17 of 1959?
P.L.D. 1959 Central Statutes 324.
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In March, 1959 the Public Offices (Disqualification) Order, 
4-81959j was promulgated to deal with ex-Ninisters and others 
who had previously held public offices. The Order included 
a wide definition of the word "misconduct” ' and provided 
for disqualification for public office by the President or 
a Governor of any person found guilty of misconduct, after 
an enquiry by a tribunal established for the purpose. The 
disqualification could extend to a period of fifteen years 
and the order could require any sum of money to be paid in 
compensation for money lost to the public revenue through 
misconduct of the person concerned.
The Public Offices (Disqualification) Order, 1959» 
as may be noticed, was applicable only to those politicians 
who had held public offices, and did not apply to those who, 
without holding office, had been members of various repre­
sentative institutions and ware thought to have used their 
positions to their own advantage or to the detriment of the
State. The procedure under this Order was also considered
50to be lengthy and cumbersome. In consequence a further
48. President’s Order ITo. 3 of 19595 
P.L.D. 1959 Central Statutes 152.
49. It included "bribery, corruption, jobbery, favouritism,
nepotism, wilful maladministration, wilful misapplication 
or diversion of public moneys or moneys collected, whether 
by public subscriptions or otherwise, by or at the 
instance of a person holding public office, and any other 
abuse of whatsoever kind of official power or position 
and abetment of misconduct.” - Para. 2(a) of the Order.
50. See H. Feldman, op.cit., p.80.
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Order - the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, 1959*^ 
was issued in August. This Order applied to any person 
who had held public office or position, including membership 
of any ”elective body” since August 14, 1947* The Order 
provided for the appointment of three tribunals to inquire 
into the cases of misconduct of such persons as were referred 
to them by competent authorities and to report their 
findings to the appropriate government. The tribunals, 
when notifying the respondents of the charges, were to give 
them the option voluntarily to retire from public life until 
December 31* 1966. On an acceptance of this offer, further 
enquiry against a respondent would stop and he would stand 
disqualified for that period for being a member or a can­
didate for membership of any elective body. In a contested 
case, if the respondent was found guilty by the tribunal, 
the appropriate government would pass an order disqualifying 
him from holding public office until December 31 > 1966 and 
might also order restoration of any sum of money lost to 
the public revenue through his misconduct. There was also 
a provision in the Order for automatic disqualification of 
certain categories of persons for holding public office 
until the end of 1966. These categories included those who 
had been dismissed or removed from service, except for
51. President’s Order Ho. 13 of 1959 >
P.L.D. 1959 Central Statutes 288.
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inefficiency, those who had heen detained under the Security
of Pakistan Act, 1952, or had heen found guilty of an offence
under the Public aid Representative Offices (Disqualification)
Act, 194-9* and persons who had been convicted and sentenced
to not less than two years1 imprisonment.
The Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order,
1959 > proved effective in eliminating the politicians from
public life. It has been observed that "the intention was,
no doubt, to sweep into the net every person who had been
active in politics and against whom some misconduct could 
52be proved", and in this it was successful. Only a few 
denied the charges made against them; most of them accepted 
voluntary retirement. Approximately seven thousand
55persons were excluded from political life under the Order.
It may be mentioned here that in 1963, after the Constitution
of 1962 had come into force, the President issued an amending 
54-Ordinance^ providing that persons labouring under an EBDO 
disqualification order could apply for relief. This
52. H. Peldman, op.cit., p.80.
53* Karl von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, p.190. 
The number included former Prime Ministers Sutirawardy 
who contested the charges and Peroz Khan IToon, former 
Chief Ministers A.H. Sarkar (who also contested), A.R. 
Khan, and Ilumtaz Daultana.
54. Ordinance II of 1963,
P.L.D. 1963 Central Statutes 12
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gesture on the part of the President was interpreted as a
means to get support for the President's Constitution from
former political leaders. It therefore "became an object
of controversy and did not receive approval in the National 
55Assembly. ^
If the politicians were thoroughly discredited,
because of their corruption, inefficiency and abuse of
official power, there was no doubt in the minds of the
people that these vices were also rife at all levels of
the public services. To deal with the public servants,
56the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959? was promul­
gated in January, 1959* The Ordinance applied to all 
persons in the service of Pakistan and certain other persons 
holding the office of Governor, Judges of the superior 
courts, Auditor and Comptroller General, Attorney-General 
and Advocates-General. It provided for the scrutiny of 
the conduct of any of these persons by Committees consti­
tuted by the central government. Each Committee was 
empowered to order a search of any premises and to order a 
police investigation into any matter in respect of a case 
coming before it. A person appearing before a Committee 
xtfas barred from employing any legal adviser or friend; he 
was to appear personally and by himself. Under the Public
55. See Peldman, op.cit., p.82.
56. Ordinance III of 1959*
P.L.D. 1959 Central Statutes 156.
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57Conduct Scrutiny Rules, 1959? framed under the Ordinance, 
if an officer was found corrupt, guilty of conduct contrary 
to service rules or inefficient, the Committee was to 
submit its findings, together with the action against the 
person recommended by it, to the appointing authority for 
passing an order according to lav;* Under this Ordinance a 
total of fifty-seven Committees were set up, which implied 
that the conduct of a large number of officers were screened 
In all 1,662 central government ,officials were disciplined 
and the punishment varied from removal from service to a 
"simple expression of the Government1s displeasure".^®
In order to deal administratively with appropriate 
cases relating to government servants belonging to the All- 
Pakistan services or persons engaged in the service in 
connection with the affairs of the federation, the Govern­
ment Servants (Discipline and Efficiency) Rules, 1959^ 
were framed. These rules empowered a competent authority, 
the head of a Department in the case of his subordinate 
officials, and the President in all other cases, to dismiss, 
remove, reduce in rank or compulsorily retire a government 
servant if he, in the opinion of such authority, was corrupt
57* P.L.D. 1959 Central Statutes 157*
58. H. Peldman, Revolution in Pakistan, p. 74*. 
59- P.L.D. 1959 Central Statutes 138.
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inefficient, guilty of conduct contrary to service rules or 
engaged in subversive activity. If the charge was involve­
ment in subversive activity, a Board of three Secretaries to 
government was to report to the President on the proceedings. 
A person, against whom an order was made under the rules, 
had the right of an appeal to the President, and where the 
order was that of the President, he could apply for review. 
These rules were designed to tighten the disciplinary rules 
regula,ting the behaviour of public servants and provided for 
summary action against offending officials.
Legality of the Martial Law Regime
During the period of forty-four months in which 
the country was governed by the "Martial Law" regime, the 
superior courts of Pakistan were called upon to give their 
interpretation of statutory instruments promulgated by the 
regime. As has been said^earlier, the Laws (Continuance 
in Force) Order, 1958, issued by the President on October 10, 
restored most of the powers and jurisdiction of the courts. 
This short document served as the fundamental constitutional 
instrument, in the light of which other pieces of legislation 
were examined by the courts.
But first of all the*Supreme Court had to decide 
the legality of the regime which had abrogated the Consti­
tution, abolished the legal order under it, and brought into
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60force a new one. In State v. Dosso the question arose 
whether a writ issued by the West Pakistan High Court, under 
the provisions of the late Constitution, had abated under 
the provisions of the Lav/s (Continuance in Force) Order.
The Supreme Court, by a majority held that it had, as the 
late Constitution itself had been abrogated, the Court 
recognised the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order as the "new 
constitution”, which "determined” the jurisdiction of all 
courts including the Supreme Court.
In a detailed discussion of constitutional
charges, Iiohammad Hunir C.J. maintained that an abrupt
change, not contemplated by the existing constitution,
amounting to a "victorious revolution” or a "successful
coup d1etat”, was an internationally recognised method of
changing a constitution. The Chief Justice said,
"It sometimes happens ... that a Constitution 
and the national legal order under it is dis­
rupted by an abrupt political change not within 
the contemplation of the constitution. Any 
such change is called a revolution, and its legal 
effect is not only the destruction of the existing 
Constitution but also the validity of the national 
legal order." 61
Hunir C.J. pointed out that a revolution was generally
associated with public tumult, mutiny and bloodshed but "from
a juristic point of view the method by which and persons by
60. P.L.D. 1958 S.C. 535.
61. Ibid., at p. 538.
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whom a revolution is brought about is wholly immaterial ... 
Squally irrelevant in law is the motive for the revolution . 
Sor the purposes of the doctrine ”... a change is, in law, 
a revolution if it annuls the Constitution and the annul­
ment is effective11.
Regarding the "effectiveness” of a revolution his
Lordship said:
”... if the revolution is victorious in the sense 
that the persons assuming power under the change 
can successfully require the inhabitants of the 
country to conform to the new regime, then the 
revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact, 
because thereafter its own legality is judged, 
not by reference to the annulled Constitution, 
but by reference to its own success. On the 
same principle the validity of the laws to be made 
thereafter is judged by reference to the new and 
not the annulled Constitution.”
The Chief Justice continued
”If the territory and the people remain sub­
stantially the same, there is, under the modern 
juristic doctrine, no change in the corpus or 
international entity of the State and therevo­
lutionary government and the new constitution 
are, according to International 'Law, the legi­
timate government and the valid constitution of 
the State* Thus a victorious revolution or a 
successful coup d 1etat is an internationally 
recognised legal method of changing a constitution.
"After a change of the character I have 
mentioned has taken place, the national legal 
order must for its validity depend upon the new 
law-creating organ. Even the Courts lose their 
existing jurisdiction and can function only to the 
extent and in the manner determined by the new 
Constitution." 62
62. Ibid., at p. 539*
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In support of his viex\r Ilunir C.J. quoted exten­
sively from Hans Helsen’s positivist theory of "efficacy" 
of the change, including the following extract:
"From a juristic point of view, the decisive 
criterion of a revolution is that the order in 
force is overthrown and replaced hy a new order 
in a way which the former had not itself anti­
cipated*
* • t . * • * * .
"Ho jurist would maintain that even 
after a successful revolution, the old consti­
tution and the laws based thereupon remain in 
force, on the ground that they have not been 
nullified in a manner anticipated by the old 
order itself* Every jurist will presume that 
the old order - to which no political reality 
any longer corresponds - has ceased to be valid, 
and that all norms, which are valid within the 
new order, receive their validity exclusively 
from the new constitution. It follows that, 
from this juristic point of view, the norms of 
the old order can no longer be recognised as 
valid norms." 63
On the basis of Kelsen's theory, the Chief Justice 
concluded that the revolution having been successful, it 
had satisfied the test of "efficacy" and became a basic 
law-creating fact. "On that assumption the Laws (Continuance 
in Force) Order, however transitory or imperfect it may be, 
is a new legal order and it is in accordance with that Order 
that the validity of the laws and the correctness of 
judicial decisions has to be examined."
63. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 
Quoted in P.L.D.' 1958” BYC. 553> at pp. 539-^0•
64. P.L.D. 1956 S.C. 5335 at p. 540.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan in the above case 
was called upon to deal with a situation, which had no 
precedent in the legal history of the Commonwealth. The 
declaration of martial law throughout the country was accom­
panied by the abrogation of the Constitution. Other 
Commonwealth Courts from time to time and Pakistani Courts 
in 1953 kad dealt with martial law situations of the kind 
recognised by the common law. But here the Court had to 
determine the validity of a neitf legal order, which had 
replaced the old. In such a situation, as Professor Gledhill 
observed, "no Crown prerogative or rule of common law could 
be invoked to justify what had been done. Instead resort
J05was had to Hans Kelsen's 1 General Theory of Law and State1... 
lie further pointed out that the Constitution of 1956 had 
provisions for its own amendment. And if the court had 
not recognised a right to change the Constitution by rebellion, 
it was possible that the judges would have been suspended 
and replaced by military courts affording fewer remedies 
to the citizens. "But the course taken was calculated to 
encourage an individual wielding supreme power to seek the
riCL
approval of the courts for unconstitutional action."
A political scientist, Leslie J. Macfarlane, has 
also commented on the Supreme Court's decision, upholding
65. A. Gledhill, Pakistan, The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution, p.109*
66. Ibid.
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Hans Ue.lsen's doctrine of ‘’efficacy”• He said that it was
not clear “whether the Xlelsen doctrine should he taken as
simply a descriptive account of how men behave when a
successful revolution takes place or whether it is to be
read as providing an authoritative prescription which not
merely justifies but requires obedience to the new regime.”
Pakistan judges, according to Macfarlane, applied the
latter interpretation.
’’This interpretation is open to criticism ... 
for it would leave open the possibility of 
having a valid legal Order based on the arbi­
trary right of the leader or ruler to do what­
ever he thought fit, where all that the courts 
would have to determine in any case before them 
was what the leader had decreed, without any, 
reference to whether the decree was promulgated, 
whether it conflicted with other decrees or 
whether, it could reasonably or practically be 
given effect to. It would even be possible 
for the courts to be required to assist the 
authorities to find ‘legal* reasons for estab­
lishing the guilt of innocent men, (as happened 
in the Moscow trial of the thirties), if this was 
one of the 'norms* of ,the new order. In such 
circumstances for judges to uphold the decrees of 
those in power in the name of law and de jure 
authority, is to mock and undermine ordinary men's 
confidence in the rule of law. It is one thing 
to argue ... that men cannot be required to behave 
in conformity with norms of a total legal order 
which has passed away; quite another to conclude, 
as the Pakistani and Ugandan judges have done, 
that this requires that the courts of the old order 
are required to validate the norms of its effec­
tive replacements.” 67
Leslie Ilacfarlane was commenting as above in the
67• L.J. Ilacfarlane, ’’Pronouncing on Rebellion: The
Rhodesian Courts and U.D.I.” ,
(1968) Public Law 323 > at pp. 334— 335*
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context of Rhodesian cases on the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Smith regime. It may be interesting to 
note what Chief Justice Beadle of the High Court of Rhodesia 
has said about the position of judges in a revolutionary 
situation. According to him, whether the "fundamental law” 
had changed at a given time or not was a .question of fact 
and "did not in any way depend on the political view of 
the Chief Justices. If the 1 fundamental law1 had in fact 
changed, that was the end of the matter." In such circum­
stances the judges had to decide whether to go or continue 
in office. Even if they decided to relinquish, their 
decision would not have any bearing on what at that time the 
law was. His lordship then observed,
"If the 'fundamental law1 has in fact changed, 
what I consider the Judge cannot do is to purport 
to continue to sit under the old Constitution and 
declare that this constitution is still the law, 
when quite obviously it is not and he knows quite 
well it is not. Such a decision would completely 
divorce law from political reality." 68
What happened in Pakistan in October, 195Q> then 
an isolated incident in the Commonwealth, has become a 
pattern for the "Hew Commonwealth"• If the Rhodesian 
regime, in spite of Britain's claim of legal sovereignty 
over the colony, could secure the de jure recognition of 
the Rhodesian High Court on the basis of the fact that it
68. iladzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke 
1968 (2) S.A. 284, at p. 52V.
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wielded effective power, ignoring the British sanctions and 
other measures, it seems quite understandable why the 
Pakistan Supreme Court had to recognise the change, when
there was no effective opposition to the new regime. The
69 70recent experience in Pakistan  ^ and Nigeria' has estab­
lished the substance of Chief Justice Beadle’s remark that 
the Court has no control over such circumstances. This is 
at least true in the new Commonwealth countries, where 
Judicial and legal institutions do not yet enjoy the same 
support from other institutions and the people as the wielder 
of political power. No doubt the Judges ought to uphold 
the law, according to the Constitution under which they are 
appointed, and should not recognise any change in that 
Constitution, unless made bona fide and according to the 
proper procedure. But in the circumstances prevailing in 
Pakistan after the President’s proclamation of October 7> 
1958? it would have been difficult to do otherwise than the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan did. If it had declared the 
regime illegal and unconstitutional, its decision would have 
no effect at all; if the decision of the highest court is 
not given effect to, such a decision would not have any
69. See Ilir I-Iasan v. The State, P.L.D. 1969 Lahore 786.
70. See Lakanmi v. The A.-G. (West),
Supreme Court of Nigeria 1970» S.C. 58/69*
(In both these cases the Judicial decisions were 
overruled by executive decrees.)
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"real” value, nor would it enhance the prestige of the
judiciary in the eyes of the people; it might result in
their loss of confidence in the whole judicial system#
What would have happened if the Court had not recognised
the new regime may he a hypothetical question# But its
recognition hy the Court led the regime, on its part, to
recognise the Court!s authority, possibly because it
realised that "a revolution in a country is complete in law
71as soon as its courts hold the new regime to be lawful11*
It may be noted that, while the Supreme Court recognised 
that the law could be changed at the will of the President 
and the Chief Iiartial Law Administrator, there is no 
instance in Pakistan, during this "martial law" period, of 
the regime flouting any judicial decision given on the basis 
of the law, as it then existed.
The Courts1 jurisdiction
The Laws (Continuance in Porce) Order, 1958, which 
Ilunir C.J. described as the "new constitution", provided 
that all existing courts would continue to function and to 
exercise the same power and jurisdiction as before. But 
no court was to call in question the proclamation of October 
7, 1958> any order made under it or any Martial Law Order or
71. R.W.M. Lias, "Legal Politics: Horans Behind the
^rundnorm" .
(1968) Cambridge Law Journal 233-
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Regulation or any order or judgment of any Military Court#
Where a writ was applied for against the judgment of a
Summary Military Court, the West Pakistan High Court held
that it was not in all cases that the jurisdiction of the
High Court m  respects the judgment of the military court had
72been taken away. The Court recognised that it had no 
authority to question any Martial Law Regulation or Order 
or any judgment of a military court. But there was no 
ouster of the High Court*s jurisdiction, if the military 
court acted without jurisdiction. The learned judge 
observed
rlIf a Military Court passes a sentence on a person
it could not try, or tries an offence it was not
given the power to try, or passes a sentence it 
was not competent to pass, the order will be 
without jurisdiction and will not enjoy the 
immunity from scrutiny by this Court. My reliance 
in coming to the above conclusion is on the well- 
known principle of law that an order which is 
without jurisdiction cannot be treated as an order 
for any purpose.*1 73
In the above case it was held that Martial Law 
Regulations and Martial Law Orders issued by the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator had the same status and were of
niL
the same effect. And in Aziz Din v. The Statef the same
72. Manzoot. Elahi v. The State, P.L.D. 1959 Lahore 24*3. 
73* Ibid., per Shabir Ahmad J. at p. 24*6.
74-. P.L.D. 1959 Lahore 336.
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learned judge held that Martial Law Order Ho. 10^  had, hy 
implication, taken away the right of a person, convicted by 
an ordinary criminal court, if the sentence had been con­
firmed by an Administrator, to appeal to a higher court.
But the Supreme Court overruled the decisions on these 
points, holding that Martial Law Orders had not the same 
status as the Regulations and that the right of appeal 
where it existed "could only be taken away expressly or by 
necessary intendment and a mere provision of a confirming 
or reviewing authority in a different jurisdiction does not 
have the effect of destroying or taking away that right 
where it a c c r u e d . I n  Siddiq v. The State^  it was held 
that an application for revision from an order of a Magis­
trate in a case tried under para. 1 of Martial Law Regulation 
No. 61 lay to the court of session. Following the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Khuhro1s case the West Pakistan High Court 
held that an order purporting to have been made under a 
Martial Law Regulation could be investigated by the High 
Court and a suitable order passed, if it had violated the
75* M.L.O. Ho. 10. "Proceedings of cases tried under the
Martial Law Orders and Regulations by the Criminal Courts, 
after confirmation by the Administrator will be forwarded 
to Judge Advocate-General ... for review."
76. M.A. Khuhro v. Pakistan, P.L.D. I960 S.C. 237 > 244.
77. P.L.D. 1959 Lahore 769* i
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principles of natural j u s t i c e T h e  learned judge observed 
that "what was not to be questioned was the Regulation or 
the Order itself, but any action taken under the Regulation 
or Order could be examined.1
But whereas the courts were zealous to guard their 
own jurisdiction, wherever given and not expressly taken 
away, they gave a liberal interpretation to ouster of juris­
diction, where it had been provided by any Martial Law Regu­
lation. The court consistently recognised that Martial Law 
Regulations and Martial Lav/ Orders themselves could not be
called in question. The Supreme Court, upholding the High
no
Court*s judgment in Zafar-ul-Ahsan1s case,  ^held that a 
statute could provide for the exclusion of the court*s 
jurisdiction over any order or proceeding made or taken by
a statutory authority properly constituted and exercising
p>o
proper jurisdiction. It v/as, however, observed that 
"where the proceedings are taken mala fide and the statute 
is used merely as a cloak to cover an act which in fact is 
not taken, though it purports to have been taken, under the 
statute, the order will not ... be treated as an Order under
78. A. Majid v. Pakistan, P.L.D . I960 Karachi 921.
79* Zafar-ul-Ahsan v. Pakistan, P.L.D. 1959 Lahore 879* 
80. Zafar-ul-Ahsan v. Pakistan, P.L.D. I960 S.C. 115.
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81the statute.’1 Not only could the ordinary jurisdiction 
of the court he taken away by an express provision of a 
statute made by the competent authority, but the extra­
ordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Courts and the 
Supreme Court was ’also subject to orders of the President 
and Chief Martial Law Administrator who possesses unfettered
o p
plenary power of legislation”. The Supreme Court also
held that a Martial Law Regulation, issued by the Chief
Administrator of Martial Law, could exclude jurisdiction,
including the writ jurisdiction, for ’’the powers of the
Chief Martial Lav/ Administrator to legislate are not subject
to any restrictions, and it was open to him to provide that
action taken under any Ordinance of the President shall not
83be liable to be questioned in any court of law.” ^
The Laws (Continuance in Porce) Order had restored 
to the Supreme Court and the High Courts power to issue the 
named writs in respect of matters provided for by that 
Order and all applications and pending proceedings for issue 
of writs, not so provided for, were to abate. In the State 
v. Dosso, the Supreme Court, interpreting these provisions,
81* Ibid., at p. 120.
82. Pahlomal-Motiram v. Chief Land Commissioner, 
P.L.D. 1961 Karachi 584",' 402.
83. Iflikhar-ud-din v. M. Sarfraz,
P.L.D. 1961 S.C. 585, 866 (.per Kaikaus, J.).
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held, by a majority, that with the abrogation of the Con­
stitution of 1958 the fundamental rights created by that Con­
stitution were "no longer a part of the national legal 
order and neither the Supreme Court nor the High Court has 
under the new order the authority to issue any writ on the 
ground of the violation of the fundamental rights".
Future writs would lie only on the ground of infraction of 
a law preserved or right recognised by the Laws (Continuance 
in Force) Order. The phrase "shall be governed as nearly 
as may be in accordance with the late Constitution" did not 
have the effect of restoring the fundamental rights, because 
the reference to "government” here meant only the "structure 
and outline of Government" and not the laws of the consti­
tution, which had been expressly abrogated. The effect 
would be that all applications for writs for contravention 
of fundamental rights would abate. This meant that all 
proceedings for enforcement of such writs would also abate.
Dissenting from the majority, Cornelius J. (as he 
then was) held that though the fundamental rights of the 
late Constitution were not saved by the LCFO, proceedings 
commenced should not fail or abate because of the failure 
of those rights upon which they were based. The Order 
issued on October 10, 1958, had no retrospective effect, 
and, before October 7» the High Court had the duty to examine
84. P.L.D. 1958 S.C. 533, 541 (per Kmir, C.J.)
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the validity of any legislation in the light of the pro­
visions of the Constitution, which the High Court had done in 
the instant case. The provisions in Article 2(7) of the 
Laws (Continuance in Force) Order could not have the effect 
of bringing to an abrupt end the proceedings in the petitions 
commenced and concluded before the High Court. His Lordship 
observed, "I do not, therefore, consider that it is open to 
me to reverse the judgment of the High Court •.. and to 
recall the writs issued by them, unless I am satisfied that 
the view of the High Court on the point of repugnancy to 
Article 5 of the [late] Constitution is not tenable."^
86
In the Province of East Pakistan v. Mehdi Ali Khan 
the Supreme Court, again by a majority, held that no writ 
would lie on the basis of, nor to enforce, any fundamental 
rights, which ceased to exist o m  the abrogation of the 
Constitution. Dissenting, Cornelius J. expressed his doubts 
that the effect of the provisions of the Laws (Continuance 
in Force) Order was to abruptly terminte all proceedings 
commenced before the proclamation. The learned judge held 
that the phrase that writs Mnot so provided for shall abate 
forthwith" was "applicable only to such proceedings as might 
constitute a threat to the supremacy of the new regime.
85. Ibid., at p. 561.
86. P.L.D. 1959 S.C. 387.
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Such proceedings might be motions of writs directed to a 
Martial Law authority and these are expressly excluded . .."^ 
The court was entitled to examine any action taken 
under any Regulation or Order and to issue the appropriate 
order or writ, if it was found that the action taken was 
not authorised, though the Regulation and Order themselves
O Q
were immune from judicial scrutiny. And an action under
a Regulation or Order was immune from judicial review, only
89when it was taken by an authorised officer. J A writ of
certiorari would issue directing a court to accept juris-
90diction, which it refused to accept. The courts1 power
to issue writs could be taken away by a statute issued by
91the President and the Chief Martial Lav; Administrator*,
and the High Courts had not such wide powers to issue writs
under the Laws (Continuance in Porce) Order as they had
92enjoyed under Article 170 of the late Constitution.
But where it was contended that the writ of mandamus could
Ibid., at p.442.
88. Sher Muhammad v. ITasiruddin, P.L.D. I960 Lahore 565; 
A. Majid v. Pakistan, P.L.D. I960 Karachi 921.
89. M. Siddiq v. The State, P.L.D. 1959 Lahore 769.
90. Zahid Umar & Co. v. Chief Secretary,
P.L.D. 1959 Lahore 7^
91. Iftikhar-ud-din v. M. Sarfraz, P.L.D. 1961 S.C. 5&5; 
Patilomal-Motiram v. Chief Land Commissioner,
P.L.D. 1961 Karachi J8T.
92. Pakistan v. M. Sayeed, P.L.D. 1961 S.C. 192.
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not be issued to government, the Supreme Court held that,
as "government" was not mentioned in the Laws (Continuance
in Force) Order, as one of the authorities against whom a
writ did not lie, an appropriate writ would issue against
"government" in an appropriate case and mandamus was no 
qx
exception* ^
^aws in ForceM and the Constitution of 1956
According to the provisions of the Laws (Continuance 
in Force) Order, though the Constitution of 1956 bad been 
abrogated, the country was to be governed, as nearly as 
possible, according to the late Constitution and all laws, 
other than the late Constitution, existing immediately 
before the proclamation were to continue in force, subject 
to changes made by the President or the Chief Administrator 
of Martial Law*
In assessing the status of the late Constitution 
in the new legal order, the Supreme Court held that the 
late Constitution was to provide only "the structure and 
Outline of Government" and all laws of the Constitution 
had been abrogated*^ In ilehdi Ali Khanfs case^ it was
93* Pakistan v. M.A. Hayat, P.L.D* 1962 S.C. 28* 
94. State v. Dosso, P.L.D. 1958 S.C. 555, 541.
95. P.L.D. 1959 S.C. 387.
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held that the lav/s, which were void for "being in conflict 
with the fundamental rights contained in the late Consti­
tution, had been revived with full force and effect on the 
disappearance of the fundamental rights* A law passed by 
a competent legislature, but inconsistent with certain 
fundamental rights was not void ab initio, but was only void 
so long as such inconsistency existed. With the disappearance 
of the fundamental rights, it became fully effective as
enacted. The Chief Justice, who gave the principal judgment
96of the majority cited a number of foreign authorities*^
to show that the courts did not decide the constitutionality
of a law on a hypothetical case, and that laws conflicting
with the paramount law were not struck off the statute
book. It merely became "inoperative" to the extent of the
repugnancy or was "kept in abeyance" for so long as that
superior law was in force. As soon as the contravening
provision of the superior law disappeared, the law would
re-appear with full force.
Earlier, the West Pakistan High Court had held
that laws which were repugnant to the fundamental rights
before their abrogation were void ab initio and would not
07
revive on the disappearance of those r i g h t s . K a y a n i  C.J.
96. A.-G., Ontario v. A.G. .Dominion, (1896) A.C. 34*8;
Iiarbury v. iiacLison^  1 cranch 137 U.S. 1803;
Carter and others v. The Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board, 
66 C.L.R. $$7.
97• Hasham v. Tribunal, P.L.D. 1959 Karachi 286.
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qg
referred to two Indian Supreme Court casesJ and, discarding
the neclipse,r theory enunciated in the latter, held that a
/
law was either valid or void and observed that "to say that 
it is not void in toto or not void for all purposes or for 
all times or for all persons is to introduce laxity and
vagueness into the meaning of a well-recognised and
qq
perfectly definite expression." But on appeal, ' the 
Supreme Court reversed the findings of the High Court and 
confirmed its own full bench decision in Mehdi Ali Khanfs 
case.
Under the new legal order there was no such dis­
tinction between "organic" or "constitutional" and "ordinary" 
law as had existed during the pre-revolution period. "At 
present two kinds of legislation are in vogue in this 
country. One is an ordinary legislation which is issued 
in the name of the President and other are Martial Law 
Regulations, which are issued under the authority of the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator# In law both of them 
have equal force ..."^
With the passage of time it seems that the courts 
were disposed to give a better status to the Constitution 
of 1956, than the Supreme Court had given in its judgment
98. Saghir^Ahmad v. State of U«P» > A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 728; 
Bhikaji Narain v. State"of Madhya Pradesh,
A.I.E.1955 S.C. 7STY
99* Tribunal v. Hashim, P.L.D. I960 S.C. 260.
nd Commission!
.per Wahiauddin, J.).
1. Pahlomal-Motiram v. Chief La Q iaiBg iiSEt 
P.L.i). 1961 Karachi 584,402 ^
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in Dosso1s case, which was heard only a week after the issue 
of the proclanation* In Iftikhar-ud-din1s case ICaikaus, J. 
pointed out that the words in Article 2 of the Laws (Con­
tinuance in Force) Order "shall he governed as nearly as 
may he in accordance with11 were "exactly the same as in 
subsection (2) of section 8 of the Indian Independence Act, 
194-7* and nay well have heen lifted therefrom. In that 
provision these words admittedly referred to all functions 
of the Government and it will not he improper to infer that 
the Constitution was to he in force in Pakistan, in the same 
way as the Government of India Act was to he in force from 
the 14th of August, 194-7*11 ^ The Constitution of 1956 was 
adopted, as the President could adopt the constitution of 
any other country, hut this was more convenient. It was 
in force, not as a Constitution to which all laws and powers 
were subject, hut as an enactment adopted by the President, 
subject to amendment at his will#
The laws which were in existence at the time of 
the proclamation could only he altered by the supreme 
authority of the President and they had priority over the 
statutes made by authorities other than the President and 
the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. Any order of a
2. P.L.D. 1961 S.C. 585, 598
5* Ibid., at p. 599*
216
Zonal Administrator of Martial Law or a provincial 
Governor would be void if it was inconsistent with the
lL
"existing" law, which was given validity by the President* 
The provisions of the Constitution of 1956 and the laws 
existing immediately before the proclamation, according 
to the court, were to have full effect, unless they were 
inconsistent with the President's Orders or Regulations 
of the Chief Administrator of Martial Law.
With the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956 
the fundamental rights enumerated therein disappeared.
Though the country was to be governed as nearly as possible 
by the "late Constitution11, that did not mean the restor­
ation of the fundamental rights to their proper place.
The "so-called fundamental rights" were no longer a part 
of the national legal order and no writ would lie for the 
violation of those rights.^ But, according to Cornelius, 
J., who dissented from the above majority view, the funda­
mental rights enumerated in the Constitution did not derive 
their entire validity from the Constitution. "A number of 
these rights are essential human rights which inherently 
belong to every citizen of a country governed in a civilised
4. M. Afzal v. Commissioner, P.L.D. 1965 S.C. 401.
5. State v. Dosso, P.L.D. 195S S.C. 553, 541.
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mode ...”, these could not he denied to citizens Mat a time 
when they were expressly assured by writing in the funda­
mental law of the country, merely because that writing is
0
no longer of any force’1 •
Following the decision in Dosso1s case, the 
Supreme Court further held that not only had the funda­
mental rights disappeared, but all laws which were repugnant 
to such rights and so void to the extent of repugnancy
7
would recover their full force. Even the writs which were 
issued by the East Pakistan High Court on the directions of
o
the Supreme Court in Jibendra Kishore1s case would abate by 
reason of the provision in the Laws (Continuance in Force) 
Order* Again, Cornelius, J. dissented from the majority 
and held that such rights as would have prejudiced the 
success of the new regime would be regarded as non-existent 
by reason of the provision in the L.C.F.O. But other 
rights, though with the abrogation of the Constitution they
had lost their compulsive force, as provisions of the late
9Constitution were not entirely devoid of validity*y
The judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court
6 . Ibid., at pp* 560-61*
7« Province of East Pakistan v* Mehdi Ali Khan, 
P.L.D." 1959 sVc. 357.
8 . Jibendra Kishore v. Province of East Pakistan,
P.L.D. 195? 9.
9. P.L.D. 1959 S.C. 387, 441.
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in recognising the abrogation of the Constitution, and 
with it the disappearance of the fundamental rights, in 
the context of the situation, is understandable* But 
Cornelius, J.fs dictum that some rights, though they had 
lost the compulsive force as such rights, were not absolutely 
devoid of validity, seems vague and unenforceable* A right 
is either valid and enforceable or it is not* If they 
had ”lost the operation” itfhich was conferred on them by 
the late Constitution, then they must be regarded as having 
disappeared. To say that they had ”not become entirely 
devoid of validity” is to invite the question of deter- 
rining the quantum of validity, which it is impossible to 
determine and enforce.
According to the Supreme Court, however, the 
provisions of the late Constitution, not repugnant to any 
order of the President or any Regulation made by the Chief 
Administrator, were valid and would be enforced. But the 
fundamental rights contained in that Constitution were held 
to have disappeared with the abrogation of the Constitution. 
No court would allow any proceeding to enforce those rights 
or nalie any order on the basis of them.
Martial Law Regulations and Martial Law Orders
Though Martial Law Regulations and Martial Law 
Orders were issued by the same authority, that is, the
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Chief Administrator of Martial Lav/ or any Zonal Adminis­
trator of Martial Lax/, the court distinguished between the 
status of the two instruments. The Supreme Court in 
Khuhro1 s case^ held that "while the Regulations prescribe 
the penalties, the Orders merely provide the method of 
enforcing the Regulations, and in Martial Lav; terminology 
that is the correct distinction between the tx;o.,! It was 
for the Chief Martial Lav; Administrator to determine whether 
he would describe a rule as a Regulation or an Order, but 
the latter would not have the same status as the former.
The Regulations and Orders issued by the Chief 
Martial Lav; Administrator, in their turn, took priority 
over those issued by the Zonal Administrators and Sub- 
Administrators of Martial Law. Por convenience's sake the 
latter we re given the' general authorit}?- to issue Regulations 
and Orders, but "this authority was to be exercised consis­
tently with the Orders and Regulations issued by the Chief 
Administrator of Martial Lav;, In this manner the main 
legislative authority was kept by the Chief Martial Lav; 
Administrator himself while the Administrators and officers 
were to exercise a kind of delegated legislative authority,•
According to the provisions of the Laws (Continuance
10. P.L.D. I960 S.C. 237*
11. Ibid., per Munir, C.J. at p. 247;
also M. Afzal v. Commissioner, P.L.D. 1963 S.C. 401.
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in Force) Order, 1958, the court had no jurisdiction to
declare a Martial Law Regulation or Order invalid or ultra
vires. But the Supreme Gourt held that "calling in
question an order made under a Martial Law Order is entirely
different; it may or may not amount to questioning the
Martial Lav; Order itself, the former being prohibited, the 
12latter not." Though the court must accept a Martial
Lav; Regulation or Order, an order passed under it by an
unauthorised officer would not be immune from judicial 
13scrutiny*
With the promulgation of the Constitution of 1962
the proclamation of "Martial Lav;’1 was revoked and the Martial
Lav; Regulations were repealed, except those saved by the
14Constitution itself* But all acts duly done or anything
suffered under any repealed statute were protected by the 
15Constitution. ^
The courts also would not disturb anything done
during the "Martial Law" period, ev§n if it was repugnant
to the fundamental rights, incorporated in the new Consti-
16tution in January, 1964. The Supreme Court followed its
12. M.A. IThuhro v, Pakistan, P.L.D. I960 S.C. 2371 248.
13. Zahid Umar & Co. v. Chief Secretary,
P.L.D. 1959 Lahore, 7 ^
14. Constitution of 1962, Article 225*
15* Ibid., Article 250.
16. Tanbir Ahmad Siddiky v. Province of East Pakistan, 
t.L.il." iybS,"l3".T!7""l'S5. ------- ----------- :-------
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decision in Dosso1s case, which was confirmed in Mehdi 
Ali Khan's case, that the fundamental rights of the Con­
stitution of 1956 had not survived the successful "Martial 
Law" revolution and that all proceedings based on those 
rights would abate. Cornelius, C.J., who as a member of 
the bench in those cases had dissented from the majority- 
on these points, expressed his reluctance to review those 
judgments. His Lordship said that
"the pronouncement of the Supreme Court that writs 
for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights under 
the 1956 Constitution were not competent by 
reason of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 
was an interpretation of that Order. To put 
it differently, that legal pronounpement became 
a part of Martial Law."
On the basis of this finding of the Supreme Court, numerous
executive actions were performed, all in the belief that
those actions were immune from challenge for repugnancy
to the fundamental rights in the Constitution of 1956.
To hold the contrary then would have the effect of disturbing
a great many things done during the period of "Martial Law",
affecting innumerable individuals and institutions. The
Chief Justice said that all actions done or brought to
completion during this period were covered by "Martial Law",
of which the decision in Losso1s, as confirmed in Mehdi Ali
Khan's case, was an essential part. Cornelius C.J.
observed, "the principle of stare decisis can have no more
direct application than to the judicial interpretation of a
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major instrument "by which the governance of an entire
country was controlled during a limited period and within
the terminal points of that period. On general grounds,
therefore, it is not open to this Court to review its
17decision in the case of Dosso." ( Consistent with its 
first judgment recognising the "Martial Law" regime, the 
Supreme Court refused to cast any doubt on its legitimacy 
hy questioning its actions taken during the "Martial Law" 
period.
The "Martial Lav;" regime, according to the view of 
Pakistan judiciary, was a revolutionary government, which 
had successfully overthrown the old legal order and 
established a new one, based on the President's proclamation 
of October 7 smd a "new constitution" issued by the Presi­
dent on October 10, 1958 as the Laws (Continuance in Force) 
Order. The Constitution of 1958, not as the supreme law 
of the land but as an enactment adopted by the President, 
and the pre-existing laws continued in force subject to 
changes made by the President and the Chief Administrator of 
Martial Lav;. The Supreme Court and the High Court had the 
same powers and jurisdiction as before, except in so far as 
it had been expressly taken away by the President's Order or
17. P.L.D. 1968 S.C. 185, at p. 211.
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Regulations made by the Chief Administrator. The Martial 
Law Regulations and Martial Law Orders were immune from 
judicial scrutiny, but actions taken under them were sub­
ject to judicial review. The President and the Chief 
Administrator of Martial Law was the supreme law-giver, 
who could effect change or alteration in the existing lav/ 
at his will, unrestricted by any principle or any funda­
mental right, which had disappeared with the abrogation 
of the late Constitution. Things done and actions taken 
during this period based their validity on the legal set­
up as it then existed, and became an essential part of the 
whole system, creating rights and obligations affecting 
innumerable citizens. The interim period, with its dis­
tinctive features, formed an integral part of the legal 
and constitutional structure of the country.
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Chapter VTI 
Reflections on the Presidents Action
Iskandar Mirza^ background and political ideas
In the preceding two chapters we have tried 
to give a picture of the circumstances in which President 
Iskandar Mirza abrogated the Constitution of 1956 and 
brought the armed forces into the political arena.
It has been suggested that the lamentable political 
conditions, on account of which the President had 
professedly declared martial law, were mostly his own 
creation, and that, in overthrowing the political system, 
which he was by oath bound to defend, Hirza was inspired 
by the ulterior motive of perpetuating his own position 
and establishing his personal rule. In the present 
chapter it is proposed to discuss the background of 
Mriza's attitude and ambition and the role he played 
during his period of office as the Head of the State, 
in order to determine his responsibility for the break­
down.
Iskandar Hirza started as an Army officer, one 
of the first young Indian officers commissioned from
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S a n d h u r s t H e  was later transferred to the Indian 
Political Service. When independence came, Mirza was 
one of the few experienced political agents Pakistan had 
inherited from the old Indian services. By background 
and training Iskandar Mirza was an authoritarian ruler 
and proved himself to be an able and efficient adminis­
trator. He was a strong admirer of the bureaucratic 
system established by the British in India and condemned 
any sort of political interference in the administration. 
As Minister of the Interior in the Governor-General1s 
Council of Ministers in 1954-, Mirza said, ”In the British 
system the District Magistrate was the king-pin of
administration. His authority was unquestioned. We
2
have to restore that.”
Prom the inception of Pakistan Iskandar Mirza 
was connected with the Defence Ministry of Pakistan.
He was Secretary of the Ministry of Defence when, in 
May, 1954-1 ke was appointed Governor of East Bengal, 
after the suspension of parliamentary government in that
1. L.P.E. Williams, The State of Pakistan, p. 14-9* 
Pawn, October 31 * 1954-•
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province. As an official in the Ministry of Defence,
Mirza "played an influential role in improving the
defence posture of Pakistan" which made him "fond of
wielding enormous power". An advocate of strong rule,
Mirza insisted on the Nazimuddin government declaring
martial laxtf in Lahore in March, 1953 when violent
religious riots occurred in that city. One year later,
when parliamentary government was suspended in East
Bengal, he was sent to Dacca as Governor to clear up
the "mess" created by the politicians "when they were in
Zl
power for four to six weeks". In October, 1954-> 
Iskandar Mirza was appointed Minister of Interior in 
the "Cabinet of Talents". In the following August he 
became the Acting Governor-General in place of the 
ailing Ghulam Muhammad, and in October Mirza was con­
firmed in that office, when Ghulam Muhammad relinquished 
it. When the first Constitution came into force in 
March, 1956, Iskandar Mirza, being the only candidate, 
was elected President of the Republic under the Consti­
tution by the Constituent Assembly.
5- K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p.89* 
4-. Dawn, November 18, 1954- (from Mirza1 s own statement).
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Iskandar Mirza1s training and experience 
in the former Indian Political Service had made him an 
unsuitable Head of the State in the constitutional 
structure of Pakistan. As a Political Agent under 
the British Raj, "he built up a steadily-growing repu­
tation for resourcefulness and ability in that most 
testing of all fields, the North-West Frontier. His 
adroitness in confusing opponents by playing one off 
against the other, and getting his own way in the end, 
became proverbial."^ "Mirza had never outgrown the 
role of Political Agent", whose traits were clearly 
visible in his dealings, as Head of the State, with the 
politicians, who were "even more manageable tools than 
the Pathans, for they lacked loyalty to the group or 
party to which they belonged". He lacked and never 
developed the impartial attitude and broadness of mind 
to visualize things beyond his personal interest, which 
are the essential attributes of a head of state in a 
parliamentary democratic system. As Head of the State 
Mirza proved himself to be the captive of his own
5. L.F.R. Williams, op.cit., p. 149.
6 . K.B. Sayeed, op.cit., p. 89.
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interests and ideas*
Iskandar Mirza might have had a strong faith
in Pakistan hut he did not have any faith in the demo-
7cratic political system* { As has been said earlier, 
he wanted a strong and efficient administration and 
was an ardent advocate of the former Viceregal system. 
When Mirza was Governor of East Bengal and later when 
Minister of Interior, he publicly condemned political 
manoeuvrings and interference in the administration of 
the country* During the period between the dissolution 
of the first Constituent Assembly and the first meeting 
of the second Assembly, as the spokesman for the existing 
regime, he tried to popularise the idea of a political 
system which would concentrate effective powers in the
O
hands of the Head of the State* He thought that the 
people of Pakistan, being illiterate and having little 
training in democracy, could not be expected to work 
successfully political institutions and forms of demo­
cratic government evolved in a highly developed society
7. See G.W* Choudhury, Constitutional Development in 
Pakistan, pp. 137-13HT
8. See Chapter III, pp.&if~&&«
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like England* "People of this country need controlled
q
democracy for some time to come", where the Head of 
the State would have adequate powers to control an 
abnormal situation whenever necessary. By the year 
1954- Mirza had become convinced that Pakistan was not yet 
ripe for the practice of democracy, as the term was 
understood in Britain or America, and that "democracy 
had run riot during seven years in Pakistan"
As the President, under the Constitution of 
1956, which provided for a federal, parliamentary form 
of government, Mirza openly criticised the Constitution 
and was opposed to the devolution of power to the 
provinces. He would prescribe for the country a 
unitary form of government, with two provinces enjoying 
limited powers; while remaining subservient to the 
centre. He was an advocate of an executive independent 
of the support of the legislature,'and in the Republic 
Bay Broadcast in March, 1957 declared "the Westminster 
system unsuitable for Pakistan and advocated the substi­
tution of presidential g o v e r n m e n t " B e i n g  the
9* Bawn, October 31* 1954-*
10. Ibid., November 19? 1954-.
11. A. Gledhill, Pakistan, The Bevelopment of its Laws 
and Constitution, p. 103«
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constitutional Head of the State under a parliamentary 
system, Iskandar ilirza's expression of contempt for the 
Constitution, /under which he held the highest office, 
was perhaps unique in Commonwealth constitutional 
history. However, T,his predilection for the presi­
dential form of government, which he vehemently advocated,
were interpreted as a move for the concentration of
12authority in his own hands’1. It has heen remarked
that at a time when everybody else seemed to be confused,
Mirza knew his mind clearly and acted according to his
own plan. Having been elected as President, Mirza
had two aims, "to discredit the Constitution which had
at long last been produced and made him President and
to discredit all politicians. The latter aim was the
13more easily achieved.” ^
Mirza and party-politics
Immediately after Iskandar Mirza*s appoint­
ment as Acting Governor-General in August, 1955* a
12. Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan 
(2nd ed., 1963)> P» 4-1*
13* Z.A. Suleri, Pakistan*s Lost Years, p. 119*
231
political crisis developed at the centre* After the 
elections to the second Constituent Assembly, the Muslim 
League Parliamentary Party elected Chaudhri Mohammad Ali 
as its leader* There was a move for a coalition 
between the Muslim League and the Awami League, and the 
Awami League leader, Suhrawardy, "considered that 
he had received an undertaking that he would be invited 
to form a government11. But instead, a coalition was 
formed between the Muslim League and the United Pront 
of Pazlul Huq. It was suggested that the former move 
was frustrated by the initiative of the United Pront 
leader, Pazlul Huq, to oust Suhrawardy and he was 
actively supported by Iskandar Mirza because "the
14Govemor-General preferred Chaudhri Mohammad Ali"*
The Governor-General1 s "preference" was purely based on 
his personal dislike for Suhrawardy, who, Mirza knew, 
would make a stronger Prime Minister than Chaudhri 
Mohammad Ali*
Iskandar Mirza was a strong force behind the 
integration of the West Pakistan territories into a 
single province* To neutralise opposition to the
14. L.P.R* Williams, op.cit., p. 152*
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integration scheme from smaller provinces, on his
initiative Dr Khan Sahib, a non-party politician from
North-West Frontier Province, was appointed Chief
Minister of West Pakistan before that province came
into being. Mirza, following the dictates of his own
interests, developed a great attachment for Dr Khan
Sahib, and tried to maintain the latter*s position at
all costs. When, in April, 1956 the Muslim League
Parliamentary Party in the West Pakistan Assembly
passed a resolution calling for the appointment of
its parliamentary leader as the head of the provincial
government, President Mirza who was on a visit to Azad
Kashmir, cut short his tour and rushed back to Lahore.
It was suggested that the President wanted to protest
Dr Khan Sahib and his ministry and through them to
retain the support of the substantial majority in the
National Assembly for himself. His involvement in party
politics at that time was so obvious that it created
misgivings in the public mind which were not dispelled
15by the statement he issued from Lahore. ^
15. Mushtaq Ahmad, op.cit., p. 39*
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Mirza supported the foundation of the
Republican Party by Dr Khan Sahib. He wanted to
wield power with the support of those members of the
Assemblies who would gather around him ”through the
sheer magnetism of patronage” But he used a
different method from his predecessor in keeping
the Assembly under his control. Parliament was not
to be antagonised; it was to be used to concentrate
powers in his own hand ”by dividing his opponents
and thus obtaining a free hand to deal with adminis-
17trative problems”. ( Mirza, therefore, encouraged
and supported Dr Khan Sahib in the formation of the
Republican Party, which was reputed to have been ”born
18in the Government Houses of Karachi and Lahore”.
This party would look to President Mirza for guidance 
and proved to be an easy instrument in his hand to 
create political crises at his will.
It is significant to note that, after the 
formation of the Republican Party in the midst of
16. Z.A. Suleri, op.cit., p. 119*
17* L.P.R. Williams, op.cit., p. 152.
18. G.W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, p. 122.
frequent governmental changes both at the centre and
in West Pakistan, it was never out of power, because of
the manipulations of President Mirza and the support of
Governor Gurmani. In West Pakistan in May, 1957 there
was a possibility of the Republicans being defeated in
the Assembly; Mirza promptly imposed Presidents rule
in the province. Though it constituted a majority in
the Assembly, the opposition Muslim League was not called
upon to form a government. In the meanwhile, ,fa series
of conferences took place between the Republican leaders
and President Mirza at his summer resort, Hathiagali .. •11
and the party was re-grouped so that it controlled a
majority in the Assembly and could form a government.
The President was accused, along with his appointee,
Governor Gurmani, by the Muslim League of inducing the
members of Muslim League Party in the central and pro-
19vincial legislatures to desert their organisation. J
President Iskandar Mirza had full control over 
the policies of the Republican Party and further ttit
was well-known that a number of Republicans were
19. See G.W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, pp. 111-112.
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President’s men1, both at the Centre and in West 
Pakistan; in East Pakistan the President could depend 
upon the support of several influential members of the 
K.S.P. [Krishak Sramik Party]. The Krishak Sramik
Party of Fazlul Huq was initially despised by Mirza, but 
in 1955 he joined forces with Fazlul Huq and brought 
about a coalition between the K.S.P. and the Muslim 
League in order to keep Suhrawardy out of office.
Further, he aimed at controlling and re-shaping East 
Pakistan politics through his supporters in the Krishak 
Sramik Party. When in 1957 there was a split in the 
Awami League over Prime Minister Suhrawardy*s foreign 
policy, President Mirza endeavoured to create a coalition 
between the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik Party, but 
the negotiations proved a failure. It has been 
suggested that, in order to discredit the politicians, 
Mirza compelled his supporters in the Krishak Sramik 
Party in the East Pakistan Assembly to create the poli­
tical situation, which led to the tragic incident in
21that Assembly in September, 1958*
20. K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, 
p. 89*
21. Ibid., p. 92.
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President Mirza's direct involvement in party
politics was responsible for the frequent governmental
changes at the centre. His attempts to keep Dr Khan
Sahib in power in V/est Pakistan led the Muslim League
to disown its own leader in the National Assembly,
Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, who was then the Prime Minister,
On the Muslim League's refusal to support Dr Khan Sahib1
government in West Pakistan, the Prime Minister issued
a statement in favour of Dr Khan Sahib, and accused his
22own party of going back on its promise. While Dr 
Khan Sahib was unwilling to join the Muslim League, 
Chaudhri Mohammad Ali was unable, in the face of the 
President's manoeuvres, to follow his own party line. 
Ultimately he resigned the premiership.
The next Prime Minister, Suhrawardy, had 
only the solid support of thirteen members of his own 
party. The Republicans, the larger party in the 
coalition, numbered twenty-one and were all President's
p*
men. Suhrawardy had, therefore, to take measures
agreeable to the President and the Republicans, and at
22. G.W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, p. 111.
23. See Z.A. Suleri, op.cit., p. 119 •
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the same time maintain his leadership in East Pakistan 
by conforming to his party’s ideology* Though the 
Prime Minister asserted that he controlled his govern­
ment’s policy, it is well-known that important decisions 
of his government were made without reference to his
OIL
ministers* It must also be admitted that, during
his premiership, Suhrawardy was creating a national
image for himself, which was contrary to Mirza1s designs*
So when the Republicans withdrew their support from
Suhrawardy in October, 1957 > on one unit issue, Mirza
took the opportunity to get rid of Suhrawardy* The
Prime Minister requested that the National Assembly
be summonded, expecting the support of the Muslim League
25and the Punjabi Republican members* ^ But his advice 
was rejected by the President, who demanded his resig­
nation, threatening dismissal if he refused it*
Though under the constitutional provisions 
the appointment and dismissal of the Prime Minister were
24-. Removal of West Pakistan Governor Gurmani in August, 
1957 was definitely made without the Prime Minister’s 
concurrence* See Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and 
Politics in Pakistan (2nd ed*, 1965) * P* 4-1"•
25* See K.B. Sayeed, op.cit*, p* 90.
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within the discretionary powers of the President, his 
refusal to summon the Assembly as advised by the Prime 
Minister, provoked adverse comments* It has been 
argued that it is unlikely that a Prime Minister under 
the British Parliamentary system would advise summoning 
the legislature, when he had lost the support of the 
senior partner of his coalition; it is equally diffi­
cult nto conceive that, if a Prime Minister under the 
British Parliamentary system should tender such advice 
to the Head of the State, that request would not be 
conceded11 • Mirza's motive behind the refusal to 
Suhrawardy1s request became clear when, in December, 
1957> after the next Prime Minister, Chundrigar, had 
resigned when he lost the support of the Republicans, 
he was commissioned by the President, for the second 
time, to form a government. Chundrigar's attempt to 
form the government was, however, unsuccessful. It 
was clear that Suhrawardy1s dismissal was mainly due 
to the displeasure with which President Mirza regarded 
his growing influence. The President wanted a weak
26. G.W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, p. 114.
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Prime Minister, under his control, and Suhrawardy was
27making the President’s own position weaker• ' As the 
Republicans had always looked to President Mirza for 
inspiration and guidance, the withdrawal of their 
support of the Prime Minister was probably instigated 
by the President.^®
Iskandar Mirzafs designs
President Iskandar Mirza had an overweening 
ambition to wield political power. As constitutional 
Head of the State he was never happy. His design was 
to keep the political parties in a state of constant 
strife, so as to maintain control over them but he 
hoped to discredit not only the politicians but also 
the Constitution and to introduce new constitutional 
provisions which would perpetuate his own position.
He was successful in creating a pejorative public image 
of the politicans; he played off one party against 
the other; coalitions were made and broken at Mirza's 
instance and it has been observed that nin the making
27* See ibid., pp. 113-114.
28. See Z.A. Suleri, op.cit., p. 119*
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and unmaking of Ministries, his hand was throughout 
"visible”
The President was directly involved in party-
politics. The formation of the Republican Party in
early 1956 is alleged to have been engineered by him,
in order to maintain control over the legislatures.
It has been observed,
"The Republican Party provided him 
with a convenient tool to establish 
his supremacy both over the Parlia­
ment and the Prime Minister • • • At 
his [Mirza1s ] instance, the party 
gave and withdrew support from 
successive governments and in each 
crisis people were given the 
impression that the President alone 
was the one and only force of 
stability in the country," 30
Politicans were represented as identified with insta­
bility and with everything inimical to the healthy 
growth of a scftind social, economic and political system 
in the country.
In his campaign against the Constitution 
Mirza publicly declared that the Constitution was not 
workable in Pakistan, because most of the people were
29* Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in 
Pakistan, (2nd ed., 1%5)> p* 39*
30. Ibid., p. 40.
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illiterate and had not enough training to work so
sophisticated a system. He advocated a presidential
type of constitution. He even encouraged his henchmen
to propagate the idea of setting up for five years a
"Revolutionary Council", of which presumably he would
be the head. The streets of Karachi were plastered
31with huge posters making that demand. In the face 
of the barrage of criticism from the press and the 
people, who were against any change of the Constitution 
till after the general elections, which he had promised 
would be held soon, Iskandar Mirza abandoned open propa­
ganda against the Constitution, but he lost no oppor­
tunity of representing that the Constitution was unworkable.
"And so all political parties were 
constantly kept on tenterhooks by 
playing the game of musical chairs.
Ministries changed from time to 
time and political crises were staged 
with monotonous regularity. This 
chronic situation of instability, 
he calculated, would itself bring 
his goal of all-power nearer and 
within reach. His juggling with 
political parties and his utter 
indifference to anything stable and 
enduring in political thinking did 
create an intolerable strain." 32
31. Z.A. Suleri, Pakistanis Lost Years, p. 122; also 
D.N. Banerjee, East Pakistan, p.
32. Z.A. Suleri, op.cit., pp. 122-123.
242
February* 1959 bad been fixed as the date
for the general election under the Constitution. As
this date drew nearer* President Mirza became restive,
Anxious for his own re-election, he could find no
political party or political group which would support
his claim to the presidency. It may be recalled that,
when the Constitution came into force in March, 1956,
Mirza extorted support for his own election by the
Constituent Assembly in consideration of his assent to
the Constitution. During his presidency, by political
intrigue he had already antagonised the Muslim League,
33which had passed a resolution against him. ^ By
virtually dismissing Suhrawardy, he had alienated the
Awami League; Suhrawardy publicly accused Mirza of
34-conspiring against his party.^ After the assassination
of Dr Khan Sahib in May, 1958* Mirza found it difficult
to exercise as much influence on the Republican Party
35as he had done through Dr Khan Sahib. ^ He discovered 
that the Republican leader, Peroz Khan Moon, had entered
33* See G.W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, p. 112. 
34. D.H. Banerjee, op.cit., p. 99*
35- Ibid., p. 100*
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into an election alliance with, his adversary, Suhrawardy,
who had also come to an understanding with such powerful
Muslim League leaders as Mumtaz Daultana and Mushtaq
Ahmad Gurmani* "Thus, Suhrawardy had embarked on a
bold and brilliant plan of forging an alliance between
Bengal and Punjab which had not heen attempted before*"^
It was expected that this election alliance would win
the coming general elections and establish the strong
and stable government, which was hadly needed,and in
the expected political line-up, it was more than likely
that Iskandar Mirza would be deprived of the office of
president* Furthermore, "it was widely rumoured that
the basis of the Suhrawardy-Noon alliance was that,
after the general election, Suhrawardy would be Prime
37Minister and Noon would be President*11^'
In this situation Iskandar Mirza had a bleak 
prospect* All the political parties had experienced 
rough treatment at the hands of Mirza and it seemed 
that, despite their other differences, they were agreed 
on one point, and that was to get rid of Iskandar Mirza
36* E.B*. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, 
p. 91.
37* G*W. Choudhury, op*cit*, p. 115.
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at the first opportunity. In such a situation, it was 
natural for a man like Mirza to contemplate the frus­
tration of the coming election. Ayuh Khan has given 
a fair assessment of Iskandar Mirza1s designs when he 
said,
"The President had thoroughly 
exploited the weakness In the 
Constitution and had got everyone 
connected with the political life 
of the country utterly exposed 
and discredited. I do not think 
that he ever seriously wanted to 
hold general elections; he was 
looking for a suitable opportunity 
to abrogate the Constitution.
Indeed he was setting the stage 
for it.!f 38
The "suitable opportunity" referred to by 
Ayub Khan came when the army, under General Ayub Khan, 
readily gave support to the President's design of 
abrogating the Constitution. So far Mirza's plan 
had worked successfully. He remained President in the 
new set up, while, as Chief Administrator of Martial 
Law and Supreme Commander of the Armed Porces, General 
Ayub Khan wielded the real power. Though, after the 
abrogation of the Constitution under which Mirza had
38. M. Ayub Khan, Priends Not Masters, p. 57*
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held the office of President, experts in martial law 
were of the opinion that his position had become 
redundant* But General Ayub Khan did not consider the 
time to be opportune to remove Mirza* Mirza*s inherent 
capacity for intrigue and duplicity, and for main­
taining his own supremacy had to be demonstrated before
39he could be removed.
Responsibility for the breakdown
Pakistani politicians are unanimous that 
Iskandar Mirza was solely responsible for the "failure" 
of parliamentary system under the Constitution of 1956.
The Constitution Commission appointed by President Ayub 
Khan commented on the "undue interference by the Heads 
of the State with the ministries and political parties 
which, according to the Commission, had greatly contri­
buted towards political chaos* This may be an over­
statement and the politicians may have found Mirza a 
convenient scapegoat, because they cannot deny that they 
helped the President in his designs, and did as he wished*
39. See M. Ayub Khan, op.cit., pp. 73-75*
40. Report of the Constitution Commission, 1961, p. 6 .
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But, as has been observed,
lfit could be said with greater 
justice tbat be contributed more 
than any one else to tbe creation 
of those conditions of political 
confusion, which he used as an 
argument in support of the alleged 
failure of the Constitution and 
his action in abrogating it." 41
Ayub Khan thought on similar lines. As an explanation 
for Mirza's removal he noted, "he [Mirza] was too much 
connected with the politicans and the country's diffi­
culties. He was as much responsible for political
42deterioration as any one else." Iskandar Mirza was,
indeed, successful in discrediting the politicians and
the political system they had established, in creating
a situation in which his own position was secure and
his ambition of establishing his personal rule might
have been fulfilled. It is true that Mirza would not
have done what he did on the night of October 7* 1958,
4-5if he had not received support from the armed forces. ^
41. See Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in 
Pakistan (1963), pp. -40-41.
42. M. Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 191.
43• The New York limes commented; "The real situation
was that without the Army, which was loyal to General 
Ayub Khan, President Mirza could not have dreamed of 
abrogating the Constitution and dissolving the political 
parties; without the quasi-constitutional blessing of
/Continued over
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But every fact so far revealed suggests that it was the 
President who voluntarily called in the armed forces*
It has been suggested that the army initiated 
the military take over of the country in 1958 and President 
Mirza was compelled to acquiesce; that "General Ayub 
Khan found himself unexpectedly confronted with con­
clusive proof that a coup d 1etat of the kind which had
brought General Kassem into control of Iraq, was being 
44prepared*" But there are good reasons to believe
that the initiative came from Mirza himself and the
army, which had become impatient with the political
situation in the country, readily responded under the
leadership of Ayub Khan. Major-General Fazal Muqueem
Khan stated that "on receipt of orders from Karachi,
the Chief of the General Staff was instructed to plan
45the take over"* ^ And again, "It was becoming clear
Footnote 45 continued from previous page.
President Mirza as the Chief of the State, the 
army could not have taken power smoothly and 
swiftly*" Quoted in G.W. Choudhury, Democracy 
in Pakistan, p* 129*
44. L.F* Pushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan,
p. 182.
45. F.M. Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, p. 194.
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that President Iskandar Mirza had only used General
Ayub Khan and the army to get rid of the politicians,
and that, under cover of the army, he now planned to
46have a government of his own choice.11 Ayub Khan's 
revelations also suggest that this was so. He noted,
"A few days earlier President Iskandar Mirza had 
conveyed to me that the whole situation was becoming 
intolerable and that he had decided to act." And when, 
on October 1958* the President, on being asked by 
the General, said that it was 11 absolutely necessary” to 
act, Ayub Khan's reaction was that ”it was very unfor­
tunate that such a desperate stage had been reached
47necessitating drastic action”. (
It may be some time before we know conclusively 
whether the army acted on its own initiative or on the 
invitation of President Mirza. But even if the ini­
tiative came from the army, it is clear that Mirza was an 
active party to it, and, having got rid of the politicians, 
he itfanted to get rid of the army by creating suspicion
46. Ibid., p. 201.
47. M. Ayub Khan, Friends Hot Masters, p. 70.
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and misunderstanding amongst its officers, "by playing
one general against the other, in order to establish
48his dictatorial rule. But he was soon disillusioned. 
Once the army had forsaken its neutral role, it 
asserted itself and wanted to run the country according 
to its own plan. Mirza*s interference was not to he 
tolerated and in three weeks time Mirza was asked to quit, 
leaving the country in the exclusive control of the 
army.
48. See F.M. Khan, op.cit., p. 202.
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Chapter VIII 
Progress under Martial Law, 1958-1962
Land Reforms in West Pakistan
While the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution 
may be deprecated, it must be conceded that the proclam­
ation of martial law made it possible to enact socially 
and economically beneficial legislation, which would have 
been difficult to get through the legislatures created by 
that Constitution, Pakistan inherited from the British 
Indian Government systems of land tenure which were not 
the same in different parts of the sub-continent. In 
East Pakistan the land tenure system had been renovated by 
the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, 
passed by the provincial legislature. This statute 
abolished all intermediary interests between government 
and the tenant, created by what was popularly known as 
the 1permanent settlement1 made with the Zamindars by 
Lord Cornwallis in 1795• The provincial government in 
1956 started taking over gradually the interests of 
Zamindars and other rent-receiving interests on payment 
of compensation, so that there is now only one kind of 
interest in agricultural land, that af a tenant holding 
directly under the government. The Act provided for the
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acquisition of land in excess of the statutory maximum 
for each tenant and ownership in the excess vested in 
the government. Whether the present system is the 
optimum from the economic point of view is a debatable 
question, for reform of land tenures should aim not only 
at the changing ownership of land, but it must also aim 
at the enhancement of production. The Act of 1950 has 
not produced any such result. Apart from the question 
of productivity, the abolition of the Samindari system 
is generally regarded as a great social reform, in that 
cultivators, who had been under the tutelage of landlords 
for ages, have now been freed from their control. The 
tenants are assured of full occupancy rights, with the 
right of transfer to bona fide cultivators. The aim is 
to build up a rural society consisting largely of indepen­
dent and self-reliant peasant proprietors, with changed 
social and political attitudes.
In West Pakistan the land tenure system differed 
from district to district. Without going into details 
of the different systems, it could be said that "while at 
one end of the scale 3 *3 .million people (65 cent, of 
the owners) own about 7*4- million acres of land (15%) in 
holdings of less than 5 acres each, at the other end a 
little more than 6,000 people (0 .1% )  own as much as 7*5
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million acres (a little over 15% )  in properties of more
than 500 a c r e s T h i s  vast disparity in the size of
holdings in a primarily agrarian society was ‘bound to
result in problems, which affected the social, economic
and political structures of the State* These evil
effects had been recognised in the British period and
after independence the Muslim League, the ruling party,
p
appointed an Agrarian Reforms Committee in May, 194-9*
This committee recommended, inter alia, the break-up of 
the large estates and the grant of security of tenures 
to all tenants-at-will* The National Planning Board, in
its report on the Pirst Pive Year Plan, also called for 
urgent land reform on the same lines• But effect could 
not be given to these recommendations by the legislatures, 
owing to strong opposition from the landlords, who domi­
nated both the National Assembly and the provincial 
Assemblies*
1. Report of the Land Reforms Commission for Vest Pakistan 
(Government Printing, Lahore 1959) , PP* 15-14*.
2. Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan
(1965), p. 195*
5. The Pirst Pive Year Plan (Government of Pakistan, 1957),
p. 516.
4-. In the National Assembly out of 80 members in 1956 
28 were landlords, all from West Pakistan* See 
Mushtaq Ahmad, op*cit*, p. 115.
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When the armed forces took control in October,
195S one of the urgent problems they dealt with was land
reform in West Pakistan, On October 31> 1958 President
Ayub Khan appointed the Land Reforms Commission with
Akhter Husain, Governor of West Pakistan, as its chairman.
The commission was asked "to consider problems relating to
the ownership and tenancy of agricultural land and to
recommend measures for ensuring better production and
social justice, as well as security of tenure for those
5
engaged in cultivation."^ In less than three months the 
commission completed its labours and submitted a detailed 
report, which was unanimous, except that two members 
dissented from the majority in respect of the maximum 
area of land which a landowner should be permitted to 
retain. The government accepted the recommendations 
made by the commission, and the majority opinion with 
regard to the ceiling. In March, 1959? the West Pakistan 
Land Reforms Regulation^ was promulgated. The regulation 
provided for the creation of the West Pakistan Land 
Commission with the Governor as its ex-officio chairman. 
The commission was given power to nominate one of its 
members as Chief Land Commissioner, responsible for
5. Report of the Land Reforms Commission, Introduction.
6 . Martial Law Regulation No. 64, P.L.D. 1959 Central 
Statutes 101.
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implementation of the provisions contained in the regu­
lation, subject to the supervision and direction of the 
commission, and to make rules, which were to he deemed 
part of the regulation.
The West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation was 
deemed to he an Act of the central legislature and was 
subsequently protected from attack on grounds of violation 
of the fundamental rights incorporated in the Constitution 
of 1962.^ It extended to the whole of West Pakistan, 
including the federal capital territory, hut did not extend 
to the Special Areas, It applied to agricultural land, 
including buildings and structures on such land.
The regulation declared all transfers of land 
on or after October 8 , 1958> by persons holding more than 
five hundred acres of irrigated land or 36,000 produce
o
index units, whichever is more, as void • Wo person was
7* Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, Article 6(3)(ii)>
Fourth. Schedule,
8 * The unit is used to measure the productivity of land, 
which varies from one assessment circle to another.
The Land Reforms Commission gave an illustration of 
the method of calculation. Approximately 80 produce 
index units make a standard acre. See Appendix II 
of the Report.
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entitled to own or possess in any manner land in excess 
of 500 acres of irrigated or 1000 acres of unirrigated 
land - one acre of irrigated land being reckoned as 
equivalent to two acres of unirrigated land. Exceptions 
were made in respect of educational institutions, 
charitable institutions and stud and livestock farms, 
at the discretion of the government. A person was allowed 
to retain up to 150 acres of orchard land in excess of 
the maximum, if the entire holding consisted of compact 
blocks of not less than ten acres each and had been 
entered as an orchard in the record of rights since 1956*
A landowner could transfer up to 18,000 produce index 
units of his land, in excess of the maximum he was 
entitled to retain, to his presumptive heirs. Any orchard 
land retained by himself and any transfer of land by way 
of gift made to his heirs since 14 August, 1947 was 
included in the transferable area. Further, the Land 
Commission could allow an owner to make a further gift of 
up to 6000 produce index units of land to such female 
dependents as would be entitled to a share in his property 
by intestate succession.
Land in excess of what a landholder was entitled 
to retain vested in government, free from any encumbrance 
or charge. The owners of the acquired land were to be
256
paid compensation in heritable and transferable bonds, 
bearing four per cent, simple interest per annum, the 
sum payable as compensation being calculated according 
to a scale provided in the regulation.^ The land 
resumed by government was offered for sale to the cul­
tivating tenant in the first instance.
The regulation virtually abolished family wakfs, 
as defined in the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913* in 
respect of agricultural land. These were settlements of 
land in perpetuity for the maintenance of the family or 
dependents of the wakif or of the wakif himself. The 
regulation provided that land forming part of such wakfs 
should forthwith revert to the wakif if he was alive, or 
to other beneficiaries in proportion to the benefit 
reserved in the settlement in the case of non-heirs, and 
according to the law of inheritance in the case of heirs. 
It prohibited any further settlement of land in family 
wakfs. Jagirs^  of all kinds were abolished, and all
9. The rate of compensation was: For the first 18,000
produce index units Rs 5 pen unit; for the next 
24,000 units Rs 4 per unit; for the next 36,000 units 
Rs 3 per unit; for the next 72,000 units Rs 2 per 
unit; and for any balance Re 1 per unit; see Para. 17 
Martial Law Regulation Ro. 64.
10. "Jagir literally means an assignment of land revenue ... 
The grant of a Jagir involved the transfer by Govern­
ment to an individual of the State!s right to collect 
and appropriate a share of the produce of land. In
some cases the transfer of this right was also accompanied
/Continued over
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rights and interests or estates granted under any such 
Jagir reverted to government without payment of any com­
pensation* Land held under a Jagir was to he regarded 
as land owned by the holder for the purpose of assessing 
his excess land under the regulation. Restrictions were 
put generally on partition of joint holdings, if any 
individual holding, after partition, became smaller than 
a "subsistence h o l d i n g " I n  the same way restrictions 
were put on alienation by sale or in any other manner of 
holdings below the minimum subsistence holding, but a 
person could alienate the entire area of his holding• 
Restrictions on partition and alienation aimed at saving 
wastage of land by sub-division and fragmentation of 
holdings and also at ensuring efficient methods of culti­
vation, and the production of the maximum output, which 
was regarded as possible only in comparatively large estates.
Footnote 10 continued from previous page.
by the transfer of the proprietory rights in land to 
the jagirdar." (Para. 7 of the Report).
11. The area of a subsistence holding differed from one 
area to another. A minimum of 12.5 acres of land 
formed a subsistence holding (Para. 120 of the Report)* 
At independence.it was generally assumed that exten- 
sive cultivation was essential to maximum production 
but expert opinion now seems to be that in the sub­
continent a small holding can be as efficient as a 
large farm, provided there is no difficulty in ob­
taining water, fertilizers and good seed.
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As a result of the regulation, some 2,547,000
acres of land were surrendered by 902 landowners; much
12less than the area originally estimated. The total
area mentioned included land which was not arable so the
actual cultivable area of the surrendered land was only
2,225,563 acres, which were distributed among 150,000 
15cultivators. ^ In the process of redistribution, the
land resumed was first offered to the tenants who had
cultivated it and in the event of their refusal, other
cultivators were entitled to purchase it. Hot only
was the land resumed under the regulation much below the
estimated area, but it was also only a small proportion
of the estimated area of cultivable land, which was over
14
4-8,000,000 acres. It did, therefore, not go far towards 
settling the millions of landless agricultural labourers 
in the province. This was the direct result of the 
provisions in the regulation, which allowed the landowners 
to retain orchards and to transfer land within the family 
by way of gift. Moreover, as was pointed out by the 
Commission, the owners of large estates, even before the 
appointment of the commission, had already redistributed
12. Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, p. 59*
15* Mushtag Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan
(1965), p. 199.
14. Appendix I of the Report.
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their land among members of their families, so that each
member appeared to have a separate holding• This had
been done in order to avoid agricultural income tax and
other duties, and also "as a prudent safeguard against the
possible imposition of ceilings on ownership of landed
property, which has been talked about ever since the Muslim
15League Agrarian Reform Committee met in 1949«"
The Land Reform Commission, when recommending a
ceiling for holdings, recognised the desirability of
breaking up the existing large estates, because they
created immense social, economic and political problems.
But in fixing the maximum, the majority x^ rere not prepared
to make it as small as that proposed by the Muslim League
16Agrarian Reform Committee and the National Planning 
17Board. ( 1/hen specifying its ceiling, the commission 
observed that, though it was not its specific object to 
destroy the power of ,!the old ruling oligarchy with its 
roots in big estates1*, it expected that "such a consequence 
may follow in some measure", if its recommendations were
15. Para. 64- of the Report.
16. It recommended for maximum holding of 150 acres of 
irrigated and 450 acres of non-irrigated land.
See Mushtaq Ahmad, op.cit., p. 195*
17* Recommended for maximum holding of 150 acres of 
irrigated, 300 acres semi-irrigated and 450 acres 
of non-irrigated land. See report on The Pirst 
Pive Year Plan (1957)> 518.
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18implemented. At least one member of the commission 
though.t that the upper limit for holdings recommended by 
the majority was too large and would not destroy the 
monopolies of the big Zamindars or give the masses economic 
opportunity. The control of economic opportunity by 
the concentration of landed wealth in the hands of a 
few results in the stagnation of economic growth, hampers 
social progress and stratifies society. The net effect 
of the proposed measures, for a long time to come, accor­
ding to the dissenting opinion, would be to leave the 
concentration of land in families instead of individuals
and would not conduce to the attainment of the objectives
1 q
of the reforms. J
It must be noted, however, that the martial lav; 
regime was conscious of the ill-effects of the concentration 
of large areas of land in one hand. On the eve of the 
promulgation of the regulation, President Ayub Zhan in a 
broadcast said, T1In view of the special prestige, which 
ownership of land over large areas enjoys, political power 
is concentrated in the hands of a privileged few. Apart 
from its social consequences, such concentration of
18. Para. 37 of the Heport. 
19* Para. 57 of the Heport.
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powers hampers the free exercise of political rights
20and stifles the growth of free political institutions.”
But the measures adopted to remove these consequences 
were inadequate. It is said that the landlords only 
surrendered land which was not of much use to them, so 
that they did not lose their former power and influence.
The small area of land resumed by government for redis­
tribution among the cultivators benefited only a small 
number of them and, it is l,difficult to trace whether the
landless peasantry has received any conspicuous benefit
21by the change”. It has not reduced the economic
superiority of the big landlords and their political
22influence has not been affected. But the reform has 
been welcomed as a forward step towards the desired ob­
jective, and demands for a more equitable distribution, 
with a view to giving benefits out of the land to the 
people and the State will no longer be "resisted, either 
in the name of religion or the sanctity of private property,
without making the government suspect in the eyes of the 
25people”.
20. M. Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Vol. I, 
pp. 4-8-49 •
21. H. Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan , p. 60.
22. In 1962, 56 landlords were elected from West Pakistan 
to the Rational Assembly of 150. See Hushtaq Ahmad, 
Government and Politics in Pakistan (1965) * p« 273«
23* liushtaq Ahmad, o p . c i t pp. 199-200.
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The Wakf Properties Ordinances
As has been said earlier, family wakfs of agri­
cultural land were abolished by the West Pakistan Land 
Reforms Regulation, 1959* All land which had formed 
part of any such wakf was brought under the ordinary land 
law for all purposes. It was now felt necessary to 
tighten the law for the administration of wakfs which did 
not fall within the definition of family wakfs. With 
this end in view, the provincial government of West Pakistan
promulgated the West Pakistan Wakf Properties Ordinance,
24-1959* This Ordinance was amended in I960 and ulti­
mately replaced by the West Pakistan Wakf Properties
25Ordinance, 1961, ^ which consolidated the law relating to 
control and administration of wakfs.
To ensure tighter control and proper adminis­
tration of wakf properties, the Ordinance provided for the 
appointment of a Chief Administrator of Waq'.|s, entrusted 
with authority and responsibility for the proper manage­
ment of wakf properties. The Ordinance defined wakf on 
the same lines as the definition in the Mussulman Wakf
24-. Ordinance XXI of 1959* P*L.D. 1959 West Pakistan 
Statutes 202.
.25* Ordinance XXVIII of 1961, P.L.D. 1962 West Pakistan
Statutes 108.
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or
Validating Act, 1913* It empowers the Chief Administrator, 
when he deems it desirable, to take over by notification, 
and to "assume the administration, control, management 
and maintenance of a waqf property”. A person aggrieved 
by such notification issued by the Chief Administrator may, 
within thirty days, petition the District Court for a dec­
laration that the property is not wakf property or that 
it is wakf only within certain limits. A further appeal 
to the High Court can be preferred within sixty days of 
the decision of the District Court. The District Court 
and the High Court are debarred from issuing any temporary 
injunction pending the disposal of a petition, in the 
District Court against the notification, or in the High 
Court pending the disposal of the appeal. The decision 
of the District Court, where there is no appeal, and of 
the High Court where there is an appeal, is final.
Apart from taking complete control of wakf 
property the Chief Administrator has powers to ensure 
proper management of wakfs managed by private persons.
He may require any person in charge or control of any 
wakf property which has not been taken over, to furnish
26. Act VI of 1913• Section 2(1) defines wakf thus:
”1Wakf1 means the permanent dedication by a person 
professing the Mussalman faith of any property for 
any purpose recognised by the Mussalman law as 
religious, pious or charitable.”
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returns, statements, statistics or any other information 
for his examination. He may issue directions or instructions 
to persons in charge of any wakf property, prescribing the 
manner in which such property should be managed.
Thus the martial law administration accomplished
a long awaited reform for which no previous administration
had been able to legislate. The Supreme Court had ruled 
27in 1957, in effect, that property under settlement as 
wakf could not be regarded as owned by the Hutawalli or 
the beneficiaries, and therefore, could not be acquired 
by the State, as legislation to enable this to be done was 
repugnant to the fundamental right of freedom to establish 
religious institutions, as set out in the Constitution of 
1956. The West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation abolished 
this myth. Ownership of land under any family wakf 
reverted to the beneficiaries and was made liable to be 
resumed by government, if the total holding, including 
such land, of any person exceeded the ceiling. The 
Waqf Property Ordinance has paved the way for reform of 
the institutions to which it applies by ensuring efficient 
and progressive administration and management of such 
institutions.
27* Jibendra Kishore v. East Pakistan, P.L.D. 1957
s^rg:-----------   :--
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The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance
p o
The Muslim Family Lav/s Ordinance, 1961, 
promulgated by the President in March, 1961, has codified 
certain principles of Muslim personal law, resulting in 
some fundamental change in the Sharia. It was enacted 
to give effect to certain recommendations of the Com­
mission on Marriage and Family Laws; it extends to the 
whole of Pakistan and applies to all Muslim citizens, 
wherever they may be. The Ordinance deals with some 
vital principles of Muslim personal law, such as succession, 
marriage, dower, divorce and maintenance of a wife*
In the law of succession, the Ordinance has 
introduced an important innovation, giving rights of 
inheritance to the children of the pre-deceased son or 
daughter of the propositus* The grandchildren, in the 
absence of their father or mother as the case may be, are 
put in the same position as their father or mother would 
have been, if they were alive and they inherit the property 
of their grandparent per stirpes* It may be noted that 
grandchildren, according to Sharia, in the absence of any 
children of the propositus, are entitled to inherit, but
28. Ordinance VIII of 1961, P.L.D. 1961 Central Statutes 
209.
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where the propositus leaves a male child and grand­
children by his pre-deceased sor or daughter, the former 
would exclude the latter, by operation of the principle 
that the nearer in degree excludes the more remote.
Under the Ordinance such grandchildren now have the right 
to inherit their grandparent1s property, along with their 
uncles and aunts and take as much as their father or 
mother would have taken. This introduces the doctrine 
of representation, which is generally not recognised by 
the classical Islamic law.
The provision has removed from the law of inher­
itance what has long been regarded as a harsh rule. The 
orphaned grandchildren of the propositus are relations who 
most need help and the Ordinance is designed to recognise 
this. In other Muslim countries, however, the same 
result has been achieved without any apparent change in 
the fundamental law. For example, Egypt in 194-6 adopted 
the system known as "obligatory bequests" under which
"notwithstanding the absence of any 
testamentary disposition to this 
effect by the deceased, the orphaned 
grandchildren of the deceased are 
entitled, in the presence of his 
surviving son, to the share their 
own parent would have received, had 
he or she survived, within the maximum 
of one-third of the nett estate." 29
29. N.J. Coulson, "Islamic Family Law: Progress in Pakistan"
Changing Law in Developing Countries, J.N.D. Anderson
TeTjyrmu; at'p-. 255"
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The Pakistan innovation has been criticised because it
is an infraction of the fundamental classical law and also
30because it may lead to anomalies in certain cases.
However, while it is desirable that the law should be 
amended to meet the possible anomalies, in most cases the 
Ordinance has brought about a commendable change.
Every Muslim marriage is, under the Ordinance, 
required to be registered with the Hikah Registrar. A 
person contravening this provision is liable to suffer 
imprisonment up to three months or fine of one thousand 
rupees or both. A man may not, during the subsistence 
of an existing valid marriage, contract another marriage, 
without the previous permission of an arbitration council. 
An application for permission for such marriage is to be 
submitted to the chairman of the union council or town 
or union committee or such other person as is appointed 
by government. On receipt of the application the chairman 
must ask the applicant and his existing wife or wives 
each to nominate his or her representative to the arbi­
tration council. If the chairman is a non-Muslim or 
himself an applicant or unable to act, the members of the 
council must elect one of their number to act for him.
30. For instance if the deceased left a daughter and a 
son’s daughter, the former would get one-third while 
the latter, representing her father, would get two- 
thirds of the deceased’s estate.
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The arbitration council must examine the grounds and, if 
satisfied that the proposed marriage is necessary and 
just, it should grant the permission applied for, hut 
it may attack conditions and must record reasons for its 
decision* Either party may appeal against the decision 
of the arbitration council to the Sub-divisional Officer 
in East Pakistan and the collector in West Pakistan; 
the decision of the appellate authority is final* A 
man who remarries without permission is liable to pay 
immediately the entire amount of the dower, whether prompt 
or deferred, due to his existing wife; and, on conviction 
upon complaint, is liable to be sentenced to imprisonment 
which may extend to one year or to fine which may extend 
to five thousand rupees or both* Such a remarriage has 
also been made a ground for the previous wife to apply 
for dissolution of her marriage under the Dissolution of 
Iluslim Marriages Act, 1939*
Certain changes have also been introduced in 
the law of divorce* Under the Ordinance, if a man wants 
to repudiate his wife, he is required to give notice, as 
soon as may be after the pronouncement of divorce, to the 
chairman of the union council* The chairman constitutes 
an arbitration council, which is required to endeavour to 
bring about a reconciliation between the husband^the wife,
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and the divorce, if not revoked earlier, will not he effec­
tive until the expiration of ninety days from the date of 
notice* The divorced woman may remarry the same husband, 
without an intervening marriage with a third person, 
unless the termination of her marriage with the said 
husband has become effective by three pronouncements of 
talaq. The same rule applies mutatis mutandis where the 
right to divorce has been duly delegated to the wife or 
the dissolution is effected in any other manner*
The Ordinance has given power to the arbitration 
council, constituted by the chairman on an application by 
a wife, to specify the amount of maintenance to be paid 
to her by the husband, if the latter fails to maintain 
her adequately* The husband may, as in other decisions 
of the arbitration council, apply for a revision. Any 
amount specified as payable as maintenance, if not paid, 
may be recovered as arrears of land revenue. In respect 
of dower, the entire amount, according to the provisions 
of the Ordinance shall, in the absence of any details in 
the marriage contract, be presumed to be payable on demand.
The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance has provoked 
strong protests from the orthodox Ulema, who regard any 
change in the conventional Sharia as an act of heresy.
They are particularly critical about the provisions
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restricting polygamy and the rules regarding divorce.
It may be noted that polygamy is not altogether abolished 
and, where there is a just ground for a subsequent 
marriage, permission may be granted. In regard to 
dissolution and attempts to reconcile the parties after 
pronouncement of talaq by the husband, it may be said 
that the provision has only incorporated the procedure 
under an approved form of repudiation known as talaq-i- 
ahsan. These provisions have not Introduced any prin­
ciple which is unknown to the Sharia, but they have 
certainly effected changes in the conventional practices 
followed by Muslims in the sub-continent. In view of 
the fact that no reputable Pakistani would contract a 
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid one 
or would thoughtlessly repudiate his wife so as to cause 
misery or cruelty to his wife, the Ordinance is regarded 
by some as unnecessary. But the Ordinance, it must be 
admitted, at least reconciled the lav; with the custom of 
most Pakistanis on the points dealt with by it. It has 
also introduced remedies for injustices generally done to 
women among the more backward sections of Pakistan 
society.
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The Conciliation Courts
Till near the end of 1961, most criminal cases 
were dealt with by magistrates of the first, second and 
third classes and most civil disputes by subordinate 
courts. But even magistrates of the lowest grade and 
subordinate judges were stationed at the subdivisional 
headquarters, which in most cases would be miles away 
from the scene of the crime or the residence of the 
parties in remote villages, not connected with sub- 
divisional headquarters by any modern kind of communi­
cation. This distance between the scene of the crime or 
the place where the cause of action arose and the . seat of 
justice, combined with the formalities of the procedure 
followed in the courts, made justice expensive and dilatory. 
Successive governments since independence had promised
reform in this regard but nothing was done till the Con-
31ciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 was promulgated by the 
President in November. This Ordinance has brought about 
a general change affecting both wings of the country; it 
aimed at providing cheaper and local settlement of disputes 
in an informal atmosphere.
The Conciliation Courts Ordinance has conferred
31. Ordinance ZLVT of 1961, P.L.D. 1961 Central
Statutes 3.
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judicial powers upon the primary Basic Democracies, which, 
consist of union councils and town and union committees*
An application may he made to the chairman, by any party 
to a dispute referable to a conciliation court under the 
Ordinance, to constitute such a court, which consists of 
a chairman and two representatives nominated by each party. 
One of the nominated representatives must be a member of 
the council or the committee. The chairman of the 
council or the committee must be the chairman of the 
court, unless he is unable to act on account of illness 
or for other personal reasons or because his impartiality 
is challenged by any party, in which case any other member 
may be appointed in his place.
Jurisdiction of the conciliation court is 
limited to disputes arising in the union territory, and 
to persons resident therein. The courtfs power extends 
to such minor criminal offences as are scheduled in the 
Ordinance; they include unlawful assembly, rioting, affray, 
hurt, assault, criminal trespass, killing of animals, 
theft, cheating and criminal breach of trust. Though the 
offences are exclusively triable by the concilation court 
and the ordinary criminal court has no jursidiction, where 
the offences are of a more serious nature or the injury 
caused is of a high value, the conciliation court only
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has jurisdiction when "both parties consent to the reference 
to the conciliation court. It has also jurisdiction over 
civil causes involving properties of value not exceeding 
one thousand rupees* The court has no power to pass 
any sentence of imprisonment or impose any fine on the 
accused, hut if it holds a person guilty of an offence 
specified in the schedule, it may order the accused to 
pay to the aggrieved party compensation up to two hundred 
and fifty rupees and, in certain cases, up to five hundred 
rupees. In civil cases the court can ‘order payment of 
money up to the value of the suit and restoration of 
property to the person entitled to it* The court has 
power to punish contempt by imposing a fine of fifty 
rupees, and nay forward a criminal case to the criminal 
court having jurisdiction, where it considers that the 
ends of justice demand that an offender should be more 
heavily punished.
The procedure is simple and fees are very low. 
Generally the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872, and 
of the Codes of Crimincal Procedure, 1898, and Civil 
Procedure, 1908, are not applicable and no legal prac­
titioner. is allowed to appear for any party before the 
conciliation court or any other authority exercising 
judicial power under the Ordinance. A purdanashin lady,
32. A woman who observes seclusion and does not appear 
in public.
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however, can he represented hy a duly authorised person, 
who must not he a paid agent, A unanimous decision in 
all cases, and a decision hy a majority of four to one in 
cases involving lesser offences, are final. Against a 
decision hy a majority of three to two any party may apply 
for revision, in criminal cases to the controlling authority, 
who is the suh-divisional officer in East Pakistan and the 
collector in West Pakistan, and to the district judge in 
civil cases. The revisional authority may set aside 
or modify the decision or refer the case hack for recon­
sideration. In the cases where the consent of parties 
is necessary, a divided verdict of the court has the 
effect of a failure of a conciliation.
As has heen already said, the Ordinance aimed 
at providing cheap and informal justice, within the easy 
reach of the villagers, for causes involving minor offences 
or small amounts of money. Different views have heen 
held on the utility of the Ordinance. The former Chief 
Justice, Mr Justice Cornelius, observed:
"The object to he secured is to maintain 
the harmony of life in the union terri­
tory, and the accent is therefore, on 
conciliation. The types of criminal 
cases that a Conciliation Court may try 
are the relatively minor offences that 
are apt to occur in village or moholla 
life and which, unless appropriately 
settled at the initial stage, are apt 
.to lead to feuds and consequent serious
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33crimes and mischief s.1 ^
But the Ordinance is not immune from criticism* It has 
been pointed out that the people who are likely to con­
stitute the conciliation court at the village level will 
he mostly semi-literate people without experience, so 
that miscarriage of justice may result and the harmony 
envisaged may he seriously jeopardised* There is force 
in this ohjection at present hut, with the spread of 
education and social progress, the situation may change 
and the system may prove beneficial in the course of time*
The West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963
In 1963 the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly 
passed the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,
3 lL
3-963> "to provide for the more speedy trial and more 
effective punishment of certain heinous offences in West 
Pakistan and also to take more effective steps for the 
eradication of corruption11. The statute laid down a new 
procedure for the trial of criminal cases in West Pakistan, 
which had been promised hy the martial law regime.
President Ayub Khan in one of his major speeches said:
33* A.R. Cornelius, Judicial Reforms in the Decade 
(1958-68)"P.L.D. 1969 Journal 28, at p. 30.
34-. Act VII of 1963? P.L.D. 1963 West Pakistan Statutes 172.
276
"At present our legal system is 
cumbersome, expensive and dilatory.
The delays in hoth civil and 
criminal courts are notorious*
Also, these delays cost money by 
simply continuing and in the form 
of fees of lawyers* Men shrink 
from seeking justice, unless they 
have no choice. On the criminal 
side, things are worse, since the 
delays are to be interpreted in 
terns of human misery. The dispen­
sation of justice should not be 
marked by these handicaps and we ' 
are giving high priority to this 
problem," 35
As the Constitution of 1962 came into force in June of that 
year, the Amendment Act had to be passed by the West 
Pakistan provincial legislature.
The Act provided that, if, in the opinion of a 
commissioner , it was inexpedient in the interest of justice, 
that a case relating to offences enumerated in the statute 
Should not be tried by an ordinary court, he might refer 
the case to a tribunal. The scheduled offences were 
mostly crimes of violence, including homicide, kidnapping, 
robberty, dacoity and criminal trespass. But theft, 
housebreaking, smuggling, corruption, talcing a gift to 
recover stolen property, illegal abuse of offical power 
by public servants and abduction of married women were
35« M. Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Vol. I,
p. 26.
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also included* In the case of a public servant the neces­
sary sanction of the relevant government had to be obtained. 
The new procedure was not applicable to all cases but 
only to those which the commissioner selected and referred 
to the tribunal for reasons to be recorded by him, which 
could be the difficulty of procuring evidence admissible
under the Evidence Act, if the case were tried by an
56ordinary criminal court.
The tribunal consisted of a president, who had 
to be a magistrate with specified qualifications and four 
other private individuals, who were appointed by rotation 
from a panel. The commissioner constituted for each 
district a panel of between thirty and fifty members, 
taking into consideration their integrity, education and 
social status. On receipt of a reference by the com­
missioner, the district magistrate nominated the members 
of the tribunal and their names were communicated to the 
parties. An objection to a nomination could be filed 
by any party; the objection was heard and decided by the 
district magistrate in his discretion, but he had to 
record his reasons. The members of the tribunal were 
required to take an oath to act impartially, honestly and
36. A. R. Cornelius, "Judicial Reforms in the Decade” 
(1958-68) P.L.D. 1969 Journal 28, at p. 29.
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to the "best of their ability.
The procedure followed by the tribunal was of 
the simplest form. The president and at least three 
members formed a quorum to hear the case; they were 
obliged to hear any evidence adduced before the tribunal 
in support of the accusation and by the accused in his 
defence. But the tribunal had authority in its dis­
cretion to refuse to hear any evidence which it felt was 
being tendered "for the purpose of vexation or delay or 
for delaying the ends of justice". The provisions of the 
Evidence Act, 1872, did not generally apply to proceedings 
before the tribunal. Eor the proper disposal of a 
reference the tribunal could require the attendance of 
any witness and the production of any document. It could 
tender a pardon to an accomplice and examine him as an 
approver. There was no bar on the representation of 
parties by legal practitioner* And "although the Act 
does not say so, it is conceivable that a tribunal may 
hold enquiries behind the back of either party, on its
own initiative in order to ascertain the truth of the
37matter referred to them."^'
On completion of the trial, the tribunal
37* A.R. Cornelius, "Judicial Reforms in the Decade" 
(1958-68) P.L.D. 1969 Journal 28.
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submitted its findings on the guilt or innocence of tbe 
accused to the district magistrate, who might acquit the 
accused or refer the question back for further inquiry; 
if the findings were not supported by a three-fourth 
majority, he referred the case to a second tribunal; 
he might convict the accused in accordance with a finding 
of the tribunal by a four-fifths majority. He might 
pass any sentence except a sentence of death or trans­
portation or imprisonment for a term exceeding fourteen 
years; any sentence exceeding seven years had to be 
confirmed by the commissioner. There was no appeal 
against any sentence under the Act but the commissioner 
had the power of revision; a petition also lay to 
government from the commissioner1s order.
The tribunal had been given power to allow, 
with the permission of government, the composition of 
offences, including even murder, culpable homicide not 
amounting to murder and attempted murder. For the first 
two of these offences it was essential that the heirs of 
the deceased should agree and in the last case compo­
sition had to be approved by the victim himself. The 
statute also empowered the district magistrate to require 
any person to execute a bond to be of good behaviour, with 
or without security, if he was satisfied that the person
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was involved in a blood-feud or was likely to cause a 
blood-feud. For a bond for a period exceeding one month., 
the recommendation of the tribunal was necessary. For 
sin apprehended blood-feud or other cause of quarrel between 
families, any or all male adult members of a family might 
be required, after inquiry by the tribunal, to execute 
bonds of good behaviour for a period which might extend 
up to three years.
The West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,
1963, corresponded closely to the Fronter Crimes Regulation,
1901, which was enacted "to provide a mode for suppression
of crimes which fitted in with the sentiments, practices
and code of honour of the tribes occupying the region on
38the western frontier of the sub-continent11. It had been 
impugned for having created inequality before the law, by 
providing a special summary procedure for cases selected 
by the commissioner, while the majority of crimes of 
violence were still being tried before the ordinary criminal 
courts. The courts had consistently refused to interfere 
in any case under the West Pakistan Criminal Lav; (Amend­
ment) Act, 1963* in the exercise of their writ juris­
diction, "although they would indeed have power to correct 
any errors of law or legal procedure in respect of such
38, Ibid., at p. 29•
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matters as, for example, the proper authority competent 
to hear an a p p e a l , A l t h o u g h  the right of equal pro­
tection of law had been incorporated in the Constitution 
of 1962 by the first amendment in 1964, the statute could 
not be impugned on that ground, as it was one of the 
statutes protected against attack for repugnancy to the
4*0Constitution by a special provision in the Constitution.
4-1The Act has, however, been repealed by the 
present regime, in response to the demand of the legal 
profession which had attacked the statute since its enact­
ment as discriminatory, because it drastically curtailed 
the rights of the accused. The statute also had the 
effect of curbing the .powers of the Judiciary because at 
no stage was there a right of appeal to any court against 
any order made under the statute.
The Basic Democracies
On the day following the abrogation of the 
Constitution of 1956, General Ayub Khan, it may be recalled, 
declared that the martial law regime^ ultimate aim was tfto
39* Ibid., p. 29«
40. Constitution of 1962, Article 6(3)(ii) and the 
Fourth Schedule.
41. West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (Repeal) 
Ordinance, 1969 (Ordinance XLII of 1969) P.L.D. 1970 
West Pakistan Statutes 198.
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restore democracy but of the type tbat people can under-
42stand and work11. He reiterated bis promise in December,
1958> saying tbat a representative form of government
was essential for Pakistan but "we sball bave to ensure
tbat sucb a representative government is so designed tbat
43its working is not marred by political instability." ^
The first official bint of tbe type of representative
government Ayub Khan bad in mind came after tbe Governors1
Conference, presided over by President Ayub Kban, in June,
1959* A press communique announced tbat it bad been
decided to create "union pancbayats" throughout tbe
country, consisting of tbe representatives of tbe people,
who were to participate in tbe implementation of develop-
44ment schemes in every nook and corner of tbe country,
Tbe structure of representative government 
envisaged by tbe regime was not only to administer local 
government, it was also to form tbe base on xtfhich tbe 
pyramid of a sound political system could be developed.
This was revealed by President Ayub Kban on September 2, 
1959) when be introduced tbe scheme of Basic Democracies
42. M. Ayub Kban, Speeches and Statements, Vol. I, p. 3.
43. Ibid., p. 28.
44. See M. Hasan, Text Book of Basic Democracy and Local 
Government in Pakistan (P.L.D., Lahore, 19&8), p. 39>
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to the nation in a broadcast speech* The President said 
that past experience had shown that certain prerequisites 
such as the "high degree of social and political aware­
ness and mass literacy" necessary to work a western-type 
democracy were absent in Pakistani society, and this had 
resulted in the failure of the parliamentary system in 
the country* The new system of democracy, under the 
name of "Basic Democracy", was the result of a study of 
the people’s needs and requirements and was based on the 
realities of the situation. The name "Basic Democracy" 
was given to the system because it was to evolve from the 
lowest rung of the political and economic ladder, so that 
"it finds its roots deep among the people, starting at the
village level in rural areas, and at the moholla level in 
4-5towns". ^ The system, as visualised by the President, 
would penetrate the hard core of the nation; it would 
enable the people to exercise the franchise in their 
community or village, having regard to their individual 
and community interest; the process would create a 
patriotic, honest, realistic and dynamic leadership in 
the country.
4-6The Basic Democracies Order, 1959 > was promul­
gated by the President on October 27; it provided for the
45. M. iyub Ehan, Speeches and Statements, Vol. II, p. 24-.
4-6. President's Order No. 18 of 1959? P.L.D. 1959 Central
Statutes 564-.
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structure and function of the institutions to be estab­
lished under the system• It repealed altogether sixteen 
statutes relating to local government in the former 
provinces and "provided a five-tiered hierarchy of local
government boards, with an elected majority in the lowest
iin
tier and representation in the higher tiers". ' The 
Order gave legal shape to the system of representative 
institutions envisaged by the regime, which was to form 
the foundation of the political system given to the 
nation by the Constitution of 1962.
At the lowest tier of the five-tier hierarchy 
are.the union councils, for rural areas and union com­
mittees and town committees for the urban areas. Ori­
ginally these consisted of a number of members directly 
elected by the people and a number of appointed members, 
whose number should not exceed more than half of the 
elected members. The total number of members prescribed 
for each union council and union or town committee varies 
between ten and fifteen. Each council elects its chair­
man, who becomes an ex-officio member of the next higher 
council. The lowest council has been given a variety of 
functions to perform. It may undertake all or any of the
47. A. Gledhill, Pakistan: The Development of its Laws
and Constitution, p. IKS'.
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functions enumerated in the Schedule, which contains 
thirty-seven items* The list includes such civic 
functions as provision and maintenance of public ways 
and streets, burning and burial grounds, playgrounds, 
public places, sanitation, conservancy, relief, regu­
lation of births and deaths, increased food production, 
promotion of education; and any other function declared 
appropriate by government or delegated by the district 
council.
The council is responsible for village defence, 
by enrollment of a rural police force, which also assists 
the regular police in maintaining law and order in the 
union* The chairman is to assist the village revenue 
officials, the police and other government officials and 
furnish all information required by them. But he is not 
to interfere in the officials1 performance of their duties 
The union council has the power to levy taxes, with the 
prior sanction of the commissioner, on any of the twenty- 
nine items enumerated, which include taxes on the annual 
value of buildings and lands, transfer of immoveable 
property, professions, trades and callings, marriage and 
feasts. All money collected is paid into the council 
fund. A budget is prepared and sanctioned by the council 
but the controlling authority may modify it.
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In the next tier is the thana council in East 
Pakistan and tahsil council in West Pakistan. Such a 
council is composed of the chairmen of the union councils 
and town committees within its area, who are ex-officio 
representative members and other official and appointed 
members who must not together outnumber the representative 
members. The sub-divisional officer and, in his absence, 
the circle officer is the chairman of this council. The 
purpose of the thana or the tahsil council is to co­
ordinate the activities of the councils of the lower grade 
and to perform such other functions as are delegated by 
the district council.
The third step-in the hierarchy is the district 
council, consisting of official members, comprising the 
chairmen of thana or tahsil councils and representatives 
of government departments, and at least an equal number 
of appointed members, half of whom should be chairmen of 
the lowest councils. The collector is the chairman.
The district council is an executive body, with compulsory 
and optional functions. The compulsory functions include 
the provision for and maintenance of libraries, hospitals, 
bridges, public roads, sanitation and relief. Seventy 
prescribed optional functions include education, culture, 
social and economic welfare, public health and public works.
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The district council must co-ordinate local councils1 
activities and formulate and recommend development schemes 
to the divisional council and other authorities. Like 
the union council it has, with the sanction of govern­
ment, taxing power over twenty-nine subjects, enumerated 
in a schedule; the money collected is applied to the 
maintenance of the council and the discharge of its 
functions.
The divisional council is a co-ordinative body, 
consisting of the chairmen of the district councils, 
municipal and cantonment boards and representatives of 
government departments, and at least an equal number of 
appointed members, half of whom must be chairmen of the 
lowest councils. Its function is to co-ordinate activities 
of the district councils and formulate and recommend 
development schemes to higher authorities.
At the apex of the structure, according to the 
original Order, was the provincial development advisory 
council, consisting of official members from among the 
heads of government departments, and a number of appointed 
members, at least one-third of whom were chairmen of the 
lowest boards. The Governor was the chairman of this 
council, the function of which was to advise the government 
on matters relating to local councils and other local
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authorities, including grants made to them# In view of 
the prospective establishment of provincial assemblies 
under the Constitution of 1962, the provincial develop­
ment advisory council was omitted from the structure by
48the Basic Democracies (Second Amendment) Order, 1962.
This amending order also abolished the provision for 
"appointed members" in the councils and provided for 
election of members at all levels.
Such was the structure, powers and functions of 
the Basic Democracies. For the purpose of election to 
the local councils or committees, each union territory 
was divided into wards and members were elected by the 
electors on the electoral rolls, prepared on the basis of 
universal adult franchise. But after the promulgation 
of the Constitution of 1962, this part of the Basic Demo­
cracies Order was incorporated in the Electoral College
40
Act, 1964, y enacted by the National Assembly. For the 
purpose of this Act, each province was divided into forty 
thousand electoral units, each of which was to elect one 
member to the Electoral College of Pakistan. The President, 
the members of the National Assembly and the two Provincial
48. President’s Order No. 22 of 1962, P.L.D. 1962 Central 
Statutes 634.
49. Act IV of 1964, P.L.D. 1964 Central Statutes 95*
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Assemblies under the Constitution were elected by the 
members of the Electoral College. The Act provided 
that, after they had discharged their function as electors, 
the members would form union councils and union or toWn 
committees to perform functions of local government 
bodies under the Basic Democracies Order. After the 
abrogation of the Constitution of 1962 in March 1969 * 
it is presumed that the basic democrats have reverted to 
their former position of constituting local bodies, 
without having to function as members of the Electoral 
College..
Basic Democracies were established to perform
the dual functions of discharging the duties of local
government bodies and serving as the basis of the electoral
system introduced by the Constitution of 1962. These
were expected to become
"the nerve centre of their areas, 
where all local problems of develop­
ment and civic responsibilities 
[could] be studied at close range 
and their solutions discovered and 
applied with concentrated attention;"
and replace in due course of time "the purely official
agencies as the traditional 'Mai Baap* [Mother and Father]
of the people
50. M. Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Vol. II, 
pp. 24-25.
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The system has been compared with local govern­
ment system introduced by the British administrators in 
the nineteenth century in India*
"The philosophy of the new order was 
also similar to that of the Ripon 
school of local self-government 
enthusiasts: it was hoped, through
actual experience of the working of 
public services at a local level, 
leaders could be trained to manage 
national affairs. In the Ripon 
period this was often called 
’political education’; President 
Ayub named his experiment ’Basic 
Democracy': democracy ’of the type
that people can understand and 
work*." 51
There are opinions which hold that democratic structure 
of government established in the Indo-Pakistan sub­
continent after independence in 194-7 was premature and 
too sophisticated for the comprehension of politicians, 
who were entrusted with the working of the system.
A training and apprenticeship at the local government level 
would provide aspiring politicians with opportunities for 
gaining experience of the actual functioning of represen­
tative institutions. It has been dbserved that it was 
"probable that considerations of this kind were current, 
when the President made the Basic Democracies Order on 
October 27, 1959.1,52
51. Hugh Tinker, "Tradition and Experiment in Forms of 
Government", in O.H. Philips (ed.), Politics and 
Society in India, pp. 171-172.
52. A. Gledhill, on. cit.. p. 116.
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But Basic Democracies have "been criticised for
their role both as a system of local self-government and
also as the basic tier in the new electoral system. As
local government bodies, they were not given enough
freedom of action and the hands of official control were
too obvious to inspire any self-confidence and sense of
responsibility among the members. The government had a
general power of supervision and control over the local
councils. The controlling authority could modify the
budget, quash any proceeding, suspend or prohibit execution
of any measure, and require a local council to take such
53action as was s p e c i f i e d . I t  is extremely doubtful 
whether this “paternalistic control” would help to develop 
among the basic democrats a spirit of responsibility, 
independence and service, which was so essential for the 
successful working of the local government bodies.
As the basic tier of the electoral system under 
the Constitution of 1962, the Basic Democracies were 
attacked as a means for perpetuating Ayub Khan's supremacy 
and continuing the autocratic system that he introduced.
The “so-called mandate" given to the President by the basic 
democrats in January, I960, to give the nation a new
53. Basic Democracies Order, 1959* Articles 73-75•
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Constitution was regarded as the root of this undemocratic 
and autocratic political system. Indirect election to 
high political office by'basic democrats had not only 
deprived the people of any say at the higher level; 
it was also alleged that the basic (democrats were made to 
vote for the existing establishment by official influence. 
The basic democrats, as members of local government 
bodies being under strict official control, as members 
of the Electoral College they were unlikely to exercise a 
free choice as electors. The attack in the country-wide 
movement of 1968-1969 was , therefore, against the whole 
system. ’’Basic Democrats were made the target of hatred 
and no distinction was made in the functions that they 
performed as members of a local body and their functions 
as members of the Electoral College ••• They were just 
the symbols of the Constitution of 1962.”^ Obviously 
the type of politicians who sought election to the national 
and provincial assemblies would be resentful of the 
powers exercised by the basic democrats.
Though there was a strong demand for abolition 
of the Basic Democracies, along with the political system 
established by the Constitution of 1962, the new martial
54. S.II. Zafar, Through the Crisis, p. 18,
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law regime has decided to retain them as a system of 
local self-government.^ As it is proposed, in the new 
system to he established after the conclusion of the 
present martial law period, to have elections for central 
and provincial assemblies based on universal adult fran­
chise, the members of Basic Democracies would not then 
function as members of an Electoral College* They 
would function exclusively as local government bodies; 
official control and supervision might be relaxed and they 
might be able to function with more independence and 
freedom*
The Constitution Commission
Within three months of the abrogation of the
Constitution of 1956 and declaration of "martial law"
President Ayub Khan said: "As soon as the major problems
facing the country have been solved, the reforms have been
put into operation and the administration rehabilitated,
the best constitutional brains in our country will be
asked to apply themselves to the question of framing a con- 
56stitution."^ He reiterated his intention of appointing
55* Pakistan Observer, January 5» 1971 (Editorial).
56. Speech delivered in Karachi on December 25, 1958,
M. Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Vol. I, p. 28.
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a constitution commission "consisting of the best brains 
in the country" on January 15* 1959* when he told the 
Karachi High Court Bar Association that the future con­
stitution should suit the circumstances and conditions
of the country and that it should not admit of political
57instability in any circumstances• ' In the meantime 
reforms were introduced or contemplated, which were "in 
fact designed to prepare the base on which an upward 
pyramid of a sound political system can be developed", 
and with this end in view the Basic Democracies scheme 
was introduced* Elections to local councils under the 
Basic Democracies Order, 1959 commenced in December, 1959 
which continued till mid-January, I960.
On January 15* I960, the Presidential (Election 
and Constitution) Order, 1960,^ was made, providing that, 
on completion of elections to local councils under the 
Basic Democracies Order, the elected members would be 
asked to declare by secret ballot whether or not they had 
confidence in President Ayub Khan. If the majority
V
declared confidence in the President, he would be deemed 
to have authority to take all steps for making a constitution
57• Ibid., p. 41.
53. President’s Order No. 5 of I960, P.L.D. I960
Central Statutes 30.
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and also to have been elected President for the first term
under that constitution, The Order gave legal effect to
a cabinet decision made earlier but not announced until
January 8 , I960, The election, in substance a vote of
confidence, was held on February 14- and 95 VeT cent, of
59the votes cast were in the affirmative, y Three days 
later the President was inducted into office, and, after 
the swearing-in ceremony, the President announced the 
appointment of an eleven-man Constitution Commission, 
with Mr Justice Shahabuddin, then the senior most puisne 
Judge of the Supreme Court, as its chairman.
The terms of reference to the Constitution Com­
mission were to examine the progressive failure of parlia­
mentary government in Pakistan leading to the abrogation 
of the Constitution of 1956, to identify the causes of 
the failure, suggesting measures to prevent their recur­
rence; and to submit, talcing into consideration all 
factors and circumstances, constitutional proposals which 
would ensure a democracy adapted to changing circumstances 
and based on the Islamic principles of Justice, equality 
and tolerance, consolidation of national unity and a firm 
and stable system of government
59* E.A. and K.R, Schuler, Public Opinion and Constitution 
Making in Pakistan, p. 4-8,
60, Report of the Constitution Commission, p. 1,
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The Constitution Commission soon after its 
appointment got down to work and prepared a questionnaire 
containing forty questions, asking for the causes of the 
failure of the 1956 Constitution and ln v * \ t iw g sug­
gestions for the future set-up. The questionnaire also 
contained explanatory notes on the terms and provisions 
of the late constitution to facilitate understanding of 
them by those invited to answer the questions. The 
questionnaire was widely distributed and the public was 
invited to procure the questionnaire and send their replies 
to the Commission. In addition, the Commission toured 
extensively in both East and West Pakistan, interviewing 
people selected from different walks of life. In this 
process, a total of 565 people was interviewed and 6269 
replies to the questionnaire were received. The Commis­
sion analysed the opinions and views expressed before it, 
compiled a report, which was unanimous except for a note 
of dissent by one member on some points; it was submitted 
to government on April 29> 1961.
The Commission concluded that the parliamentary 
system of government had failed in Pakistan and there­
for e/ucommended a presidential system. We shall comment 
on the Commission’s conclusion later in the chapter. In 
recommending the presidential type of government, the
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commission discarded the views of 50*6 per cent* of those 
who had given them, which favoured the parliamentary 
system and accepted, for its own reasons, the view of 
the 47*40 per cent., who favoured the presidential system. 
The presidential system, according to the commission, 
would give stability to government and firmness to the 
administration, which were essential for the success of 
any form of government. It would avoid possible clashes 
between the Head of the State and Prime Minister, which 
were bound to occur in a parliamentary system. The 
presidential system would give a stable executive "where 
there is only one person at the head of affairs, with an 
effective restraint exercised on him, by an independent 
legislature, members of which, however, should not be in 
a position to seriously interfere with the administration 
by exercising political pressure for their personal ends” 
The president should have powers of partial veto over the 
appropriation bill and to make law by Ordinance, when the 
legislature was not in session. There should be a vice- 
president, to whom the president could delegate some of 
his functions.
The commission accepted the opinions expressed 
ty 65*5 Pe *^ cent. , of the respondents for a federal form
6l. Report of the Constitution Commission, Para. 499 p* 28.
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of government with the existing two units, and recom­
mended that “the government should he of the same pattern 
as that of India and Canada and not unitary as in Great
r q
Britain”. The character of government, however,
would not he strictly federal and there would he some
degree of control hy the centre over the provinces, hoth
in the legislative and executive fields. 55*5 per cent.
of the opinions received favoured a unitary form of govern-
G7)ment and the official delegation ^ strongly advocated 
the same, to avoid growing opposition of the provinces to 
the centre, resulting in administrative friction. The 
commission did not accept this view and advocated three 
lists of subjects, hs in the late constitution, with some 
modifications, giving the centre power to legislate on any 
subject in circumstances of absolute necessity and in 
emergencies. The residuary powers should he with the 
centre, and, in the event of repugnancy between a central 
law and a provincial law on any subject, the former should 
prevail and the latter to the extent of repugnancy be void.
62. Report of the Constitution Commission, Para. 68, p. 4-0.
63. A body of officials appointed for placing before the 
Commission the official views on different constitu­
tional questions.
64. Para. 71 of the Report.
299
The commission recommended a bi-cameral legis­
lature for the centre, though 74.1 per cent, of the 
opinions received favoured a unicameral parliament.
The upper chamber, to be known as the Senate, should 
consist of forty members elected by the lower house and 
the two provincial legislatures and eight members nomi­
nated by the president. The Senate should be able "to 
act as a check on the impetuosity of legislation by the 
Lower House, and also exercise a healthy influence, by
its utterances, both on the members of that House and the 
65public". ^ The provincial legislatures were, however, 
to be unicameral, with one hundred members directly 
elected by the people. Although the commission depre­
cated interference in the administration by the legis­
lature, it favoured an independent legislature within 
its own sphere. It observed that, whatever modifications 
on the American presidential system, where the legis­
lature was entirely independent, might be adopted, "we 
cannot, if we want to have a democratic form of government 
make the legislature ineffective. It should be in a 
sufficiently strong position to act as a check on the 
exercise by the executive of its extensive powers,without
65• Report of the Constitution Commission, Para. 75 > P* 4-5
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at the sane time affecting the firmness of administration.” 
As regards the judiciary, the commission recom­
mended the retention of most ofjthe provisions of the 
late constitution. While the High Court should have the 
same power and jurisdiction as in the late constitution, 
the Supreme Court should not have original writ juris­
diction, though it itfould have appellate jurisdiction over 
such cases. The value of causes giving a right of 
appeal to the Supreme Court in civil matters should he 
raised to twenty thousand rupees. The High Courts should 
have jurisdiction to issue a writ, if either the place 
where the cause of action arose or where the defendant was 
resident was within its territorial jurisdiction in 
original causes, the choice being given to the plaintiff.
A judge of the Supreme Court was to he removable by 
impeachment in the Senate, but a judge of the High Court 
should be removable by the president on an adverse finding
by the Supreme Court, after judicial investigation into
67a reference received from the president. f
The commission recommended direct elections for 
the president, vice-president, the lower house of parlia­
ment and the two provincial legislatures, the franchise
66. Ibid., para. 4-9? p. 28. 
67* Ibid., para. 139? p* 90.
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being exercisable only by citizens who had attained 
specified standards of literacy or possessed sufficient 
property* It advised that these standards should be 
fixed according to the recommendation of a Franchise 
Commission, to be appointed in the immediate future*
The commission rejected the principle of universal adult 
franchise on the ground that illiteracy was x^idespread 
among the masses and observed that nthe extension of 
franchise should, as in England, go hand in hand with
C O
the spread of education • ••" It also rejected the 
official preference for indirect election through an 
electoral college, consisting of the basic democrats, 
but recommended that the first parliament and the pro­
vincial legislatures should be indirectly elected by the
basic democrats, in order to avoid delay in establishing
69constitutional government* y Although 55*1 Pe^ cent* of 
the answers to the questionnaire favoured joint elector­
ates, the commission recommended separate electorates for 
elections to the Lower House of parliament and the two 
provincial legislatures*^
The Constitution Commission advised incorpor­
ation in the constitution of the fundamental rights of the
68* Ibid*, para* 108, p* 68*
69. Ibid*, para. 120, pp* 78-79*
70* Ibid*, para* 117 > PP* 76-77*
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late constitution but recommended that the West Pakistan
Land Reforms Regulation, 1959 and the Frontier Grimes
Regulation, 1901 should be exempt from avoidance for
71repugnancy to those rights* f The preamble of the 
late constitution with suitable modifications was to be 
adopted and the Islamic Research Institute, established 
under the old constitution, continued. As regards con­
formity of existing laws with Islamic injunctions, it 
recommended the appointment of a commission, which, after 
a study of the different schools, should define such basic 
principles of Islam as could be regarded as setting the 
standard, to which the laws of the country should conform.
Political parties, according to the commission, 
were inevitable and essential to representative govern­
ment. It rejected the contention of the official dele­
gation that political parties could be dispensed with and 
observed: 11 If we want to have a democratic form of
government, our endeavour should be to create conditions
73in which parties based on principles can emerge ...nf 
As long as a representative form of government had to be 
worked, the existence of political parties was unavoidable
71. Report of the Constitution Commission, para. 1631
p. 103.
72. Ibid., para. 194, p. 124.
73* Ibid., para. 121, p. 80.
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Regarding the method of amending the constitution, 
the commission favoured a comparatively easy procedure, 
in view of the fact that the constitution was not going 
to he promulgated by a constituent assembly. It recom­
mended that an amendment should require the support of 
two-thirds of the total members of both houses, sitting 
together, and the assent of the president. If the 
president withheld his assent, his veto could be nullified 
by a three-fourth majority. For amending certain articles 
relating to provincial legislatures, the legislature 
affected was to be consulted, as was provided in the 
Constitution of 1956
As has been said earlier, the Constitution Com­
mission, after considering the eleven years of working 
#
the system, reached the conclusion that the parliamentary 
system had failed and would not work in Pakistan. In 
view of the prime need for stable and firm government in 
the country, the commission rejected the parliamentary 
system and said: nWe shall be running a grave risk in
adopting the parliamentary form, either in its purity or 
with the modifications suggested, and we do not think 
that we can afford to take such a risk at the present
74-. Ibid., para. 197 > PP* 127-28.
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75stage. " { y Analysing the opinions expressed, the 
commission indicated three main causes for the "failure” 
of parliamentary government. These causes were:
”(1) Lack of proper elections and
defects in the late constitution.
(2) Undue interference by the Heads 
of the State with ministries and 
political parties, and by the 
Central Government with the 
functioning of the governments in 
the provinces.
(3) Lack of leadership, resulting in 
a lack of well-organised and 
disciplined parties, the general 
lack of character in the politicians 
and their undue interference in
the administration.” 76
The commission in its conclusion gave emphasis to the 
third cause mentioned above, and identified it as "the 
real cause” of the failure of the parliamentary system 
of government in Pakistan, and recommended a presidential 
form of government as more suitable to the genius of the 
people and more likely to work in the conditions and 
circumstances in Pakistan.
It would seem, from a reading of the report, 
that the Constitution Commission despised the attitude 
and activities of the politicians and political parties
75* Ibid., para. 37? P* 20 
76. Ibid., para. 10, p. 6 .
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during the period under review. There were no well- 
organised political parties and after the death of 
Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, the gap in political leader­
ship was never filled. The members of the legislatures 
were apt to shift their allegiance from one party to 
another to further their own advantages and interests. 
Neither they, nor their parties would stand up to 
authoritarian Heads of the State. As a result of their 
unscrupulous behaviour, the country suffered from insta­
bility of government and maladministration. If the 
politicians had acted properly, according to the commission, 
things would have been different. A presidential system, 
with a head of the government independent of the support 
of the members of the legislature, would be more likely to 
ensure stability and firmness in the administration than 
a parliamentary system.
The commission, it may be noted, though it 
recommended a presidential system, did not accept the 
official view that political parties and politicians 
should be dispensed with. Instead, it stressed the 
necessity for political parties, subscribing' to specific 
political principles, in any democratic set-up. It 
might have been argued, therefore, that the politicians 
who were responsible for past "failure", would be likely
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to form new parties, pledged to sustain the new system.
But if they had lacked in character in the past, they 
would not he likely to turn into ideal politicians, just 
because there had been a change in the form of govern­
ment. Secondly, the president visualised by the commission, 
under the new constitution would inevitably be a politican.
If the former Heads of State, only armed with the limited 
constitutional powers given by the parliamentary system, 
could act with impunity, ignoring the principles and 
spirit of the constitution, an unscrupulous individual 
holding the office of the president under a presidential 
system, would be an even greater danger to the country 
and, as the politicians apprehended when giving their 
views to the commission, the system would deteriorate
into dictatorship of the kind prevalent among some of the
77Latin American countries.'' That a presidential system 
of government, in the absence of well-developed and res­
pected conventions, can be reduced to dictatorship is 
recognised by most authorities in constitutional law.
In advising the Pakistan authorities about the form of 
government for the country in 1955 > Sir Ivor Jennings had 
to ”admit that the American system could easily be converted
77* See Schuler, op.cit., p. 72.
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into a dictatorship • . . These arguments would seem 
unanswerable in Pakistan, unless the commission expected 
things to remain indefinitely as they were when Ayub Khan 
was president and an entirely new political leadership 
would be evolved. But such considerations should not 
form the basis of constitutional proposals for a country 
which had undergone such strains and stresses as Pakistan 
since independence. Political leadership cannot be an 
isolated phenomenon distinct from the society in which it 
exists, for it is the product of that society, though it 
is responsible for giving a lead in political thinking.
The commission did not think that the Constitution
of 1956 was an unworkable instrument. It observed:
"As for the defects in the late constitution, which has
also been mentioned as one of the causes of the failure,
we do not see any that could have effectively prevented
79its being worked successfully• J The commission, there­
fore, rightly, stressed that the failure of the 1956 Con­
stitution was due to the behaviour of the people who were 
entrusted to work it. We have already discussed the role
78. Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government,
p. 19.
79. Report of the Constitution Commission, para. 12,
p/y.
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played by the politicians and the Head of the State 
during the two and a half years that the Constitution of
OA
1956 survived. The politicians themselves said, in
their replies to the Commissions1s questionnaire, that the 
constitution and parliamentary system it introduced did 
not have a chance to show that it could be made to work 
properly. Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, a former Prime Minister, 
said: !,In a parliamentary democracy, where free elections
are of its essence, it is wholly unfair to judge a con­
stitution after an experience of only two and half years,
81when not even one election had been held under it."
A constitution, to be judged properly, should be in oper­
ation for a considerable period of time and all its 
provisions should be enforced; the various organs set 
up by it should be allowed to function unhindered.
Only then would its weaknesses and faults appear; these 
could be amended unless a complete change was obviously 
desirable.
flA constitution when written does 
not breathe. It comes to life and 
begins to grow only when human 
elements get together and work it.
80. See Chapter V, pp. 15*3-I5S and Chapter YII.
81. Quoted by G.W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan,
p. 138.
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As time passes, it almost imper­
ceptibly changes in form and 
content and assumes a. new shape 
and even a new meaning. This 
comes of the nature and temper of 
those who xrork it. Time and 
circumstances do have their impact 
on it. Yet, it is men, more than 
anything else, who shape and 
mould the destiny of a written 
constitution,M
op
observed M.V. Pylee. The same author quoted Dr B.R 
Ambedkar, who was the chairman of the constitution 
drafting committee in the Indian Constituent Assembly. 
Dr Ambedkar, in one of the debates of the Assembly ob­
served:
"However good a constitution may 
be, it is sure to turn out bad, 
because those who are called to 
work it happen to be a bad lot.
However bad a constitution may 
be, it may turn out to be good, 
if those who are called to work 
it happen to be a good lot.
The working of a constitution 
does not depend wholly upon the 
nature of the constitution.
The constitution can provide 
only the organs of State such as 
the Legislature, the Executive 
and the Judiciary. The factors 
on which the working of these 
organs of State depend are the 
people and the political parties 
they will set up as their instru­
ments to carry out their wishes 
and their policies." 83
82. M.V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India, p.
«
700.
83* C.A.D. X, p. 975* Quoted in Pylee, ibid.
310
Professor G.W. Choudhury, while admitting that 
parliamentary democracy in Pakistan was not functioning 
in the same way as in England or in other older members 
of the Commonwealth, commented that it must be borne in
04
mind that the ways of democracy were often slow. He
also referred to Professor R.M. Maclver's observation
that a people cannot bring democracy into immediate being
by a sudden change of attitude and that democracy attains
its fuller development after many experiments, some of
which may be abortive or at best only partially success- 
85ful. ^ Por improper functioning of a form of government, 
the constitution is not entirely to blame. It depends 
upon the people who are called to work it and the circum­
stances under which they are required to work. In 
Pakistan there was no general election under the Consti­
tution of 1956? in the absence of which political parties 
were functioning without any object in view. There was 
no opportunity, without election, for the polarisation of 
views on problems and issues. The Constitution of 1956 
was, therefore, never tested in the light of public opinion. 
The Constitution Commission does not seem to have paid due
84. G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan,
p. 257.
85* R*H* Maclver, Web of Government (1949)? pp* 188-92.
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heed to these points when it reached its conclusion 
about the ''failure” of the parliamentary system in 
Pakistan.
The most important point, which the Constitution 
Commission overlooked in recommending a presidential form 
of government, was the composition of society in Pakistan. 
H o t  only was it a plural society, in the sense that it 
comprised various racial and ethnic groups with their 
own language and culture, but the two wings of Pakistan 
were geographically separated by over a thousand miles of a 
foreign country. The differences between the two wings and 
the apprehension of the domination of one wing by the other 
were already causing anxiety, when the commission was 
considering its constitutional proposals. Moreover, 
politicians had seriously made the point before the com­
mission that under presidential system
"when a President is elected from one 
wing, the other wing will surely feel 
that people have not been represented 
in the government. Active and effec­
tive participation by the people in 
the affairs of government is a sine qua 
non of an ideal pattern of government, 
that is only possible in a Parliamentary 
system of Government and impossible in 
any form of Presidential Government." 86
86. Reply to Constitution Commission questionnaire, 
Quoted in G.W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, 
pp. 151-152.
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That the sense of participation on the part of 
the people was essential in working any form of government 
was admitted by President Ayub Khan, who was the strongest 
advocate for the presidential form of government in 
Pakistan. The lack of that sense among the people, and 
among East Pakistanis in particular, was identified by 
the President as the cause of popular dissatisfaction with 
the Constitution of 1962. In a broadcast on February 21, 
1969 he said, "I realise also that the intelligentsia 
feels left out and wants a greater say in the affairs of 
the State. People in East Pakistan--feel that in the 
present system they are not equal partners . . . " ^  In a 
plural society such as in Pakistan, collective leadership 
is desirable and such leadership is only possible in a 
parliamentary system. As Sir Ivor Jennings said, in a 
plural society "Cabinets can be mixed in respect of race, 
religion, caste, tribe or clan. In Ceylon it is usual 
to have at least two Tamils and one Muslim. The Indian 
Cabinet is drawn from the several racial groups in India. 
Pakistan has to give due weight both to East and West 
Pakistan.
Cabinet government, with the administration
87* Keesingfs Contemporary Archives (1969-70), p. 23221.
88. Sir Ivor Jennings, op.cit., p. 158.
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answerable to a popularly elected legislature, appears 
more responsible than presidential government. A parlia­
ment which has direct control over government and power 
to overthrow it, can effectively reflect public opinion 
in the country at any time, but a president under the
presidential system may be remote from public opinion and
8Q
he is not easy to remove, J This may lead to serious 
deadlock, resulting in political chaos and disorder or 
even to a revolutionary situation. This factor should be 
kept in mind when prescribing a constitutional formula 
for a heterogeneous society. The constitution commission, 
obsessed with their contempt for the misdoings of the 
politicians under the parliamentary system, seem to have 
overlooked this.
It has been noted that one of the maiu.reasons 
why the commission favoured the presidential system was 
to avert clashes between the Prime Minister and Head of 
the State. But in a presidential system such as was 
recommended by the commission , there is the danger of a 
clash between the president and the legislature, if the 
conventions, which are essential to such a constitution, 
in practice are not accepted by the political leaders.
89. No United States president has ever been removed 
from office. The impeachment to remove President 
Andrew Johnson in 1868 failed by one vote.
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Professor Jennings anticipated such a clash in Pakistan
under a presidential system, when he said, flIt could not
be assumed that the conventions accepted in the United
States would be acceptable in Pakistan, and accordingly
it was necessary to provide means for solving, for instance,
90conflicts between the executive and the legislature. 11J 
Considering all these factors and assuming that people of 
Pakistan want a democratic form of government, one would 
be inclined to conclude that the parliamentary system is 
the only answer to Pakistan's protracted political problem.
A Brief Review of the Period 1958-1962
Political scientists and lawyers assume that the 
object of a martial law administrator is to restore public 
order and restore civil government as quickly as possible, 
but "martial law" in Pakistan in the period 1958-1962 
was different from martial law as understood in the Common­
wealth earlier. It was described by Chief Justice Munir 
as a successful revolution. But the administration set 
up by Field Marshal Ayub Khan, and which effectively 
governed Pakistan during the years 1958-1962, differed from 
most other revolutionary governments. The typical
90. Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government,
p. 18.
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revolutionary government claims, though often without 
much justification in fact, to have destroyed the powers 
of evil, the citadel of inefficiency, corruption and 
exploitation, and established the order of justice, 
righteousness and peace* But Ayub Khan, from the moment 
of taking over, represented himself as a caretaker, his 
government as an interim affair; immediate measures 
would be taken to create a constitution suitable to the 
genius of Pakistan.
Unless one is to say that such a government as 
Ayub Khanfs military regime is bound by no law, human or 
divine, one is entitled to ask whether legislation con­
sidered in this chapter comes properly within the scope 
of such powers as are exercisable by such a regime*
Should it have imposed such important innovations on the 
general body of law as a ceiling for agricultural holdings, 
which affected the vested interests of an influential 
body of Pakistanis, far-reaching alterations to procedural 
law, which the legal profession would not approve, and 
changes in the personal law which conservative Muslims 
would regard as blasphemous? Should not these laws have 
been referred to legislatures set up under the new Con­
stitution? Ayub Khan would say that these were essential 
for the good of Pakistan and could not have been enacted by
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the legislatures set up by the 1956 Constitution* This 
would seem to mean that he intended to force Pakistan to 
do for its own good what it did not want to do. But 
if one declares that Pakistan is a democracy, even a 
"controlled" democracy, one cannot impose on its popu­
lation the most desirable legislation, for its own good, 
if a majority or even a large minority do not want it. 
Interference in personal law has traditionally provoked 
protests from conservative sections of society in the 
Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and the regime could not have 
enhanced its popularity with the people generally by 
further interference with the personal law* It should 
not be forgotten that the National Assembly elected under 
the 1962 Constitution lost no time in restoring the 
adjective "Islamic" which the regime had removed from the 
title of Pakistan.
The much-publicised land reforms in I7est Pakistan, 
as explained above, have to a great extent failed to 
accomplish their purpose. The regime pushed these reforms 
through, though the impossibility of achieving their 
object had already been demonstrated in India. There the 
plans were made by the Centre but had to be implemented 
by State legislatures. The Zamindars controlled most 
State legislatures and so the necessary legislation was 
delayed. But, when enacted, various loopholes were left,
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the consequences of which were only discovered later and
the revenue officials interpreted the provisions of the
legislation so as to benefit the landlords, The effect
was that a few bigger Zamindars lost a little, the tenants
gained nothing and the real beneficiaries'were the middle-
91sized landholders*
With regard to the establishment of the Consti­
tution Commission, one may ask whether a third constituent 
assembly should not have been summoned. The Indian 
Independence Act, 194-7 > to which Pakistan legally owed 
its existence, provided that the then existing Constituent 
Assembly should enact the constitution and it alone could 
amend the Independence Act. After it had been dissolved, 
the Federal Court held that, to enact a constitution a 
new Assembly must be summoned. The Independence Act must 
be obeyed, except' in matters for which it had not provided. 
In making the Constitution of 1956, the provisions of 
this Statute had been followed as far as possible, but 
the setting up of the Constitution Commission was something 
new. It is true that it did endeavour to sound public 
opinion on the relevant questions but its recommendations 
were made in its discretion; some of them were opposed to
91. See H.C.L. Merillat, Land and the Constitution in 
India, Chapter 5*
public opinion and not all of them were accepted by Ayub 
Khan, who claimed the right to impose his will on the 
people of Pakistan by virtue of a plebiscite, in which 
only the basic democrats participated and they were 
unlikely, at that time, to oppose Ayub Khan's will.
To the question whether the Constitution should 
not have been referred to a newly summoned Constituent 
Assembly, Ayub Khan and his advisors would probably say in 
reply, that the two previous Constituent Assemblies had 
not performed their duties in such a manner as to encourage 
a third experiment of this kind. To this the retort 
must be that there was nbthing wrong with the 1956 Consti­
tution in itself and it was enacted with considerable 
speed; the fault was not in the Constitution but in those 
who swore allegiance to it and violated their oaths. In
any case Ayub Khan's recipe for constitution-making 
eventually proved inadequate. No longer are its special 
features, presidential government, indirect elections and 
the integration of West Pakistan regarded as possible 
parts of a future constitution. The process commenced 
by the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956 seems, at 
present, to have landed the country into an extremely grave 
political crisis which may be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to solve.
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It is difficult, therefore, to maintain that 
any promised benefit accrued to Pakistan from the estab­
lishment of martial law in 1958* Would it not have been 
better if the Constitution of 1956 had been preserved 
and elections held under it? The proposed election under 
that Constitution in February, 1959 > contrary to President 
I-lirza's view, could have resulted in a political stability 
leading to an understanding between leaders of different 
regions. This would have ensured governmental stability 
and national unity. It could have been otherwise indeed, 
but signs in the autumn of 1958 were indicative of a better 
picture.
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Chapter IX 
The Constitution of 1962
Outline of the New Constitution
The Constitution Commission, it may he recalled, 
submitted its report in May, 1961. The report was 
thoroughly examined by the President and his Cabinet.
A cabinet sub-committee then formulated the principles 
on which the new constitution was to be based. Finally 
a drafting committee , with Manzur Quadir, the Minister 
for External Affairs, as chairman, drafted the consti­
tution,^- which was announced in a broadcast by President 
Ayub Khan on March 1, 1962. As will be seen, the 
Constitution, as it finally emerged, differed from the 
recommendations of the Constitution Commission on some 
fundamental points, such as the fundamental rights, the 
role of judiciary, the system of election and adherence 
to federal principles. The commission's recommendation 
regarding the form of government was accepted, but the 
kind of presidential system that was introduced by the
1.  See Gr.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in
Pakistan (2nd ed.), p. 1?S.
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Constitution of 1962 was substantially different from 
the pure presidential form envisaged by the commission*
2
President Ayub Khan, in his introductory speech, 
recalled his promise made on October 8 , 1956, that the 
ultimate, aim of the martial law regime was 11 to restore 
democracy but of the type that people can understand 
and work’1 • The Constitution of 1962, which the President 
gave to the nation, was the fulfilment of his promise*
It provided for the presidential system, as it was 
11 simpler to work, more akin to our genius and history, 
and less liable to lead to instability - a luxury that 
a developing country like ours cannot affordn. The 
parliamentary system was discarded, not because the 
system itself was defective, but because certain 
pre-conditions essential for its successful operation 
were absent in Pakistani society* Not only were certain 
intellectual attainments necessary to work the parlia­
mentary system but "above all, you need really cool and 
phlegmatic temperament which only people living in cold 
climates seem to have”. Nations other than Britian
2. Text of the speech, Dawn, March 1, 1962* Constitution 
Supplement, p* II.
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and the Scandinavian countries have failed to work it*
The President, therefore, observed, "So, don't let us 
kid ourselves and cling to cliches and assume that we 
are ready to work such a refined system, knowing the 
failure of earlier attempts. It will be foolhardy to 
try it again, until our circumstances change radically*
Taking into consideration the prevailing 
conditions and the genius of the people, Ayub Khan 
thought that the presidential system was the correct 
answer to Pakistan's constitutional problems, which 
would "release the Chief Executive from obligation of 
having to be sustained artificially so as to enable him 
to get on with the functions entrusted to him for the 
benefit of the people at large"* The philosophy behind 
the new political system was the "blending of democracy 
with discipline, the two prerequisites to running a 
free society with stable government and sound adminis­
tration" •
The new Constitution came into force on June 8 , 
1962 with the first meeting of the National Assembly, 
when the President declared the lifting of martial law*
3. Ibid.
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Apart from a kind of presidential system, the Constitution 
provided that Pakistan should be a 1 form of federation1, 
with the provinces enjoying such autonomy as was con­
sistent with the unity and interest of the country as a 
whole. The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, 
tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, 
were to be fully observed, while the legitimate interests 
of the minorities and the independence of the judiciary
IL
were to be adequately safeguarded. The State, to be 
known as the 'Republic of Pakistan1, was to consist of 
two units - East Pakistan and West Pakistan and such 
other territory as might be included in Pakistan.
Instead of justiciable fundamental rights, such as were 
enumerated in the 1956 Constitution, a chapter entitled 
"Principles of Law-Making and of Policy" was incorporated 
in the Constitution, but the responsibility to uphold 
them was left to the legislatures and no law was to be 
void on the ground of violation of these principles. In 
his inaugural address to the National Assembly on June 8 ,
4-. Constitution of 1962, Preamble.
5. Ibid., Article 1.
6 . Ibid., Article 6 (Before amendment).
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1962, President Ayub Elian said "(The Constitution that 
comes into force from today represents my political 
philosophy in its application to the existing conditions 
of Pakistan and it deserves a fair trial.
The executive authority of the Republic was 
vested in the President, who exercised all powers either 
directly or through officers subordinate to him in accor-
Q
dance with the Constitution and the law. The President 
under the Constitution of 1962, was the "central figure", 
the ruler of Pakistan, not responsible to nor dependent
q
on the support of a majority in the central legislature.
He was elected indirectly by the members of the electoral 
college,*^ and held office normally for five years. As 
under the late Constitution, the president was to be a 
Muslim, qualified to be a member of the National Assembly, 
and at least thirty-five years of age.^ He could be 
impeached in the National Assembly for wilful violation
7. Text of President’s Speech, Dawn, June 9* 1962, p.4.
8 . Constitution of 1962, Article 31*
9. A. Gledhill, Pakistan, The Development of its Law 
and Constitution, p. 136.
10.Constitution of 1962, Article 165*
11. Ibid., Article 10.
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of the Constitution or gross misconduct; he could he
removed from office for physical or mental incapacity.
Votes of three quarters of the total membership of the
Assembly were required for his exit, but if in the
final voting at least half of the total members did
not vote for the resolution, the members who initiated
12it would cease to be members of the Assembly.
The Supreme Command of the Defence Services
was vested in the President, who appointed the Commander s-
in-Chief of the services, granted commissions and raised
13and maintained the armed forces. ^ The President 
appointed provincial governors, parliamentary secretaries 
and the Attorney-General. The chief justices and 
judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts were 
appointed by him. To assist him in the performance 
of his functions the President appointed a council of 
ministers who were directly responsible to him. Accor­
ding to a provision of the Constitution, if a member of
an Assembly was appointed a Governor or a Minister, he
14-was to cease to remain a member of that Assembly.
12. Constitution of 1962, Articles 13 and 14-.
13. Ibid., Article 17.
14-. Ibid., Article 104-.
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After the first Assembly elections in 1962, President 
Ayub Khan faced difficulties in appointing ministers 
from among the members of the Assembly. The members 
refused to serve as ministers, if thereby they lost 
their seats in the Assembly. The President, therefore, 
promulgated the Removal of Difficulties (Appointment of 
Ministers) Order, 1962,^ by which "Ministers” were 
exempt from the application of Article 104 of the Con­
stitution. The Order was made in purported exercise 
of the President's power under Article 224(3) to remove 
difficulties, which might arise in bringing the Consti­
tution into operation. On a writ preferred by a member 
of the National Assembly, the East Pakistan High Court 
held that the "difficulty" faced by the President in 
appointing ministers was not the kind of difficulty
envisaged by Article 224(3)> and the President's Order
16was, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution. The 
government appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld 
the decision of the court below and observed that the 
President's power to remove difficulties in bringing the
15* President's Order No. 3^ of 1962. P.L.D. 1962 
Central Statutes 647*
16. Muhammad Abdul Hague v. Fazlul Ouader Chowdhury 
P.L.D. 1^63 Dacca b&9.
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Constitution into operation did not extend to "altering
ttie Constitution itself". The important provision
setting up the presidential form of government was a
fundamental feature of the Constitution and any change
in this fundamental structure could not he regarded "as
one in aid of bringing the integral provisions of the
17Constitution into operation". r
Under the Constitution of 1962 the President 
enjoyed enormous legislative powers. Not only did all 
hills passed hy the National Assembly require his 
assent hut he was also a legislature himself, more 
powerful than the National Assembly. The President 
could legislate hy Ordinance when the Assembly was not 
in session. The Ordinance was to he placed before the 
Assembly, which could approve or disapprove of it. If 
within forty-two days after the re-assembly of the legis­
lature or one hundred and eighty days of the promul­
gation of the Ordinance the Assembly approved it, it was 
deemed to be an Act of the legislature. If before the 
end of the above period, the Assembly disapproved it, it 
was repealed forthwith. If the Assembly did nothing or
17* Pazlul Quader Chowdhury v* M* Abdul Haque, P.L.P.
i9 6 3 ~sT<r;"'^s.------------  ---------------
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if the Ordinance was not put to the Assembly, it would
18be deemed repealed at the expiry of the period mentioned. 
The President could issue a Proclamation of Emergency 
under Article 30 of the Constitution, if he was satis­
fied that the security of Pakistan.was threatened by 
war or external aggression, or that the economic life 
of the country was endangered by internal disturbances. 
During the emergency he had power to make Ordinances, 
which remained valid till the proclamation was revoked.
The National Assembly had no power to disapprove of such 
an Ordinance. The President was the sole judge as to 
the necessity for the proclamation and the revocation 
of an emergency, and his satisfaction was not subject to 
the court's s c r u t i n y He had the power to grant pardon, 
reprieves and respites, and to remit, suspend or commute 
any sentence passed by a court, tribunal or any other 
authority. ^
The executive authority of a province was
21vested in the Governor, who was appointed by the
18. Constitution of 1962, Article 29«
19* Abdul Baqi Baluch v. Government of Pakistan. 
P.L.D. 196S, S.C. 313.
20* Constitution of 1962, Article 18.
21. Ibid., Article 80.
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President and performed his functions subject to the
22directions of the President, The Governor, in order
to assist him in the performance of his functions,
appointed ministers with the concurrence of the President; ^
he also appointed parliamentary secretaries from amongst
the members of the Provincial Assembly, The Governor,
like the central ministers, held office during the
pleasure of the President and could be removed by him
24at any time without assigning any cause. Like the
President at the centre, the Governor performed all
executive functions vested in the province. Like the
President, he had power to legislate on provincial sub-
23jects by Ordinance, ^ and all bills passed by the Pro-
Q/"
vincial Assembly required his assent to become law.
The provincial executive was similar to the 
central executive but subject to control and direction 
of the President, It has been observed, "Though the
22, Constitution of 1962, Article 66. 
23* Ibid., Article 82.
24. Ibid., Article 118.
25* Ibid., Article 79*
26. Ibid., Article 77*
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pattern of the central executive is generally followed 
in the provinces, the position of the Governor is very 
different from that of the President, for the provincial 
governments are now subordinate governments, as they 
were before the Government of India Act 1935> came into 
force* The Governor is an assistant of the President 
and their relations are similar to those between central 
Ministers and the President*11 ^
The new Constitution, like the Constitution of 
1956, provided for a central legislature consisting of 
the President and one house, known as the National 
Assembly* The Assembly consisted of one hundred and 
fifty-six members, equally divided between the two pro­
vinces of East Pakistan and West Pakistan* Six seats -
pO
three from each wing - were reserved for women. The
members of the Assembly were elected indirectly by the
members of the electoral college from constituencies
created by grouping the electoral units they represent*
pq
The normal life of the Assembly was five years, J but
27• A. Gledhill, Pakistan, The Development of its Laws 
and Constitution, p* 14-3 *
28* Constitution of 1962, Article 20* The total member­
ship was later increased to 218 by the Constitution 
(Eighth Amendment) Act, 1967*
29* Ibid*, Article 21.
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the President could dissolve it at any time, unless the 
unexpired portion of the term of the Assembly was less 
than one hundred and twenty days or a notice for 
impeachment or removal of the President was under con­
sideration of the Assembly. It was, however, provided 
that if the President dissolved the Assembly, he himself 
ceased to hold office unless re-elected.
The President summoned the Assembly and
prorogued it. He could address or send messages to
the Assembly; his ministers and the Attorney-General
had the right to participate in the proceedings, though
31they were not entitled to vote in the Assembly. A 
bill passed by the Assembly required the assent of the 
President to become law. In the event of the President 
withholding his assent, a majority of two-thirds of the 
total membership could override his veto and the bill 
could be re-presented to the President. In such 
circumstances the President, within ten days, if he still 
disagreed with the Assembly, had to refer the bill to 
the members of the electoral college. If the majority
30. Constitution of 1962, Article 23*
31* Ibid., Article 25•
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of votes cast in the referendum were for the hill, the
32President would he deemed to have assented to the bill.
The referendum to the members of the electoral college,
as provided hy Article 24 of the Constitution, was a
device to resolve any conflict between the President
and the National Assembly.
There were to he at least two sessions of
the Assembly within a year and not more than one hundred
and eighty days should intervene between two sittings..^
34The Assembly was to make its own rules of procedure, and members
and officers of the Assembly were to enjoy the conventional
immunities from judicial proceedings for anything spoken
35or done in the Assembly.^ But novel provisions obliged
the Speaker of the Assembly to arrange for instruction of 
its members about their functions, and to refer any
36breach of rules by any member to the Supreme Court.
If, after enquiry, the court found the member guilty of 
misconduct, he would cease to be a member. Similar 
provisions applied to the provincial assemblies , but the
32. Constitution of 1962, Article 27*
33. Ibid., Article 109.
34. Ibid., Article 110.
55* Ibid., Article 111.
36. Ibid., Articles 112 and 113*
reference would be to the High Court of the relevant
37province. Money bills-'' and bills relating to preventive 
38detention-' were to be introduced in the Assembly only
with the previous consent of the President.
The provision that consent of the President was
necessary for the introduction of a money bill to the
National Assembly was in line with the practice followed
in all Commonwealth countries. But the new Constitution
significantly deprived the legislature of the control
over the finance, which is generally regarded as a
necessary check on the executive and one might regard
such a check as being essentially desirable in the kind
of presidential form of government introduced in Pakistan,
where the President had untrammelled executive power and
effective legislative power. The President was obliged
to cause the annual budget statement to be laid before
the National Assembly. The budget was divided into
“charged” end other expenditure. The other expenditure
was again sub-divided into recurring and non-recurring
expenditures, the “new expenditure” being shown separately
3 Q
among the “other" items. ' The National Assembly was
37* Constitution of 1962, Article 47 •
38. Ibid., Article 26.
39. Ibid., Article 40.
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entitled to discuss the items on 11 charged” expenditure
but could not vote on them.^ It could discuss and
reduce the demand for a grant on other items not shown
as nnew expenditure”, only with the consent of the 
41President, Only in respect of sums shown as ”new
expenditure” did the Assembly have full authority to
42assent, reduce or refuse a demand* But an increase 
of up to ten per cent on the previous yearfs expenditure 
on a project was not regarded as ”new expenditure”*
It would seem that these provisions were 
enacted in the Constitution in order to avoid any possi­
bility of government coming to a standstill by refusal 
of a financial grant by a hostile Assembly. The President 
was made independent, not only in the legislative sphere 
by giving him the Ordinance-making power, but he was
largely independent of the legislature in financial 
43matters* ^ The legislature under the Constitution of
40. Constitution of 1962, Article 41(1).
41. Ibid*, Article 41(4).
42. Ibid., Article 41(5) •
45. It was reported that in June 1962 when the expenditure 
of Rs. 1170 million on the armed forces was brought 
before the Assembly, the Assembly could exercise its 
control only over Rs. 60 million, which represented 
the ”new expenditure”. K.B. Sayeed, ’’Pakistan's 
Constitutional Autocracy”, Pacific Affairs (1963), 
p. 365, 370.
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1962 was a chamber of discussion rather than a chamber 
of decision* It could discuss matters of public impor­
tance when summoned by the President but was powerless 
to do anything, unless the President agreed*
Each province had a provincial legislature 
consisting of the Governor and the Provincial Assembly.
A Provincial Assembly consisted of one house of one
hundred and fifty-five members, five seats being
44-re served for the women members. All provisions con­
cerning the relationship between the President and the 
national Assembly, including the financial procedure 
at the centre, were reproduced with necessary modifi­
cations in relation to the Governor and the Provincial 
Assembly. But, while a conflict between the President 
and the National Assembly had to be resolved by a 
referendum to the electoral college, a conflict between 
the Governor and the Provincial Assembly was settled by 
the National Assembly. And if the National Assembly 
decided in favour of the Governor, he could dissolve the
45Provincial Assembly with the concurrence of the President. y 
Like the National Assembly, the Provincial Assembly was
44-. Constitution of 1962, Article 71*
45* Ibid., Article 74.
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designed to play an insignificant role, while the
Governor exercised enormous executive powers, effective
power of legislation hy Ordinance, and was virtually
independent in financial matters, hut he was under the
direct control and direction of the President*
The Constitution of 1962 retained the structure
of the judiciary as it existed before. At the apex
of the judicial hierarchy was the Supreme Court, and
there was one High Court for each province, which
exercised control and supervision over all other courts
subordinate to it. Appointments of judges to the
Supreme Court and the High Courts were made hy the
President as before, hut their removal was to he effected
4-6on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council.
The Supreme Court retained exclusive original
jurisdiction over any dispute between the central and
4-7provincial governments. ' It had appellate jurisdiction 
over the decisions of the High Courts, if the High 
Court certified that the case involved a substantial 
question of law as to the interpretation of the Consti­
tution, or the High Court had sentenced a person to death
4-6. Constitution of 1962, Article 128.
4-7. Ibid., Article 57*
337
or transportation for life or imposed punishment for
£LQ
contempt of itself. It could also grant special leave 
to appeal from any decision of a High Court. The 
Supreme Court had advisory jurisdiction, under Article 
59» on any question of law referred to it hy the 
President for its opinion. It had no original writ 
jurisdiction as was given hy Article 22 of the Constitution 
of 1956, though it had appellate jurisdiction from the 
decisions of the High Court over such matters. The 
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in civil matters 
was curtailed, in that no appeal lay as of right, 
whatever might have heen the property valuation of the 
suit. The two High Courts retained their previous 
jurisdiction, including the writ jurisdiction, which was 
in substance incorporated in Article 98 of the Consti­
tution without giving the writs their ancient names.
But the important feature in this part of the 
Constitution was that the superior courts were deprived 
of the power of deciding the constitutionality of any 
legislation enacted hy any legislature. y The concept 
that the judiciary was the guardian of the Constitution,
48. Constitution of 1962, Article 58.
4-9* Ibid., Article 153•
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particularly a written constitution with division of 
legislative powers between the centre and the regions, 
did not find a place in the Pakistan Constitution of 
1962. The responsibility of deciding whether a legis­
lature had power under the Constitution to make a law 
lay on the legislature itself. As the Supreme Court 
in 1963 said, obiter, that the interpretation of the
of the Constitution was the prerogative as well as the
50duty of the superior courts, this prerogative was,
presumably, applicable to the question whether a
provincial law inconsistent with a central law was void
51to the extent of inconsistency. The central legis­
lature could make a law on any matter by invoking 
Article 131(2), and the court had no jurisdiction to 
declare such law ultra vires the central legislature.
As has been noted earlier, the preamble to the 
Constitution described it as a "form of federation11 with 
provinces enjoying such autonomy as was consistent with 
the unity and interest of Pakistan as a whole. The 
principles of federalfern which in the case of Pakistan
50. Fazlul Quader Chowdhury v. N. Abdul Hague, supra.
51. Constitution of 1962, Article 134*.
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had been regarded as the wdictates of geography” were 
virtually discarded in the new Constitution. Though 
there were provincial governments and legislatures* 
separate from the central institution^ they were sub­
ordinate to the central authorities. We have already 
seen that the provincial executive, headed by the 
Governor, was completely under the control of the centre. 
The Governor, who was a presidential appointee, had a 
constitutional obligation to comply with the directions 
of the President.
The division of powers between the centre and 
the provinces was effected by setting out a single list
of subjects, on which the centre had exclusive power to
52make laws.^ The list of forty-nine central subjects 
incorporated in the third schedule included all important 
matters of state activity and important heads of revenue, 
guaranteeing adequate finance for the centre. The 
provinces were given power to make laws on any subject 
not enumerated in the exclusive central list.^ But 
the centre was given an overriding power of making law 
on any unenumerated subject, if the national interest
52. Constitution of 1962, Article 131(1) and Third Schedule.
53• Ibid., Article 132.
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required it in relation to the security, including the 
economic or financial stability of Pakistan, planning 
or co-ordination, or for the achievement of uniformity 
in respect of any matter in different parts of Pakistan.^ 
It would, therefore, seem that the centre would be able 
to legislate on any provincial subject under the doctrine 
of "national interest", and the court had no power to 
declare such a central law as void.*^
The centre’s power to legislate in the "national 
interest" was given an expensionist interpretation by 
the courts. When the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) 
Ordinance, 1962, promulgated by the President, was 
impugned as ultra vires the President, as industry was 
a provincial subject, the court pointed out that the 
centre had power to legislate on any subject in the 
"national interest".^ It was held to be in the national 
interest to bring about "uniformity" in the law relating
54. Constitution of 1962, Article 131(2).
55* Ibid., Article 133# After the first Amendment the 
court had power to declare any law or part of it 
as void if the law violated the fundamental rights 
incorporated by the Amendment.
56. Chittagong Mercantile Employees Assoc, v. Chairman, 
Industrial dourt of East Pakistan. P.L.D. 1962
Dacca b^6 .
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to industrial disputes in different parts of Pakistan*
The court held that the distribution of legislative 
powers between the centre and the provinces under 
the Constitution of 1962 rested "on an entirely different 
basis” from that in the Government of India Act, 1955* 
and the Constitution of 1956. While the centre had 
limited legislative powers over the subjects enumerated 
in the third schedule, the provinces had powers to make 
laws on all unenumerated subjects, including subjects 
previously dealt with by the centre.^ But, in the 
"national interest”, the central legislature was competent 
to make laws in all concievable legislative fields, and 
the court would uphold them as valid central laws.
The central legislature could also control 
legislation on purely provincial matters by a provincial 
legislature, for it was the arbiter in a conflict between 
the provincial Governor, who was a central appointee, 
and the Provincial Assembly. The Provincial Assembly 
could be kept subservient to the centre's will by the 
threat of dissolution, which the Governor was empowered 
to do with the concurrence of the President. Further,
57. Manzoor Ahmad v. Commissioner, Lahore Division
P.L.D. 1964 Lahore 19^ *; Azizuddin v. Abdul Ghafoor 
Arain, P.L.D. 1964 Karachi 88.
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when a provincial law was inconsistent with a central
law, the latter would prevail and the former, to the
58extent of inconsistency, would he invalid.
Generally the executive powers of the centre 
and the provinces covered the same field as their 
respective legislative powers. But the Governor, in 
whom the executive power of a province vested, was only 
the agent of the President, who could remove him any 
time without assigning any reason. He was, in the 
performance of his functions, subject to the direction 
of the President. It is, therefore, clear that the 
Constitution of 1962 virtually established a unitary 
form of government, with provinces exercising so much 
executive and legislative power as the centre was 
pleased to allow. It has been aptly observed: HThe
allocation of powers ... indicates that there is no 
effective constitutional limitation on the invasions in 
the provincial legislative sphere by the centre and that, 
in the executive sphere, the Governors and other provincial 
authorities are subject to central direction. These
58. Constitution of Pakistan 1962, Article 154**
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59features would be inadmissible in a federal system.
The Constitution provided that the State 
should be known simply as the Republic of Pakistan and 
the adjective "Islamic1*, which was in the late Consti­
tution, was dropped. But the President was to be a
Muslim, and, according to a principle of law-making, no 
law repugnant to Islam was to be enacted, and state 
policy was to be directed to enabling the Muslims of 
Pakistan to order their lives in accordance with the 
fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam.
An Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology was to be set up 
by the President,^ with members having the understanding 
and appreciation of Islam and of the economic, political, 
legal and administrative problems of Pakistan. Among 
its functions, the Council was to make recommendations 
to the central and provincial governments as to the means 
of enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to 
adopt the Islamic way of life. It was to advise the 
National Assembly, the Provincial Assemblies, the 
President and the Governors, about the repugnancy to
59* A. Gledhill, Pakistan. The Development of its Laws 
and Constitution, p.152.
60. Constitution of 1962, Article 200.
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61Islamic principles of any proposed law. There was
also to be an Islamic Research Institute, established 
by the President to undertake research and instruction 
in Islam for the purpose of assiting the reconstruction 
of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis.
Elections to the office of President and to 
the central and provincial assemblies were to be made 
by the members of the electoral college. Each
province was to be divided into forty thousand terri­
torial units and each unit was to elect, on the basis 
of adult franchise, a person known as the nelector11 for 
that unit. All the "electors" together were to con­
stitute the electoral college of Pakistan. While the 
President was to be elected by all the members of the 
electoral college, for the purpose of elections to 
central and provincial assemblies each province was to 
be grouped into seventy five and one hundred and fifty 
constituencies respectively. Political parties, which 
had been abolished by the proclamation of October 7* 1958 
still remained under the ban and could not be revived 
until permitted by legislation of the central legislature
61. Constitution of 1962, Article 204.
62. Ibid., Articles 165 and 168.
65. Ibid.. Article 175*
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This meant that at least the first election held in 
April-May, 1962 was made on a non-party basis, and any 
person holding himself out as a party-member or having 
the support of any party in that election was to be 
punished.
Defects of the Constitution
Even before the Constitution of 1962 was 
promulgated by President Ayub Khan on 1 March, 1962, 
public opinion in Pakistan became restive, and appre-
OJL
hensions of its probable contents were expressed.
While the President himself and the whole regime were 
organising propaganda against the parliamentary system 
of government and other aspects of the Constitution of 
1956, public leaders, in spite of the strict ban on 
political discussion, were expressing views in favour 
of the old system. As early as I960 Z.H. Lari, then 
President of the Karachi High Court Bar Association, 
listed several provisions essential to "willing accep­
tance" of any constitution, such as (a) fundamental
64. See DfP* Singhal, "The Constitution of Pakistan" 
(1962) 2 Asian Survey 14.
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rights enforceable by the courts, (b) an independent 
judiciary, (c) supremacy of parliament, (d) direct 
elections based on adult franchise, (e) elections to 
all offices and legislatures after the withdrawal of 
martial law, and (f) authority of parliament and 
parliament alone to change the Constitution.^ As has 
already been said those who had earlier been active in 
Pakistan political affairs, when giving their opinions 
to the Constitution Commission, unanimously favoured 
the parliamentary system , as established by the Consti­
tution of 1956* Apprehensions were expressed that 
the presidential system, which was favoured by Ayub 
Khan, was likely to result in a kind of Latin American 
dictatorship, and would not be suitable for a plural 
society like Pakistan's* Their opinions were published 
in the newspapers and aroused strong controversy on 
constitutional issues. The government had to issue a 
warning against "playing politics" when replying to 
the questionnaire issued by the Constitution Commission.
65* See Z.H. Lari, "Address of Welcome to the Minister 
of Law", (I960) 5 Pakistan Bar Journal 56.
66. See E.A. and K.R. Schuler, Public Opinion and 
Constitution Making in Pakistan, p.55*
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The controversy over constitutional issues 
never really died down* Rather, as the date for 
announcement of the new constitution drew nearer, the 
opposition to what was feared to be coming was intensi­
fied. The regime was aware of this development.
A former prime minister, Suhrawardy, was arrested on 
January 30, 1962 on a charge of sedition. Commenting 
on the grounds for the arrest, President Ayub Khan said, 
"Now that the new Constitution was going to be launched,
we want people to be benefited by it and get it to 
67work.11 f Students in Dacca and other cities in East 
Pakistan demonstrated against Suhrawardy*s arrest and 
made such political demands, as lifting martial law and 
establishing representative government under a parlia­
mentary system. Violent demonstrations in support 
of these demands .raged in most towns in the province 
for over a week.^
It was, therefore, not entirely unexpected 
that, as soon as the new Constitution came into effect 
on June 8, 1962, demands for its "democratisation" were 
voiced in all quarters. On June 24, 1962, nine political
67* Dawn, February 1, 1962. 
68. Ibid., February 14, 1962.
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leaders of East Pakistan, including three former Chief 
Ministers, issued a statement calling for the estab­
lishment of a Constituent Assembly composed of elected 
representatives of the people to frame a constitution 
for the country* The statement said that a consti­
tution, to be democratic and to command the loyalty of 
the people, must be framed by the representatives of the 
people* "The present constitution lacks this basic 
strength, viz* the popular consensus enshrined in basic 
laws framed by the people’s representatives*11 It 
pointed out the undesirability of indirect elections, 
which were based on a "distrust of popular will"•
Besides, the assemblies created by the Constitution were 
given practically no power to decide anything without 
the agreement of the President* "Whereas the President, 
after the initial start, can rule without any agreement 
of the Assembly, both in the legislative and executive 
fields. Experience of barely three weeks' working have 
already demonstrated that the present scheme is unworkable, 
unless it is radically remodelled and changed." As the 
leaders were calling for the establishment of a constituent 
assembly, with popular representatives, to frame a 
constitution, they would not comment on the form of the
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constitution. But they maintained that "by far the 
largest volume of opinion is for the parliamentary form.
The reasons are historical. Our long association with 
experiences of the working of this system predisposes 
us to it*
The statement of nine political leaders was 
the first organised reaction to the presidential con­
stitution. By calling for a new constituent assembly, 
they indirectly questioned the right of any individual 
to impose a constitution on the country and demanded 
the replacement of the authoritarian presidential system 
by a liberal parliamentary system. Sardar Bahadur 
Khan, the brother of President Ayub Khan, who became 
the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, 
called the new Constitution "a thoroughly undemocratic" 
instrument, which did not suit the genius of the people.
He said that the presidential system was doomed to 
failure in Pakistan, because of the "unique geographical, 
social and economic conditions of the two wings", and 
reiterated the plea for reverting to the parliamentary
f
system, which would "best meet the requirements of both
70wings by ensuring them due share in political authority".
69* Dawn, June 25, 1962. 
70. Ibid., April 2, 1962.
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Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, a former Prime Minister, described 
the Constitution as "of the President, for the President 
and by the President". He condemned the system estab­
lished by the Constitution as designed to concentrate
71and retain all political powers in one hand.'
There was, therefore, in opposition circles, 
a unanimous demand not merely for the removal of the 
undemocratic features of the Constitution but, for the 
total abolition of the presidential system and its 
replacement by the parliamentary system, with which, it 
was argued, the people and their leaders were familiar.
One of the grounds of attack on the Constitution 
was the absence of justiciable fundamental rights.
Even those who were prepared to give a trial to the 
presidential form of government were disappointed that 
these rights were now dependent on the good will of the 
legislature. "Ho feature of the Constitution was more 
severely attacked or criticised than this particular 
provision. The issue of fundamental rights has created 
a storm of controversy and insistent demands have been 
made on behalf of the people to make these ‘principles
71* Pawn, April 2, 1962
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of law-making1 justiciable and enforceable by the courts ... 
President Ayub Khan in his inaugural address at the 
Pakistan Lawyers1 Convention on September 30, I960, 
said that the fundamental rights must be "preserved and 
protected" unimpaired; this was beyond question. But 
whether the legislature or the court was to be entrusted 
with their protection was for the Constitution Commission 
to recommend; what they would propose he would not 
anticipate. ^ The Constitution Commission on its part 
examined the question thoroughly and accepted the 
opinion of 98.39 per cent, of those who, in answer to 
the questionnaire, had said that the fundamental rights, 
as in the Constitution of 1956, should be incorporated 
in the new Constitution. The Commission observed, "we 
do not think we can follow the example of England in this 
regard because, there, the tradition that has grown, and 
the genius of the people,make it almost certain that the 
Parliament, though it is supreme in the sense that it can 
pass any law, which the English Courts have no power to 
declare as void, would not infringe the fundamental rights, 
except in grave emergency and that, too, only to the extent
72. G.W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, p.264.
75• M. Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Vol. Ill, 
pp. 30-31.
352
strictly necessary."^ But the new Constitution did 
not incorporate the commissions recommendation and 
left the rights at the mercy of the legislature.
The nation-wide feeling about the absence of 
justiciable fundamental rights in the Constitution soon 
took the shape of a concrete political demand from all 
quarters. In every statement and speech concerning 
tbe Constitution, political leaders were obsessed with 
the deprivation of the basic rights of the people.
The Council of the Muslim League at its meeting in Dacca 
on October 28, 1962, passed a resolution to pursue a 
minimum demands programme, which included the restoration 
of justiciable fundamental rights.^ But strangely 
enough Manzur Quadir, an eminent lawyer, who is credited 
with the final drafting of the Constitution, tried to 
defend the position by saying that the charter of the 
fundamental rights was there in the shape of "principles 
of law-making11 and, that there were "definite checks 
and balances" to make sure that they were not violated 
at any stage.^ But the members of the National Assembly,
74-. Report of the Constitution Commission (1961) 
Para. 161, p. 1(51.
75* Dawn, October 29 > 1962.
76. Ibid., March 7» 1962.
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who had been elected under the new Constitution did not 
agree with Manzur Quadir* Mohammed Ali of Bogra, a 
former Prime Minister, who had replaced Manzur Quadir 
as External Affairs Minister, said in the National 
Assembly within three days of its inauguration that 
the 11 omission of fundamental rights1* was one of the 
many "objectionable and obnoxious features** of the new 
Constitution. Mohammad Ali, however, said that, had 
President Ayub Khan been left alone, these features 
would not have been there. They were there "due to 
the e r l l influence of a political upstart [an obvious 
reference to Manzur Quadir] who was the proto-type of 
Russia* s Rasputin. At. a public meeting at Lahore, 
several members of the National Assembly demanded the
restoration of civil liberties by making fundamental<■
rights fully justiciable.^ While there were members 
who wanted the complete abolition of the Constitution 
and a reversion to parliamentary system, there were others 
who wanted to retain the broad structure of the Consti­
tution but to democratise it by incorporating essential
77* Dawn, June 12, 1962. 
78. Ibid., June 26, 1962.
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liberal features, such as justiciable fundamental 
rights.
Along with the demand for the restoration 
of fundamental rights, a demand for the enhancement 
of powers of the judiciary was also pressed, As has 
been said earlier, under the new Constitution, though 
the Supreme Court had been given original jurisdiction 
over disputes between the governments, it was provided 
that the validity of any law could not be questioned 
on the ground that legislature by which it was
no
made had no power to make the law, 7 The concept that 
the judiciary should prevent the different organs of 
the state from exercising their constitutional powers 
beyond the constitutional limitation was discarded in 
the new system. The responsibility of deciding whether 
a legislature has power to make a law was entrusted to 
the legislature itself and the court was denied the 
right to examine the vires of any legislation. Articles 
57 and 56> which gave power to the Supreme Court to 
hear inter-governmental disputes and to grant special 
leave to appeal were said to conflict with Article 133 >
79* Constitution of 1962, Article 133(2)
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which barred the judiciary from questioning any law.
It was asked MHow can the judiciary settle disputes 
between the central and a provincial government, or 
interpret the Constitution, if it has no power to decide
Q A
the legality of enactments passed by any legislature?”
To place the judiciary in its former position with powers 
to examine the legality of any legislation, and to safe­
guard the fundamental rights from encroachment by any 
authorities including legislatures, was, therefore, a 
strong and extremely popular demand.
The system of indirect elections to the office 
of the President and to the National and Provincial 
Assemblies, as provided in the Constitution of 1962, 
attracted probably the most intense criticism in all 
circles. It was interpreted as a deprivation of people1s 
basic right to elect their rulers. President Ayub Ehan 
in his broadcast on March 1, 1962, said that the indirect 
system of election was adopted, because the direct system 
would involve delay in establishing constitutional 
government in the country and was far too expensive.
80* G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in
Pakistan (1969) >™"p7555^
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He implied thayordinary voters were incapable of exer­
cising their franchise in a proper manner, with a 
conscious understanding of national and international 
issues. The President said, "Anyhow the voters will be 
less liable to be exploited and misled in this system
than in direct elections, where they were driven as
81cattle to polling booths."
But criticism of the indirect system of 
election was wide-spread. The nine East Pakistani 
leaders in their joint statement said that "the present 
document [the Constitution of 1962] is framed on a dis­
trust of popular will. Whatever be the justification
?
put forward for that, a body of 80,000 electors have been
provided as the base of the system in a population of
82more than 80 million.'1 Other leaders also joined in
the demand for establishing the "democratic right" and
83"sovereignty of the people". ^ The Council Muslim 
League under Khawaja Nazimuddin included direct elections 
on the basis of adult franchise in their minimum six- 
point political demands for democratisation of the
81. Dawn, March 1, 1962, Constitution Supplement, p. II.
82. Ibid., June 25> 1962.
83. Suhrawardy1s statement, Dawn, September 24, 1962.
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Constitution. The National Democratic Front, which 
combined all the opposition elements under the leader­
ship of Suhrawardy, demanded that the people should be 
given their democratic right to elect their represen­
tatives.^*"
The Constitution Commission, it may be 
pointed out, while recommending a presidential form of 
government, with heavy responsibilities imposed on the 
President, advised his direct election, though on a 
restricted franchise. It also recommended direct
85election to the central and provincial assemblies. x
The indirect system provided by the Constitution was
attacked as a means of perpetuating the existing regime,
and it was said that President Ayub Khan "had no faith
86in the people, the masses who had won Pakistan"♦
An eminent Australian scholar, commenting on the Con­
stitution of 1962, said, "In view of Ayub*s avowed pro­
fessions of democracy, this document, which grants the
84. Dawn, October 5* 1962.
85* Report of the Constitution Commission (1961) 
para. l09> pp* 68-69.
86. Richard Wheeler, "Pakistan, New Constitution, Old 
Issues", (1963) 3 Asian Survey 107*
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President extensive powers on one hand and denies people
the right to elect him or members of parliament in direct
elections, falls much too short of general expectations#
In fact this constitution is based upon the distrust of
the people, the repercussion of which may be far-reaching."
The writer further observed
"By out-lawing general elections based 
on adult franchise, President Ayub 
may well precipitate what had already 
caused so much chaos* Direct 
elections, through public debates 
and ideological conflicts only, clarify 
issues and lead to firm decisions by 
popular choice* In contrast, 
indirect elections, conducted in a much 
smaller body - in this case 500 basic 
democrats electing one member of 
parliament - must admit of personal 
pressures, parochial interests, and 
even bribery.11 87
The indirect system of elections through basic democracies
came to be regarded as symptomatic of the undemocratic
nature of the Constitution, and opposition to it became
almost universal in Pakistan*
It has already been observed, while discussing
the legislatures under the new Constitution, that the
Assemblies - both central and provincial - were chambers
87• D*P* Singhal, "Democracy with Distrust", (1962) 8 
The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
p* 2o6 .
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of discussion rather than of decision. The National 
Assembly was dependent upon the Presidents will even 
for its own sittings, unless there was a requisition by 
at least one-third of the total membership and it was
oo
summoned by the Speaker. Though it was provided that 
there must be two sessions of the Assembly within a year, 
the President, having absolute power of legislating by 
Ordinance, was not likely to be keen on summoning it, 
and when the Assembly was summoned by the President, it 
was he who prorogued it. The Assembly's law-making 
power was subject to Presidential veto, and the President 
in any conflict, could appeal to his electors over the 
head of the legislators or even dissolve the Assembly.
But it was in financial matters that the Assembly's role 
was made most insignificant. Only a very negligible 
portion of the total budget - only the new expenditure 
and new taxation - was subject to its control. The 
rest could be discussed by the Assembly but could not be 
voted. The Assembly had, therefore, little scope for 
influencing the executive's policy.
Explaining the provisions regarding financial
88. Constitution of 1962, Article 22(2).
360
procedure under the Constitution, President Ayub Ehan
in his introductory speech said,
"In order to reduce chances of 
conflict between the Assembly and 
the President and to prevent 
paralysis of the administration 
and to ensure continuance of on­
going schemes, it has been laid 
down that the previously passed 
budget shall not be altered 
without the permission of the 
President, and new taxation shall 
not to levied without the consent 
of the National Assembly. This 
is based on the theory that the 
President is finally responsible 
to the country for administration 
and the members of the National 
Assembly represent the feeling of 
the people who have to pay the 
taxes." 89
But it is obvious that the "feeling of the people" in 
respect of the "previously passed" taxes and expenditure 
had no chance of being expressed in the Assembly.
In view of this position, the demand for the 
extension of Assembly1s powers received enthusiastic 
popular support. The statement of the nine leaders 
mentioned earlier pointed out that the Assembly was 
absolutely powerless vis-a-vis the President and it 
could not do anything unless the President agreed. The
89• President’s Broadcast on March 1, 1962. Dawn, 
March 1, 1962. Constitution Supplement.
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minimum six-point demand of the Council Muslim League
included giving 11 full11 powers to the Assemblies, including
90control of finance. The opposition leaders, when 
talking of a "democratic constitution11, in contrast to 
the Constitution of 1962, were demanding direct elections 
on the basis of adult franchise to Assemblies, which 
should have adequate control over the executives. The 
members of the National Assembly, who had been elected 
under the Constitution, started clamouring for increased 
powers for the Assembly. Even those who supported 
President Ayub Khan's programme refused to accept 
ministerial office, if it meant losing their seats in 
the Assembly. The politicians, who had been elected 
to the National Assembly, attached high importance to 
their status as members of parliament, which they thought 
should be allowed to exercise effective legislative 
powers with substantial control over the executive.
But President Ayub Khan was, apparently, not 
willing to concede so much, though he acceded to their 
demand for retention of their seats in the Assembly; 
this, however, was frustrated by a decision of the Supreme
90. Dawn, October 29* 1962*
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91Court. "The President has often not only dismissed
the doctrine of popular sovereignty as emotional and
unrealistic in the context of developing areas, hut has
also been disdainful towards the idea of the executive
being accountable to the wishes of or demands of the
parliament." Writing in 1968 the same writer recorded
that "the common complaint is that under the present system
the National and Provincial Assemblies have not been taken
into the government’s confidence in either the formu-
92lation or discussion of government policies."^ The 
issue became synonymous with the demand for a parlia­
mentary system of government and proved to be a major 
obstacle in any dialogue between the regime and the 
opposition in the country.
We have already said that the framework of the 
Constitution was designed to provide for a strong centre, 
with provinces enjoying only limited powers at the 
pleasure of the centre. In the legislative sphere,
91. Fazlul Quader Chowdhury v. M. Abdul Hague, supra♦
92. K.B. Sayeed, "Pakistan: New Challenges to the 
Political System" (1968) 8 Asian Survey 97*
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though there was an exclusive list of central subjects 
and the province had power to make law on any unenumerated 
subject, in the name of national interest which was 
stretched to include the security of the country, planning, 
co-ordination and the achievement of uniformity, the 
central legislature could ignore the third schedule and 
legislate on any matter. And in the case of conflict 
between a central law and a provincial lav;, the former 
was to prevail. In a conflict between a provincial 
Assembly and the Governor, it was the central assembly that 
would resolve the conflict; the provincial assembly was 
in every way subservient to the central assembly. In 
the executive sphere the Governor, who wielded the 
provincial executive power, was an appointee of the 
President and, in the performance of his duties, he was 
subject to control and direction of the President. The 
provincial ministers were appointed by the Governor, with 
the concurrence of the President. The ministers* role 
was diminished by a provision in the "Rules of Business" 
that, if there was any disagreement between a minister and 
his departmental secretary, the matter had to be referred 
to the Governor for final ordersI^
93« K.B. Sayeed, "Pakistan's Constitutional Autocracy", 
Pacific Affairs (1963) p.365»
So, by any standard the Pakistan Constitution
of 1962 was not federal* The centre had predominance
in every field and provincial authorities had to act like
local authorities in a unitary system. The question of
regional autonomy was one of the issues which hampered
constitution-making in Pakistan during the period 194-7-1956
Even after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1956,
politicians from East Pakistan protested against the
excessive concentration of power at the centre. During
the period of martial law (1958-1962), when most powers
were exercised by the President, supported by the army
and the civil service, which was mainly recruited in West
Pakistan, public opinion in East Pakistan demanded complete
control over her own affairs. The Constitution Commission
in its report, recognised this feeling in East Pakistan
and advised a greater degree of autonomy for the
provinces. It said prophetically, l!It is our considered
opinion that, if we impose a unitary form, ignoring the
state of feeling in East and West Pakistan, we would be
driving the average Muslim of East Pakistan into the arms
of the extremists and the disruptive elements, which are
94-active in that province.
94-. Heport of the Constitution Commission (1961), Para. 63, 
p . y i ,  '
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The issue proved too difficult to admit of 
any political solution. The question of having a 
greater degree of control over her own economic affairs 
has been a burning issue in East Pakistan since 194-7*
The East Pakistan Awami League leader, Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, put forward his now famous and controversial 
six-point autonomy programme before the All-Party National 
Conference, held with all opposition leaders in February, 
1966, at.'Lahore. But the programme did not find support 
in the Conference. It is the degree of autonomy, 
which has threatened the political unity of the two wings. 
Further, people from the smaller provinces of West Pakistan 
became restive over, what they called "Punjabi domination" 
in the one unit of West Pakistan. They refused to accept 
one unit as a fait accompli and there were agitations for 
the break-up of the West Pakistan Province and the restor­
ation of the pre-unification provincial entities, with 
autonomous powers over their own affairs. The demand 
for autonomy, therefore, became a popular ground for 
attacking the Constitution of 1962.
With the proclamation of "martial law" on 
October 8 , 1958, all political parties i^ ere abolished
95* Dawn, February 12, 1966.
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and politicians were subjected to various restrictions
under the martial law regime. President Ayub Khan waged
a ceaseless campaign against the politicans and political
parties, and envisaged a no-party state. The President,
in his nation-wide broadcast on March 1, 1962, said that
the sad experience of the past had proved the undesirability
of having political parties, which, if allowed to re-
emerge, would not be ’’any different from what they were
before”. He said, "In our case, political party activity
only divides and confuses the people further and lays
them open to exploitation by the unscrupulous and
demagogues. So, I believe that, if we can run our
politics without the party system, we shall have cause to
bless ourselves, though I recognise that like-minded people
in the Assemblies will group themselves together. That
is not serious, but what is dangerous is for these groups
to have tentacles in the country.”-^ The President
97restated his view in his inaugural a d d r e s s t o  the 
National Assembly, where he said, ’’Being only concerned 
with the means, fair or foul, of acquiring power, political
96. Dawn, March 1,1 Constitution Supplement.
97* Dawn, June 9, 1962. Pull text of President’s speech 
at p. 4.
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parties have been our bane in the past*" They were 
responsible for the chaos and instability in the past 
and for these reasons the President said he was 
"personally opposed to the idea of political parties".
The Constitution, by Article 173» put restric­
tions on revival of political parties and empowered the 
central legislature to decide the issue. The Constitution 
Commission, it may be recalled, advised recognition of 
political parties, based on principles, which the
Commission thought were essential for working any form
or
of representative government. The Commission's strong 
plea for allowing political parties to function was 
not incorporated in the Constitution. The ban on the 
parties was criticised as an attempt to prevent public 
opinion being mobilised on important national issues.
It was pointed out that, while the regime had its media 
for propagating its ideas and views through government 
agencies, the people were denied this opportunity in the 
absence of organised political parties.
Not only did the opposition raise its voice 
against the ban on organising political parties, but the
98. Report of the Constitution Commission (1961) 
Para. 121, p.80.
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members of the Assembly who supported President Ayub 
Khan and his programme also demanded the removal of 
this restriction. Shortly after the Constitution came 
into force, the revival of political party activity 
became a popular demand. It was then observed that 
"Ayub's attitude in this respect is very confusing; he 
is prepared to let like-minded people assemble, discuss 
and decide common problems, yet he is not prepared to 
allow them to take the natural next step of self-imposed 
discipline of a party. The President has indeed taken 
his distrust of the party system much too far to give rise 
to genuine hope that he will ever willingly step aside
QQ
and allow its r e j u v e n a t i o n . T h e  President's attitude 
towards party organisation was represented as a means of 
safeguarding his own position by preventing any organised 
opposition.
Attempts to Liberalise the System
By giving a Constitution to the country, 
President Ayub Khan had expected that the people, after
99. D*P* Singhal, ,fdemocracy with Distrust", (1962)
8 The Australian Journal of Politics and History,
p. T0"cr'20T.-------------- ---------------------
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so much political tutelage during the previous three 
and a half years, would accept his system without 
reservation. Efforts were made by Presidential words 
and action "to impress the population that the President 
and through him the armed forces were committed to the 
Constitution and would not permit trifling with it.11'*- 
But, as has been said above, almost simultaneously with 
the launching of the Constitution came demands for a new 
constitution or at least modifications of the existing 
one. Though everything possible had been done to malign 
the politicians and political party activity during the 
previous forty-four months, including the promulgation 
of such statutes as the Political Organisations (Prohi-
p
bition of Unregulated Activities) Ordinance, 1962, which
forbade all political activities till permitted by Act
of the central legislature , the elections to the Assemblies
in April-May, 1962, showed that the politicians retained
their prestige and influence.
"The electors demonstrated no aversion 
for the politicians of past regimes.
Although political parties had been 
prohibited, the vast majority of
1. K. Von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, 
pp. 208-09.
2. Ordinance XVIII of 1962, P.L.D. 1962 Central Statutes 
228.
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successful candidates had a clear 
record of political affiliation.
Most impressive was the performance 
of the Muslim League. In East 
Pakistan, for example, where the 
party had heen practically wiped 
out in 1954*, no less than 4*3 out 
of 76 National Assembly members 
from the province had been actively 
associated with the League in the 
past." 3
The members of the National Assembly, immediately 
after their election, started organising themselves into 
"like-minded groups" as President Ayub Khan had antici­
pated. But contrary to Ayub Khan's expectations, 
different groups demanded in chorus "democratisation" of 
the Constitution. They were, however, divided amongst 
themselves as to the degree of democratisation. On the 
one hand there were those who wanted the annulment of the 
new Constitution and the establishment of a parliamentary 
form of government; on the other hand there was a section 
of the Muslim Leaguers, which wanted to liberalise the new 
system by removing such undemocratic features as the sus­
pension of the justiciable fundamental rights, the ban 
on political parties, and the system of indirect elections. 
This section "expressed their willingness to support the 
President in exchange of his acceptance of 'liberalization-
3. K. Von.Vorys, op.cit., p.238.
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IL
of-the Constitution* proposal**.
President Ayub Khan, in the face of the 
mounting opposition to his system both inside and out­
side the Assembly, agreed to a liberalization programme* 
This, it was thought, would isolate the group, which 
wanted the whole-sale scrapping of the Constitution and 
take the offensive out of the hands of the opposition 
outside the Assembly* It would also rally the support 
of a strong group inside the Assembly and their followers 
outside, for the President*s system*
The first step in the **liberalization** pro­
gramme was the enactment of the Political Parties Act, 
1962^ which was passed by the National Assembly at its 
first session. The Act defined a political party as a 
group of persons operating for the puxpose of propagating 
political opinions or indulging in any other political 
activity. While a political party could be formed to 
function under prescribed conditions, no party could be 
formed with the object or acting in a manner prejudicial 
to the Islamic Ideology, the integrity or the security 
of Pakistan. Nor could any party be formed at the
4. K.P. Misra, et al*, Pakistan*s Search for Constitutional 
Consensus (1967)*p.37* !
5. Act III of 1962, P.L.D. 1962 Central Statutes 698.
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instance of, or with financial aid from, any government 
of or party in a foreign country. The central govern­
ment could refer to the Supreme Court the question whether 
a political party came within the mischief of the Act.
If the Supreme Court found against the party, it would 
automatically stand dissolved and its funds and property 
would be forfeited to the central government. Certain 
classes of persons, including those disqualified under the 
Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, 1959* were 
debarred from joining any political party, either as 
members or office-bearers. Any such person associating 
with any political party was liable to suffer imprison­
ment up to two years, or fine or both.
After the enactment of this statute, the old 
political parties were revived one after another. The 
All-Pakistan Muslim Leaguers1 Convention, held in Karachi 
on September 4, 1962, decided to revive the Muslim League 
and adopted a three-point scheme for the party reorgani- 
sation. The initiative in reviving the party was 
taken by the ministers and the party, which later came to
6. Dawn, September 5» 1962.
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be known as the Convention Muslim League, gave full 
support to the presidential constitution. President 
Ayub Khan joined the party in May, 1963» and became its 
president in the following December. The next step 
was the revival of the "council" Muslim League, which, at 
its Dacca Conference in October, 1962, adopted a six- 
point demand for liberalization of the Constitution.
Other parties followed suit. But, with the exception 
of the Convention Muslim League, all other parties joined 
forces with Suhrawardy's National Democratic Front.
The Front was described, to avert action under the 
Political Parties Act, as a "movement" and not a party, 
which was working for the democratisation of the political 
system and the realisation of fuller democracy in the
7
country. r
The next important step in "democratisation" 
of the Constitution came when in March, 1963> a bill was 
introduced by the government in the National Assembly 
which would, in effect, convert the original "principles 
of law-making" into justiciable fundamental rights. The 
bill was the first amendment to the Constitution proposed.
7* See Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics in 
Pakistan (1963)* p. 2b4.
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While its object was to make the enumerated rights 
enforceable by the courts all regulations and lax^ s promul­
gated during the martial law period were to be protected 
from avoidance for repugnancy to those rights. There 
were hundreds of such regulations and laws. The Oppo­
sition in the National Assembly was not willing to 
support a constitutional amendment which would protect 
the numerous undemocratic measures promulgated in the 
past. The clause purporting to protect such measures, 
therefore, provoked a storm of controversy and the govern­
ment was unable to muster the two-thirds majority necessary 
for amending the Constitution. After much controversy, 
the government agreed to reduce the number of protected 
statutes to thirty-one, and, with the support of a splinter 
opposition group, the Constitution (First Amendment) Act,
o
1963 was passed in December, 1963*
The first amendment also added the adjective 
"Islamic” to the title of the Republic, making it similar 
to that in the Constitution of 1956. For the original 
chapter on "Principles of Law-Making and of Policy” was 
substituted one entitled "Fundamental Rights and Principles
8. Act I of 1964, P.L.D. 1964 Central Statutes 33.
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of Policy”. The rights enumerated in the chapter 
included the right to life and liberty, safeguards 
against unlawful arrest and detention, freedom of move­
ment, freedom of assembly, association and vocation, 
freedom of speech, of religion and right to acquire, 
hold and dispose of property. One right declared all 
citizens equal before law and guaranteed equal protection 
of the law* Safeguards against discrimination in the 
public services on the grounds of race, religion, caste, 
sex, residence or place of birth were provided, and every 
section of citizens had the right to preserve its own 
culture, script and language. These rights were generally 
to be enjoyed subject to reasonable restrictions imposed 
by law on such grounds as national security, public order 
and morality.
It was provided that laws, customs and usages,
having the force of law, inconsistent with the enumerated
fundamental rights, would, to the extent of inconsistency,
be void, and that the State should not make any law which
would take away or abridge any of the rights. Laws made
in contravention of this provision would, to the extent
q
of the repugnancy, be void. Laws relating to the Defence
9. Constitution of 1962, Article 6(1) and 6 (2).
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Services and other forces with the responsibility for 
maintaining public order, and laws specified in the 
Fourth Schedule, were exempted from the operation of the 
above provision.^ The Fourth Schedule listed thirty- 
one statutes, which included the Public Offices (Disquali­
fication) Order, 19591 the Basic Democracies Order, 1959i 
the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, the Political Parties Act, 
1962, and the West Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 
1965* It is significant that the statutes which had 
aroused public controversy during the martial law period 
were all protected.
To enforce the fundamental rights the High 
Court was given power to make, on application from an 
aggrieved party, any appropriate order or direction to 
any person or authority, including any government, 
exercising any power or performing any function within the 
territorial jurisdiction of that court Article 155
of the Constitution, which forbade courts to question 
the constitutionality of any law passed by any legis­
lature was amended so as to give the High Court power to
10. Constitution of 1962, Article 6 (5).*
11. Ibid., Article 98(2)(c).
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determine the validity of any law, when enforcing a 
fundamental right* It is to be noted that, differing 
from its position under the Constitution of 1956, the 
Supreme Court was not given original jurisdiction to 
enforce the rights* As in the previous Constitution, 
the President was empowered to suspend, during a Procla­
mation of Emergency under Article 30 of the Constitution, 
the right to move a High Court for enforcement of any right 
specified, and proceedings pending in court for the
12enforcement of such rights could also be suspended*
The President declared an emergency on 6 September, 1965> 
at the commencement of the war with India, and the operation 
of certain fundamental rights was suspended by a presi­
dential order. Article 30 was further amended in 
November, 1965 to enable the State to make, during the 
continuance of emergency, any law or take any executive 
action derogatory to the rights of freedom of movement, 
assembly, association, vocation, speech and the right to 
property* Any law made or action taken in pursuance
of this provision was to remain valid till the revocation
13of the proclamation* ^ The power of the President under
12. Constitution of 1962, Article 30(9)*
13* The Constitution (Pifth Amendment) Act, 1965» 
Act No. XVII of 1965.
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Article 30 to proclaim an emergency could "be exercised 
when there was a threat to the security and economic life 
of the country, but such wide and vague terms imposed 
very little restraint on the President, whose action could 
not, in any case, be called in question in the court*
As the period of validity of the proclamation was 
unnecessarily prolonged the rights incorporated in the 
Constitution proved to be of little value. The operation 
of the rights was suspended in September, 1965 and was 
not restored till February, 1969» when, due to violent 
demonstrations, the proclamation of emergency had to be 
revokedJ
To examine the system of elections the President
appointed the Franchise Commission in August, 1962, with
Akhter Hussain, the Chief Election Commissioner, as its
chairman* The five-member commission completed its work
in six months and submitted its report in February, 1963*
The majority report recommended that "universal adult
franchise should be the basis of elections for the President
14and members of the National and Provincial Assemblies ...M 
It argued that to obviate the danger of illiterate voters 
being misled by unscrupulous party propaganda, the proper
14. Report of the Franchise Commission (1963)* para. 10.
379
remedy was a stringent law against such exploitation
and not "in depriving a substantial section of the
country's adult population of their rights to vote on
the ground of illiteracy"• The majority made the point
that the President with his "wide powers and tremendous
responsibilities" under the Constitution could inspire
and command the confidence of the people only if he was
15elected by popular vote in a direct election* ^ But, 
as a gesture of compromise towards the regime, the com­
mission recommended that the next presidential election
16
should be held indirectly, through an electoral college,
but the number of electors should be 120,000 instead of
17eighty thousand* r
The minority, including the chairman himself, 
recommended the retention of the indirect system of 
election, as provided by the Constitution. The report 
was, however, not presented to the National Assembly 
until August, 1965* The Opposition strongly criticised 
the delay, which reflected the government's dilatory 
attitude on the issue, and demanded the enactment of the
15* Report of the Franchise Commission (1963)> para* 11. 
16. Ibid., para. 15*
17• Ibid., para. 17.
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the necessary statute, incorporating the commission's 
recommendations. But the recommendations of the majority 
came as a’ surprise to the government, and the President 
and his advisors were not prepared to change the system 
of election. So, on the plea that the commission's 
recommendations were not unanimous, the report was 
referred to a Special Committee set up by the Ministry of 
Law which was required to examine and analyse the recom­
mendations. The Special Committee held that universal 
adult franchise had been conferred on the people by the 
Constitution, but in view of the conditions prevailing in 
the country, that right should be exercised on an indirect 
basis. It, therefore, recommended the retention of 
indirect election of the President and the Assemblies by
an electoral college which "should be sufficiently broad- 
18based’1. On the basis of this recommendation, the 
Electoral College Act, 1964, was passed, providing for 
an electoral college consisting of eighty thousand members 
for the purpose of electing the President and the members 
of the Assemblies. The number of electors was increased
18* Report of the Franchise Commission 1963 - An Analysis 
(1964), para. $4.
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1 9to one hundred and twenty thousand only after the 
presidential election of 1965, "being part of the second 
instalment of ”liberalizing" measures in the latter half 
of the decade.
Despite the consistent demand for enhancement
of the powers of the Assemblies, the attitude of the
regime seemed unrelenting though the government had a
clear majority in the Assemblies after the 1962 election
and an overwhelming majority after 1965, the President
was unwilling to give in to this demand. Even members
of his own party were not satisfied with the position of
the Assemblies, which, vis-a-vis the executives were
insignificant. It did not take long for members to
realise the actual position and become conscious of the
impotence of the Assembly. It was reported that, during
a general discussion on the budget for the year 1963, the
National Assembly had to be adjourned for want of a 
20quorum.
After the elections of 1965 government circles 
seemed in favour of increasing the power of the Assemblies.
19* The Electoral College (Second Amendment) Act, 1967 
Act No. XVII of 1967, P.L.R. 1968 Statutes 3.
20. E.B. Sayeed, "Pakistan1s Constitutional Autocracy”, 
Pacific Affairs (1963), p*365.
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The first minor concession came when the Constitution
21(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1966, was enacted, giving 
powers to the Assemblies to make, when necessary, amend­
ments to the Ordinances by the President or a Governor.
The amended Ordinance, however, was subject to the assent,
as the case might be, of the President or the Governor.
22By the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1967, the 
number of members of the Assemblies was increased to two 
hundred and eighteen. It was also reported that President 
Ayub Khan was willing to give more power, including 
financial power, to the Assemblies, if the leaders of the 
opposition groups would make an agreed recommendation to 
that e f f e c t T a l k  of more powers for the Assemblies 
was finding favour with the members of the government 
during 1967-68. But the nation-wide movement against the 
system as a whole led to the abrogation of the Constitution 
itself in March, 1969*
Failure of the Constitution of 1962.
The Constitution given to the country by Field- 
Marshal M. Ayub Khan was said to provide for a presidential
21. Act No. XXVI of 1966, P.L.D. 1967 Central Statute 65.
22. Act No. XVIII of 1967.
2^. a.17. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan 
(1969), p. 206.
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form of government. But except for a vague structural 
similarity with other presidential constitutions of the 
world, such as that of the United States of America or 
de Gaulle*s fifth republic, the new Constitution was a 
unique combination of a variety of political institutions, 
designed to concentrate all effective powers in the 
President, who was the key-figure in the whole political 
set-up and ruled the country without any real check from 
any quarter whatsoever. It was observed, ”The Consti­
tution has been styled as prescribing a presidential form 
of government in Pakistan, but it would be misleading to 
liken it to the American system.” There was very little 
substantial resemblance between the two, and Ayub Khan 
wielded more power than the American President. ”Not
even de Gaulle, the French President under the fifth
24-republic, can match Ayub's authority.11
As the chief executive of the State, the 
President, Tinder the Constitution of 1962, had unlimited 
executive powers, which were not subject to any control 
by the legislature. Not only was his power unlimited 
in the central executive field, but a provincial governor
24*. P.P. Singhal, ’’Democracy with Distrust” (1962) 8
The Australian Journal of Politics and History, p.200, 
at pp. £11-12.
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who exercised provincial executive powers, was the 
President's nominee and was bound to comply with, the 
directions of the President.^ The President's legis­
lative powers to make Ordinances was also enormous.
This power could he exercised independently of the legis­
lature. Though, when in session the Assembly could 
disapprove of an Ordinance, there was nothing to prevent 
the President from re-promulgating the same Ordinance.
The law-making power of the Assembly was subject to the 
President's veto and, in extreme circumstances, he could 
dissolve the Assembly without consulting anybody. The 
President was independent of the legislature in financial 
matters. The National Assembly had limited powers to 
alter items in the annual budget of "new expenditure" 
or "new taxation", but these items constituted only a 
small part of the whole budget, the bulk of which related 
either to the "charged" or "recurring" items which were 
outside the control of the Assembly. The impotence of 
the Assembly in financial matters really made the 
President all-powerful.
25* Constitution of 1962, Article 66
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The President had emergency powers without 
parallel in any other constitutional framework* He was 
the sole judge of when to proclaim an emergency and when
or
to revoke it. During such an emergency the President 
could exercise absolute executive and legislative powers, 
and the National Assembly had no power to disapprove of 
presidential Ordinances while the proclamation remained 
in force. He could, by order, suspend the right to 
move a High Court for enforcement of fundamental right 
specified in the Order, and stay all pending proceedings 
for enforcement of these rights. In such circumstances 
all other institutions became subservient to the President1 
will. Even the judiciary would lose its vital juris­
diction of enforcing the fundamental rights.
The wide authority given to the President under 
the Constitution made him a dictator. Such extensive 
power, it was observed, would not have been conceded to 
by Ayub Khan himself to any one else.^ Furthermore, 
the Constitution strongly entrenched the position of the 
President. It was unlikely that a President elected 
under the Constitution would ever have been removed or
26. Constitution of 1962, Article 30.
27* D.P. Singhal, "The New Constitution of Pakistan" 
(1962) 2 Asian Survey 14.
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successfully impeached. Not only was a three-fourths 
majority of the National Assembly required for success 
of any such resolution, hut the penal provision that if, 
in the voting, at least one half of the members did not 
vote for the resolution the members who initiated the
p o
move would lose their seats, made the Presidents 
position almost unchallengable. It has been remarked 
that the Constitution attached more importance to securing 
the President in office than to preserving the constitution 
itself. MPor amending the Constitution only a two-thirds 
majority is required, whereas to impeach the President a 
three-fourths majority is essential. This obviously
2Q
makes the President more important than the Constitution.” y 
The unusual concentration of power in the hands 
of the President led the critics of the Constitution to 
express doubts as to whether President Ayub Elian had 
really intended to transfer any power which he had been 
exercising since the imposition of martial law in October, 
195S® It has been said that "because of the fear of 
growing resentment in the army against his personal rule,
28. Constitution of 1962, Article 13(7) an& Article 14(9)*
29. Biswanath Singh, "Theory and Practice of Controlled 
Democracy in Pakistan1*, The Modem Beview (1963)*
P. 375, 379.
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Ayub has devised a constitution which gives him civilian
support to sustain him against army rebels, without
requiring him to surrender even a part of his authority
30to civil control in r e t u r n , P r o f e s s o r  K.J. Newman,
a keen observer of constitutional development in Pakistan,
said, "The document bears all the hallmarks of a
constitution devised by the Executive, to be imposed
31through the Executive, and for the Executive."^ Com­
menting on the motive behind the system he said, "What 
emerges ••, is the fact that the constitution has been 
drafted in such a way as to perpetuate the present regime,
and to eliminate the competition of political parties for
32a long time to come."*' With all power concentrated in 
his hand, the President under the Constitution of 1962 
was described as a "constitutional dictator" with the 
added advantage that he exercised absolute powers on the 
authority of a written constitution.
The next important feature which had far-reaching
30. D.P* Singhal, "Democracy with Distrust", op.cit.
31 • K.J. Newman, "The Constitutional Evolution in Pakistan", 
International Affairs (1962), Vol. 38, p# 353*
32. K.J. Nev/man, "Democracy under Control", The Times 
(London), March 16, 1962, p.13*
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consequences was the unitary form of the Constitution.
The preamble to the Constitution declared that "Pakistan
should be a form of federation" and it was generally
assumed that a federal form of government for Pakistan
was a "dictate of geography", but in the body of the
Constitution there was nothing which could be related to
the federal principle. Not only was the provincial
executive headed by the Governor, an agent of the central
government, but, in the Legislative sphere also, the
provinces were subordinate to the centre. While the
provincial legislative field was wide, the centre could
at any time invade the provincial field in the "national
interest". It has been observed,
"... in any case the central power 
of legislation is exclusive on the 
matters enumerated in the third 
schedule and the impediments to its 
intrusion into the provincial field 
are not insuperable. In case of 
conflict, the central law prevails.
The provincial legislative power 
subsists at the pleasure of the 
central legislature; the federal 
principle does not receive even 
lip-service." 33
The provincial institutions under the Constitution were
in the position of local authorities under a unitary
33* A. Gledhill, Pakistan, The Development of its Laws 
and Constitution (19£>7)» P« 131*
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constitution.
These features of the Constitution - the concen­
tration of all powers in one hand and the unitary nature 
of the political set-up - provoked severe opposition from 
all quarters. In East Pakistan and in the former 
provinces of Sind and North-West Frontier, the demand 
for full regional autonomy was particularly strong. In 
East Pakistan it was alleged that, in spite of a consti­
tutional provision to ensure that disparities between
34-provinces were removed, in practice nothing substantial 
was done towards that end. It was argued that, unless 
the provinces were given control over their economic 
matters, East Pakistan would continue to suffer at the 
hands of the West Pakistan dominated central government. 
This sense of suffering and deprivation of political 
power led to the formulation of the six-point autonomy 
programme of the East Pakistan Awami League, the contro­
versy over which had raised the question of the very 
existence of a united Pakistan in March-April, 1971*
It is difficult to say with certainty where the crisis 
of 1971 will end. But it seems clear that, whatever the
34-. Constitution of 1962, Article 14-5(4-).
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outward appearance of Pakistan may be after this crisis, 
it will never be the same nation as existed before the 
crisis. Centralisation of power has been the root 
cause of dissatisfaction in East Pakistan. The Consti­
tution of 19^2 , without trying to remove the cause, 
further entrenched it in the political system.
The Constitution of 1962 has been described as 
a document which did not put any trust or confidence in 
any person or institution except the President.
"Distrust in the keynote of this 
document, distrust of the people, 
of politicians, of parties, of 
direct elections, of a vice- 
president and of the parlia­
mentary system."
The writer then observed
"Actually the complexities of 
democracy have been far too much 
overrated; it is about time that 
the myth of democracy as being 
the creed of the educated or of 
advanced societies was exploded.
The theme of people's incompetence 
to work democratic institutions 
has been overplayed already, con­
tinuation of which would either 
plunge the nation into a general 
revolt or reduce them to a state 
of permanent submissiveness, 
habitual acquiescence to authority 
and political apathy." 35
35. D.P. Singhal, "Democracy with Distrust", op.cit.
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Despite the eight amendments enacted by December, 1967, 
the character of the Constitution was not changed*
The reluctance of the regime to concede powers to 
constitutional institutions in the face of strong demands 
led to the general revolt of the people in the latter 
part of 1968* The result was the abrogation of the 
Constitution, and the imposition of martial law for 
the second time in just over ten years.
The abrogation of the Constitution of 1956, 
resulting in martial law rule for over four years and 
then imposition of the authoritarian Constitution of 
1962, which concentrated all political powers in one 
hand, did more than anything else to alienate the people 
of East Pakistan against the West Pakistan ruling coterie. 
Ever since October, 1956, East Pakistan virtually had no 
share in political authority; this helped to develop a 
growing sense of deprivation and lack of participation . 
in the government of the country, leading to an utter 
sense of frustration among the people of the Province.
It is unlikely that this would have occurred under a 
parliamentary system. Whatever may be the defects of 
that system it definitely provides a forum, where popular 
leaders representing different regions can meet and 
attempt to reach agreement on different issues. This
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is what has heen conspicuously absent in Pakistan since 
1958. If the parliamentary system had been allowed to 
continue, the popular representatives from East Pakistan 
would at least have had the opportunity of discussing 
their problems at the highest level with the Cabinet and 
their parliamentary counterparts in West Pakistan* 
Dialogue at the policy-making level was the only means 
which could have led to understanding between the 
leaders of the two wings* This became impossible 
under Ayub Khan's regime, the mainstay of which was the 
West Pakistan army and the West Pakistan dominated civil 
service•
Twelve years (1958 - 1970) of deprivation of 
political power and alleged economic exploitation led the 
people of East Pakistan absolutely to distrust their 
rulers, so the demand for provincial autonomy became 
inevitable. During these years, due to the political 
system, true representatives of the people of both wings 
had no opportunity to sort things out. The political 
leaders were too busy with the movement for "democrati- 
sation” of the Constitution of 1962 to direct their 
attention to the real issues. The present crisis (since 
March, 1971)» therefore, can be traced back to 1958 when,
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without resorting to constitutional means to overcome 
current difficulties, President Iskander Mirza, for his 
own selfish ends, with the help and support of his 
friends in the armed forces overthrew the Constitution.
Chapter X
The Political Movement Against the Constitution of 1962
Origin of the movement
It has heen seen in the last chapter that, as soon 
as the Constitution of 1962 was implemented, all opposition 
elements in the country demanded its modification on liberal 
and democratic lines. Even the group of politicians, who 
had pledged their support to the presidential system, wanted 
a democratization" of the Constitution. In order to isolate 
those who wanted to abolish the presidential system and sub­
stitute a parliamentary form of government, President Ayub 
Khan agreed to meet the demands of those who gave general 
support to his regime. But the President and his advisors 
were not prepared to go far enough to meet the general 
aspirations of the people. Up to the time when the Con-
t
stitution was abrogated in March, 1969, the two main demands, 
viz., direct elections on the basis of adult franchise, and 
more powers for the legislatures, were not met, though these 
even had the support of a section of the President's own 
party.1
1. The West Pakistan Finance Minister said in July, 1965 
that the "consensus of opinion" among his party-men was 
that the next elections for Assemblies should be on adult 
franchise basis. Pawn, July 8, 1965; also for the 
Central Law Minister1 s view see S.M. Zafar, "Through 
the Crisis (Lahore 1970), pp. 8-20.
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Public opinion in opposition to the Constitution 
of 1962 first found its organised expression in the joint 
statement by nine East Pakistan leaders who pleaded for the
convening of a constituent assembly, composed of represen-
2
tatives of the people, to frame a constitution* A former 
Prime Minister, Suhrawardy, who had been arrested in 
January, 1962, on his release in August, joined other oppo­
sition politicans and endeavoured to form an alliance of 
those who were opposed to AyuVs political system* He 
defined his policy by saying
”The problems at present before the country are 
very specific and quite different from the problems 
that confronted political parties before the advent 
of Martial Law* If we want this country to pro­
gress and be stable and united, it is necessary to 
re-construct democratic institutions and restore 
democratic values, and all those interested in 
doing so should get together to achieve this * 
objective* This is not a struggle for power*,t:>
Suhrawardy^ efforts led to the formation of the 
National Democratic Pront (NDF) - a loose alliance of the
tL
entire opposition forces from both East and Vest Pakistan*
2* See Chapter IX, supra*
3* Dawn, August 24, 1962*
4* The National Democratic Front was supported by the
"Council0 Muslim League (a splinter Muslim League faction 
organised in opposition to the official Convention”
Muslim League which gave support to the regime), the 
former Awami League, the National Awami Party, the Krishak 
Sramik Party, the Nizam-i-Islam party, the Jamaat-i-Islami, 
and the Republican Party*
i*
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The Front was launched in October, 1962, to secure wa demo­
cratic constitution in which the will of the people would 
be paramount*1 • The leaders of the National Democratic 
Front emphasised that the Front was not a political party 
struggling for power, it was a ’‘movement*1 for achieving demo­
cratic rights of the people* Nurul Amin, one of its 
prominent leaders, declared at a public meeting that the 
leaders of the National Democratic Front were prepared to 
give a written undertaking that they would not seek political 
offices, if the present regime would only acknowledge the 
sovereignty of the people and allow them to frame a con­
stitution of their own choice and thereby establish full 
democracy in Pakistan*^
The N*D*F* leader, Suhrawardy, when launching the 
movement, stressed the need for mutual consultation between 
the government and the Opposition, in order to reach an 
understanding for bringing about a democratic political 
system* He appealed to the President personally to give 
thought to the matter, and suggested a round table conference 
to discuss possible amendments to the Constitution* But 
Ayub Khan rejected the proposal for a dialogue with the 
’’so-called leaders” • In a letter to the editor of a Karachi 
magazine, ’’Mirror**, which, in an editorial supported the
5« Dawn, October 20, 1962.
6* Ibid*, October 5* 1962*
397
proposal for a round table conference, the President said
that the Constitution that had been promulgated was "based
on the democratic principle of representative institutions
and periodic accountability of elected representatives, and
there are specific provisions for making changes"• It was
the Constitution which "suits our condition best" but
"wholesome changes, when required, should be made 
through the Assembly in a lawful manner ... So, 
to say that I should hold a •round-table con­
ference1 with so-called leaders and agree to 
bypass the Assembly would be tantamount to defying 
the Constitution and entering into a conspiracy.
This is the last thing that I would do."
With obvious reference to the demand for a return to the
parliamentary system the President said "the so-called
leaders ... want a system of •democracy1 in which complete
lawlessness prevails, as in the past, so that they have
licence to indulge in the activities habitual to them,
n
activities that brought notoriety and chaos in the country."'
President Ayub Khan reiterated his views on a 
conference with the opposition in his broadcast to the 
nation on October 27, 1962. He said that, though it was 
he who had given the Constitution, he could not now amend it 
as he liked. He advised "the leaders of the people" to 
persuade the members of the Assembly to adopt concrete 
proposals for amending the Constitution by the required
7. Text of the Presidents letter, 
Dawn, October 11, 1962, p.9*
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majority* It was only then that he would come into the
picture* He said
"When a Bill so passed is placed before me for 
assent, it is my duty, in view of the oath I took 
as President, to consider to what extent the will 
of the majority reflects the will of the people, 
and what would be its effects on the nation, if 
it became law* It is obvious that, in judging 
the will of the people and the national interests,
I cannot be influenced by the public utterances 
of individuals, however vocal or important they 
may be •**H 8
There seemed, therefore, no possibility, at least 
in the immediate future, of any understanding between the 
government and the opposition on constitutional issues*
In the meantime, however, the programme for liberalising the 
system, to the limited extent acceptable to the regime, had 
been implemented by enacting the Political Parties Act,
1962, and later incorporating the justiciable fundamental 
rights into the Constitution* The President refused to 
go any further* The National Democratic Front, under the 
leadership of Suhrawardy, and individual political parties, 
which had been revived after the enactment of the Political 
Parties Act, continued the campaign for the direct elections 
on the basis of adult franchise, more power for the Assemblies 
and powers for the courts to put an effective check on the 
powers of the executive* The Front leader, Suhrawardy,
8* Text of the Presidents address, 
Dawn, October 27» 1962, p* 11*
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claimed that it was wrong to suggest that democracy had 
failed in Pakistan* He said that democracy had never been 
tried in Pakistan since its inception and the Constitution 
of 1956 had never been given a chance of "democratic 
implementation"
The "Council" Muslim League,*^ on its revival in 
October, 1962, under the Presidency of Khawaja Nazimuddin, 
a former Governor-General and Prime Minister, in its six- 
point political programme, demanded, among other things, 
effective provisions for the full realisation of Islamic 
ideology and the abolition of restrictions on membership 
and democratic functioning of the political parties* The 
party called for a united effort to achieve its objectives 
and pledged its full support for the National Democratic 
Front.'*** The opposition leaders made extensive tours of 
the two provinces and a convention of the Front leaders was 
scheduled to be held in Karachi in January, 1965* Apart
9* Dawn, October 18, 1962.
10. After the Political Parties Act, 1962, allowed party 
activity, the old Muslim League was revived, but in two 
factions. The one, popularly known as the Convention 
Muslim League, so-called because it owed its origin to
a convention of workers held in Karachi in September, 1962 
and was later joined by the President himself, gave 
support to the Ayub regime. The other, known as the 
Council Muslim League deriving its name from the meeting 
of the old council of the party which decided the revival 
of the party, joined other forces opposed to the regime, 
and itself became a prominent opposition party.
11. Dawn, October 29* 1962.
from the popular movement led by the N.D.F. and other
opposition parties, members of the different opposition
groups inside the National Assembly formed themselves into
a loose alliance for "democratisation" of the Constitution.
Sardar Bahadur Khan, brother of President Ayub Khan, became 
12its leader. So, the attack on the Constitution came from
all directions, and the President appeared to have been left 
with the support of the office-aspiring politicians, the 
civil service and the armed forces only. This was the 
pattern of politics in 1962, when the Constitution came into 
force and it remained substantially the same for so long 
as it survived. In spite of the elections under the Con­
stitution in 1965, which were fought by the Opposition with 
the clear objective of abolishing the existing political 
system, the Constitution of 1962 never took root or achieved 
general acceptance by the people.
In view of the President's rejection of the plan 
to seek an understanding with the opposition on constitutional 
issues, and the letter's determination to continue the move­
ment against tftie Constitution, the regime resorted to measures 
to stifle the opposition. On January 7, 1965, two presi­
dential Ordinances were promulgated. One of them, the 
Political Parties (Amendment) Ordinance, 1963,*^ defined a
12. Dawn, October 28, 1962.
13« Ordinance I of 1963, P*L.D. 1963 Central Statutes 11.
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"political party" so as to include any group or combination 
of persons, who were operating for the purpose of propa­
gating any political opinion or indulging in any political 
activity, and provided that no person, who was disqualified 
under any law, should associate himself with any political 
party# The Ordinance also provided that, if, in the 
opinion of the central government, a disqualified person 
was indulging or likely to indulge in any political activity, 
it could, by Order, restrain him for up to six months from 
addressing any meeting or press conference or issuing any 
statement of a political nature to the press# The res­
triction could be further extended for another period of 
six months# Contravention of these provisions was 
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding two years or with 
fine or with both. The second Ordinance, the Elective
Bodies Disqualification (Removal and Remission) Ordinance,
1419631 empowered the President to remove or reduce the 
period of disqualification of a person for election to any 
elective body on application made to him by any person dis­
qualified under the original order#
These two Ordinances provoked a storm of protests 
from all quarters. They were represented as machinery for 
suppressing political opinion on the one hand and of 
compelling the support of the opposition leaders on the other#
14# Ordinance II of 1963* P#L*D# 1963 Central Statutes 12#
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All political leaders condemned the two Ordinances#
Suhrawardy's comment was that ”this is a most blatant form
of corruption on the one hand, coercion and suppression on 
15the other”• ^ Even Dawn, the leading Karachi daily, which 
had given strong support to President Ayub Khan since he 
siezed power in 1958, was ruthless in its criticism of the 
measures# An editorial said ”It was a sad moment, when the 
President of Pakistan consented to the promulgation of the 
two new Ordinances published yesterday, which relate to the 
activities of persons disqualified under the Elective Bodies 
Disqualification Order# Sad for democracy, sad for 
elementary civil rights in a civilised society, sad for 
Pakistan, sad for the Government and sad for the President#” 
On the President's power of remission or reduction of sen­
tences under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order, 
the editorial commented
”In other words the Ordinance will be seen as a 
further weapon in the hand of the Government, to 
be used for winning over politicians now opposed 
to them •#• As enacted, the Ordinance will be 
regarded as an instrument of coercion, rather 
than an opening for large-heartedness and 
clemency#
The editorial concluded ”In the sum total, therefore, the 
new law or 'decrees' will deepen the political gloom in the 
country and make people wonder whether it was necessary at 
all to lift Martial Law — if THIS was to follow #”^  Such
15* Dawn, January 8, 1965• 
16# Dawn, January 9> 1965.
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comments from a pro-government newspaper indicate the 
intensity of the resentment with which the country received 
these Ordinances*
But the government, oblivious of these reactions, 
proceeded with its plan of political repression* The N.D.F* 
convention was held, as scheduled, in January, 1963 at the 
residence of Suhrawardy at Karachi, though he was then sick 
in hospital* It was attended by representatives from all 
political parties opposed to the regime* The convention 
was mainly concerned with the formal launching of the Front, 
whose modus operandi was adopted and approved by the various 
parties and groups. The police opened cases on charges 
of sedition against a number of politicans who attended the 
convention, and in May, arrested eight prominent opposition 
leaders*^ The National Democratic Front, however, was 
weakened by the death of its leader Suhrawardy, in December, 
1963 and the illness of Maulana Bhashani another leader* 
After Suhrawardy’s death, the different parties which had 
composed it were revived and pursued their own programmes in 
opposition to the regime, but the Front continued to serve 
as a refuge for disqualified political leaders*
The two Ordinances were clearly promulgated to curb 
the activities of politicians who were suffering under the
17# Dawn, May 8, 1963
disqualification laws and who now took the lead in opposing 
President Ayub Khan’s system. It has been remarked that 
"the tightening of,grip over the activities of the EBDOed 
politicians showed that they were neither politically for­
gotten nor discredited enough for President Ayub to ignore
them. The move was to liquidate the NDF and the EBDOnians
18acting under its cover.”
In purauance of the Government's repressive policy 
against the opposition, its leaders were arrested and de­
tained in both wings of the country and section 144 of the
lq
Code of Criminal Procedure v was constantly used to prevent
the opposition from holding public meetings to mobilise
public support. The orthodox Jamaat-i-Islami was banned
on January 6, 1964. The two provincial governments in
identical press notes declared the party to be an "unlawful
association" throughout Pakistan under section 16(i) of the
20Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908. The party’s chief,
18. D.N. Banerjee, East Pakistan, p. 135*
19# The section of the Code meant to maintain public order 
empowers magistrates to prohibit an assembly of five 
or more persons in a public place.
20. The provision of the Act (XIV of 1908) empowers a pro­
vincial government, by notification, to declare an 
association unlawful, if in the opinion of the govern­
ment, the association interferes, or has as its object 
interference with the administration of law and order 
or that it constitutes a danger to the public peace.
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Maulana Maudoodi and other members of the executive were
arrested on the allegations of having tried ”to subvert the
loyalty of the people11 and planned Mto seize power and set
21up a fascist regimeM. The governments action was 
challenged in the High Courts in East and Vest Pakistan# 
While the Dacca High Court held that the provision under
which the party was banned was repugnant to the fundamental
22right of the freedom of association and therefore void, 
the Vest Pakistan High Court held that the action of the 
government on January 6, 1964, was not affected by the sub­
sequent incorporation in the Constitution of the fundamental 
rights on January 10, 1964. The Court upheld the pro­
vision of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, as being an 
emergency measure, designed to stop immediately the unlawful 
activities of an association so that it could not be dec­
lared void for repugnancy to section 3 of the Political
Parties Act, 1962, which contemplated total disbandment of
27>an association. y
The Supreme Court, on appeal, upheld the decision 
of the Dacca High Court, declaring the provision of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act void because it was inconsistent
21. Keesingfs Contemporary Archives, 1963-64, p. 19883*
22. Tamizuddin Ahmed v. Government of East Pakistan, 
P.ij.1)• 1^64 Dacca 795*
23* Abul A 1 la Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan, 
g7E:.T .~,T96A Kairachi 475T-------------------------
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with the fundamental right to freedom of association;
that it also overlapped provisions of the Political Parties
Act, 1962; as that Act was passed subsequent to the
Criminal Law Amendment Act and was designed to deal with all
political party activity, it should prevail in so far as it
was inconsistent with the Criminal Law Amendment Act. The
Act of 1908, it was said, conferred r,a naked arbitrary
power” on a provincial government and "has the potentialities
of becoming an engine of suppression and oppression of an
opposition political party at the hands of an unscrupulous
24party in power.” The government action against an 
opposition political party was thus frustrated, but its 
action against individual opposition politicians and workers 
went on unabated.
As well as opposition politicians, newspapers 
critical of government policies were subjected to res­
trictions. The editor of a Lahore Urdu weekly "Chattan" 
was banned^ from entering the district of Gujarat under 
the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance,
I960. Similar measures were often taken against journalists
26and opposition politicians. The President himself was
24. Abul A 1 la Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan, 
P.L.lJ. 1964 S.C. 673#
25# Dawn, July 1, 1963*
26. Mir Jafar Khan, a Sind politician, was served with an 
externment order from Quetta-Pishin district,
Dawn, July 9* 1963#
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intolerant of journalists critical of him. He deprecated 
”a propensity on the part of some newspapermen, who seemed 
to be wearing coloured glasses and anything to them looked 
black and gloomy”. The President said that such news­
papermen served no good purpose for the people of the 
country they professed to serve# On the other hand they 
engendered dissatisfaction and created lack of confidence 
among the people#^ The Presidents sentiments were echoed 
by his followers, including Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, the chief 
organiser of the Muslim League faction which Ayub Khan had 
joined in May, 1963; Choudhry even advocated suppression 
and control of the press# The Council of Pakistan News-
28paper Editors strongly protested against this suggestion,' 
and most newspapers published editorials protesting against 
any move on the part of the government to restrict freedom 
of the press#
In September, 1963* the two provincial govern­
ments simultaneously promulgated identical Press and Pub­
lication Ordinances, which, keeping intact the existing 
provisions regarding security deposits and other provisions 
restricting printing or publishing anything prejudicial to 
the maintenance of peace and public order, put restrictions 
on the publication of proceedings of the Assembly and the
27* Dawn, July 7* 1963#
28# Ibid., July 18, 1963*
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courts; only the official versions of these proceedings 
were to be published. The Ordinance required every printer 
and publisher to maintain regular account books, and em­
powered the government to appoint a commission to inquire 
into the affairs of any printing press or newspaper, and, 
in particular, to report on whether the newspaper under 
investigation was in receipt of any extraneous aid from a 
Pakistan or foreign source.
These measures against the press aroused strong 
resentment in all sections of the people. Opposition 
political leaders strongly criticised the press "curb"; 
the Karachi Union of Journalists, demanding withdrawal of 
the Ordinances, called for a general strike bn September 9 
of all working journalists throughout Pakistan in protest 
against the restrictions.^ Dawn of Karachi, in an edi­
torial, bitterly criticised the ”curbs” and said that the 
measures were particularly unfortunate, when the Council of 
Pakistan Newspaper Editors had adopted a ”Gode of Ethics” for 
guidance of journalists, which was to be implemented volun­
tarily under the supervision of a court of honour, presided 
over by a High Court judge. The editorial concluded: ”The
'curbs' have come too soon and are out of proportion to any 
faults and failings of even the extreme section of the press.
29* Dawn, September 7* 1963.
30* Ibid., editorial, September 7* 1963*
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Journalists throughout the country observed a one 
day strike on September 9* 1963 and no newspaper was pub­
lished on the following day. A deputation of newspaper 
editors waited on the President on September 10 and urged 
him not to take any action under the ordinances for at 
least one month; in the meantime they would consider con­
structive suggestions for removal of the difficulty. The
President was reported to have agreed, and recommended the
31proposal to the provincial Governors. On October 10,
1963 the revised and consolidated press laws were promul­
gated; they allowed publication of all Assembly and court 
proceedings, except those whose publication had been pro­
hibited by the authorities. The consolidated Ordinances 
kept intact the provisions relating to security deposits, 
closure and forfeiture of newspapers and press for any 
offensive publication. The government seemed determined to 
punish the non-conformist newspapers and journalists, and 
was not prepared to allow them to publish anything which, 
in its opinion, was irresponsible and destructive criticism 
of its policies. The press laws indicate the strength of 
public opinion against the regime and its policies, and 
government's intolerant attitude towards opposition propa­
ganda.
It has been said earlier that, after the death of
31* Dawn, September 11, 1963*
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Suhrawardy in December, 1963* the national Democratic Front 
lost much of its force as a united opposition to the regime. 
Almost all the political parties that existed before October 7 
1958 were revived and each party was campaigning for the 
"democratisation" of the Constitution and the implementation 
of other party programmes. But a move for united action 
was made as the presidential and assembly elections drew 
near. A joint meeting of representatives of all opposition 
parties, the Awami League, the National Awami Party, the 
"Council” Muslim League, the Nizam-i-Islam Party, and the 
banned Jamaat-i-Islami, was held in Dacca in the third week 
of July, 1964; it decided to put up a joint candidate in 
the forthcoming presidential election. The meeting also 
issued a nine-point programme, which, among other things, 
demanded direct elections, curtailment of the President's 
power, enhancement of the Assemblies1 powers, and the with­
drawal of restrictions on the functioning of political 
parties On the other hand the "Convention” Muslim
League, of which Ayub Khan became the President in December, 
1963i was trying to propagate an idea of allowing the 
President to be elected unopposed in the national interest.
The Central Minister for Communications, Khan A. Sabur, 
appealed to the opposition parties "to refrain from the
32. Dawn, July 259 1964
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unholy alliance •.• of setting up a candidate against 
President Ayub K h a n " A f t e r  Ayub Khan had been adopted 
officially as a presidential candidate by his party, the 
leading Pakistan daily in an editorial pleaded for
754.
"unanimous and unopposed" election of President Ayub Khan*^ 
In September 1964- the Combined Opposition Parties 
(COP) met in Karachi and adopted Miss Fatima Jinnah as the 
joint opposition presidential candidate*^ Her nomination
was denounced as "un-Islamic" by the Jamaat-Ulema-i-Pakistan, 
an orthodox religious party, on the ground that a woman 
could not hold such an important office as President or 
"Khalifa" in an Islamic state But the Man 1 is-i-Shura
of the opposition Jamaat-i-Islami passed a resolution 
upholding the election of a woman as Head of State "in the 
present circumstances"*^ Miss Jinnah declared that she
was fighting the election with the object of establishing 
true democracy in the country* Direct election of the 
President and the Assemblies on the basis of an adult fran­
chise, freedom of thought, speech and association, and a 
free press were the basic ingredients of a democracy* In
33* Dawn* July 27» 1964-•
34-* Ibid* * editorial, August 21, 1964-* 
35* Ibid*, September 18, 1964-*
36* Ibid*, September 27* 1964-*
37* Ibid*, October 3» 1964-*
38* Ibid. * October 2, 1964-*
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the Basic Democracies elections, which preceded the presi­
dential elections, the Combined Opposition Parties sup­
ported a programme calling for a fully democratic system 
of government, direct elections to the Assemblies, represen­
tative government and provincial autonomy# The Convention 
Muslim League - the ruling party to which President Ayub 
Khan belonged, without officially adopting the candidates, 
advised the electors to consider their own interest, 
pointing out that the Opposition parties were committed to 
the destruction of the basic democracies system# The 
success of the Opposition would, therefore, mean abolition 
of the system in the existence of which the interest of the 
basic democrats lay# The party also decided to "own the 
person who wins the election11 for the forthcoming presi­
dential election# ^
The presidential election was held on January 2, 
1965 and was overwhelmingly won by President Ayub Khan#
Just before the election the President, in a personal 
message to the members of the electoral college, expressed 
the hope that the electors would not vote for their own 
"strangulation". He pointed out that, if the opposition 
won, the basic democrats would be deprived of their "most 
important" powers of electing the President and the
39# Sharif al-Mujahid, "Pakistani First Presidential Elections 
(1965) 5 Asian Survey* p# 280#
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4 0assemblies, Otlier issues were almost ignored and,
therefore, "the largest single factor in the President's
victory was the fact that in voting Ayub the electors were
41voting for themselves”• In his victory message Ayub
Khan said that ”through these elections the people have
endorsed their verdict in favour of the Constitution and
given me a clear mandate to pursue my internal and external
42policies, which they have approved,” He said that there 
should be no more controversy over the Constitution and the 
political system it had set up.
But the opposition alleged that the elections 
were not free and fair; the opposition had been handi­
capped by the Government's frequent use of restrictive 
43measures; government agencies like the radio and tele­
vision were extensively utilised for Ayub Khan's election 
propaganda and similar facilities were totally denied to 
the opposition candidate. Miss Jinnah condemned the 
government role in the elections in much stronger "terms.
40. Dawn, January 1, 1965*
41. Sharif al-Kujahid, op.cit., p. 293,
42. Dawn, January 3, 1965*
43. The Combined Opposition's first call to observe 
"Protest Day” on September 29 > 1964 against government's 
repressive measures, and to mobilise public opinion in 
its favour was disrupted by prohibitory orders passed 
under section 144 Cr.P.C. in Karachi and other places. 
See Dawn, September 28, 1964.
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She said,
"Instances of serious irregularities and mal­
practices committed at polling stations throughout 
the country are well-known ••• The entire conduct 
of these elections has been marred by flagrant 
official interference, police high-handedness, 
intimidation, corruption and bribery# More­
over, they were held under the shadow of section 
14-4, the provisions of which applied, in practice, 
only to COP workers# In these circumstances 
the claim that the elections were fair and 
impartial is absolutely untenable." 44
The defeat of the Combined Opposition Parties by 
President Ayub Khan in the election seemed to have shattered 
the opposition forces, at least for the time being# The 
opposition had taken part in the election and had tried to 
demonstrate tbeajnpopularity of President Ayub Khan's political 
system, but, officially at least, it had been defeated in 
its constitutional struggle# This election thus marked the 
end of the first phase of the movement against the Con­
stitution of 1962 by constitutional means# It also marked 
the beginning of the mass movement, which adopted a violent 
form three years later#
The Second Phase of the Movement
After the presidential election, the Combined 
Opposition Parties met in Dacca to take stock of the 
situation and to plan for the future# Differences cropped
44# Dawn, January 4, 1965*
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up as to whether they should participate in the next 
assembly elections. Those who wanted to boycott the 
elections felt that the elections were bound to be 
"flagrantly rigged" and that they should not be "partners 
in a farce worse than the last". They had lost faith, 
not only in the basic democracies, but also in the electors, 
who could be "intimidated, coerced and bribed"#^ The 
opposition was actively considering a "mass movement for 
democracy" in preference to "frustrated attempts" at the 
polls. They were convinced that, under the existing system 
of elections, it was not possible to subvert the regime 
and to establish democracy. In spite of this scepticism, 
however, the opposition ultimately decided to contest the 
elections to the National Assembly. In the course of the 
election campaign, and particularly during the last week, 
there were large-scale arrests, intimidation and coercion 
of opposition political workers and electors who supported 
the opposition. Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, after visiting a 
number of districts, complained that it was the police who 
were fighting the elections "with police methods".
The result of the National Assembly elections, as 
expected, was a thumping victory for Ayub Khan's Muslim 
League and a crushing defeat for the Combined Opposition*^
46. Sharif al-Mujahid, "The Assembly Elections in Pakistan", 
(1965) 5 Asian Survey, p. 538*
46. Ibid., p. 546.
47. Only 15 seats in a house of 155 were captured by the 
Opposition.
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The opposition was now more than ever convinced that, in 
the face of the built-in advantage of the system in favour 
of the regime, it was impossible to change the system itself 
by participating in its operation. Demoralised by the 
election results, the opposition felt that it had won 
morally by exposing the inherent weakness of indirect system 
of elections# It was, therefore, decided not to contest 
elections to provincial assemblies on the common platform, 
though individual parties were allowed to put up candidates 
against the ruling party candidates# Instead of fighting 
a losing battle, the Combined Opposition should, it was 
felt, explore other ways to prepare the country for the 
ultimate restoration of ffthe birthright of democracy of the 
people1
The presidential and the assembly elections early 
in 1965 seemed to indicate that the regime was ruling the 
country in accordance with the Constitution# The opposition 
had apparently failed to demonstrate that the people were 
opposed to this system. The reality was, however, dif­
ferent from the appearance# During the campaign for the 
presidential election, the enthusiastic popular support 
given to opposition cause proved unmistakeably that the 
majority of the basic democrats elected belonged to the
48# Sharif al-Mujahid, "The Assembly Elections in Pakistan*1, 
op.cit., p# 547*
49. Ibid.
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opposition camp* But, when the vital hour came, a majority 
of them voted for President Ayub Khan for the simple reason 
that on his victory depended their own survival. So, 
after a period of disillusionment, the opposition started 
again demanding direct elections on the basis of adult fran­
chise and the restoration of the parliamentary system of 
government in the country#
The next unified forceful move, however, did not 
come till after the signing of the Tashkent Declaration in 
January, 1966, after war* with India in September 1965* The 
war with India and its conclusion by the Tashkent Declaration 
caused diverse reactions in the two wings of the country# 
While the opposition in the western province felt that the 
signing of the declaration was a defeat for Pakistan's claim 
on Kashmir, in East Pakistan the cessation of war was 
generally welcomed, but the wisdom of starting it was 
seriously questioned. It was said that the war had exposed 
the weakness of the defences of the country, and £hat East
50Pakistan, during the 17-day war, was at the mercy of India#*' 
The inner reaction of the opposition from both wings was, 
therefore, anti-government, though for different reasons#
An All-Party National Conference of opposition elements was 
held in Lahore in February, 1966# It was attended by over 
seven hundred delegates from both wings, and a resolution
50. See S#M# Zafar, Through the Crisis, pp. 72-75*
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was passed condemning the Tashkent Declaration, which, the
resolution said, was detrimental to the interest and honour
of Pakistan and had adversely affected the prospects of a
51solution of the Kashmir problem. After the conference 
there were anti-government demonstrations in Lahore and 
other places, resulting in clashes between the demonstrators 
and the security forces. (The political atmosphere became 
tense and anti-government feeling grew.
But the significant outcome of this conference was 
the concrete political demands, on behalf of East Pakistan, 
of the leader of the Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 
who placed before the Conference his now-famous and contro­
versial sixwpoint programme^ for acceptance as a basis for 
the constitutional struggle against the regime. But his 
proposals did not find support in the conference. Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, thereupon, dissociated his Awami League 
from the other parties at the Conference, published his
programme in public and expressed his intention to struggle
55for the realisation of his demands,^ the most important of 
which was full autonomy for East Pakistan in her internal 
affairs. President Ayub Khan denounced the autonomy demand, 
as aiming at the break up of the country and warned the 
people to prepare for the "civil war", if it was forced upon
51. Dawn, February 6, 1966.
52. See Appendix V.
55. Dawn. February 12, 1966.
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them by the "nefarious activities" of some opposition 
elements,^ The Muslim League Council, which the President 
was addressing, passed a resolution calling upon the govern­
ment to take adequate steps in order to meet the challenge 
of the "treasonable campaign and pressure" and to protect 
the "ideology of Islam and the integrity of the Muslim home­
land"*
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, along with a few colleagues 
was arrested on May 8, 1966, under the Defence of Pakistan 
R u l e s f p k e  Awami League called for a general strike on 
June 7* 1966, throughout the province of East Pakistan, in 
protest against government repression and to show public 
support for its six-point programme* The strike was ob­
served, but disturbances took place in Dacca and Narayanganj 
where ten people were killed and several injured when the 
police opened fire* During the day trafficccould not move 
on the streets, cars were burnt, trains were detained and 
railway signal lines were cut at different p o i n t s . T h e  
East Pakistan Awami League announced its decision to observe 
"anti-repression days" for three days starting from June 17, 
1966, to "voice protest against government's repressive 
measures"*^ The provincial government arrested the
54. Dawn, March 21, 1966.
55. Ibid., May 10, 1966.
56. Ibid., June 8, 1966.
57. Ibid.. June 15, 1966.
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editor of the pro-Awami League Bengali daily, MIttafa&n 
and by a notification under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 
forfeited the Few Nation Printing Press which was pub­
lishing the p a p e r , T h e  closure of the New Nation press 
affected the publication of two other newspapers - the 
English language weekly “Dacca Times” and the Bengali 
weekly “Purbani”, A joint committee, representing the 
Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors, the All-Pakistan 
Newspaper Society and the Pakistan Federal Union of Jour­
nalists, condemned the government action and called upon 
all concerned to observe a token strike on July 5* 1966, as
59a protest against government action against the newspapers* '
The strike was, however, postponed when government gave an
assurance of due consideration of the matter*
These actions of the government, which aroused
strong resentment throughout the country, led the opposition
leaders to explore once again the possibility of evolving a
common programme to fight the regime for the “establishment
of democracy” in the country* Representatives of six
opposition parties met on July 31* 1966, discussed the
matter and announced their intention of making continuous
60efforts in this regard* The discussion resulted in the
58* Dawn, June 18, 1966*
59* Ibid „ June 29* 1966*
60* Ibid*, August 1, 1966* The parties were: the National
Democratic Front, National Awami Party, Nizam-i-Islam 
Party, Awami League, Jamaat-i-Islami and Council Muslim 
League•
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formation of the Pakistan Democratic Movement, an alliance 
of five opposition parties; only one recognised opposition 
party, the National Awami Party headed by Maulana Bhashani, 
remained outside the alliance* The eight-point programme 
of the Movement included the establishment of a federal, 
parliamentary system of government, direct elections on the 
basis of adult franchise, full regional autonomy, funda-
61mental rights, a free press and an independent judiciary*
The formation of the Pakistan Democratic Movement from among 
the Opposition parties provoked a sharp reaction in govern­
ment circles; it was represented as a Movement11 against
62the interest and integrity of the country* Though it 
did not prove to be very effective in its activities, the 
Pakistan Democratic Movement nevertheless provided a common 
platform for opposition politicians to meet and discuss 
political and constitutional issues* It started holding 
public meetings and issuing press statements, inviting 
support for its eight-point programme of constitutional, 
political and economic demands*
In the later part of 196? a new phenomenon was 
observed in Pakistan opposition politics* Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto, who was Poreign Minister till April 1966, resigned
61* Dawn, May 2, 1966*
62. Dawn, May 4, 1967* Iu its editorial Dawn gave "its
real meaning" as "Pakistan Disintegration Movement" *
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from the government and became a vocal opponent of the
regime, which he condemned for its adherence to the Tashkent
Declaration* He eventually became a strong critic of
the whole political system, which he had upheld and served
for a long time* Bhutto organised a political party of
his own, the Pakistan People's Party, and formally launched
it after a convention of his workers at Lahore in December,
19679 with the objective of achieving the "fundamental
rights" for the people, which had been denied them under
63the Ayub Constitution* ^ The emergence of Bhutto's People's 
Party, which had strong support among young people, parti­
cularly the students, proved to be a turning point in 
Pakistan politics*
The government, on its part, was not prepared at 
that stage to concede the opposition demands for changing 
the political system* The emergency declared on September 
6, 1965> at the start of the war with India, was not lifted 
and opposition leaders were being arrested and detained 
without trial under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, promul­
gated under the emergency powers* But, in the exercise of 
its discretionary powers of arrest and detention, the 
government suffered a serious set back at the hands of the 
judiciary* The Supreme Court discarded the contention that
63* Dawn, December 3* 1967*
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a person could be preventively detained under the Defence
Rules on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority* and held that the detaining authority must
satisfy the court of the reasonableness of the grounds on
which his satisfaction of the necessity of the detention
was reached* Article 2 of the Constitution conferred on
the citizens the right to be treated strictly in accordance
with law, and Article 98 had authorised the High Court to
probe into the exercise of power by executive authorities
and to ensure that power in the treatment of a citizen was
64-exercised in a lawful manner*
The decision was followed in a subsequent Supreme 
Court case*^ But the government, in an attempt to frus­
trate the effect of these judgments, amended the law by 
giving the detaining authority power to arrest and detain a 
person if he Mis of the opinion1 that detention was necessary 
In the case that followed it was argued on behalf of the 
government that the detaining authority was not required to 
act honestly, reasonably or on reasonable grounds, so that 
its satisfaction was purely subjective and could not be 
controlled by the High Court* But Hamoodur Rahman J*, as 
he then was, pointed out in his judgment that the High Court1
64*. Malik Ghulam Jilani v* The Government of West Pakistan,
5?.L'.B7T957"577. "375.
65* Abdul Baqi Baluch v* The Government of Pakistan,
P.i/.D." 1968"S.c .' 515.
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power under Article 98(2) was to see that a citizen was
treated in accordance with law, and "law” here used was in
a generic sense. It was in this sense that mala fides or
colourable action under a statute, or action on extraneous
or irrelevant considerations, or without any ground at all
or without proper application of the mind of the detaining
authority, would be an action taken in an unlawful manner*
The detaining authority was given a power coupled with a
duty. Here the duty was to apply its mind to the question
whether the action of the person sought to be detained would
fall reasonably within the mischief of the statute* Until
such opinion was formed by the honest application of the mind
of the detaining authority, there was no jurisdiction to
make the order of detention* The Court was, therefore,
entitled to examine the reasonableness of the grounds and
66to satisfy itself that the detention was necessary* These 
judgments of the Supreme Court certainly boosted the morale 
of the opposition, while putting a check on the arbitrary 
exercise of powers by the executive.
An important development in early 1968, which had 
a great impact on the mass movement and insurrection later 
in the year and early next year, was the so-called "Agartala 
Conspiracy” case* On January 6, 1968, the central Home
66. Government of West Pakistan v. Begum Agha Abdul Karim 
Shorish EashmifiT 
P.L.i. 1969 S.fl. 14.
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Ministry announced that twenty-eight persons, including two
top civil servants and a few service personnel, had "been
arrested on a charge of conspiracy to bring about the
secession of East Pakistan from the rest of the country in
concert with and help from the Indian authorities.^ Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman the Awami League leader, who was already in
detention, and a few others, including another senior civil
servant, were later implicated in the case* The accused,
*
numbering thirty-five in all, were put in military custody* 
The trial of the case began in June 1968 before a Special 
Tribunal appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment (Special 
Tribunal) Ordinance, 1968* The Special Tribunal consisted 
of a retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and two High 
Court judges. The Ordinance made special rules of evidence 
applicable to this case. The Tribunal was empowered to 
admit any statement made by an accused or a witness, which 
had been recorded by a police officer in the course of the 
investigation of the case. This provision was, however, 
amended by a subsequent amendment of the Ordinance.
The 1 Agartala conspiracy” case had to be withdrawn 
under pressure from the opposition movement in February 1969* 
The case was viewed by the people generally as having no 
substantial basis and the implication of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman as an afterthought was regarded as only a move to
67* Dawn, January 7* 1968.
68. Ordinance V of 1968,
P.L.R. 1968 Statutes (Sec. B) 35*
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6 9crush, the demand for autonomy in East Pakistan* J There 
was no immediate open comment on the case hut when the 
movement against Ayub system in 1968-69 became widespread 
it served in East Pakistan as the main cause for demon­
strations and disturbances. The National Executive of the 
Pakistan Democratic Movement, however, as early as February 
1968, passed a resolution calling upon the government to
hold the trial of the "conspiracy” case in open court under
70the ordinary law of the land*
Such was the political condition of the country
and the position of the government vis-a-vis the opposition
political demands on the eve of the insurrection that flared
up late in the year 1968. The mass movement that started
in late 1968 and continued for about five months resulted
in the end of the Ayub regime. It was actually sparked
off by students agitating in West Pakistan for educational
reforms, who on October 15* 1968 observed "Education Day" to
voice demands, which included the repeal of University
Ordinances, which provided for forfeiture of a degree on
the ground of the student’s subversive activities, withdrawal
of the Hamoodur Rahman Report, reduction of tuition fees
71and extension of other facilities to students.' Anti­
government feeling among students was reinforced when on
69* See S.M. Zafar, Through the Crisis, pp. 84-85#
70. Ibid., p. 82.
71. Dawn, October 16, 1968.
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November 8, 1968, one student was killed by the police 
when they opened fire in Rawalpindi. The students of 
Rawalpindi, on that day, formed a procession to protest 
against the behaviour of Peshawar customs officials towards 
a students1 party, returning from a tour. The situation 
deteriorated when the police tried to prevent students from 
gathering near the Hotel Intercontinental, where the Peoples 
Party chairman, Bhutto, was expected. The demonstrators 
became violent, damaged property, burnt cars and set fire 
to buses. A curfew was imposed in the city and all edu­
cational institutions were closed.^ Feelings, instead of 
cooling down, flared up and more disturbances took place in 
the city; two more persons being killed when the police 
opened fire. The disturbance spread to Lahore, where 
Bhutto’s arrival was marked by clashes between the police
and his supporters, and to Lyallpur, Ginjranwala, Bahawalpur
75Peshawar and other places.
On November 10, 1968, two shots were fired by a
student at a public meeting at Peshawar and it was said
74that they were aimed at President Ayub Khan. Demon­
strations accompanied by violence took place in protest 
against police action in most cities of West Pakistan.
72. Dawn, November 9* 1968.
75# Ibid., November 10, 1968.
74. Ibid., November 11, 1968.
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Bhutto, Wali Khan, the National Awami Party leader, and 
eleven other opposition politicians were arrested on 
November 13, 1968, and detained under the Defence of 
Pakistan Pule s. 75 More arrests were made on the following 
day* The arrest and detention of the political leaders in 
the wake of the students* agitation and violence created a 
mass uprising, which was joined by all the opposition 
political forces, factory and industrial workers, teachers, 
journalists and all other disaffected sections of the people, 
who demanded a change of the political system and the redress 
of their class grievances*
At Peshawar, Lahore and Multan even lawyers 
formed processions in protest against the arrest of the 
political leaders*7^ Dacca followed suit* About this 
time Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan, a former Air Force 
chief, made his debut in politics by making a statement 
accusing the government of corruption, incompetence and 
suppression of civil liberties*77 He was followed by S*M* 
Murshed, a former Chief Justice of the Dacca High Court, 
who entered the political field with a view 11 to assist all 
those forces that seek to establish the basic freedom of 
life1** In December Lt.-General Azam Khan, one time friend 
of President Ayub Khan and one of the architects of the
75* Dawn, November 14, 1968*
76* Ibid*, November 16, 1968.
77* The Times (London), November 20, 1968*
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martial law regime in 1958* joined the opposition forces 
and called for a combined "mass movement” for the restoration 
of democracy. The General said that he had been opposed 
to the Constitution of 1962 from the beginning. "The
people alone have the right to choose their leaders, the 
type of constitution and the mode of government they find 
most suitable.”^® The active participation of these 
persons of such high standing and previous political inde­
pendence gave great encouragement to the opposition move­
ment. It now became a universal popular movement against 
the existing political system, irrespective of party con­
siderations.
The attack oh the Constitution of 1962 was further
strengthened by a statement made by H. Shahabuddin, a former
Chief Justice of Pakistan, who was the chairman of the
Constitution Commission appointed by President Ayub Khan
in I960. The former Chief Justice accused the government
of representing to the people that the Constitution was in
full accord with the Commissions recommendations. He said,
"I wish to emphasise that there are fundamental 
differences between our recommendations and the 
present Constitution. Even a cursory reading 
of our report would make this clear. We 
recommended a fully democratic presidential 
form of government, and we provided effective 
checks and balances, which do not find place 
in the present Constitution.” 79
78. Dawn, December 19* 1968.
79. Ibid., December 9* 1968.
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The students' agitation, originally directed to 
educational reforms, due to clashes with the forces of law 
and order, took a serious and violent turn by mid-November, 
when other anti-regime forces joined, and turned it into a 
mass opposition movement. The government's attempt to 
suppress the students' agitation by arresting and detaining 
opposition political leaders, stimulated support for the oppo­
sition. People from every walk of life joined in the attack 
of the regime and its repressive policies. The West 
Pakistan High Court Bar Association, at an emergency meeting 
on November 26, 1968, adopted a resolution-urging the govern­
ment to withdraw immediately the declaration of emergency, 
condemned arbitrary arrest and detention without trial of
political leaders, advocates, workers and students, and
80demanded their immediate release. In almost every town 
lawyers marched in procession protesting against the sup­
pression of civil liberties, and demanded the release of all 
political prisoners and the acceptance of students' and 
workers' demands. The movement, in its initial stage, was 
hostile to the Muslim League and offices of the ruling party 
were damaged and set on fire in many places. People
belonging to the party were subjected to harassment and 
81violence. Serious violence in both wings followed and,
80. Dawn, November 27, 1968.
81. The first incident of arson took place at Bahawalpur, 
where the Muslim League office was set on fire on 
November 27, 1968. Dawn, November 28, 1968.
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particularly at a later stage in East Pakistan* basic demo­
crats and known government supporters were singled out as 
targets.
The President in bis first-of-the-month broadcast 
on December 1* 1968, announced that legitimate grievances 
of students would be redressed and that be bad given
op
direction for amendment of tbe university Ordinances#
On tbe following day at Lahore tbe President said tbat be 
was always ready to discuss national problems witb tbe 
opposition parties, provided tbey bad any constructive sug­
gestion, Tbe President also denied any plan to amend 
Articles 2 and 98 of tbe Constitution, It may be noted
here tbat since Sborisb Kashmiri* s ease government circles 
bad considered an amendment of tbe Constitution to make tbe 
High Court's jurisdiction under Article 98 subservient to 
tbe emergency laws, and tbat tbe meaning of "law” in 
Article 2 should be restricted to statutory law and not 
to include tbe generic law,®^ But tbe President's dec­
laration of bis readiness to talk was no longer credible 
when on December 6, be warned tbe nation tbat any attempt
to change tbe fundamentals of tbe existing system would
84spell disaster for tbe country.
82, Dawn, December 2, 1968,
83* See S.M, Zafar, Through tbe Crisis, p, 78*
84, Dawn, December 7* 1968,
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Demonstrations and disturbances throughout the 
country continued unabated. On December 7, 1968 at least 
two persons were killed and several injured in Dacca in 
clashes between the police and demonstrators. The Oppo­
sition in the National Assembly, which was in session in 
Dacca, staged a walk-out when its demands for a discussion 
of the situation were rejected on the plea that the primary 
duty of the legislature was to legislate, while the main­
tenance of law and order was the responsibility of the pro- 
vincial government.85
A general strike in Dacca, Chittagong and other 
places was observed on December 13 to protest against police 
excesses and the repressive policies of the government. 
Processions marched in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi, Hyderabad 
Peshawar and other places. Violence, killing and damage 
to public and private property became part of every day life 
in Pakistan. Troops were called out in different places 
and curfews were imposed. But people became frenzied and 
no action seemed adequate to quell the riots and disturbances 
Students and demonstrators defied the curfew and clashed 
with troops on several occasions. The death-toll in 
clashes during these months was estimated in hundreds. Edu­
cational institutions, factories and industrial concerns 
remained closed for months. The country was in a state of
85. Dawn, December 8, 1968.
86. Ibid., December 14, 1968.
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economic and political chaos*
In the midst of this insurrection several moves
were made to induce the President to hold talks with the
opposition* Justice Murshed made an appeal on December 11f
1968, urging the President to create conditions conducive
to holding talks with the opposition by releasing the
political prisoners and accepting the principle of direct
elections to the assemblies.®*^ On December 30 the President
admitted that there was "room for improvement in the present?
constitutional set-up”, which was open to "genuine and
beneficial” amendments in accordance with the wishes of the
people* But he insisted that the presidential system was
the only means which could ensure political stability and
national progress* To those who held that the parliamentary
form was the only democratic system of government, the
President harshly remarked that they suffered from an
inferiority complex and a "slavish mentality”, which had
88developed under British rule. The President defended th^ 
Constitution of 1962 in his monthly broadcast, when he said 
that the Constitution had been promulgated by him, followings 
the mandate given to him by the people in I960* He said 
that the last two general elections (in 1962 and 1965) were 
”in fact in the nature of a referendum” on the Constitution,?
87* Dawn, December 12, 1968*
88* Ibid., December 31* 1968.
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which in the process had received nsolid support” from an 
overwhelming majority of the people* "There can hardly he 
a more popular and democratic procedure of adopting a 
Constitution.
The opposition, which was leading a mass movement
for the abolition of the Constitution of 1962, naturally
did not agree with the President* They differentiated the
basic democrats, an overwhelming majority of whom had voted
in the elections for Ayub Khan, from the people at large,
who, they maintained, were against the Constitution* The
Lahore District Bar Association called for a general boycott
of the coming elections to the Assemblies under the existing 
90system* . The National Executive of the Pakistan Democratic 
Movement, after days of discussion in Dacca, announced, on 
January 6, 1969, its "firm decision” not to participate at 
any stage in the coming elections under the present "wholly 
unacceptable Constitution”• It called upon the people for
their united and determined support in its struggle to 
achieve ”full democracy through direct elections based on 
adult franchise”* The Executive outlined five points as 
essential for a fair and free election; they were that 
elections should be direct, that assemblies should enjoy full 
powers, that the declaration of emergency should be
89* Dawn, January 2, 1969*
90* Ibid*, January 2, 1969*
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immediately withdrawn, that all political prisoners should 
he released, and that all cases against politicians, workers 
and students should he withdrawn* It denounced the Con­
stitution of 1962 and declared all "so-called elections” 
held under it to he deceitful and a fraud practised on the 
people with the sole object of keeping the present regime in
_ _ - t r f a  91power*
The Dacca meeting of the opposition parties led 
to the formation of the Democratic Action Committee (D*A*C*), 
comprising representatives of eight opposition parties*
The committee announced an eight-point programme for the 
realisation of "full and complete democracy and restoration 
of sovereignty to the people", which included the estab­
lishment of a federal, parliamentary form of government, 
direct elections on the basis of adult franchise, immediate 
withdrawal of the declaraction of emergency and the res­
toration of civil liberties. The Democratic Action Committee 
resolved that, unless these demands were met, the opposition 
parties would not participate in the elections, and it urged
Qp
the people to boycott them.7
91* Dawn, January 7» 1969*
92* Xbid*, January 9» 1969* The parties represented in the 
D.A.C* were: the Council Muslim League, the National
Awami Party (Wali Khan group), the Nizam-i-Islam Party, 
the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jamiatul Ulema-i-Islam, the 
National Democratic Front, the Awami League and the six- 
point Awami League. The Awami League after its revival 
in 1964- split into two factions* The one led by 
Nasrullah Khan joined the P.D*M* in 1967» while the
/Continued over
436
The Democratic Action Committee became the central 
organisation directing the mass movement against the regime. 
But, as transpired later, the committee was too broadly 
based to keep all the opposition forces together for long 
or to give a clear direction to the movement. It, how­
ever, proved its ability to create disruptions in all spheres 
of life by calling for strikes and demonstrations, and 
thus to make things difficult for the government. On 
January 179 1969 * “Demands Day” was observed throughout the 
country on a call from the Action Committee. Clashes 
between students and police occurred in Dacca on that day 
and disturbances continued. The death of a student in Dacca 
on January 20 when the police opened fire aggravated the 
situation. Protest processions and demonstrations continued 
to be held every day and in almost all cases, ended in 
violence. The crowd on January 24, 1969 attacked the East 
Pakistan secretariat, ransacked and set on fire the offices 
of the Press Trust newspapers, the “Morning News” and the 
Bengali daily “Dainik Pakistan” and the house of a pro-Ayub 
member of the National Assembly. In dispersing the violent 
crowd the police had to resort to shooting, killing several 
people. Troops were called out and a curfew was imposed
Footnote 92 continued from previous page.
other led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman adhered to its six 
points demands. Now both factions joined the D.A.C. 
The parties which remained out were: The Pakistan
People1s Party and the National Awami Party (Bhashani 
group)•
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in the city#^
The insurrection spread to all cities and towns
throughout the country. In Karachi clashes occurred
between the police and demonstrators, where a curfew was 
04.
i m p o s e d # T h e  Army was called out in Karachi and Lahore 
to assist the civil administration# Reports of death and 
destruction caused by anti-government demonstrations were 
coming from all over the country, and the administration 
seemed incapable of coping with the grave situation, or 
restoring law and order# In the face of this violent and 
wanton destruction, the regime retreated# On January 27 
the Governor of West Pakistan said over the radio that the 
government was "willing to discuss any issue which are agi­
tating the minds of the people"#^5 ^ senior minister had
talks with the opposition leaders in Dacca and it was 
reported that the President would shortly send an invitation 
to opposition political leaders to attend a meeting in 
order to "thrash out with them the whole constitutional 
issue " # ^
95# Dawn, January 259 1969* 
94# Ibid., January 26, 1969* 
95• Ibid#, January 28, 1969* 
96# Ibid., January 50, 1969*
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The Round Table Conference
In his first-of-the-month broadcast on February 1, 
1969, President Ayub Khan announced that he would shortly 
invite the opposition leaders to a conference to discuss 
constitutional issues# The President said "The Consti­
tution is no word of God# It can be changed# It is not 
something immutable or static •#. I am always ready to welcome 
any sensible proposal to improve the present Constitution 
in the light of public opinion#" He continued
"During the last few days certain proposals have 
been put forward; obviously various aspects of 
the proposals will have to be considered and in 
this connection it would be necessary to exchange 
views and hold consultations with representatives 
of responsible political parties# Ity political 
party, my colleagues and I are ready to discuss 
the proposals; we shall have no hesitation in 
agreeing to any settlement that is arrived at 
through mutual discussion# For this purpose I 
shall shortly invite representatives of responsible 
political parties for talks." 97
So, after nearly seven years, the President agreed
to talk to the "so-called" leaders about changes in the
political system, that he had given the country in June,
1962# The President's announcement was generally welcomed
in the country, though his mention of representatives of
"responsible" political parties provoked some criticism#
The convener of the Democratic Action Committee, however,
97 • Full Text of President's Speech,
Dawn, February 2, 1969*
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required four conditions to be fulfilled "before any dialogue 
between the government and the opposition could he held*
They were the withdrawal of the declaration of emergency, 
the restoration of civil liberties, the lifting of curfews, 
and the immediate release of all political prisoners*
The President on February 5> 1969 wrote to Nawabzada Nasrullah 
Khan, the convener of the Democratic Action Committee, 
requesting him "to invite on my behalf whomsoever you like 
to attend a conference in Rawalpindi on the 17th of February, 
1969 at 10*00 a*m*, if this is suitable and convenient to 
you11* In the course of an interview with newspaper corres­
pondents, the President also expressed his willingness to 
meet party leaders outside the Democratic Action Committee 
such as the leaders of the National Awami Party (Maulana 
Bhashani's faction) and the People's Party, and independent
QQ
opposition leaders like Air Marshal Asghar Khan*" It was 
disclosed by the Central Law Minister that there would be 
no more action under the emergency laws and that the state 
of emergency would be lifted soon. The government began 
releasing political prisoners; and the ban on publication 
of the Dacca daily "Ittefaq" imposed in 1966, was withdrawn*^ 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was released from jail and put under
98. Dawn, February 2, 1969*
99* Ibid., February 6, 1969*
1* Ibid*, February 10, 1969*
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house arrest.
The executive of the Democratic Action Committee 
met in Dacca on the 9th and 10th of February to consider 
the invitation sent by the President. Its convener met 
the Awami League leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who, as an 
accused in the "Agartala Conspiracy" case, was in military 
custody in Dacca cantonment. It was reported that the 
Awami League, the most powerful party represented on the 
Committee, insisted that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman must be 
present at the talks and demanded that the "conspiracy" case 
should be withdrawn. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was reported 
to be unwilling to accept an offer of parole or personal 
amnesty and instructed his party to boycott the conference,
pif charges against all the accused people were not dropped. 
The President was reluctant to drop the case as "the case 
was one of conspiracy" involving the security of the country. 
The issue had nearly divided the Democratic Action Committee 
and created a deadlock in the holding of the round table 
conference.
On February 14, 1969* a. general strike was 
observed throughout the country at the call of the Democratic 
Action Committee to demonstrate the people's "solidarity in 
support of democracy". No newspapers were published on 
the following day. Disturbances took place in many places,
2. The Times (London), February 12, 1969#
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and in Karachi alone four persons were killed. On the same 
day the Law Minister declared that the emergency would 
cease on February 17; and Bhutto^Wali Khan and other 
politicians were released from detention. But on February 
15> 1969 Sergeant Zahurul Huq, an accused in the "Agartala 
Conspiracy11 case, in what was alleged to be an attempt to 
escape, was shot and killed by a sentry in the Dacca canton-
lL
ment. This incident caused a serious commotion among the 
people. Clashes occurred in the wake of his funeral 
procession in Dacca on February 16. The houses of three 
ministers and the State Guest House, where the chairman of 
the Special Tribunal trying the "conspiracy” case was 
living, were set on fire by violent crowds. Maulana 
Bhashani, leader of the left-wing National Awami Party, at 
a public meeting gave the government an "ultimatum" that, 
unless the students' demands were met within two months and 
the "conspiracy” case was withdrawn immediately, his party 
would launch a "violent movement” against the regime. The 
Maulana called for a general strike on the following day.^ 
Widespread rioting took place on that day and three persons 
were killed in Karachi, where a curfew was reimposed.
5. Dawn, February 16, 1969* 
4. Ibid.
5* Ibid., February 17* 1969*
6. Ibid., February 18, 1969•
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The Democratic Action Committee on February 16 
accepted the invitation of the President to attend the round 
table conference, as the pre-conditions were fulfilled and 
the government agreed "to make Mr Mujibur Rahman available 
for the conference”. The Committee suggested that invi­
tations should be sent to Maulana Bhashani, to Bhutto,
and to three independent leaders, ASghar Khan, Murshed and 
7
Azam Khan.' The President sent the invitations accordingly,
but Asghar Khan, Murshed and Azam Khan refused to attend,
unless Sheikh Mujibur Rahman also attended the conference,
while the latter would not attend unless the whole "conspiracy
case was dropped. Maulana Bhashani and Bhutto declined the
invitation ”as the exercise would be futile", unless the
3government accepted the "basic" demands. The law and
order situation continued to deteriorate throughout the
country. A teacher of Rajshahi University was shot on
February 18, 1969* when he went to the street to persuade
the students not to defy prohibitory orders. This led to
defiance of the curfew by students at Dacca and riots in
many other places. Several people were killed and wounded
by the police and the army during the four days of riots
q
and violent demonstrations which followed.
7* Dawn, February 17? 1969*
8. Ibid#, February 19* 1969*
9* Ibid.» February 20, 1969*
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The round table conference, the date of which was 
shifted from February 17 to February 19 on the DAC's request 
was postponed, as the opposition would only agree to send 
its convener, Nawazada Nasrullah Khan, to meet the President 
The Awami League refused to meet the President until the 
"Agartala Conspiracyw case was withdrawn.^ The govern­
ment's readiness to solicit the opposition's help and co­
operation was manifested when the pro-government press 
called for "national government", composed of moderate 
opposition leaders and members of Ayub Khan's nearly defunct 
Muslim League, who, it was suggested, could co-operate in 
getting over the "constitutional hurdles" and containing 
the upsurge of extremist forces. This gesture was seen as 
an indication that President Ayub Khan was prepared to con­
cede the opposition demands, including the grant of direct
adult franchise, if the right-wing opposition would support
11him in an interim national government. But the response
from the Opposition was not encouraging. It insisted on
the unconditional acceptance of its demands.
In the face of this situation, President Ayub Khan
12on the night of February 21, made "the ultimate sacrifice" 
to end fifteen weeks of agitation against his rule and
10. The Times (London), February 20, 1969•
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., February 22, 1969*
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announced that he would not contest the presidential
election in the following year* In a nation-wide radio
broadcast President Ayub Khan summarised the popular
grievances by saying:
"I am fully conscious of the dissatisfaction that 
exists in the country with the present system of 
elections; people want direct elections on the 
basis of adult franchise* I realise also that 
the intelligentsia feels left out and wants a 
greater say in the affairs of the State*
People in East Pakistan feel that in the present 
system they are not equal partners and also that
they do not have full control over the affairs of
their province* There is also the feeling that 
the National and Provincial Assemblies do not 
possess the powers they are entitled to have 
under a democratic system*” 13
In order to find an agreed solution to these problems,
the President had convened the round table conference*
The agreed formula would then go to the National Assembly
for enactment. If the round table conference failed to
reach an agreement, the President said that he would then
place directly before the people his own constitutional
proposals* Regarding his retirement the President said
”1 have decided to announce today that I shall not be a
candidate in the next elections. The decision is final
and irrevocable. All doubts, suspicions and misgivings
must end with this announcement.” At the end of his speech
the President said that he was trying to remove ”difficulties
13# Full Text of President's address,
Dawn, February 22, 1969 at p* 7*
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which had delayed the holding of the round table conference, 
so that all political parties and leaders could participate 
in it.
The President's speech indicated that he had
clearly and correctly identified the problems which he was
ready to remedy. It also indicated that the last hurdle
in holding talks between the government and the opposition,
the ”Agartala Conspiracy” ease, would soon be removed.
The Ordinance establishing the Sp'ecial Tribunal for trial
14of the case was repealed on February 22, 1969 "on the 
ground that the restoration of the fundamental rights 
[following the lifting of emergency] had cast doubts on 
the validity of the Ordinance”.1^ All the accused in the 
case were released from military custody on the same day.
The government's surrender to this last but most crucial 
demand showed that they were ready to concede to all con­
stitutional demands, once the opposition united to place 
them on the negotiating table. But signs of division 
within the opposition had already appeared and their 
differences on basic political issues were clearly manifest 
in the proceedings of the round table conference.
In spite of Maulana Bhashani's refusal to attend
14. Criminal Law Amendment (Special Tribunal) (Repeal) 
Ordinance, 1969 (VIII of 1969)*
P.L.D. 1969 Central Statutes 124.
15* S.M. Zafar, Through the Crisis, p. 90.
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the talks unless the students' demands were met, and
Bhutto's unwillingness to go to the round table conference
16"as a passive observer", the conference between the 
government and the opposition opened on February 26 and sat 
for only forty minutes; then, on a request made by the 
convener of the Democratic Action Committee, it was adjourned 
till March 10* Before the conference met again, a split 
within the opposition was reported on the issue of repre­
sentation on the basis of population at the centre, regional 
autonomy, and the dismemberment of West Pakistan. One 
section of the Democratic Action Committee maintained that 
these three matters, as well as direct elections and
parliamentary government were not negotiable and must be
17accepted, subject to working out of the details. f
The round table conference reassembled on March 10 
and the convener of the Democratic Action Committee put 
forward the two agreed demands of the opposition. They 
were, first, the country should have a federal, parlia­
mentary system of government with regional autonomy, and 
second, the assemblies should be elected on the basis of 
direct adult franchise. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented
another set of demands based on his party's six-point pro- 
18gramme. He was supported by some East Pakistani delegates
16. Dawn, February 25* 1969.
17* Ibid., March 9> 1969.
18. Ibid.» March 11, 1969.
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and also "by the Frontier leader, Wall Khan, who demanded 
that Vest Pakistan must he disintegrated forthwith and that 
a decision must be taken on the issue of representation on 
a population basis. He said that "if we keep these issues 
open for the next elections, they will harm our body 
p o l i t i c " O t h e r  Vest Pakistan Opposition leaders were, 
however, not willing to discuss or decide the issues at the 
conference table, and insisted on the President’s acceptance 
of the two agreed demands.
The Conference came to sin end on March 13 * 1969*
with the President announcing the acceptance of the proposals
for direct adult franchise and a parliamentary system of
government. In a written statement to the delegates the
President said that the unresolved issues could be settled
by the representatives of the people, to be elected by
20direct adult franchise. Vhile most of the Democratic 
Action Committee leaders welcomed the President's announce­
ment, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman said that he and his party 
would work "peacefully and constitutionally" for the 
realisation of the remaining demands, complete regional 
autonomy, dismemberment of Vest Pakistan and representation 
on the basis of population. Vali Khan, describing the 
President's announcement as "historic", said that a decision
19* S.M. Zafar, Through the Crisis, p. 155*
20. Dawn, March 14, 1969*
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should have "been taken on the issues of the dismemberment
21of West Pakistan and regional autonomy* After the con­
clusion of the round table conference the Democratic Action 
Committee was declared dissolved by its convener ”as its 
task had been accomplished” •
The Awami League of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had 
earlier severed its connection with the Democratic Action 
Committee on the ground that the latter had "failed” to 
support the basic demands of the people, and was not 
pledged to continue to work for their realisation* Maulana 
Bhashani, who had declined the invitation of the President 
to attend the conference, said that the President’s accep­
tance of the two demands mentioned above would not solve 
the problems confronting the masses* He declared that his 
party would continue the struggle till all the students1 
and people’s demands had been met. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the outcome of the round 
table conference and demanded that Ayub Khan should step 
down in favour of a neutral caretaker government, which 
should hold elections to a constituent assembly on the basis
of direct adult franchise, to frame a fresh constitution
22for the country.
After the President’s announcement, it was expected
21. Dawn, March 14, 1969.
22. Ibid.
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that law and order would be restored. But, instead of 
appreciating what had been achieved, the opposition leaders, 
with a few exceptions, directed attention to the issues 
which had not been tackled at the conference. Bhutto and 
Maulana Bhashani were openly against making constitutional 
amendments incorporating the agreement reached. The 
situation continued to deteriorate daily; there was com­
plete disruption of normal life throughout the country, due 
to strikes by government servants, doctors, factory and 
transport workers. Serious clashes were reported, not 
only between the demonstrators and the security forces,
but between workers and supporters of different parties.
Appeals for peace by different leaders .were of no avail. 
Certain leaders, however, would not admit the existence of 
any danger in this absolutely abnormal situation. Bhutto, 
commenting on it said,
”The law and order situation has deteriorated 
because the people have risen in revolt against 
the regime. Normal conditions can arise in 
the country only after the rejected regime steps
aside. The people of the country have not shown
alarm over the situation. Only the regime and 
handful of vested interests are alarmed and they 
are determined to frustrate the struggle of the p, 
people for better economic and social conditions.” ^
It was reported that the government had finalised 
its proposals to amend the Constitution in accordance with
24the President’s announcement at the round table conference.
25. Dawn, March 23, 1969.
24. Ibid., March 18, 1969*
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But due to utter lawlessness prevailing in the country and 
the high emotion with which the political atmosphere was 
charged, it was generally felt that the round table conference 
had failed and that the implementation of the agreed formula 
by an amendment of the Constitution would not help to 
restore normality. When the President resigned and handed 
over power to the army on March 25, 1969, that fear was 
vindicated and the work of the round table conference was 
shown to have been done in vain.
m
Collapse of the Civil administration
The round table conference convened by President 
Ayub Khan to resolve constitutional issues with the oppo­
sition seemed doomed to failure even before the conference 
had actually started. As soon as it was clear that the 
President was prepared to concede the opposition demands, 
basic differences among the opposition leaders on other 
political issues became manifest. The Democratic Action 
Committee, when deliberating on its policy when dealing with 
the President, had been unable to reach agreement about 
demands for regional autonomy, representation on population 
basis and the dismemberment of West Pakistan. This dis­
agreement among the leaders of the movement and the deter­
mination of a few of them to continue the struggle for the 
realisation of these demands did not help to abate the law­
lessness in the country; in fact it aggravated the whole
451
situation.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, on returning to Dacca
after the round table conference, said that, had other East
Pakistan delegates supported him in his demands for East
Pakistan’s cause, the President would have been compelled
to accept them. He gave the names of the delegates who,
he alleged, had not given their support.^ This statement,
made at a time when the political atmosphere was extremely
hot, naturally enraged East Pakistani sentiment against these
leaders. One of them, Mahmud Ali, on his return from West
Pakistan, was allegedly kidnapped by Bengali extremists
26and later rescued by the police. Members of the Rational
Assembly belonging to the Awami League, on instructions from
Sheikh Mugibur Rahman, drafted a constitution amendment
Bill, incorporating the party's six-point programme and
submitted it to the Assembly secretariat to be considered
at its next session.^ This move on the part of the Awami
League was seen as the party's strategy "to seek to achieve
through private members' Bills in the National Assembly what
28it has failed to achieve at the round table conference"•
25* Dawn, March 15, 1969*
26. Ibid., March 25, 1969.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., March 15, 1969.
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In West Pakistan, for the smaller units the 
burning issues were dismemberment of the province and 
regional autonomy. A prominent Sind leader, Z.H. Lari, 
regretted that these "problems of explosive nature" had 
not been settled at the round table conference. Lari parti­
cularly blamed Chaudhri Mohammad Ali who, according to 
Lari, ignored the unanimous decision of the LAC sub-committee 
and "sought shelter behind technicalities to perpetuate 
injustice committed by him in the past".^ The Sind anti- 
one unit Front leader, G.M. Syed, outlined an eight-point 
programme to implement the break-up of the province. It 
was also reported that six members of the National Assembly 
from Sind would move a Bill in the next session of the 
Assembly, to disintegrate West Pakistan. The draft Bill 
was released to the press.^ Wali Khan, the North-West 
Frontier leader warned that failure to break up West 
Pakistan before the elections would create serious problems 
in the country. He demanded an immediate break-up.
Public demonstrations in support of these demands 
in both wings created an extremely dangerous situation. 
Demonstrators attacked everything that symbolised authority, 
damaged public buildings and other properties and set them
29* Dawn, March 16, 1969.
30. Ibid., March 16, 1969*
31* Ibid., March 20, 1969*
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on fire, clashed violently with each other, and attacked
persons of known loyalty to the regime.
The situation was further aggravated by the cam­
paign of those who had refused to participate in the round 
table conference. Maulana Bhashani about this time came
to West Pakistan on a tour. In Lahore he said that
piecemeal amendment of the Constitution would only enhance 
bitterness, and demanded a settlement of the constitutional 
and economic issues on socialistic lines.^ In reply 
Maulana Maudoodi of the orthodox Jamaat-i-Islami called on 
members of his party to form committees to "smother the 
tongue” that uttered the word "socialism”. ^  Two days 
later Maulana Bhashani was attacked by four youths at Sahiwal 
in a railway carriage. A general strike on March 17 was 
observed in East Pakistan and places in West Pakistan to 
protest against the assault on Maulana Bhashani.*^ The 
Maulana said in Karachi that elections would not be allowed 
to be held in the country, until all the demands of the 
people were accepted. He said that the polling booths 
would be burnt and those who participated in the elections 
would do so at the risk of their houses being burnt. The 
Maulana advised the government and the industrialists to 
accept the demands of workers and students, otherwise workers
32. Dawn, March 15, 1969*
33. Ibid.
34-* Ibid., March 18, 1969•
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would be compelled to take "drastic action" to get their
demands a c c e p t e d H e  said that the time had come for
the common man to take up arms and step up their struggle
36against the "capitalists and imperialists".^
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who had great influence
over the younger people in West Pakistan, was openly
opposed to the implementation of any constitutional formula
by amendment of the 1962 Constitution. He demanded the
immediate resignation of President Ayub Khan, followed by
elections to a constituent assembly, which should frame a
constitution for the country. He rejected the government's
claim to be endeavouring to effect a peaceful transfer of
power. Commenting on the suggestion that a "broad-based"
cabinet should be appointed, Bhutto said that it would be
"illogical and immoral" that a person who had been rejected
by the people should be the head of any cabinet, and
accused the government of encouraging civil war in the
country Referring to the Home Minister's warning of
s t e m  action against the law-breakers, Bhutto said,
"The Home Minister has threatened the people with 
dire consequences, but he should remember that 
these threats have failed to intimidate the people 
who are struggling for their rights. The regime
35• Dawn, March 18, 1969.
36. Ibid., March 19, 1969.
37* Ibid., March 17t 1969*
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is again lifting its head to repeat its past 
follies, only because a part of the opposition 
has come to a tacit agreement with the regime 
at the cost of the people." 33
The policy pursued by these opposition leaders and 
their public statements were not calculated to stop 
insurrection; in fact they were likely to provoke breaches 
of the peace and disturbances of public order. The 
situation was made worse by the public statements of 
members of President Ayub Khan's own party. These men had 
given unqualified support to the regime throughout, but 
now, under pressure from opponents of the regime, they 
expressed critical opinions on highly controversial issues. 
In mid-February thirty-seven members of the ruling party in 
the National Assembly and the East Pakistan Assembly issued 
a statement demanding, in essence, a parliamentary form of 
government and representation on the basis of population 
at the centre. The statement also roundly blamed the 
East Pakistan Governor for his "provocations, misjudgment 
and mishandling" of the situation, which had led to so much 
bloodshed and large-scale damage to property. J About the 
same time, five Muslim League members of the National 
Assembly from Sind submitted a memorandum to the President, 
urging the dismemberment of West Pakistan, as experience
38. Dawn, March 23» 1969*
39* Ibid., February 11, 1969*
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had shown the miserable failure of the merger of the former
provinces, which had caused discontent among the people of
40the smaller units*
All these declarations might have been made "in
order to save one1 s life and property11 - as one member of
41the government party said* But there is no denying the
fact that the whole ruling junta had become demoralised and
the administrative machine , was not capable of coping with the
fast-deteriorating situation* The Governors of the
42provinces were thoroughly discredited* The people had
lost all confidence in the government’s capacity to maintain
law and order and nobody heeded its appeals to keep the
45peace* Though the two Governors were replaced later, , 
the new appointments came too late to stem the tide of 
events.
All-round chaos and disturbance prevailed through­
out the country* Killing, arson and looting were on the 
increase* A report from East Pakistan published in The 
Times on March 20, 1969 said that "an unchecked reign of 
terror is rapidly spreading through the rural areas of East
40. Dawn, February 12, 1969*
41. S*M. Zafar, Through the Crisis, p. 176*
42. Ibid., p. 178.
43 • New Governors were sworn in on March 20 and March 23» 
1969 in West Pakistan and East Pakistan respectively*
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Pakistan, where hundreds of villages have been razed;
thousands of Bengalis have been left homeless, and more than
150 people have been slaughtered during 10 days of mob
executions,11 The targets, according to the report, were
in most cases thieves or suspected criminals, who bolstered
up the ruling Muslim League's authority in the rural areas#
The villagers turned on unpopular police officials, rent
collectors and the basic democrats# In many villages
students set up "people's courts" to fine basic democrats
and supporters of the ruling party# Police stations
were attacked and officials clubbed to death. Industry,
commerce and government business had come to a standstill#
The situation was no better in cities#
"Abdul Monem Khan, the Governor, has not ventured 
out of his residence for several weeks; his writ 
does not extend beyond his office walls, while a 
police uniform has not been seen in the streets 
of Dacca for a fortnight." 44-
In West Pakistan the condition was not different# 
Clashes between rival political groups, demonstrations and 
strikes of all kinds of people, including government 
servants, continued apace# Houses belonging to basic 
democrats and government supporters were set on fire# The 
President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry disclosed 
that in Karachi alone 1000 million rupees were lost in
44# The Times (London), March 20, 1969#
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monetary terms during the previous five months.^ The 
Home Minister on March 19 gave a grim picture of the 
situation in the country. He confirmed that murder, arson, 
looting and intimidation of government servants were taking 
place. Economic life had been paralysed and labour unrest 
was fast spreading. Politicians were instructing mobs to 
shout the slogans •Gherao* and ■Jalao1. The forces of 
disruption and disintegration were on the rampage and a 
general feeling of insecurity and uncertainty had gripped 
the country. The minister described the prevailing con­
dition as "much worse11 than it was on October 7* 1958. He 
said that generally speaking there was no law and order in 
the country; "mob rule is the order of the day".^
Some efforts were made by certain leaders and 
students to stop the insurrection and restore peace and 
order# But their efforts had no effect on the frenzy that 
possessed the people. Accusations were made of the 
absence of effort by government to contain the upsurge.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman expressed his "unqualified condemnation
45# Dawn, March 22, 1969♦
46. "Gherao" literally means "encirclement" but is used as 
a special teim meaning confinement of government 
officials or factory managers to their offices, some­
times without food or water, till they gave in to 
employees1 demands. "Jalao" means "burning out" and 
is used to mean burning of factories or offices to 
terrorise employers into accepting employees1 demands.
47. Dawn, March 20, 1969*
459
for the situation which has heen created by the total abdi­
cation of the Administration of the responsibility for pro­
tecting the rights of the ordinary citizens*11 He called 
upon all democratic forces Vigorously to work for the
maintenance of peace and protection of the rights of the
4-8citizens"• The chairman of the All-Party Students* 
Action Committee of East Pakistan criticised Maulana 
Bhashani for preaching violence, and appealed for peace*
In West Pakistan the Pakistan Democratic Movement leaders, 
Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, Mumtaz 
Daultana aind Maulana Maudoodi appealed for restoration of 
"peace and tranquillity"* Dacca lawyers took out a 
procession in support of peace and held a meeting which 
passed a resolution appealing for maintenance of law and 
order*^
But all these activities proved futile, though 
signs of improvement appeared on the eve of the imposition 
of military rule* The country was just not in the mood 
to return to sanity* The machinery of the civil adminis­
tration appeared to be totally exhausted and incapable of 
re-asserting itself after it had collapsed in the face of 
total defiance of its authority* The regime had lost all 
hopes of restoring order and normality* The only other
48* Dawn, March 20, 1969#
4-9* Ibid*, March 21, 1969*
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alternative was to call in the army and hand over the
country to it*
The conditions prevailing in Pakistan on March 25»
1969 no doubt warranted drastic action* But there were
some among the opposition who alleged that
"the serious situation as regards law and order, 
aggravated by the complete withdrawal of the
police and armed forces in recent weeks, was
created specially by the establishment to justify 
martial law* Sindhis, Baluchis, Bengalis and 
Pathans will see the decision as a conspiracy 
of bureaucracy, industry, and particularly the 
Punjab, to re-establish the traditional power 
structure of Pakistan which was threatened in 
recent months•" 50
Whatever might have been the reason, the situation undoubt­
edly called for a declaration of martial law, as understood
in the conventional sense. If "martial law" of 1956 had
little semblance of justification, martial law in 1969 was 
certainly, beyond any question, justified*
Thus the movement sparked off by students' agitation 
in November, 1968 and later utilized and strengthened by 
the opposition for political purposes, was successful in 
compelling the Ayub regime to abdicate, but failed to bring 
about any positive victory in the form of a political 
solution to the problems facing the country* The opposition 
could not consolidate its achievements at the round table 
conference, due, mainly, to its own divisions and weakness*
50. The Times, March 27» 1969*
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The Democratic Action Committee, with the leaders of which 
the President negotiated, was organised by the opposition 
leaders in January 1969, in the midst of violent disturbances 
throughout the country, when emotion, rather than practical 
thinking, ran high. In their strong antagonism to the 
regime the opposition leaders had been able to sink only 
temporarily their own basically different attitudes towards 
different constitutional and political issues; they were 
united on the sole aim of dislodging the regime. The 
Action Committee thus accommodated heterogeneous elements 
like the "Council" Muslim League and Jamaat-i-Islami, both 
of which wanted a strong centre, and the six-point Awami 
League, which wanted complete autonomy for the units* It 
was, therefore, not unexpected that they should fall apart 
as soon as their common enemy was eliminated from the scene.
By the time it became apparent that the Ayub system 
was on the verge of collapse, the infighting among the 
opposition parties on their diverse attitudes to different 
problems became manifest. The Democratic Action Committee 
proved incapable of containing the strong feelings of its 
constituent parties and failed to produce agreed solutions 
on the issues. This disagreement, clearly manifest by 
each individual party's commitments to continue the struggle, 
was thoroughly exploited by the forces opposed to any 
settlement by agreement reached at the round table conference 
The Democratic Action Committee miserably failed to give
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proper direction to the movement calculated to ensure unity 
of purpose. Due to ohvious differences among its con­
stituent parties, it had to be dissolved when it was most 
needed to secure united action to restore peace and order*
It may be argued that even a united attempt by the leaders 
of the Democratic Action Committee would have been frustrated 
by the forces belonging to Bhutto's and Maulana Bhashani's 
parties* But a forceful re-assertion of power by the 
administration in full co-operation with the Action Com­
mittee opposition parties would have had a good chance of 
restoring law and order* But due to internal rifts in 
the opposition, like the regime, it succumbed to insur­
rection, which it had encouraged but which it was now 
incapable of controlling* The Pakistan politicians, once 
again, proved their failure to find a solution to the con­
stitutional problems which had been facing the country since 
its incepifion* Their reluctance to understand each other's 
points of view coupled with total lack of imagination and 
foresight created a situation in March, 1969, in which 
martial law became inevitable.
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Chapter XI 
Martial Law in 1969
The Presidents resignation and declaration of martial law
In the evening of March 25, 1969? General A.M. Yahya 
Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, by a 
proclamation, declared the abrogation of the Constitution' 
of 1962 and imposed martial law throughout the country. 
Earlier, on March 24-, President Ayub Khan had addressed a 
letter to General Yahya Khan, in which the President des­
cribed the chaotic situation prevailing in the country, 
his attempts to restore order, and having concluded that 
these attempts had failed and the civil administration 
collapsed, conveyed his decision to hand over power to the 
armed forces. The President in his letter"*" explained his 
attempts to resolve the crisis that was raging throughout 
the country from one end to the other by all possible civil 
and constitutional means. He said that he offered to meet 
,fall those regarded as leaders of the people11 in a con­
ference and, when assembled, asked them to evolve an agreed 
formula. But due to their internal differences, they 
could only agree on two points. The President said,
1. Pull Text of the Presidents letter,
Dawn, March 26, 1969•
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MI accepted "both of them. I then offered that 
the unagreed issues should all be referred to 
the representatives of the people, after they had 
been elected on the basis of direct adult fran­
chise. Ily argument was that the delegates in 
the conference, who had not been elected by the 
people, could not arrogate to themselves the 
authority to decide all civil and constitutional 
issues, including those on which even they are not 
agreed among themselves.”
The President said that he had decided to call
the ITational Assembly to consider the two agreed points, but
"it soon became obvious that this would be an 
exercise in futility. The members of the 
Assembly are no longer free agents and there is 
no likelihood of the agreed two points being 
faithfully adopted. Indeed, members are being 
threatened and compelled either to boycott the 
session or to move such amendments as would 
liquidate the Central Government, make the main­
tenance of the Armed Forces impossible, divide 
the economy of the country and break' up'Pakistan 
into little bits and pieces. Calling the Assembly 
in such chaotic conditions can only aggravate the 
situation. How can anyone deliberate coolly and 
dispassionately on fundamental problems under 
threat of instant violence?”
The President said that it was beyond the capacity of the
civil government to deal with the prevailing complex
situation and that the Defence Forces must step in.
President Ayub Khan, continuing, said that every 
single instrument of administration, and every medium of 
expression of sane public opinion was subjected to "inhuman 
pressure”. The economic life of the country had all but 
collapsed. In such circumstances the President had come 
to the conclusion that "all civil administration and con­
stitutional authority in the country had become ineffective.
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If the situation continues to deteriorate at the present
alarming rate, all economic life, indeed, civilised existence
will become impossible." The President continued,
"I am left with no option but to step aside and 
leave it to the Defence Porces of Pakistan, 
which today represent the only effective and 
legal instrument, to take over full control of 
the affairs of the country They alone can 
restore sanity and put the country back on the 
road to progress in a civil and constitutional 
manner.n
On the eve of the declaration of martial law on
March 25? 1969> President Ayub Khan explained the situation
2
in a radio broadcast to the nation. He repeated most of 
what he had written to General Yahya Khan and said that, 
after his, announcement. of retirement on Pebruary 21, he .had. . 
hoped that the situation would improve. But the condition 
continued to deteriorate from bad to worse. The President 
referred to the round table conference, his acceptance of 
the two agreed demands of the opposition and proposed that 
the issues, on which no agreement had been reached, should be 
left for decision by a directly elected Assembly. "But 
this proposal,M said the President, "was not acceptable to 
the political leaders. Every one of them was insisting for 
the immediate acceptance of their demands without even 
waiting for the election of the people's representatives."
2. Pull Text of the President's address,
Dawn, March 26, 1969*
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The President maintained that the acceptance of 
all these demands would spell the liquidation of the country. 
He reminded his listeners, nI have always told you that 
Pakistan's salvation lay in a strong centre. I accepted 
the parliamentary system, because in this way also there 
was a possibility of preserving a strong centre." He 
continued, "But now it is being said that the country should 
be divided into two parts. The centre should be rendered 
ineffective and a powerless institution. The defence 
services should be crippled and the political entity of 
West Pakistan be done away with." The President declared 
that it was impossible for him "to preside over the des­
truction of oUr country". The integrity of the country 
should take precedence over everything else and fundamental 
and basic constitutional issues could only be settled in a 
peaceful atmosphere, which was completely absent. He 
admitted that
"the situation now is no longer under the con­
trol of the Government. All Government 
institutions have become victims of coercion, 
fear and intimidation. Every principle, 
restraint and way of civilised existence 
has been abandoned. Every problem of the 
country is being decided in the streets.
Except for the armed forces, there is no con­
stitutional and effective way to meet the 
situation."
In view of these circumstances, the President said 
that he had decided to hand over power to General Yahya 
Khan, who had the Navy and the Air Porce with him. The
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President thought the army should he allowed to "carry out 
freely their legal duties" without any impediment, and, in 
view of this, he decided to relinquish the office of Presi­
dent. Thus President Ayub Khanfs period of power ended in 
a nation-wide insurrection; it began over ten years 
previously in a time of internal political crisis manoeivred 
by his predecessor, President Iskandar Mirza.
Shortly after Ayub Khan's speech, General Yahya 
Khan issued a proclamation, placing the whole country under 
martial lav/ and assuming to himself "the powers of the Chief 
liartial Law Administrator and the command of all the Armed 
Forces of Pakistan". The proclamation said that Martial 
Lav/ Regulations and Orders would be made by the Chief Martial 
Lav/ Administrator or any person or authority empowered by 
him; contravention of the Regulations would be punished by 
Military Courts set up by the Regulations and duly authorised 
ordinary criminal courts. The Constitution of 1962 was 
declared abrogated, but all laws in force immediately before 
the abrogation v/ere continued. All existing courts and 
tribunals would continue to exercise the same pov/ers and 
jurisdiction as before, but no court was to call in question 
any Martial Law Regulation or Order or any judgment of any 
Military Court, and no writ or order was to be issued against 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator or any person exercising
5. For full text of the Proclamation, see Appendix VI
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powers under his authority.
Under the proclamation, the persons holding office 
as President, the Governors, and members of their Councils 
of Ministers ceased to hold such offices, and the Rational 
Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies were dissolved.
With those exceptions, all persons holding offices or who 
were in the service of Pakistan, unless otherwise directed 
by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, were to continue in 
their offices or service, and all other authorities con­
stituted or established under the Constitution were to 
exercise their normal powers and perform their normal 
functions. The proclamation, therefore, by abrogating the 
Constitution of 1962, abolished the legal order established 
by it. But it required the administrative and judicial 
machinery to function normally, subject to the direction, 
and with the support, of the martial law authorities. In 
the face of the nationwide chaos and disturbances, Martial 
Law Regulations and Orders would be issued with a view to 
stop insurrection and restore peace and order.
On the day following the proclamation of martial 
law, General Yahya Khan, now the Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces and the Chief Martial Lax/ Administrator, in a
4. Contrast the proclamation of October 7> 1956? which did 
not make any provision regarding the existing laws and 
the courts.
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broadcast^ to the nation, referred to the chaotic situation
in which President Ayub Khan had called upon him to carry
out his ’’prime duty” to save the country from disaster.
He said that the army had hoped that ’sanity would prevail”
and the extreme step of declaring martial law would not be
necessary. But shattering this hope the situation had
drifted from bad to worse; the normal methods of law
enforcement had proved ineffective and had almost completely
broken down. The General said that the armed forces had
to step in to save the country from ’’utter disaster”. His
sole aim in imposing martial law was ”to protect life,
liberty and property of the people and put the administration
back, on the. rails”.. He said...............................
"My first and foremost task as the Ghief Martial 
Law Administrator, therefore, is to bring back 
sanity and ensure that the Administration resumes . 
its normal functions to the satisfaction of the 
people. We have had enough of administrative 
laxity and chaos and I shall see to it that 
this is not repeated in any form or manner.”
As for his oxm and his administration1s role in 
establishing the future constitutional structure, the General 
said
”1 wish to make it absolutel;/ clear to you that 
I have no ambition other than the creation of 
conditions conducive to the establishment of a 
constitutional government. It is my firm 
belief that a sound, clean and honest adminis­
tration is a prerequisite for sane and
5. Pull Text of the Speech, Dawn, March 27  ^ 1969.
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constructive political life and for the smooth 
transfer of power to the representatives of the 
people, elected freely and impartially on the 
basis of adult franchise. It will be the task 
of these elected representatives to give the 
country a workable constitution and find a 
solution of all other political, economic and 
social problems that have been agitating the 
minds of the people.”
But the Chief Martial Lav; Administrator warned that the 
country was passing through the most fateful period of its 
history. "The recent events have dealt a serious blow to 
our national prestige and progress. The Martial Law 
Administration cannot and will not tolerate agitational and 
destructive activities of any kind.”^
So, unlike his predecessor, General Ayub Khan, 
who, on the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956 just over 
ten years earlier, took upon himself the task of designing 
and putting into operation a kind of demo era; cy, which "the 
people can understand and work”, General Yahya Khanfs 
announcement made it clear that it would be for the people*s 
representatives "to give the country a workable constitution” 
The Martial Lav; Administration would ensure that conditions 
for their election prevailed in the country and the adminis­
tration functioned honestly, impartially and effectively.
The General, differing from Ayub Khan, significantly did 
not put any blame on the politicians for the existing serious 
situation in the country, but he expressed his determination
6. Dawn, March 27? 1969*
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to put an end to chaos and disturbances and to restore nor­
mality. All political activities were banned, but the 
political parties were not abolished. This was indicative 
of the regime's intention to allow political activities, 
once peace and order were restored. Contrary to the fears 
felt in some quarters, the imposition of martial law was 
followed by the immediate re-establishment of order.
Virtually all the strikers returned to work peacefully on 
March 26. Schools, colleges and universities reopened 
after months of inactivity; and the martial law authorities 
encouraged and took steps which helped to secure a quick 
return to normality. Certain concessions were made to 
students and .it was. announced. that. wage. agreements, made, 
before martial law was proclaimed, would generally be honoured
There was no press censorship except for military details
7about deployment and units.
Five days after the imposition of martial law
throughout the country, the Chief Martial Law Administrator,
8General Yahya Khan, on March 31 "by a proclamation assumed 
the office of President, left, vacant since President Ayub 
Khan relinquished the same on March 25? 1969* Ho maintain 
continuity,, his assumption of the presidential office was 
made retrospectively effective since it fell vacant. In a
7* Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969-70? P* 23357*
8. Text of the Proclamation,
P.L.D. 1969 Central Statutes 4-1*
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separate press note the reasons for the Ghief Adminis­
trator^ assumption of presidential office was explained.
The press note pointed out that certain functions such as 
the certification of budgets, issue of laws and ordinances, 
confirmation of appointments could only be performed by 
the President as Head of State. Similarly in international 
relations, only the President was competent to receive and 
issue certain documents, appoint representatives abroad, 
receive foreign envoys and ratify international treaties 
and agreements. It was
nfor the performance of essential acts of State, 
that the Chief Martial Law Administrator, in his 
capacity of Head of State and Administration, is 
required to perform, it is necessary that he 
should have a designation, which enables him to 
discharge these responsibilities within the 
framework of the countryfs laws and in accordance 
with the requirements of international practice 
and usage.11 9
To keep in step with what was being done at the 
centre, the President and the Chief Martial Law Adminis­
trator, by a notification,^ on April 10, 1969* directed 
that the Zonal Martial Law Administrators of East and West 
Pakistan would exercise all powers and perform all functions 
of the provincial Governors under the Constitution of 1962. 
The order was to be deemed as effective retrospectively since 
March 25, when the Constitution was abrogated. These
9. Dawn, April 1, 1969•
10. P.L.D. 1969 Central Statutes 62.
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measures enabled the Chief Martial Law Administrator and 
the Zonal Martial Law Administrators to function as heads 
of the central and provincial administrations respectively 
and, as such, exercise powers in accordance with the 
provisions of the abrogated Constitution.
The Martial Law regime
In administering martial law the Yahya Khan 
regime followed the precedent established by Ayub Khan's 
administration during the martial law period of 1958-1962. 
Martial Law Regulations and Martial Law Orders were issued 
by the Chief Martial Law Administrator or Zonal Adminis­
trators. But the Regulations and Orders made by the Chief 
Administrator took precedence over those made by other 
authorities. By the first of these Regulations the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator appointed three Deputy Chief 
Martial Law Administrators, two being the chiefs of the air 
and naval forces and the third the senior-most general in 
the army. Each of the two provinces was placed under a 
Zonal Administrator, who was authorised to issue Martial 
Law Regulations and Orders.^ Breach of these regulations 
was to be met with punishments which ranged from death,
12imprisonment, whipping and fine to forfeiture of property.
11. Martial Law Regulation (M.L.R.) No. 1.
12. M.L.R. No. 4-.
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By one of these regulations, criticism of the
imposition of martial law or its operation, bringing into
contempt or hatred or exciting disaffection towards the
Chief Martial Law Administrator or any martial law authority
was made punishable by a sentence of ten years1 imprison- 
13ment.  ^ As in the earlier martial law period the term
"recalcitrant" was defined to include "any external enemy
of Pakistan and mutineers or rebels or rioters and enemy 
14agents". Assisting in any way or harbouring a recalci-
15trant was punishable with death, ^ while withholding
information about a recalcitrant was punishable with four-
16teen years' imprisonment. It may be noted that until the
beginning of 1971 no-one was prosecuted under these regu­
lations .
Because martial law was proclaimed to suppress a 
nation-wide insurrection, it was provided that the crimes
17of looting, arson or dacoity would be punished with death. f 
Spreading reports to create alarm or despondency amongst 
the public, or to create dissatisfaction towards the armed
13. M.L.R. Mo. 6.
14. M.L.R. Mo. 7; cf* M.L.R. Mo. 3 (1953).
15. M.L.R. Mo. 10; cf. M.L.R. Mos. 6 and 7 (1958).
16. M.L.R. Mo. 13.
17. M.L.R. Mo. 9.
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forces was made punishable with imprisonment of up to
*1 Q
fourteen years. Strikes, lock-outs and agitations in
educational institutions and industrial concerns were pro­
hibited; contravention could be visited with fourteen
19years1 imprisonment. J Giving false evidence or refusal
to give evidence in any investigation or trial held under
martial law regulations was made punishable by imprisonment
20for fourteen years. Smuggling of goods, helping a
smuggler and withholding or failing to render a report
21regarding a smuggler carried the death sentence. Pro­
vision was made for rewarding an informant about smuggling
or black-marketing out of the fine realised from the 
22convict, but false information to acquire any advantage
23was punishable with imprisonment for five years. ^
As in 1958> special courts with criminal juris­
diction, namely Special Military Courts and Summary Military
Courts, were established to enforce the martial law regu-
24lations and also to try offences under the ordinary law.
18. M.L.R. No. 17; cf. M.L.R. No. 24 (1958).
19. M.L.R. No. 18; cf. M.L.R. No. 29 (1958).
20. M.L.R. No. 15; cf. M.L.R. No. 19 (1958) which pro-
vided for death sentence for similar offence.
21. M.L.R. No. 25; cf. M.L.R. No. 27 (1958).
22. M.L.R. No. 51.
25. M.L.R. No'. 27.
24. M.L.R. No. 2.
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An Administrator of Martial Law was empowered to convene a 
Special Military Court, which was to be constituted in the 
same manner, to have the same powers and to follow the 
same procedure as a Field General Court Martial under the 
Pakistan Army Act, 1952. A magistrate of the first class 
or a session judge could be appointed a member of such a 
court. It had the power to pass any sentence authorised 
by lav/ or by the regulations; a death sentence, however, 
required confirmation by the Chief Martial Law Administrator. 
A magistrate of the first class, or any military, naval or 
air force officer, could be empowered to hold a Summary 
Military Court to exercise the same powers as a Summary 
Court Martial under the Army Act. It had power to pass any 
sentence authorised by law or by the regulations, except a 
sentence of death, transportation, imprisonment exceeding 
one year, or whipping exceeding fifteen stripes. The pro­
ceedings of every Summary Court were to be forwarded for 
review to the Administrator of Martial Law of the area in 
which the trial was held.
Besides these Military Courts, the ordinary 
criminal courts, as by law established, v/ere to exercise 
their existing jurisdiction to try all offences not con­
nected with the disturbances preceding martial law. But 
they were empowered to try cases connected with those dis­
turbances, if they were transferred to them for trial under
477
25the martial law regulations, ^ A Zonal Martial Law
Administrator was authorised to order such transfers. The
proceedings of these trials were to be submitted to the
Martial Law Administrator for his confirmation and then
forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for final review.
The provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the ordinary
ccriminal courts were revised by a subsequent regulation,
which empowered them to try all ordinary offences and cases
relating to offences created by martial law regulations,
27which were transferred to them for trial. r Another regu­
lation provided for the transfer of pending cases under the 
ordinary law from an ordinary criminal court to a. Military
po
Court for trial. These provisions came up for inter­
pretation before the West Pakistan High Court and will be 
dealt with later in this chapter.
On April 4, 1969* the Chief Martial Law Adminis-
29trator issued the Provisional Constitution Order,  ^which 
was given retrospective effect from the abrogation of the
25. M.L.R. No. 3.
26. Martial Law Order (M.L.O.) No. 12.
27. M.L.R. No. 3> reconstituted by M.L.R. No. 45.
28. M.L.R. No. 42.
29* P.L.D. 1969 Central Statutes 41.
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Constitution and the imposition of martial law. The
general effect of this Order, like the Laws (Continuance
in Force) Order issued by the President in October, 1958,
was the validation of all laws, other than the Constitution
of 1982, existing before the proclamation, the restoration
of the courts* jurisdiction, and a further direction that
the country should be governed as nearly as possible in
accordance with the abrogated constitution. But, unlike
*
the Order of 1958, the new Order attempted to give specific 
directions about the abolition of certain fundamental 
rights, the abolition of which had given rise to doubts in 
1958.
Article 3 of the Provisional Constitution Order 
provided that, notwithstanding the abrogation of the Con­
stitution of 1962, but subject to any regulation or order 
made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, the State oL 
Pakistan should be governed, as nearly as possible, in 
accordance with the provisions of that Constitution. The 
Chief Martial Law Administrator, as President of Pakistan, 
would perform all functions of the President under the 
abrogated Constitution. Out of the nineteen fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, eleven were declared 
abolished. They were, the right to safeguards against 
arrest and detention, the right to protection from retro­
spective punishment, the rights to freedom of movement,
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assembly, association, to carry on a trade, business or 
profession and freedom of speech, the right to acquire, 
hold and dispose of property, the right to equality, and 
protection against discrimination in the public service.
The courts were forbidden to issue any judgment, decree or 
writ to the Chief Martial Law Administrator and his deputies, 
or any martial law authority exercising powers and juris-
I
diction under their authority.
The limitation on the durability of any Ordinance 
made by the President or a Governor, prescribed by the late 
Constitution, was abolished. The proclamation of martial
i
law,.any order. made . in .pursuance of the proclamation, any 
martial law regulation or order, and any finding, sentence 
or order of a military court were to be immune from examination 
by the courts. Generally the Supreme Court, the High Courts 
and all other courts and tribunals would continue to exer­
cise the same powers and jurisdiction as they had immediately 
before the proclamation. But para. (1) of Article 6 of 
the Provisional Constitution Order, by giving the Supreme 
Court power to accept criminal appeals in specified circum­
stances only, seemed to have taken away its extraordinary 
jurisdiction in appeal by grant of special leave. The 
Supreme Court, however, in interpreting the provision in 
Article 6(1), which apparently confined its criminal j
appellate jurisdiction to specified cases, held that the
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word fappeal* in that paragraph "meant and was manifestly 
intended to mean an 1 appeal* as of rightf* so that the 
Supreme Court had, as before, the jurisdiction to grant 
special leave to appeal from any judgment or order of the 
High Court.^
The Provisional Constitution Order provided that 
nothing in that Order would prejudice the operation of any 
martial law regulation made by the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator or any person authorised by him. In the 
event of a conflict between a regulation and an Ordinance 
promulgated under this Order, the regulation was to prevail. 
To ensure untramelled power of arrest and detention in . 
suppressing disturbances, it was provided that any pro­
vision in any law, providing for the reference of a detention 
order to an advisory board, would be of no effect. Lastly, 
the President was empowered to make any provisions, 
including constitutional provisions, which appeared to him 
to be necessary for the administration of the country.
The Provisional Constitution Order would, there­
fore, seem to have added nothing much to what had already 
been provided by the proclamation of martial law issued by 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator on March 25* 1969•
30. Muhammad Ismail v. The State,
p.i/'.'i)1. 1969 s.c. 24-r:
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But it provided for the exercise of President's pov/er under
the abrogated Constitution, which was necessitated by the
subsequent assumption of the presidential office by the
Chief Martial Law Administrator on March 31* The Order
also made it clear that not only were the provisions of
the Constitution of 1962 subject to regulations and orders
made by the Chief Martial Lav/ Administrator, but that he,
in exercise of the authority of the President, would have
power to make any constitutional provision necessary for
the purpose of the administration of the country.
While in 1958 the Martial Law Administration was
designed to meet an apprehended breach of peace in defiance
of the imposition of martial law, the 1969 Administration
had to deal with actual insurrection, which had been raging
the country for over four months. But as has been noted
earlier, the declaration of martial law was followed by
the immediate restoration of peace and order. Only a few
incidents were reported. In Karachi on March 27 twenty-one
people were arrested on suspicion of instigating strikes;
eight people, who continued a fast outside a factory in
support of their wage demand, were arrested and charged with
attempted suicide under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and
a clash between the troops and workers in the Quetta mining
31area was also reported. These were only minor incidents,
31, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969-70, p. 23357*
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compared with the situation which prevailed before March 25 • 
The regime immediately granted some concessions to students 
and promised to investigate the students' and workers' 
grievances and to formulate far-reaching educational and 
labour policies. President Yahya Khan's announcement that 
elections would be held as soon as normality returned, of 
representatives of the people, who would be asked to tackle 
the country's constitutional and political problems, 
helped the rapid restoration of peace and order.
One of the main public grievances against Ayub's 
administration was corruption and nepotism among officials, 
including the top civil servants. The new regime, there­
fore, immediately after taking over, took stringent measures 
to eradicate these vices, and screened officials, who were 
found guilty of these charges. Bribery and corruption
among public servants were made punishable with fourteen
32years' imprisonment and confiscation of property. A
person misusing his official position to bestow patronage
or favour to any individual or firm was to suffer the same
33prison sentence. ^ Further , to deal with the public charge 
that top officials, during the past regime, had acquired 
wealth and property through corruption and bribery, the 
President made and promulgated the Improper Acquisition of
32. M.L.R. No. 22; cf. M.L.R. Nos. 30 and 31 (1958). 
35. M.L.R. No. 29; cf. Ibid.
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Property (Special Committee) Ordinance, 1969*^
The Ordinance, as originally promulgated, required 
public servants, not below the rank of Joint secretary of 
the central government, to submit returns of their earnings 
since October 7* 1958> and statements of their property and 
assets, both moveable and immoveable, to the Special 
Committee appointed under the Ordinance for its scrutiny*
Por the purpose of inquiring into the conduct of a person, 
and the propriety of the acquisition of properties by such 
person, a Special Committee, consisting of a serving Judge 
or an ex-Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court as the 
chairman, and two other members, one of whom was a high 
ranking military officer, was to be appointed. It was 
empowered to scrutinise the correctness of the returns and 
statements submitted by the officers and submit its findings, 
together with its recommendations as to the punishment, if 
any, to the President.
55The Ordinance was amended*^ in June so as to extend 
its scope and application to all officers and holders of 
public offices equivalent to Class I officers of the pro­
vincial governments. The category of officers subject to
34. Ordinance No. IX of 1989*
P.L.D. 1969 Central Statutes 125*
35* Ordinance Ho. XII of 1969»
P.L.D. 1969 Central Statutes 130.
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the Ordinance thus included corporation officials and even 
university teachers* A Special Committee was set up for 
each province, with serving or .retired High Court judges 
as chairmen, to scrutinise the returns and statements and 
to submit their reports to the Governors* The amended 
Ordinance provided an opportunity for an officer to explain 
any fact or circumstances appearing against him. A person 
appearing before a Special Committee was, however, to appear 
personally and by himself, and no friend or legal adviser 
was allowed to be present with him. No order, proceeding 
or finding of a Committee was to be called in question in 
any court.
.................................. 3 6 ..........................
A martial law regulation^ called upon all those, 
who had ill-gotten properties and assets, to surrender them 
to government; if this were done, no penal action would be 
taken. But failure to surrender such properties carried 
a punishment of imprisonment for fourteen years and confis­
cation of property. The same regulation prescribed imprison­
ment for seven years for failure to submit or for knowingly 
submitting a false statement of assets, as required by the 
Improper Acquisition of Property Ordinance. To supplement 
these provisions, another regulation was promulgated in 
December, 1969 authorising "the authority", which included
56. M.L.R. No. 37*
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the President and the provincial Governors, to dismiss, 
remove, reduce in rank: or prematurely retire an officer
from government service on the grounds of inefficiency,
1 37misconduct, corruption or for subversive activity.
Ordinarily action under this regulation was not to be taken 
without giving the officer an opportunity to explain his 
case before a tribunal, but it was provided that the oppor­
tunity could be denied in certain circumstances.
. To enquire into the conduct of the judges, the
38Judges (Declaration of Assets) Order, 1969 was issued in 
July, 1969• The Order required all judges of the superior 
courts to submit statements of properties, and ,assets held. by. 
them to the Supreme Judicial Council for its examination.
The statement was to show the property and assets of a 
judge acquired or transferred since October 7* 1956 or if 
he had assumed office on a later date, from that date till 
April 22, 1969* The Supreme Judicial Council, on receipt of 
the statements, was to examine them and submit its report to
37. M.L.R. No. 56, Removal Prom Service (Special Provision) 
Regulation. A total of 303 officers were suspended. 
Out of them 196 were dismissed and 71 retired. Out
of 39 officers of the Pakistan Civil Service, 25 were 
dismissed, 13 were retired and only 1 was re-instated.
38. President's Order No. 4 of 1969*
P.L.D. 1969 Central Statutes 120.
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39the President. y
It is, therefore, significant that, while the
Martial Law Administration of 1958 had taken prompt and
peremptory prohibitory measures against the politicians, the
new regime lost no time in showing the public that it was
aware of the allegations publicly made against the Ayub
administration. On the other hand, no action was.taken*
at least in the first instance, nor apparently contemplated,
against the politicians. The regime represented itself as
a caretaker government, intent on its duty of restoring
peace and order and creating conditions conducive to the
holding of elections. It would be for the representatives,
of the people to find solutions to the country’s long standing
problems. In its attempt to clean the administration,
some top aides of President Ayub Khan were either dismissed
or removed from office, and were called on to answer charges
before a tribunal. The charges against these officers
ranged from personal corruption and misuse of power to the
40manipulation of official funds for political purposes.
By taking no action against politicians but taking drastic
39* It was reported that the President, on the basis of the 
report had directed the Supreme Judicial Council to 
investigate the conduct of two High Court judges.
The Pakistan Observer, September 24, 1970.
Mr Justice Shankat Ali, a permanent judge of the Lahore 
High Court has since been removed for "gross misconduct" 
on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council. 
P.O.* July 17* 1971*
40. rphft Times (London), April 20, 1970.
action against corrupt officials, public confidence in the 
administration bad. been generated. It was regarded as an 
.administration genuinely interested in the removal of 
public grievances and having no political ambition.
Judicial views of the regime
It has been observed earlier that the judicial 
structure and the exercise of the judicial power by the 
ordinary courts were left generally undisturbed by the pro­
clamation of martial law. The proclamation itself said 
that all courts and tribunals in existence immediately 
before the abrogation of the Constitution would continue to 
exercise all their powers and jurisdiction as before. All 
judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts were con­
tinued in office. The Provisional Constitution Order also 
confirmed that the superior courts would have, and exercise 
all the powers and jurisdiction they had immediately before 
the proclamation. The doubt about the Supreme Court's power 
to accept appeal by grant of special leave was also resolved
by the Court by giving a ruling that it had the power to do 
41so.
But these documents, while allowing the ordinary 
courts to function normally, also imposed some restrictions
41. Muhammad Ismail v. The State, supra.
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on their power, which were inevitable in the changed circum­
stances . The proclamation of martial law stipulated that 
special military courts would be set up to try criminal 
cases and that the ordinary courts would be authorised to 
try and punish contraventions of martial law regulations,
and also that a martial law regulation could bar the juris-
4-2diction of ordinary courts from trying specified offences. 
The proclamation also forbade all courts to call in question 
any martial law regulation or order or any judgment or 
finding of a military court or issue any writ or other order 
against the Chief Martial Law Administrator or any person 
exercising power under his authority. The subsequently 
issued Provisional Constitution Order also contained pro­
visions regarding the judiciary and its power^to the same 
effect. The Order, however, empowered the President to 
make, when necessary, any provision, including a consti-
4-3tutional provision, for the administration of the country.
The first occasion involving the interpretation
of these provisions relating to the High Courts1 power
and the determination of the nature of martial law, arose
in a case which was decided by the West Pakistan High Court
4-4-
in June, 1969* The case, Malik Mir Hasan v. The State»
4-2. Proclamation of Martial Law, Clause 3*
4-3. The Provisional Constitution Order, Article 8. 
4-4-• P.L.D. 1969 Lahore 786.
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arose out of an order made by a martial law administrator, 
transferring a criminal case from the court of a special 
judge to a Special Military Court for trial, in pursuance 
of Martial Law Regulation No. 42, which empowered an 
administrator to effect'such transfer. A petition relating 
to the case was, however, pending before the West Pakistan 
High Court for disposal under section 561-A of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. ^ It was argued for the petitioners 
that the Provisional Constitution Order had preserved all 
the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court, including 
its inherent power under section 561-A Cr.P.C., to prevent 
any abuse of the process of law. The Provisional Con­
stitution Order, being a constitutional regulation, no 
ordinary martial law regulation or order could override its 
provisions; no change in its provisions could be made by a 
martial law regulation or order; it could only be done by 
an amendment of the Order itself. A martial law regulation 
or order repugnant to the Provisional Constitution Order 
was, therefore, ultra vires of the Order. The order 
transferring the case would amount to a "curb" on the
45. The section provides: "Nothing in this Code shall be
deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the 
High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to 
give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent 
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise secure 
the ends of justice."
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jurisdiction of the High Court which had been preserved, 
and particularly so when the High Court had already taken 
cognizance of the case.
In dealing with the case, a full bench of the 
West Pakistan High Court attempted to determine the true 
nature of martial law, which had been imposed on the country 
on March 25> 1969* It held that the meaning of "martial
law", as the will of the military commander, was not appli­
cable in Pakistan.
"In a country, where the army takes over to suppress 
riots or disorder and restore peace and order by 
the proclamation of Martial Law, it would be des­
cribed as the law of necessity, which must sur­
render to the rule of law. Therefore, it follows 
that, even if there is a Martial Law rule in the
....... country,, such rule, is, not arbitrary or uncontrolled
by principles nor is it the simple and pure will 
of the commander. In this country, Martial Law 
was introduced to secure general peace, to curb 
riots and to stop resistance to the law. The 
person assuming the power is to ascertain the will 
of the people, their settled habits and sentiments 
and to make laws and Regulations to gain its ends. 
Thus in our view, where the army of a country pro­
claims Martial Law to curb riots, tumults and 
violence to law, sovereignty still continues with 
the people." 46
It was observed that the proclamation of martial law did not
say anything, which would imply that the country would be
run arbitrarily or without any basis of law. Martial Law
was imposed for restoring sanity and saving the country from
46. Malik Mir Hasan v. The State,
P.L.D. 1969 Lahore 766, at p. 816 per Bashiruddin Ahmad, 
J.
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internal disorder and chaos and to ensure that the civil 
administration resumed its normal functions.
\
Following the precedent established during the 
previous occasion in 1958, the court held that the martial 
law regulation and order themselves could not he questioned 
in the court* But the court had the power to interpret 
martial law regulations and orders. Bashiruddin Ahmad J. 
observed,
"It is the inherent jurisdiction of the superior 
courts of the country to interpret law. If an 
order is passed by a Martial Law Authority or a 
Military Court, which is in excess of or without 
jurisdiction, its legal position is open for exami­
nation by the High Court, or the Supreme Court, 
though these courts would not and could not inter­
fere, if the order in question was one with juris­
diction and had the sanction' of the Provisional 
Constitution Order behind it." 47
Regarding the power and jurisdiction of the court
under martial law, the court maintained that the Proclamation
and the Provisional Constitution Order both had preserved
the position prior to the Proclamation. It was observed,
"There is not one word either in the letter of the 
former President to the Commander-in-Chief, or in 
the speech of the Chief Martial Law Administrator, 
or even in the Proclamation of Martial Law to 
suggest that the existing machinery for dispensing 
justice was found wanting or that it was to be 
subject to curbs or that a state of affairs was 
to be brought about in which the will of the 
Martial Law Commander was to be enforced. The 
Martial Law Authorities, and even the Chief Martial 
Law Administrator himself, are bound by the
47. Ibid., at p. 819
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Proclamation, Regulations and Orders as any other 
citizen of the country. No one, including the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator, can transcend or 
deviate from the sole purpose of restoring law 
and order and democracy and it needs no gainsaying 
that curbing the jurisdiction of the established 
judiciary* is not a step in that direction .. •11 48
The contention that the provisions in Martial Law 
Regulation No. 42 caused the abatement of all proceedings 
pending before any court including a High Court, in respect 
of cases transferred under this regulation to a military 
court, was not acceptable to the court. The court pointed 
out that Martial Law Regulation No. 3, reconstituted by 
Martial Law Regulation No. 45, had conferred on the ordinary 
courts jurisdiction in respect of a particular class of 
cases. Any transfer of such a case to a court of an entirely 
different jurisdiction would amount to depriving the ordinary 
court of its power and jurisdiction. The court observed 
that
na general and recognised rule of lav/ is that fthe 
jurisdiction of superior courts is not taken away, 
except by express words or necessary implication 
and that such jurisdiction cannot be excluded, 
unless there is clear language in the statute which 
is said to have that effect.1 It is, therefore, 
not open to anyone to argue that such jurisdiction 
can be affected, as if it were by a side wind, by 
a statute containing no express words to that 
effect in it.11 49
Further, the provision in Martial Law Regulation No. 42 for
48. Ibid., p. 808, per Mushtaq Hussain J.
49. Ibid., p. 800, per Mushtaq Hussain J.
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the transfer of cases by a martial lav; administrator must 
give way to the provision of the later Regulation No. 3* as 
reconstituted by Martial Law Regulation No. 45, ”which 
makes it incumbent upon a court to exercise its juris­
diction” in respect of a class of.cases.
The Provisional Constitution Order had kept intact
Article 2 of the Constitution of 1962, which provided that
every citizen was entitled to the protection of law, and to
be treated in accordance with law. The Article further
declared that every public functionary must show some legal
basis for his action concerning the rights of a citizen.
By preserving this Article of the abrogated Constitution,
the Chief Martial Lav/ Administrator had made it clear that
the intention of the government was to act in accordance
with law. The court, therefore, held that ”the action of
any authority, including a Martial Law Authority, howsoever
high he may be, if it had not the backing of a constitutional
provision, was not immune from being struck down by the
50courts of the country.,!> A right to appeal or file an 
application to the High Court under section 561-A Cr.P.C. 
was a ”vested right” accruing to a person as soon as the case 
was instituted. This right could not be taken away without 
express words or necessary implication of a statute. And
50. Ibid., p. 815» per Bashiruddin Ahmad, J.
.even if the law was changed during the pendency of an 
action, "the principle that governs the situation would 
he that the rights of the parties are to be decided accor­
ding to the law as existed when the action was begun, unless 
the new law shows a clear intention, either by express word 
or by necessary intendment, to vary such rights.” The 
court, in view of these findings, concluded that neither 
the citizen’s right to the protection of law and to be 
treated in accordance with law, nor the court’s power and 
jurisdiction, which had been preserved by the Provisional 
Constitution Order, could be taken away, without an amend­
ment of that Order, which could be done by the President 
and the Chief Martial Law Administrator alone.
The decision in Malik Mir Hasan’s case was an 
attempt by the West Pakistan High Court to contain the 
unlimited power of the Martial Law Authorities within the 
prescribed limit of a constitutional structure prescribed 
by themselves. It was also an attempt to point out the 
sphere, namely, the restoration of peace and order in the 
country, for which the martial lav; regime had a special 
responsibility, so that the machinery of the civil adminis­
tration could resume its normal functions. While the 
court would not interfere in the administration’s measures 
for the restpration of law and order, it was expected that 
other state organs would be allowed to perform their normal 
functions without any hindrance. The nature of the martial
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law regime was not arbitrary; it must follow the basic 
principles laid down by itself, and exercise powers within 
the limit prescribed by those principles and law. Com­
menting on the judgment R.W.M. Dias observed that the
Pakistan judiciary had emerged with more credit in upholding
51individual rights than did its Rhodesian counterpart.
But as will be seen presently, the decision was rendered 
ineffective by an order of the President, which reasserted 
the regime's authority to exercise unrestrained powers, 
and to be the sole judge of its ovm. actions.
The court, it may be pointed out, did not question 
the validity of the abrogation of the Constitution by the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator. It recognised the regime, 
which assumed power by an extra-legal method, by agreeing to 
function in accordance with the proclamation of martial law 
and the Provisional Constitution Order, and exercise power 
and jurisdiction as accorded in those documents. These 
documents certainly curtailed the power of the courts, in 
that they could not now issue any writ against the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator, or call in question any martial 
lav; regulation or order. The proclamation specifically 
provided that a martial law regulation could bar the
51. R.W. Dias, "The G-rundnorm Again - Martial Lav; and 
Fundamental Rights in Pakistan",
(1970) 28 Cambridge Law Journal 4-9#
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jurisdiction of ordinary courts over specified offences.
It would, therefore, seem within the authority of the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator to re-define the jurisdiction 
of the courts, after recognising the fact that he had 
successfully and validly overthrown the previous consti­
tutional and legal order, which was the source of the 
courts1 power and jurisdiction.
Again, the Provisional Constitution Order, which 
formally restored the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court and the High Courts, specifically provided that nothing 
in that Order or in any law would prejudice the operation
of any martial law regulation made hy the Chief Martial Law
............................................................g?
Administrator or hy any person having authority from him.
The same instrument empowered the President, who was also
the Chief Martial Law Administrator, to make such provisions
as were necessary, including a constitutional provision,
for the administration of the affairs of the State. It
would therefore seem that a martial law regulation made hy
the Chief Martial Law Administrator should have heen given
/
effect to, unless two regulations were clearly contradictory 
to each other and upholding the one would prejudice the 
operation of the other.
Martial Law Regulation Ho. 42, providing for
52. The Provisional Constitution Order, Article 7(1)*
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transfer of certain cases from the ordinary courts to 
military courts for trial, could be construed as not taking 
away the powers and jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.
It could be interpreted to mean that the ordinary courts 
had full poi^ rers over cases, which were left to be tried by 
them. (The regulation did not bar the ordinary courts from 
trying criminal offences; it provided for the transfer 
to military courts of cases which were calculated to assist 
the regime1s attempts to restore normality quickly and 
create public confidence in the machinery of the adminis­
tration. Normally, where the ordinary courts were given 
jurisdiction, they were allowed to function without any 
interference. Further, on the strength of the Supreme 
Court decisions in Dosso1s and Mehdi Ali Khan's cases^ 
decided after the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956, 
it could be said that the provision in the regulation for 
abatement of all applications and proceedings in any court, 
including a High Court relating to transferred cases, had a 
reasonable basis for acceptance by the court.
Regulation No. 42 re-asserted the supreme authority 
power to provide for the administration of justice. And 
once the Chief Martial Law Administrator's authority to
53* Chapter V I ,  pp. 197“
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break the whole constitutional edifice was recognised, 
his authority to provide for the administration of justice 
could not perhaps be challenged. The Chief Martial Law 
Administrator did not derive power from any constitutional 
document; his authority was based on his successful over­
throw of the previous legal order, and his ability to enforce 
obedience to his will. The only limitation on his exercise 
of supreme power was his own conscience and principles recog­
nised by him. The crude reality of the extraordinary
circumstances and the fact that legality followed power
54had to be recognised.
On the same day as the judgment in Mir Hasan1 s 
case was delivered, the President made and promulgated the 
Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order, 1969*^
The Order reiterated that no court, including the Supreme 
Court and the High. Courts, should entertain any complaint 
or application in relation to exercise of any power or 
jurisdiction by any military court or any martial law 
authority, issue any writ or order against the exercise of 
such power or jurisdiction, and declared that a decision 
in contravention of this provision would be deemed to be 
of no effect. All questions as to the correctness, legality
54. Por further discussion on the subject, see next chapter.
55* President's Order Ho. 3 of 1969*
P.L.D. 1969 Central Statutes 119*
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or propriety of the exercise of any power or jurisdiction 
by a military court or a martial law authority or any person 
deriving power from a martial law authority were to be 
referred to the Chief Martial Law Administrator, whose 
decision was to be regarded as final. Por an interpretation 
of any martial law regulation or order the issuing authority 
was to be referred to, and the interpretation given by such 
authority was to be final and exempt from examination and 
scrutiny by the courts.
The President's order made the judgment in Mir 
Hasan's case infructuous. The regime did not think it 
necessary to follow the court's direction to change the 
legal structure by amending the Provisional Constitution 
Order, which would have amounted to admitting a limitation 
on the Martial Law Authority's exercise of power within the 
framevrork of that document. It asserted that the Martial 
Law Authority was the supreme lav/-giver, which would not 
give effect to any decision of the courts contrary to its 
own policy or declaration. In the case^ that followed 
the court accepted this position. It was observed that 
"whatever may have been the wisdom in enacting the President's 
Order No. 3 of 1969? it is not for this court to make
56. Pazal Ahmad v. The State, 
P.L.D. l9?0 Lahore 74l.
500
surmises when the language is plain. The court has to
administer a statute as it is.”
The learned judge in Pazal Ahmad!s case said that
the intention of the law-giver, as expressed in the Order,
was very clear. He observed,
’’After the promulgation of this declaratory 
statute, there is no doubt left in my mind that 
the Martial Law Authorities are the sole Judges 
of both law and facts of the matters before them.
I dare say that, though Martial Law Authorities 
themselves are the creatures of statute, even if 
they do not act within the well-defined area of 
their authority, or act in total absence or 
excess of jurisdiction, this court cannot review 
their actions. It was a recognised concept 
that the superior courts of the country have 
inherent jurisdiction to interpret the law, but 
unfortunately this power has been taken away by 
this declaratory statute.” 57
58The learned judge referred to an Irish case, where 
Molony, C.J. held that, though the court had a duty to 
protect the life and liberty of the subjects, during an 
armed insurrection, when the conflict was still raging, the 
court should not interfere with the administration in taking 
measures to quell the insurrection and restore peace and 
the authority of the law. It may be pointed out that 
Molony, C.J. was dealing with a case when the insurrection 
was still raging in the realm. In Pakistan there was- no 
such resistance to law and order under the martial law
57• Ibid., p. 74-6* Shawkat Ali, J*
58. Rex v. Allen, (1921) 2 I.R. 241.
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regime, and the observation made by the learned judge in 
consenting to uphold even an unauthorised action of a 
martial law authority does not seem to be covered by the 
decision of the Irish case* In Pakistan, during the long 
spell of martial law between 1958 and 1962, it had been 
firmly established that, though the court had no power to 
question any martial law regulation or order itself, actions 
taken under such regulation or order were subject to the 
court's scrutiny* It could not be the intention of the 
law-giver that every action "under a statute, even actions 
contrary to the intention and purpose of the statute itself, 
should go unchallenged.
In another case,^  where it was contended that, 
notwithstanding the proclamation of martial law, the Chief 
Hartial Law Administrator, by his assumption of the presi­
dential office and exercising the presidential powers under 
the abrogated Constitution, had made himself subject to the 
provisions of that Constitution, the court held that the 
contention was "misconceived". The court said,
"The source of the present legal order is the 
proclamation of the 25th of March, 1969• It has 
two aspects, one that the Constitution was abro­
gated and the other was that the country was 
placed under Martial Law. It was not a pro­
clamation simpliciter for imposing Martial Law."
59* Riasat All v. Government of Pakistan, 
P.L.D.19^1 Lahore 11$.
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The fact to he noted, was that the Constitution was abrogated 
and the source of power for the Chief Martial Law Adminis­
trator was the proclamation and the absolute authority that
had been assumed. The proclamation had vested overriding 
powers in the Chief Martial Law Administrator, and he could 
make any martial law regulation or order contrary to any­
thing appearing in the Constitution of 1962, His lord­
ship held that
"the provisions of the Constitution of 1962 are, 
therefore, not applicable for the governance of 
Pakistan in all circumstances and in all situations. 
They are subject to any Martial Law Regulation or
. Order made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator,
who is the only source from which all power flows.
If any order made by him is contrary to the 
Constitution of 1962 it will have an overriding
....... effect and the provision to be applicable■would be •
that Order and not the Constitution of 1962.H 60
The martial law regime, as established on March 25 > 
1969j according to the judicial decisions, had its foundation 
on the proclamation issued on that date. Under the new 
legal order, the President, who is also the Chief Martial 
Law Administrator, is the supreme lav/-giver, from whom all 
legal powers emanate. Though the courts have powers and 
jurisidction exercised by them before the proclamation, 
jthey cannot call in question any order or regulation made by 
the President and the Chief Martial Lav; Administrator or 
by any person authorised by him. Even the court's power to
60. Ibid., p. 125
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interpret the provisions of any regulation or order, accor­
ding to the ruling of the West Pakistan High Court discussed 
earlier, has heen taken away by the President's Juris­
diction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order. This is a 
departure from the position in the earlier martial law period 
of 1958-1962. The provisions of the Constitution of 1962, 
which have not been expressly abrogated, are still in force, 
but they are subject to regulations or orders made by the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator. The Chief Martial Law 
Administrator's authority is not subject to any constitutional 
limitation or fundamental law; he can make any provision 
whatsoever for the administration of the country.
Measures to restore constitutional rule
As has been said earlier in this chapter, the 
iiiaftial law regime of 1969, unlike the previous occasion in 
1958, did not abolish the political parties, though all 
activities of political nature were banned* A martial lav; 
regulation prohibited all meetings and processions without 
prior written permission from the authorities. Contra­
vention of this provision was punishable with imprisonment 
for seven years. In his first broadcast to the nation on
March 26, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Yahya
61. M.L.R. No. 21.
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T h a n ,  e m p h a s i s e d  t h a t  t h e  r e g i m e ’ s  r o l e  w a s  t o  r e s t o r e  p e a c e  
a n d  o r d e r  a n d  c r e a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  c o n d u c i v e  t o  t h e  h o l d i n g  o f  
• l e c t i o n s .  A n d  i t  w o u l d  h e  f o r  t h e  e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
o f  t h e  p e o p l e  t o  f i n d  s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y T s  p r o b l e m s ,  
ft w a s , t h e r e f o r e , a s s u m e d  t h a t ,  o n c e  c o n d i t i o n s  w e r e  n o r m a l  
c-rid t h e  r e g i m e  c o u l d  f e e l  t h a t  e l e c t i o n s  c o u l d  s a f e l y  b e  
h e l d ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  w o u l d  b e  a l l o w e d  t o  r e s u m e  t h e i r  
n o r m a l  a c t i v i t i e s .
T h e  G e n e r a l  r e i t e r a t e d  his view at his first press 
c o n f e r e n c e  o n  A p r i l  10,1969. He said that his administration 
as f u l l y  c o n s c i o u s  o f  t h e  needs and aspirations of the 
p e o p l e  a n d  t h a t  it w o u l d  take steps to meet those needs and 
f u l f i l  t h o s e  a s p i r a t i o n s .  The Chief Martial L a w  Administra­
t o r  s a i d ,
’’T h e s e  s t e p s  w i l l  t a k e  u s  f o r w a r d  i n  t h e  a p p o i n t e d ,  
d i r e c t i o n ,  n a m e l y ,  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
o f  t h e  p e o p l e  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a d u l t  f r a n c h i s e .  I t  w i l l  
b e  f o r  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  t o  g i v e  t h e  
c o u n t r y  a  w o r k a b l e  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  I  h a v e  n o  d o u b t  t h a t  
a  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w o r k e d  o u t  i n  t h i s  m a n n e r ,  w i l l  e n j o y  
t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  a n d  w i l l  h a v e  t h e  a c c e t a b i -  
l i t y  a n d  s a n c t i t y  w h i c h  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n  m u s t  h a v e . ” 6 2
He c o n f i r m e d  that p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  h a d  n o t  b e e n  b a n n e d ,  i n
t h e  h o p e  that s o b e r  t h i n k i n g  w o u l d  s t a r t  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y
a f t e r  t e m p e r s  h a d  c o o l e d  d o w n ;  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  h a d  b e e n
r e s t r i c t e d  f o r  t h e  t i m e  b e i n g  a n d  w o u l d  b e  a l l o w e d  a g a i n ,
a s  s o o n  a s  p a s s i o n s  a r o u s e d  d u r i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a g i t a t i o n
62. Dawn, April 11,1969.
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had subsided. President Yahya Khan said that, before
announcing the composition of parliament and the pattern
of election, he would move about "among various sections of
the people to take their consensus", and might also call a
63conference of political leaders at a later stage. ^
The President held a series of talks with party
leaders on constitutional and political problems during the
next three months, and on July 28, 1969 issued a statement
64over the radio. He again said that, though banning of 
political parties would make "the task of Administration a 
little simpler ... it would delay the achievement of our goal, 
namely, that of smooth transfer of power to the elected rep­
resentatives of' the people. I, therefore, not only did not 
ban political parties but permitted and even encouraged 
limited activity in this field." Soon the martial law 
regulations on the subject would be amended to allow political 
activities in an extended form. The President said that it 
was agreed by all that "a sound base in the country, capable 
of sustaining vigorous political activity before such activity 
is allowed to be launched" must be created, and that "not 
only preliminary arrangements but the actual elections should 
be held under the overall supervision of the Martial Law 
Administration". The President, however, warned that
63. Ibid.
64. Pull Text of the Presidents speech, 
Dawn, July 29> 1969 * p« 6.
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propaganda and activities prejudicial to "the basic prin­
ciple of Islam and the ideology and integrity of Pakistan” 
and unity and solidarity of the people would not he tolerated.
On the constitutional issues the President said 
there was no unanimity among the leaders. There were 
strong diversity of opinions, particularly on parity between 
the two wings, representation on a population basis, and on 
the issue of "one unit”. The suggestion that, once the 
elections were held, these issues would be resolved, was not 
acceptable to the President. He said, ”the answer obviously 
is that these must not become points of conflict during the 
election campaign. If these are not resolved in a satis­
factory manner and within a reasonable period of time, I
may have to go to the nation to obtain its verdict on the
65basis of a constitution before elections are held.” ^ The 
President announced that a judge of the Supreme Court, Hr 
Justice Abdus Sattar, had been appointed as the Chief 
Election Commissioner to prepare fresh electoral rolls and 
to delimit constituencies. These should take about twelve 
to eighteen months, after which, the President hoped, the 
elections could be held.
Just after four months, on November 28, 1569i the 
President, in a nation-wide broadcast,^ announced far-reaching
65. Ibid.
66. lawn, November 29? 1969*
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constitutional measures, which would lead to the restoration 
of constitutional rule and the transfer of power to the 
representatives of the people* The President regretted 
that the politicians could not reach agreement on the 
various constitutional issues* He, however, appreciated 
their difficulties and said that "while no formal consensus 
has been produced, I am now fully aware of the views that 
various people hold on these issues•M He identified "three 
main issues that face us as a nation in the constitutional 
field" which were "firstly the question of fone unit1, 
secondly, the issue of 'one man one vote1 or parity between 
the two wings, and thirdly, the relationship between the 
centre and the federating Provinces*" ■ The President main-' ■ 
tained that the questions of representation at the centre 
and ’one unit' had to be decided before the elections, as 
they affected the basis of the elections and the setting up 
of the National Assembly*
The President declared that the "one unit" would 
be dissolved and the previous provincial entities restored 
in West Pakistan, and that the elections would be held on 
the basis of "one man one vote", which was "a basic require­
ment of any democratic form of government". On the other 
issues, whether there should be a federal, parliamentary 
form of government, with direct adult franchise, whether 
there should be fundamental rights of the citizens and 
whether they should be enforced in law courts, whether there).
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be a judiciary acting as the custodian of the constitution, 
and the Islamic character of the constitution, which 
preserve the ideology on which Pakistan was created,
67according to the President, there was no disagreement. (
On the third issue, that is, the relationship 
between the centre and the provinces, the Presidents obser­
vations indicated that this was a matter, the details of 
which would have to be worked out in mutual discussion.
He said,
MAs for the relations between the Centre and the 
Provinces, you will recall that, in my July broad­
cast, I pointed out that the people of East 
Pakistan did not have their full share in the 
decision-making process on vital national issues.
......  I also said that they were fully justified in......
being dissatisfied with this state of affairs.
We shall, therefore, have to put an end to this 
position. The requirement would appear- to be - 
maximum autonomy to the two Wings of Pakistan, 
as long as this does not impair the national 
integrity and solidarity of the country.” 68
These were indications of President Yahya Khan's
sympathy with the East Pakistan demand for autonomy. He
further elaborated his view by saying,
"One of the main aspects of the who He relationship 
between the Centre and the Provinces in Pakistan 
today lies in the financial and economic spheres. 
Federation implies not only a division of legis­
lative powers but also that of financial powers.
This matter will have to be dealt' with in such a 
manner as would satisfy the legitimate requirements
67. Pawn, November 29? 1969*
68. Ibid.
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and demands of the Provinces, as well as the
vital requirements of the nation as a whole.
People of the two regions of Pakistan should 
have control over their economic resources 
and development, as long as it does not adversely 
affect the working of a National Government at 
the Centre." 69
The President declared that elections to the
National Assembly would be held on October 5> 1970. The
Assembly would be required to frame the constitution within
one hundred and twenty days from its first sitting. If it
failed, there would be fresh elections.
"After the Assembly has completed its task and 
the constitution made by it has been duly authen­
ticated, it will assume the character of Pakistan's 
Parliament. The stage would then be set for the 
formation of the nexv government."
Pull political activities would be allowed from January, 1970,
but no obstruction in the way of restoration of democracy
would be tolerated. President Yahya Khan said "Throughout
these activities Martial Lav/ will remain supreme, in order
to give support to the programme of peaceful transfer of
70power to the elected representatives of the people."'
As promised by the President, the Political 
71Activities Regulation' was issued on December 21, 1969» 
allowing freedom of political activity, including the 
holding of meetings, processions and propagation of political
69. Ibid.
70. Dawn, November 29> 1969.
71. M.L.E. No. 60.
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ideas. But it provided that no political party or group 
should indulge in any activity which would involve violence, 
create hatred, racial, tribal or regional enmity, or 
obstruct the activities of other political parties. The 
Deputy Commissioners were empowered to regulate such acti­
vities to ensure peace and order, but without hindering the 
legitimate and peaceful activities of any party. By a sub­
sequent regulation the earlier Martial Law Regulation res-
72tricting public meetings and processions was rescinded.'
Political parties resumed their open activities on Jaunary 1,
1970, and except for a few incidents in which rival groups
clashed, the political atmosphere in the country remained
comparatively calm and elections were held without much
interruption.
Towards the end of March, 1970, the President
announced that an Order, outlining the basic principles on
which the elections would be held, and other provisions
relating to the composition and functions of the National
75Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies, would be issued.'^
The President declared that the West Pakistan Province would 
be dissolved with effect from July 1, 1970, restoring the 
previous provincial boundaries, and that, while the elections 
to the National Assembly would be held on October 5, 1970,
72. H.L.R. No. 61.
75• Lawn, March 29, 1969
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the elections to the Provincial Assemblies would take place
not later than October 22, 1970* As announced by the
74President, the Legal Framework Order, 1970* issued on 
March 29 > contained not only the provisions relating to 
elections and Assemblies, but also the "fundamental prin­
ciples" on which the future constitution was to be based*
The Legal Framework Order provided that the 
National Assembly would have three hundred general seats, 
distributed amongst the provinces and the Centrally
Administered Tribal Areas, in proportion to the population,
75and thirteen seats which were reserved for women. ^ The 
election to the general seats would be by direct adult 
franchise, and the women members would be elected by the 
members of the Assembly, divided into provincial units for 
the purpose of eLecting the number of women members allocated
74. Presidents Order No. 2 of 1970,
P.L.D. 1970 Central Statutes 229*
75* Schedule I to the Order provided for the composition 
of the National Assembly, as follows:
Provinces General Seats Women!s Seats
East Pakistan 162 7
The Punjab 82 3
Sind 27 1
Baluchistan 4 1
North-West Frontier Province 18 1
Centrally Administered Tribal 7
Areas ___ __
300 13
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76to each, province. The five Provincial Assemblies' were
to he elected on the same principle.
The function of the National Assembly elected
under the Legal Framework Order was to frame a constitution
for the country within a period of one hundred and twenty
days from the date of its first meeting, and its failure to
77do so would render the Assembly dissolved. ( ( Until a 
constitution had been framed and authenticated by the 
President, the National Assembly would not meet for any 
other purpose. But once the constitution came into force, 
the National Assembly would function as the first federal 
legislature, for the full term, and if the legislature was 
to consist of two Houses, the Assembly would be the Lower 
House of the federal legislature. A provincial assembly 
was not to be summoned till the constitution came into 
force.
The Order outlined the ’’fundamental principles” 
of the constitution on the basis of which the National
76. Schedule II of the Order provided for the composition 
of the Provincial Assemblies as follows:
Provinces General Seats Women's Seats
East Pakistan 300 10
The Punjab 180 6
Sind 60 2
Baluchistan 20 1
North-West Frontier Province 40 2
77* Legal Framework Order, Article 24.
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Assembly was required to frame the constitution. These 
principles included the Islamic provisions of the late 
Constitution, adherence to basic principle of democracy 
ensuring periodic elections, the fundamental rights of the 
citizens and independence of judiciary in the matter of 
dispensation of justice and enforcement of the fundamental 
rights. One of the principles provided that the division 
of power between the centre and the provinces would be effected 
in such a manner that the provinces should have the maximum 
autonomy in the legislative, administrative and financial 
fields, but the federal government should also have adequate 
power in these fields "to discharge its responsibilities in 
relation to external' and internal affairs and to preserve 
the independence and territorial integrity of the country11«
The Legal framework Order was received by the. 
people and political parties with satisfaction, though the 
provision relating to the authentication of the Constitution 
by the President gave rise to a little controversy.^
President Yahya Khan, however, gave his assurance that, if 
the ITational Assembly framed the constitution on the basis 
of the fundamental principles laid down in the Order, there
78. Article 25 of the Legal framework Order provided that 
the Constitution Bill adopted by the ITational Assembly 
would have to be authenticated by the President, and 
in the event of President's refusal, the Assembly 
would stand dissolved.
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should he no reason for his refusal to authenticate* The 
provision was there only to meet any unforeseen contingency. 
The West Pakistan province was dissolved by the Province of 
West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970.^ The P^e- 
unification provincial boundaries were restored. The East 
Pakistan demand for representation on the basis of popu­
lation was met by accepting the principle of "one man one 
vote0. Only one main issue, the relationship between the 
centre and the federating units, was left to be settled by 
the future National Assembly, though the President, himself, 
and the Legal Framework Order advocated maximum autonomy for 
the units within the framework of a viable central government.
So, by March., 1970 everything was set for the 
general elections, the first of its kind in Pakistan since 
the nation's inception twenty-three years earlier. But 
tlid elections scheduled to be held on October 5, 1970 had 
to be postponed to December 7, 1970, because of the colossal 
damages caused by floods in East Pakistan in the months of 
July and August. The postponement was opposed by the Awami 
League and Bhutto's People's Party, on the ground that this
80would delay the transfer of power to a civilian government.
But their immediate reaction was not hostile; other parties
79* President's Order No. 1 of 1970, 
P.L.D. 1970 Central Statute 218.
80. The Times (London), August 17, 1970.
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had heen pressing for the postponement to give them more 
time to consolidate their position. In November, again, 
elections in nine National Assembly constituencies had to 
he postponed, due to the devastation caused by a cyclone 
that swept through the coastal districts of East Pakistan.
The general elections and after
The election campaign of the political parties went 
fairly well, without many incidents. The authorities 
showed that they would not tolerate any gross violation of 
laws and election rules, which might disrupt the elections. 
President Yahya Khan, in a broadcast on December 3, 1970* 
reminded the nation that the elections'were being held under 
the cover of martial law and that the government was deter-
O l
mined ”to see these elections through’1. Regarding the
purpose and sequence of the election, the President said,
’The elections are only the first phase of our 
plan. The next phase will be the framing of 
the Constitution, and the final phase would be 
the transfer of power to the elected represen­
tatives. Sovereignty would pass to the 
National Assembly on the conclusion of the last 
phase and on the lifting of martial law. Need­
less to say, until this whole process is complete 
martial law will remain supreme in the country.”
Visualising the difficult task that lay ahead, the President
called upon the party leaders to ’’usefully employ the period
81. Dawn, December 4, 1970*
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"between their election and the first session of the National
Assembly in getting together and arriving at a consensus on
the main provisions of our constitution”, The President
observed, "This will call for a spirit of give and take,
trust in each other, and realisation of the extreme impor-
o p
tance of this particular juncture in our history ...”
Apart from a few incidents, the election campaign
and the voting took place in a peaceful atmosphere, and all
parties, including those which were defeated, agreed that
83the elections were both free and fair. In all, twenty-
three parties put forward over a thousand candidates for the 
National Assembly seats. On the eve of the election, how­
ever, over sixty candidates, belonging to different parties 
in East Pakistan, withdrew, ostensibly as a protest against 
the government's handling of relief operation in the cyclone- 
devastated area; they were generally believed to have done
84so in order to avoid defeat by the Awami League candidates.
Although it had been anticipated that the Awami 
League in East Pakistan and the People's Party of Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto in West Pakistan would fare well in the polls, 
their sweeping victory in their respective regions was
82. Lawn, December ^ 1, 1970.
83• Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1971-72), p. 24413. 
84-. Ibid.
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totally unexpected. While the Awami League won all hut two 
seats allocated to the eastern province, Bhutto *s party- 
won eighty-one out of one hundred and thirty-eight general 
seats in West Pakistan. The People's Party's performance 
appeared most surprising to those observers who had esti­
mated that the party would win at most forty seats in the 
national Assembly. Apart from these surprises, the elections 
also revealed four striking features of the contemporary 
political trends in Pakistan. Pirst, the electorate 
decisively demonstrated its repudiation of Pield Marshal Ayub 
Khan's political system by the overwhelming defeat of the 
candidates belonging to the ex-President's Convention Muslim 
League, which'won only two seats in the Assembly. Secondly, 
the older parties, except the Awami League, and the estab­
lished politicians, including the former ministers, were 
generally rejected by the voters. Thirdly, the right-wing 
religious parties, such as the Jamaat-i-Islami, received 
little support, suggesting that the influence of the Mullahs 
even in the rural areas, was much less than had been 
believed. The Jamaat-i-Islami won only four seats in the 
Assembly, none from East Pakistan. Lastly, candidates from 
the armed forces were generally unsuccessful, suggesting a
popular distaste of military dabbling in the country's 
85politics. ^
85. Git. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1971-1972), p*24413
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So far everything had gone well. It was much to 
the credit of the martial law administration of President 
Yahya Khan that the elections were held successfully in a 
peaceful atmosphere. The results of the elections, in a 
way, helied the fear that, due to the numerous political 
parties with varied opinions on different issues, it would 
not he possible for any single party to win a substantial 
number of seats in the Assembly, and that an Assembly composed 
of a number of small factions would cause a deterioration 
of the political situation to that prevailing in 1958*
The voters, on the whole, showed that a party with a genuine 
programme would secure their support. The fantastic vic­
tory of the Awami League' in'East'Pakistan was due to'the 
popularity of its demand for maximum autonomy for the 
province. Bhutto's success in West Pakistan, particularly 
in the Punjab, was attributed to his party's combination 
of economic radicalism and anti-Indian nationalism. But 
the overwhelming success of the Awami League in East Pakistan 
without securing a single seat in West Pakistan, and the 
People's Party's success in west Pakistan without securing 
a seat in the other wing showed the strong regional senti­
ments of the voters and their diverse attitude towards 
national politics. Ho political party and no political 
leader secured national support, or developed a national 
image. The strength of the two parties in their respective 
regions proved to be their greatest weaknesses in the events
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that followed.
After the elections, it was expected, as the 
President indicated in his broadcast on December 3, that 
the party leaders would try to reach an understanding on 
the constitutional issues. But as it happened, instead 
of endeavouring to reach an agreement, the leaders of both 
the Awami League and the People's Party proceeded to make 
announcements showing their hard-line attitude on these 
issues. The differences between the Awami League leader, 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and the People's Party leader, 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, were fundamental and called for tact, 
good will and a spirit of compromise, if they were to be 
resolved. While Bhutto wanted a strong centre and demanded 
an intensification of the confrontation with India on Jbhe 
Kashmir question, going to the length of calling for "a 
thousand year war if necessary", Mujibur Rahman demanded 
maximum autonomy for the provinces as set out in his party's 
six-point programme; this implied a weak centre, and the 
resumption of normal diplomatic relations with India, 
which had deteriorated since the 1965 war. His soft 
policy towards India was prompted by the economic benefit 
that East Pakistan would get from trade with India, which 
had been disrupted since the war.
On the autonomy issue, Bhutto on December 15 said 
that he would not agree on any arrangement "at the cost of
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Pakistan's unity, solidarity and integrity" Sheikh 
Ilujibur Rahman, on the other hand, asserted that the con-, 
stitution should he based on his party's six-point programme. 
The people of East Pakistan, by electing his party, had 
given him a clear mandate to implement his six-point pro­
gramme but his party could not frame the Constitution alone, 
even though it had a majority in the Assembly.^ President 
Yahya Khan, in an attempt to bring about a compromise, met 
both the leaders at the end of January; Bhutto and Sheikh 
iiujibur Rahman also met on several occasions at the begin­
ning of February, 1971• But as the election campaign had 
shown the two men were bent on achieving rigid and diamet- 
trically opposed ends; their meetings'made 1 it clear that ' 
there was hardly any common ground between the two parties 
in the Assembly. In mid-Pebruary President Yahya Khan 
announced that the National Assembly would meet on March 3, 
1971* Dacca; there was still little sign of the end of 
the deadlock between the two parties. On February 17*
1971 Bhutto declared that it was pointless "under the present 
circumstances" for his party to attend the Assembly session, 
merely to endorse a constitution, in the framing of which 
they would have no say. He referred to the Awami League 
leaders' insistence that the constitution must be based on
86. Dawn, December 16, 1970.
87* Ibid., January 4, 1971*
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the partyfs six-point programme and said that, if a MviahleT1 
constitution was to he framed, his party must have a hand 
in its framing.^
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on February 24, 1971* des­
cribed as "utterly false" the allegation that his party was 
seeking to impose its programme on West Pakistan* He said 
that the six-points were for safeguarding the interests of 
the federating units and, under such a framework, the 
central government would not be left at the mercy of the 
provinces. He pointed out that his programme sought to 
give the units control of those matters, which made it
possible for one wing to exploit the other, which had, in the
8Q
past created so much mistrust between-the wings; y ■ 'With' ' 
both sides remaining adamant, the deadlock remained indis­
soluble, and Bhutto announced his party*s boycott of the
Assembly session and intimidated other West Pakistani poli-
qn
ticians who were planning to travel to Dacca. In the
face of this pressure, the President on March 1, 1971* 
announced the postponement of the opening of the Assembly.
The President, in his broadcast, said that he had postponed 
the Assembly seesion, because the People*s Party, the
8 8. Dawn, February 18, 1971*
89• Dawn, February 25* 1971*
90. Peter Hazslhurst, "Background to the Failure of nego­
tiations", The Times (London), June 4, 1971* P* 14-*
leading party in West Pakistan, had announced that it would
not attend the Assembly meeting* He said, "with so many
representatives of the people of West Pakistan keeping away
from the Assembly, if it were to go ahead with the inaugural
session on March the Assembly itself could have disinteg-
91rated and the entire effort could have been wasted.
The president squarely put the onus for the difficulties on
the political leaders for the "hard attitudes" they had
adopted, and implied that only the politicians could untie
the knot they had tied.
The President, according to observers, made his
first mistake by not consulting the leader of the majority
party,. Sheikh Mujibur Bahman, in taking the decision to ■
postpone the Assembly session, for this was represented as
the P r e s i d e n t s  surrender to Bhutto and the Punjabi
92pressure. The President’s announcement sparked off unrest
and disturbances in Dacca, though the Awami League leader 
had called for the observance of a non-violent hartal, to 
show resentment against the postponement of the Assembly 
session. Security forces opened fire on several occasions 
to quell riots, resulting in heavy casualties. It was 
announced that Sheikh Mujibur Bahman would declare his future 
plans on March 7? 1971* In the meantime, the situation in 
East Pakistan became extremely tense, with a general strike
91. The Financial Times, March 2, 1971*
92. The Times (London), June 4, 1971*
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and widespread non-cooperation; mob violence and action 
of the security forces resulted in the deaths of a number 
of people. All government offices and courts remained 
closed.
In an attempt to resolve the crisis, the President
called to a round table conference in Dacca on March 10,
93the leaders of twelve parliamentary groups. Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman rejected the invitation, alleging that the
army was shooting down unarmed Bengalis in the streets of
Dacca and declared that Mwith a military build-up [in East
Pakistan] continuing and the harsh language of weapons
ringing in our ears, the invitation to such a conference is
qzl
in effect being made at g u n p o i n t . , Nurul Amin, the only
other leader invited from East Pakistan also declined the
President's invitation. The President on March 6
announced that the National Assembly would now meet on
March 25• Bhutto expressed his willingness to attend the 
95s e s s i o n . B u t  by this time things had already gone too 
far.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on March 7* ignoring militant 
cries for Mindependence”, outlined four pre-conditions for 
further talks. He demanded the immediate ending of martial
95. The Times (London), March 4, 1971*
94. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1971-72), p. 24566. 
95* The Pinancial Times, March 8, 1971*
524
law, the return of all troops in East Pakistan to their
barracks, an inquiry into the deaths which had occurred
during the previous few days, and the transfer of power to
96the elected representatives of the people. He also
called upon the Bengalis to continue their non-violent noh- 
cooperation movement till these demands were met* Life in 
the entire province had been disrupted and the Bengalis 
showed their solid support for Sheikh Mujibur Hahman*s 
demands. In the milst of such a distressing situation, 
President Yahya Khan arrived in Dacca on March 15 to negotiate 
with the East Pakistani leader.
The President, it was reported, made two alternative 
offers to resolve the crisis.' ■ The first was that he was- 
willing to restore power to the elected representatives 
immediately, if Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was willing to form 
provisional governments, both at the national and provincial 
levels. Secondly, the President was willing to restore 
power to the provinces, while an interim government, led by 
the President himself, would administer the day-to-day
97needs of the country, until a constitution was f r a m e d . A t  
the time the two leaders had said there was room for optimism. 
But when Bhutto had heard of these proposals, he publicly 
declared that "West Pakistan would go up in smoke, if the
96. The Financial Times, March 8 , 1971*
97. Peter Hazelhurst, "Background to the Failure of Nego­
tiations", The Times, June 4-, 1971? P* 14*•
- 525
Peoplefs Party was not included in the proposed coalition
government'1. He launched a massive and violent campaign in
98the Punjab to prove his point.
As the talks between the President and Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman progressed, Bhutto joined in on March 21. On the 
following day the President announced the postponement of
the Assembly session "in consultation with leaders of
99political parties from both w i n g s " . T h e  announcement 
was taken to mean that time was needed for further elabor­
ation of the arrangements before the actual meeting of the 
Assembly, or that the progress of the negotiations not being 
satisfactory and there being no agreement among the political 
leaders, the meeting of the Assembly had to be postponed.
In the midst of varying speculations and rumours, the 
President suddenly flew back to West Pakistan, as also did 
all the West Pakistani leaders, including Bhutto, on the 
night of March 25> 1971* The army then went into action 
in East Pakistan.
The talks clearly had reached a deadlock and the 
President in a broadcast^ to the nation on March 26 , 1971> 
recapitulated the attempts he had made to make the political 
leaders agree on some principles on which the future
98. Ibid.
99* The Guardian (London), March 23, 1971*
1. Pull Text of the Presidents Speech,
Dawn, March 27, 1971*
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constitution could "be based and power could be transferred 
to the elected representatives of the people. He blamed 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and. his party for the serious turn of 
events during the three weeks of March. The President 
said,
"Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's action in starting a 
non-cooperation movement is an act of treason.
He and his party have defied lawful authority 
for over three weeks. They have insulted 
Pakistan's flag and defiled the photograph of 
the Father of the Nation. They have tried to 
run a parallel government. They have created 
turmoil, terror and insecurity."
The President said that he would have taken action earlier
but he had to try his utmost not to jeopardise his plan for
a peaceful transfer of power. Eut Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's
"obstinacy, obduracy and absolute refusal to talk sense can
lead to but one conclusion - the man and his party are
enemies of Pakistan, and want East Pakistan to break away
completely from the country."
The President disclosed that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
had asked for the withdrawal of martial law and the transfer 
of power before the meeting of the National Assembly; 
he also demanded that the Assembly should meet in two com­
mittees - one composed of the members from East Pakistan 
and the other composed of the members from West Pakistan.
The President said that, despite some serious flaws in the 
scheme, he himself was prepared to agree "in principle" to 
the plan. But the West Pakistan political leaders felt
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that the transfer of power before the meeting of the 
National Assembly would be illegal and would create a 
vacuum; the splitting of the National Assembly into two 
parts "would encourage the divisive tendencies that may 
exist". The President had agreed with this view but 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was adamant on all these points.
In view of the grave situation, the President 
said, he had placed a ban on all political activities 
throughout the country, and had completely banned the Awami 
League as a political party. The President concluded, 
"Finally let me assure you that my main aim remains the 
same, namely, transfer of power to the elected represen­
tatives of the. people., , As, soon, as the, situation permits,
I will take fresh steps towards the achievement of this 
2objective." The President reiterated his view in a press 
conference on May 24, 1971• He said that the regime had 
done a lot of hard work to enable the elections to be held 
and this would not be allowed to go to waste. The President 
disclosed that in two or three weeks' time he would announce 
his new plan to transfer power to the elected representatives 
of the people.
On June 28, 1971? ^He President, in a nation-wide 
broadcast,^ announced his plan of setting up civil governments
2. Ibid.
3. The Financial Times, May 25? 1971*
4. The Guardian (London), June 29? 1971*
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both at the centre and the provinces. He said that, 
because of the unhappy h i s t o r y  of the attempts to frame a 
Constitution by an Assembly in Pakistan, the constitution 
would now be d r a m  up by an expert committee on the basis 
of the principles laid down in the Legal Framework Order. '
The President announced that, after investigation, a list of 
Awami League members of the National and Provincial Assemblies 
disqualified because of "anti-State activities", would be 
published. By-elections would be held to fill these 
vacancies but the rest would retain their seats as indepen­
dents. After the by-elections and the adoption of the new 
constitution, National and Provincial Assemblies would be 
convened and national and provincial governments formed.
The President said that these governments would
"have at their disposal the cover of martial law 
for a period of time. In actual practice martial 
law will not be operative in its present form, but 
we cannot allow chaos in any part of the country, 
and the hands of the governments need to be streng­
thened until things settle down."
The President expressed his hope that power would be trans­
ferred within four months but it would "naturally depend 
on the internal and external situation".
In the middle of 1971? the political scene looked 
like a total frustration of the two years1 preparation for 
the transfer of power from the military regime to the rep­
resentatives of the people. The failure of the talks 
between the leaders and the army's action in East Pakistan
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on March 25? 1971 aggravated the situation and widened the 
differences "between the two wings. The militant Bengalis 
now feel that self-rule for East Pakistan can only "be attained 
outside the framework of Pakistan. Apart from the Presi­
dent’s speech on March 26, it would, at this stage, he 
difficult to ascertain at what stage the negotiations were 
abandoned. The protagonists of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and 
his party maintain that the President and the now outlawed 
Awami League leader had reached agreement on all points, 
that even the proposal for splitting the National Assembly 
into two parts was accepted by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, to 
accommodate Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto, according to this 
view, feared that ”in a joint session of the Assembly Mujib 
might join hands with the Pathan and Baluch and some of the 
smaller anti-Bhutto parties in the Punjab to neutralise
5
Bhutto and even impose the six-points on Nest Pakistan”.
It is therefore maintained that there was no question of a 
break-down in the talks, because the President and his team 
never issued an ultimatum1, or laid down their minimum 
terms for a settlement.
Whatever may have been the reason, there is no 
denying the fact that it was the inflexible attitude of the
5« Rehman Sobhan, ’’Prelude to an Order for Genocide”, 
The Guardian (London), June 5? 1971* P&ge 2.
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political leaders since their election on December 7, 1970, 
that precipitated the whole crisis* It is suggested in 
some quarters that the army never intended to surrender 
power to the politicians. But from the time President 
Yahya Khan assumed power on March 25, 1909, till the crisis 
in March, 1971, there was no reason to entertain doubts 
about his promises to transfer power to the representatives 
of the people. The armed forces are no doubt an important 
factor in Pakistan. But the fact remains that the army came 
in, because the politicians failed to do their duty to the 
people and created conditions calling for the army’s inter­
ference.
After the President’s promulgation of the Legal 
Framework Order in March, 1970, there remained only one 
constitutional issue to be decided by the politicians in 
the National Assembly, the issue of centre-province relation­
ship, which is as old as the country i t s e l f T h i s  issue 
had always been the background of the drastic action taken 
by the executive against the politicians, starting with 
the dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin in April, 1953*
After so many years, by the end of 1970 the politicians 
should have been able to find a solution for this intractable 
problem. But the axiom that ’’politics is the art of
6. See M.B. ITaqvi, ’’West Pakistan's Struggle for Power”, 
South Asian Review (1971) Vol. 4*, p. 213.
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possible1 seems to be unknown, to Pakistani politicians.
It was their adamant stand on this issue that resulted in 
the tragic events that have followed since March 25> 1971*
It is not for me to justify the army!s action in 
East Pakistan, which started on March 25> 1971» a-n<3. it is 
too early to predict the consequences of this action.
But an analysis of the developments before that date points 
to the inescapable conclusion that the situation was preci­
pitated by the words and actions of the politicians. If 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman!s programme was not negotiable and 
the only programme that could keep Pakistan united was to 
concede to the provinces their due rights, as he claimed, he 
failed to convince Bhutto and the other West Pakistani' 
leaders. If, on the other hand, Bhutto had an alternative 
scheme, which would have ensured a strong centre and at the 
same time would satisfy the provincial demands for autonomy, 
he failed to secure its acceptance by the Awami League 
leaders. If President Yahya Khan made a mistake in post­
poning the meeting of the National Assembly, he did so 
under pressure from Bhutto and his party. The army, it is 
true, has its own view of the kind of constitution which, 
t^ould give the armed forces their proper place. It would 
like to see them entrenched in the constitution and it has 
been too much involved in politics to adopt an attitude of 
neutrality on the constitutional provisions. But so far, 
the army has not flouted any agreement reached by the
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political leaders. If the political leaders of the two 
wings had found a solution, it is unlikely that the army 
would have declined to implement it. The politicians, as 
in the past, failed to rise to the occasion or appreciate 
the gravity of the situation, through their lack of mutual 
trust, political goodwill and above all imagination and 
political foresight.
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Chapter XII
Reaction in Commonwealth Courts
The Cyprus Case
The principles followed and the conclusions reached by
-j
Pakistani Federal Court in 1955 and the Supreme Court in 
2
1958, found approval, and in some cases aroused vivid dis­
cussion in other Commonwealth courts, including the Judi­
cial Committee of the Privy Council, when dealing with 
legal questions in similar situations* In the first of 
these cases the Supreme Court of Cyprus was called upon 
to determine the vires of a law, which purported to have 
been passed by the Cyprus legislature, providing for the 
administration of justice, including the establishment 
of the Supreme Court itself* Following the disturbances 
and the armed insurrection in Cyprus starting at the end 
of 1963, the Turkish section of the government
machinery had ceased to function* Not only had the Turkish 
Vice-President and Turkish members of the legislature 
ceased to participate but the Turkish judges of the 
superior courts also absented themselves from the courts;
1 Reference by the Governor-General * P*L.D*1955 F*C*435;> 
Discussed in Chapter III, pp *£(.-?* ,supr a*
2 The State V Dosso, P.L.D.-1958 S.C.533,
Discussed in Chapter VI, pp*i97- t*?9.
the neutral presidents of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court and the High Court resigned, resulting in the vir­
tual collapse of the administration of justice.
Accordingly, the President of the Republic, with 
the G-reek remnant of the legislature, purported to pass 
legislation, setting up a new system of courts, and merging 
the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court into
a new unified Supreme Court, consisting of the existing
3
judges of the two superior courts. The law was passed 
by the legislature, at the instance of the executive, 
to remedy the situation temporarily and, as the preamble 
said, "until such time as the people of Cyprus may deter­
mine such matters". In the Attorney-G-eneral of the 
Republic V Mustafa Ibrahim^ the jurisdiction of the new 
court was challenged on the grounds that it had no 
constitutional existence and that the law, under the 
provisions of which the court was purporting to function, 
was ultra vires the constitution and therefore a nullity. 
The legislation in question was, in fact, passed by 
the legislature without the participation of the members 
representing the Turkish community, and furthermore, 
constitutional provisions relating to establishment of 
superior courts were among the "basic articles" of the 
Constitution, which were unalterable by any means
3 The Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
law (law 33 of 1964),
4 (1964) C.L.R.195 S.C.
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whatsoever* The Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Law, 1964 was apparently an unconstitutional 
enactment and the Cyprus Supreme Court was faced with the 
question whether, in the extraordinary circumstances 
obtaining in Cyprus during 1963-1964, apparently unconsti­
tutional legislation was valid in law, on the ground that 
it was designed to preserve the State and Cyprus society. 
In dealings the case the judges took judicial 
notice of the "recent events" that had occurred in Cyprus, 
which had paralysed the whole machinery of constitutional 
government in the island. In the judicial sphere the two 
superior Courts ceased to function and "together with 
them the whole system of the administration of Justice
5
in the Republic was in danger of collapse". The judges 
felt that the court could not allow the administration 
of justice to collapse. Necessity demanded that the 
courts should function in order to preserve the state 
and the society. Consequently it was held that tha 
Supreme Court was not an unconstitutional creation, 
although its establishment was not authorised by the 
Constitution of 1960. The constitution had to be read 
subject to the implied rule of necessity and a situation 
had arisen which it was impossible to meet in terms of 
the constitution, and the rule of necessity had to be
5 per Vassiliades,J., at p.207,
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invoked to fill the vacuum created by the abnormal situation 
in the country.
The judges unanimously held that an apparently uncons­
titutional legislation would be justified in law, if it 
could be shown that it was enacted only in order to avoid 
consequences which could not be otherwise avoided and that 
no more was done than was reasonably necessary for the 
purpose. Triantafyllides, J. said that "the doctrine of 
necessity in public law is in reality the acceptance of 
necessity as a source of authority for acting in a manner 
not regulated by law but required in prevailing circumstances, 
by supreme public interest, for the salvation of the State 
and its people. In such cases 1sulus populir becomes 
!suprema lex*. That being so, the doctrine of'necessity 
has developed in accordance with the situations which 
have given rise to its being propounded or resorted to",^
Referring to the Constitution of 1960 the learned 
judge observed that "where it is not possible for a basic 
function of the State to be discharged properly, as provided 
for in the Constitution or where a situation has arisen 
which cannot be adequately met under the provisions of 
the Constitution then the appropriate organ may take such 
steps within the nature of its competence as are required 
to meet the necessity. In such a case si*ch steps, provided
6 (1964) C.L.R.195 S.C. at pp.230-231.
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that they are what is reasonably required in the circums­
tances, cannot be deemed as being repugnant to or incon­
sistent with the Constitution, because to hold otherwise 
would amount to the absurd proposition that the Constitution
itself ordains the destruction of the State which it has
7
been destined to secure". But it must be pointed out that
prima facie the appropriate organ was not competent to
pass the impugned law. It seems better to say that in a
situation of grave emergency the legislature or such part 
tc
of it as cam summoned is competent to make any law 
necessary genuinely intended to meet the emergency not 
going beyond what is necessary for that purpose,
Josephides, J, elaborated the doctrine of necessity 
by providing prerequisites to be satisfied before the 
doctrine was applied to examine the legality of any measure. 
He said, "In the light of the principles of the law of 
necessity, as applied in other countries, and having 
regard to the provisions of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Cyprus *••, I interpret our Constitution to 
include the doctrine of necessity in exceptional circums­
tances, which is an implied exception to particular 
provisions of the constitution; and this in order to 
ensure the very existence of the State, The following
7 Ibid, at p,234 «
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prerequisites must be satisfied before the doctrine may 
become applicable :
(a) an imperative and inevitable necessity or 
exceptional circumstances;
(b) no other remedy to apply;
(c) the measure taken must be proportionate tojthe 
necessity; and
(d) it must be of a temporary character, limited
to the duration of the exceptional circumstances
A lav; thus enacted is subject to the control of this court
to decide whether the aforesaid prerequisites are satisfied
i.e. whether there exists such a necessity and whether the
Smeasures taken were necessary to meet it".
The principle of necessity, enunciated in the Cyprus
case, was the same as that which the Pakistan Federal 
q
Court applied in upholding the Governor-General1s
proclamation purporting to give temporary validity to
thirty-five statutes in 1955. The Pakistan decision was,
however, not cited in the Cyprus Court. The Pakistan
Federal Court held, as the Cyprus Supreme Court did in
the instant case, that the Governor-General had acted as
he did "in order to avert an impending disaster and to
10prevent the State and society from dissolution".
8 Ibid. at p.265*
9 Reference by the Governor-General, P.L.D.1955 F.C.435,
10 Ibid.per Munir, C.J. at p.486,
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But the similarity between these decisions should 
not obscure the difference in the basic circumstances!in 
which the apparently unconstitutional measures were taken. 
While in Cyprus the situation in which the Administration 
of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law was enacted, 
was created by factors beyond the control of either the 
executive or the legislature of the Republic, and they 
had to resort to extraordinary measures in order to 
prevent the administration of justice from collapse. In 
Pakistan the situation was directly caused by the Governor- 
General fs action in dissolving the first Constituent 
Assembly, and the plea of "necessity” was put forward to 
meet a situation, which was the Governor-Generalls own 
creation.
Now, it is an accepted principle of natural justice
that the plea of necessity would not justify an illegal
action by a party to meet an abnormal situation created
by that party by its previous action. It should, however,
be noted that the Federal Court did not allow the
Governor-General to assume to himself, following the
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, all powers,
including the constituent powers hitherto exercised jointly
11by that Assembly and the Governor-General. It was only 
when the Governor-General made provisions for setting up
11 See Usif Patel V The Crown, P.L.L.1955 F.C.387* 
Chapter III pp. 5", supra.
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a new Constituent Assembly to exercise all the powers and 
perform all the functions of its predecessor, that the 
Federal Court upheld the Governor-General1s action and then 
only accorded validity to his action until such time as the 
matters could be considered by the new Assembly*
The Uganda Case
In Uganda between 22 February 1966 and 15 April 1966 
a series of events took place which resulted in the 
abolition of the Independence Constitution of 1962 and its 
replacement by a new one, adopted contrary to the procedure 
provided for constitutional amendment in the previous 
Constitution. In Uganda V Commissioner of Prisons. Ex parte
"1 ? i
Matovu the High Court of Uganda was faced with the 
question of determining the legality of the new constitution* 
In the course of deciding the case the court had to 
consider the events that had occurred during the material 
time, which effected the change* On 22 February 1966 the 
Prime Minister of Uganda made a statement declaring that 
in the interests of national stability and public security 
and tranquillity, he had, with immediate effect, taken 
over all powers of the government of Uganda* By subsequent 
statements the Prime Minister suspended the Constitution 
of 1962, saving the provisions relating to seven subjects
12 (1966) E.A.514.
541
and assumed to himself all powers exercised and functions 
performed previously by the President and the Vice-President*
On 15 April 1966 the National Assembly, at an emergency 
session, passed a resolution abolishing the Constitution 
of 1962 and adopted a new constitution as’’the Constitution 
of Uganda until such time as the Constituent Assembly 
established by Parliament enacts a constitution in place 
of this Constitution”. On adoption of the Constitution of 
1966, the Prime Minister automatically became the executive 
President of the Republic and the commander-in-chief of 
the sovereign state of Uganda. Oaths of allegiance under 
the new Constitution were administered to all members of 
the National Assembly and others concerned, but the judges 
were deemed by the Constitution to have done so.
In determining the legality of the new Constitution, 
the court, first of all, had to establish its jurisdiction 
to go into the question. For the state it was contended 
that the court was not competent to enquire into the 
legality of the Constitution on the grounds,mainly, that, 
as judges of the High Court of Uganda, they were precluded 
by their judicial oaths from questioning the validity 
of the Constitution; secondly, constitution-making being 
a political act, it was beyond the jurisdiction of court, 
or alternatively, the court was bound to declare the 
Constitution valid, if it should undertake to enquire into
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the question of validity, because the Constitution was 
the product of a successful revolution.
The court rejected these objections as to its 
jurisdiction. On the point of "political question" the 
Chief Justice, Sir Udo Udoma,who delivered the judgment 
of the court, pointed out that the question raised before 
the court was not a question of political nature. His 
lordship said, "The Government of Uganda is well- 
established and has no rival. The question that was 
raised by the court was not as to the legality of the 
Government, but as to the validity of the Constitution". 
The Chief Justice distinguished the American case,
Luther V Borden  ^where Taney, C.J. of the United States 
Supreme Court held that it was not for the court to decide 
which of two contending constitutions was in force at a 
given time. The Judiciary had to follow the decision of 
the political department. But whereas in the American case 
there were two competing groups for the control of the 
government of the State of Rhode Island, in Uganda there 
was no such competition and the Government of Uganda had 
no such rival.
Referring to the first objection the learned Chief 
Justice said that the judges are bound by their judicial
13 (1849) , 7 Howard I.
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oath to administer justice according to the Constitution 
as by law established. One of the main functions of the 
High Court prescribed by the Constitution was to interpret 
the Constitution itself. His lordship said, "If it is the 
duty of this court to interpret the Constitution of the 
Sovereign State of Uganda, it seems to us an extraordinary 
proposition to submit that this court cannot enquire into
the validity of the Constitution. It would be difficult
\
to sustain such a proposition. In our view, since it is 
the duty of the judges of this court to do right to all 
manner of people, in accordance with the Constitution 
of the Sovereign State of Uganda as by law established, it 
must follow as the night follows the day, that it is an . 
essential part of the duty of the judges of this court 
to satisfy themselves that the Constitution of Uganda is 
established according to law and that it is legally 
valid".1 ^  The judges, therefore, had jurisdiction to go 
into the legality of the Constitution in order to dis­
charge their judicial duty to do justice to all manner 
of people in accordance with the Constitution.
Dealing with the Attorney-General^ alternative 
submission, that the Constitution of 1966 was a valid 
Constitution, because it came into existence as a result
i>d% of
of a revolution or a coup d *etat A which were recognised 
14 (1966J E.A.514, at p.530,
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in international law as proper and effective means of 
changing governments or constitutions in independent, and 
sovereign countries, the Chief Justice referred to the 
"four cardinal requirements1' outlined by the Attorney-
General which had to be fulfilled for such a change to be
valid* These requirements were :
1. That there must be an abrupt political change,
i.e* a coup d Tetat or a revolution*
2* That change must not have been within the con­
templation of an existing constitution*
3. The change must destroy the entire legal order 
except what is preserved; and 
4* The new Constitution and the Government must be 
effective*
The Chief Justice also noted the series of events 
that took place in Uganda since 22 February 1966, the 
Attorney-General1 s reference to Hans Kelsen!s positivist 
theory and the Pakistan case of The State V Dosso * and 
counselfs claim that, since the adoption of the new 
Constitution, the people had accepted it and had unani­
mously given obedience to it so that, by reason of the
effectiveness of the constitution, the machinery of 
government had been functioning smoothly. His lordship 
then observed, "These submissions aref.unassaible* On the 
theory of law and state propounded by the positivist
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school of jurisprudence represented by the famous Professoi?
Kelsen, it is beyond question, and we hold, that the series
of events, which took place in Uganda form February 22 to
April,1966 ••• could only appropriately be described in
law as a revolution. These changes had occurred, not in
accordance with the principle of legitimacy,but deliberately
contrary to it. There were no pretensions on the part of
the Prime Minister to follow the procedure prescribed by
the 1962 Constitution in particular for the removal of the
15President and the Vice-President”,
In support of his contention that what took place in 
Uganda was a "revolution”, Sir Udo Udoma quoted extensively 
from Hans Kelsen*s General Theory of Law and State, as did 
Pakistan Chief Justice Muhammad Munir in The State V Dosso, 
and said that the effect of Kelsen!s principles was that 
the Constitution of 1966 "was the product of a revolution.
Of that there can be no doubt. The Constitution had extra- 
legal origin and therefore created a new legal order. 
Although the product of a revolution, the Constitution is 
nonetheless valid in law, because in international law 
revolutions and coup^ d 1etat are the recognised methods of 
changing governments and constitutions in sovereign 
states”,^
Apart from Hans Kelsen, the Uganda Chief Justice
15 Ibid, at p.535.
16 Ibid. at p.537,
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found support of his view about the extra-legal origin of 
every constitution in Salmond on Jurisprudence. His lord­
ship quoted from Salmond :
"Every constitution has an extralegal origin,
the best illustration being the United States of
America, which in open and forcible defiance of
English law, broke away from England and set up new
states and constitution, the origin of which was not
merely extra legal but was illegal11*
"Yet, as soon as those constitutions succeeded
in obtaining de facto establishment in the rebellious
colonies, they received recognition as legally valid
from the courts of the colonies. Constitutional law
followed hard upon the heels of constitutional facts*
Courts, legislatures and law had alike their origin
in the constitution and therefore the constitution
cannot derive its origin from them. So also with
every constitution that is altered by way of illegal
revolution. By what legal authority was the Bill of
Rights passed, and by what legal title did William III
17assume the Crown".
The learned Chief Justice then discussed the Pakistan 
case, The State V Dosso, and agreed with Munir C.J., that 
the events in Pakistan on 7 October 1958 had the effect 
of the annulment of the Pakistan Constitution of 1956 and 
constituted "an abrupt political change" amounting, in 
law, to a revolution which was not within the contemplation
17 J# Salmond, "Jurisprudence"(11th edition by Glanville
Williams), p.101
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of the annulled constitution, and that a victorious
revolution was an internationally recognized legal method
of changing a constitution*
His lordship, on the point of the legality of the
new Constitution, concluded, 11 Applying the Kelsenian
principles, which incidently form the “basis of the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in The State
V Dosso , our deliberate and considered view is that the
1966 Constitution is a legally valid constitution and the
supreme law of Uganda; and that the 1962 Constitution,
having been abolished as a result of a victorious
revolution, in law does no longer exist nor does now
form part of the Laws of Uganda, it having been deprived
of its d_e facto and de jure validity. The 1966 Constitution,
we hold, is a new legal order and has been effective since
1 ftApril 14* 1966 when it first came into force1 ♦
So, where the pre-existing legal order had been 
successfully overthrown and replaced by an effective new 
order, obtaining universal obedience from the people, 
and without any rival, the judges of the High Court of 
Uganda recognised the change as a hard political fact.
The method of change was immaterial in such circumstances 
and Sir Udo Udoma, C.J. noted that the change in Uganda
18 (1966) E.A.514, at p.539 .
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about
had not comet in accordance with the principle of legitimacy, 
hut ’’deliberately contrary to it”. Both the Supreme Court 
of Pakistan in 1958 and the High Court of Uganda in the 
instant case, accepted the change as a "revolution” 
constituting a new law-creating fact. The High Court of 
Uganda asserted that it had power to examine the legality 
of the Constitution and found, on the basis of political 
facts, that the new Constitution was the effective 
Constitution of Uganda which replaced the old one.
The Rhodesian Cases
Following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
by the Smith Government in November 1965, the High Court 
of Rhodesia was called upon to determine the legality 
of the new order. In a series of cases the High Court, 
at first giving de facto status to the rebel government, 
ultimately gave de, .jure recognition to it and accepted, 
on the basis of the facts that appeared in the course 
of three years, that the overthrow of the old order had 
been effective and complete. The Rhodesian High Court, 
as well as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
referred to the Pakistan Case of the State V Dosso and 
agreed with the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court 
of Pakistan in that case.
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19In the first of the Madzimbamuto series of cases,
it was contended for the Smith Government in the General
Division of the High Court of Rhodesia, that the legal
tie with Britain had been successfully severed by the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11 November
1965, and that the Constitution of 1965, as adopted by
the legislature at the instance of the rebel Government,
was the effective Constitution of Rhodesia* But the court
rejected this argument, and, tracing the constitutional
history of Rhodesia, came to the conclusion that Rhodesia
was still linked to Britain by a legal tie. Noting the
fact that the mother country was committed to end the
rebellion, which it was potentially able to do, it was
observed that.it could not be said "that the 1965
Constitution is the lawful Constitution or that the
present Government is a lawful Government, until such
time as the tie of sovereignty vested in Britain has
20been finally and successfully severed”.
Discussing the positivist theory of Hans Kelsen,
lewis, J. said that the doctrine propounded by Kelsen
might well be correct, "and there is no difficulty in
applying it in the normal situation, where one has a
state which is already a sovereign independent state,
19 Madzimbamuto V Lardner-Burke.(1966) R.L.R.756 (G.D.)
20 Ibid. at p.794, per Lewis, J.
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changing its form of government or its constitution by a 
successful internal revolution, whether peaceful or 
otherwise. All that need happen is the complete displace­
ment of the old order within the territory itself by the 
new order. In those circumstances, provided that the 
order has completely disappeared, the existing judges of 
the courts are in no difficulty. Their former allegiance 
to the old order disappears with its complete annihilation, 
and it is then a siinple step to recognise their allegiance
to the new order and to continue to function as if they
21had been appointed under the new order". According to
the learned judge, such was the situation in the Pakistan
case, the State V Dosso. He quoted passages from the
judgment of Munir, C.J. and said that the Pakistan judges
<as
could reach the conclusion^they did, because Pakistan by 
1958 had enjoyed for some years independent sovereign 
status, and the success of the revolution was complete 
and absolute, when it succeeded within the boundaries 
of Pakistan.
The situation in Rhodesia was different. Even though 
the existing regime was in effective control of the 
internal government of the country, it could not have a 
fully de .jure status, until it broke the tie of legal
21 Ibid. at p.788,
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sovereignty of the mother country. But the court recog­
nised the fact that the rebel government was exercising 
the effective authority over the territory and all public 
servants and the armed forces were carrying on their 
ordinary duties in obedience to the lav/s and directions 
of the rebel Parliament and the Government; that no 
British legislation would, even if duly promulgated, be 
enforced by the appropriate authorities. On the other 
hand the judges, along with others, had been instructed 
by the Governor, by whom they were appointed on behalf 
of the Queen, to maintain law and order and to carry on 
with their normal task, subject to their refraining from 
"all acts which would further the objectives of the 
illegal authorities."
The judges recognised the dilemma facing them in 
such an extraordinary situation. Lewis, J., in this 
context, observed, "In this unique situation, therefore, 
the only way in which this court can continue to function 
as a court, consistently with the Governor’s instruction 
and consistently with its duty to the State, is to invoke 
the maxim 1salus populi suprema lex, * which is,in effect, 
a doctrine of State necessity, and to recognise such laws 
and such administrative actions (of the existing regimejf 
as are designed for the purposes" of the preservation of 
peace and good government and the maintenance of law
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22and order.
In coming to this conclusion the learned judge
referred to the American Civil War cases, in one of which
Chase, C.J., said that acts "necessary to peace and good
order among citizens... which would be valid if emanating
from a lawful government, must be regarded, in general,
as valid when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful 
23government." The Rhodesian judges, it would seem, had 
recognised the political facts as they then existed in 
respect of Rhodesia, in reaching their conclusions. They 
would not give the rebel regime, in the face of the British 
commitment to end the rebellion,, its full recognition. But 
they would enforce such of the regime’s measures, both 
legislative and administrative, as could lawfully have 
been taken by a lav/ful government under the 1961 constitution.
On appeal, the Appellate Division of the Rhodesian 
High Court by a majority recognised the Smith Government 
as the de facto government in complete administrative and 
legislative control of the country.^ But Sir Hugh Beadle, 
C.J., refused to accept the 1965 donstitution adopted by 
the rebel regime as the lawful constitution. The learned 
Chief Justice went into the events which had occurred since
22 Ibid. at p.811.
23 Texas V White.(1869). 7 Wallace 700, 733*
24 Madzimbamuto V Lardner-Burke, 1968 [ 2 ]S.A.284 (R.,A.D.).
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the declaration of independence, particularly talking note 
of Britain's commitment to end the rebellion and reached the 
conclusion that, though the regime was in effective control 
of the territory and was "likely" to continue so, at that 
stage, on the basis of evidence before the court, it could 
not be said "to be so 'firmly established' as to justify 
a finding that its status is yet that of a de jure government
because . I find that the evidence on what is likely to
25happen in future is not yet sufficiently conclusive*"
The,Chief Justice referred to the two grundnorm cases, 
State V Dosso and the Uganda case of ex parte Michael Matovu. 
and held, in agreement with these decisions, that a domestic 
court had jurisdiction to enquire into the legality of the 
new order. He-rejected the argument that those cases were 
examples of judges' "joining the revolution" and maintained 
that, had the judges regarded themselves simply as judges 
of a revolutionary court, their detailed enquiry "whether 
or not the old grundnorm had been superseded by the new 
would have been wholly unnecessary." In both these cases, 
observed his lordship, a revolution took place and "the 
courts found, on the facts, that the revolution had 
succeeded and that the old grundnorm had been replaced by 
the new. In consequences of this, the courts held that
25 Ibid. at p. 326,
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2 6the laws of the new grundnorm were valid."
Beadle, C.J., then dealt with the question whether a 
revolution or an abrupt change could be regarded asalawful 
method of changing the constitution. He accepted the propo­
sition that a successful revolution, replacing the old 
grundnorm with a new one, would establish the revolutionaries 
as a lawful government. But "success" here must be equated 
with the words "firmly established". Because, according to 
the learned Chief Justice, "no revolution can be said to 
have succeeded until the revolutionary government is at 
least ’firmly established’; using the word ’succeeded’ in 
this sense, the determining factor is whether or not it can
be said with sufficient certainty that the revolution has 
27succeeded."
The learned Chief Justice referred to various authoritiesa 
including Professor Hans Kelsen’s theory, which indicated 
that legality of the change in the basic norm must follow 
the political reality, and found himself in agreement with 
the findings of the courts in Pakistan and Uganda. If the 
fundamental law had changed, the court had to recognise 
it. But his lordship rejected the view, adopted in the 
court below, that all these authorities could be applicable 
only to an independent sovereign state. His lordship referred
26 Ibid. at p.313.
27 Ibid. at p.315 *
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to an American case where it was held that independent 
sovereign status of the union of American States was not 
dependent on any concession made by the British King. They 
"became entitled, from the time when they declared themselves 
independent, to all the rights and powers of sovereign states, 
and ... they did not derive them from concession made by the 
British King. The treaty of peace contains a recognition of
po
their independence, not a grant of it." Following this 
decision Beadle, C.J.,argued : "It cannot therefore be 
assumed that the ultimate success of the present revolution 
must necessarily depend on some express or implied acqui­
escence by Great Britain or on recognition of the present 
Government by other states. At what particular stage it can 
be said that the revolution had succeeded and the constitution
changed is a question of fact and must depend entirely on the
29particular circumstances obtaining at a particular time."
Regarding,the method of change of the basic norm, the 
Chief Justice accepted the contention that the validity of 
the new constitution did not depend on whether the old 
constitution had beeh changed by a lawful method or by an 
unlawful revolutionary method. According to his lordship, 
the only fundamental difference in the two methods of change 
was the demarcation of the precise timing of the change;
28 M *ilvaine V Coxe*s Lessee. (1808), 4 Cranch.209«
29 19681_2J S.A.284, at p.319,
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and in a revolutionary change it was difficult to determine 
exactly at what time the revolution had succeeded* But once 
it was clear, Beadle, C.J., observed, "that the revolution 
has in fact succeeded, the ultimate result is the same. The 
validity of the new constitution does not depend on the 
method of change; it depends on the existing factual situa­
tion, which determines, as a question of fact, whether the
old constitution has disappeared, and the new constitution,
30in the sense of the new norm, has become the norm."
The learned Chief Justice in the course of his long 
judgment included a valuable discussion of the position of 
the judges of a pre-existing court after a revolutionary 
change. He referred to the Pakistan and Uganda cases, where 
the change had followed successful coups and said that the 
judges in those cases, were satisfied that the revolution 
had succeeded and the fundamental law had changed; they 
properly so held on the basis of the facts before them. The 
judges had to recognise the facts and-whether or not they 
would continue to act under the new constitution was a 
matter for their personal decision. If they decided to 
relinquish their offices they could do so, "but this would 
not have had any bearing on what at that time the law was." 
The Chief Justice held, "If the fundamental law1 has in 
fact changed, what I consider the judge cannot do is to
30 Ibid. at p.328.
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purport to continue to sit under the old constitution and 
declare that this constitution is still the law, which 
quite obviously it is not,and he knows quite well it is not. 
Such a decision would completely divorce law from political 
reality.
When the change has in fact taken place, the validity
of the grundnorm does not depend on the political views off
the judges. But the effectiveness of the change has to be
determined by the judges, on the basis of actual facts as
they appeared before them. Beadle, C.J., further emphasised
this point when he said, ” If an old constitution is complete
ly gone, it is gone for all purposes; and ... the method of
its demise matters not* If a judge remains under the new norm
he must accept that norm and cannot remain and seek to
declare the law of a non-existent norip. He has no right to
32elect which norm he will apply.”
But Fieldsend, A.J.A., dissented from the view of the 
Chief Justice in forceful language* He argued that judges 
appointed under a written constitution must not admit of any 
change in the law, unless the procedure prescribed by that 
constitution for such change had been strictly followed. This 
applied to any illegal change, whether peaceful or revolution 
ary. The learned judge reffered to the South African
31 Ibid. at p.327,
32 Ibid. at p.329*
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3 3cases, and said that, there "the courts were obliged to
stand in the way of what might be termed a legitimate attempt
to override the constitution; a fortiori must a court stand
in the way of a blatantly illegal attempt to tear up a
constitution." Fieldsend, A.J.A., held : "A court created by
a written constitution can have no independent existence
apart from that constitution; it does not receive its powers
from the common law and declare what its powers are; it is
not a creature of Frankenstein, which,once created, can turn
and destroy its maker. It is a matter of the supremacy
of the common law as in England, where there is no fundamnntal
difference between constitutional lav/ and the rest of the 
34law."  ^ The learned judge, however, held that certain actss 
of the Smith Government, which were necessary fob the ordi-r 
nary running of the administration and not designed to defeat 
the constitution of 1961, would be given validity on the 
basis of the doctrine of necessity.
The "political reality" referred to by Beadle, C.J., in 
his long judgment was subsequently recognised by the court
■7 C
in two later cases. In Madzimbamuto V Lardner-Burke(2), 
where the applicant prayed for a declaration of her right to 
appeal to the Privy Council, the court rejected her prayer.
33 An obvious referrence to : Harris V Minister of the 
Interior, 1952 [2\ S.A.428, and Minister of the Interior 
~\Tharris. 1952 [4J S .A.769p ’)
34 1968 [21s.A.284 at p.430,
35 1968 C2JS.A.457.
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The learned Chief Justice, on the basis of the evidence, was 
convinced "that any decision of the Board, so far as granting 
any relief to the applicant's husband is concerned,which was 
the purport of her case, would be a mere brutum fulmen, and 
whatever its academic interest might be, and I have no doubt 
it would be great,it would not result in giving the applicant 
the relief for which she asked*" For the same reason the 
High Court again refused to declare the right of the appli­
cants, who had been sentenced to death, to appeal to the Privy 
Council against their sentences,and also a prayer for 
extending the period of a temporary interdict, ordering the 
respondents to desist from carrying out the execution of the 
sentences* The learned Chief Justice, on the basis of facts,
was satisfied that the rebel government would not give
37effect to any decision of the Privy Council.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which 
granted special leave to appeal from the determination of the 
Rhodesian High Court, was not prepared to recognise any change 
in the constitutional status of Rhodesia,after the Unilateral
70
Declaration of Independence. The Board discussed the
36 Ibid* at p*462.The Chief Justice did not refuse to declare 
the right to appeal to the Privy Council on the basis of 
Smith Constitution of 1965 which abolished such appeals.
But he recognised the fact that the rebel regime would 
not enforce any Privy Council judgment.
37 Dhlamini Y. Carter, 1968 [2lS*A*464.
38 Madzimbamuto Y, Lardner-Burke 7 1968 ^3jAll E.R.561 (P.C.),
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constitutional developments in Rhodesia and taking into 
consideration the fact that 1 the British Government, acting 
for the lawful sovereign, is taking steps to regain control 
and it is impossible to predict with certainty whether or 
not it will succeed,” held the Smith Government and its 
Constitution of 1965 to be unlawful, and that the United 
Kingdom Parliaments Southern Rhodesian Act, 1965 and the 
Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order-in-Council, 1965, had 
full legal effect in. Rhodesia.
The Board unanimously refused to accept the existing 
Rhodesian Government as a (le facto government. Lord Reid,who 
delivered the majority judgment, observed that the terms 
de facto and d£ jure government were "conceptions of inter­
national law and in their lordships1 view they are quite 
inappropriate in dealing with the legal position of a usurper 
within the territory of which he has acquired control.” In 
determining the status of a new regime in a foreign country, 
the court must ascertain the view of Her Majesty’s Government 
and act on it as correct. Lord Reid said, ”In practice, the 
government have regard to certain rules, but those are not 
rules of law. And it happens not infrequently that the 
government recognises a usurper as the de facto government 
of a territory, while continuing to recognise the ousted 
Sovereign as the de jure government, But the position is 
quite different, where a court, sitting in a particular 
territory, has to determine the status of a new regime,which
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has usurped power and acquired control of that territory.lt
must decide. And it is not possible to decide that there are
two lawful governments at the same time, while each is seek-
39ing to prevail over the other." ^
Discussing the Pakistan case, the State V Dosso, and the 
Uganda case, ex parte Matovu, Lord Reid indicated that as in 
both cases the revolution was completely successful and the 
new regimes had no rival in any field, the judges were right 
in holding the annulment of the old constitutions and their 
replacement by the new ones. His Lordship, however, pointed 
out : "It would be very different if there had been still 
two rivals contending for power. If the legitimate government 
had been driven out but was trying to regain control, it 
would be impossible to hold that the usurper, who is in
control is the lawful ruler, because that would mean that by, 
striving to assert its lawful right, the ousted legitimate 
government was opposing the lawful ruler.
After the Judicial Committee’s decision the Rhodesian 
High Court had to determine finally the legal position of the 
1965 Smith Constitution.^ Because the court recognised that, 
after the Board’s ruling, that the Smith regime was unlawful 
and that the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order-in-Council 
1965, had full legal effect in Rhodesia, it was impossible 
foy&ny court appointed under the 1961 Constitution to function
39 Ibid. at pp.573-’74,
40 Ibid. at p.574. „ _
41 R.V. Ndhlovu and others, 1968 [4] S.A.515 (R.,A.D).
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in Rhodesia "without, at least, acquiescing in infringements 
of the Order-in-Council*" Sir Hugh Beadle, C*J., who delivered 
a long judgment, said that the Privy Council, examining the 
factual and legal position of Rhodesia, had come to the 
conclusion that the existing Rhodesian government had not 
established itself as a lawful government* But he pointed out 
that the Board did not canvass the question what a Rhodesian 
court sitting under the 1961 Constitution should do, if it 
came to the conclusion that the 1961 Constitution had been 
annulled by the efficacy of the change, or what the Board 
itself would have done had it, on the basis of facts, come
to such a conclusion*.......................................
The learned Chief Justice, attempting an answer to this 
problem, said that the Privy Council, as an English court 
sitting in England, was bound to acknowledge the sovereignty 
of the British Parliament, irrespective of the view it took 
of t1n& Rhodesian situation* And it was not possible for their 
Lordships consistently to acknowledge both the sovereignty 
of the British Parliament and the lawfulness of the existing 
government of Rhodesia* But for a 1961 Constitution court 
sitting in Rhodesia, the position would be different. His 
lordship observed "If a 1961 Constitution court, embarking 
on the factual enquiry, which the Board did, came to the 
conclusion that the 1961 Constitution had been annulled, 
because of the efficacy of the change, it would have to 
decline further jurisdiction as a 1961 Constitution court,
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because, in Taney, C.J,rs words, it would have ceased to 
exist as a court. If, after arriving at the conclusion that 
the change had been effective, the court nevertheless con­
tinued to sit and adjudicate on the matters before it, it 
could only do so as a court different from a court sitting 
under the 1961 feonstitution. Its character would have under­
gone a transmogrification, as it were.11^
The Chief Justicefs reference to Taney, C.J.Js opinion
4.3
relates to the latterrs judgment in Luther V Borden. where 
the American Chief Justice held that it was not for the court 
to decide which of the two competing constitutions was in 
force in the State of Rhode Island at the material time. It 
was a political question to be settled by the political 
factions and once the decision was manifest, the court was 
bound to follow it. According to Taney, C.J.: 1 The acceptance 
of the judicial office is a recognition of the authority of 
the government from which it is derived. And if the 
authority of that government is annulled and overthrown, the 
power of its courts and other officers is annulled with it. 
And if a State court should enter upon the inquiry proposed 
in this case, and should come to the conclusion that the 
government under which it acted had been put aside and 
displaced by an opposing government, it would cease to be a 
court, and be incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision
42 Ibid. at p.522*
43 Xhx&x (1849), 7 Howard f.
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upon the quesrion it undertook to try. If it decides at all 
as a court,it necessarily affirms the existence and authority 
of the government, under which it is exercising judicial 
power.”
Following the judgment in the American case and in 
support of his own view, Beadle,C.J.,referred to the Pakistan 
and Uganda cases. His lordship said that the judges in those 
cases commenced their sittings as judges appointed under the 
old constitutions and as such enquired into the status of the 
new revolutionary governments. "When, however,they continued 
to:sit after they had found as a fact that as a result of 
successful revolutions the old constitutions had "been 
effectively overthrown and replaced by new. constitutions, 
they, by continuing to sit, accepted the new constitutions, 
and when they held that the new constitutions were de jure 
constitutions, they gave these decisions as Judges sitting 
under the new constitutions and not as Judges sitting under 
the old. By continuing to sit after they found the old .cons­
titutions had disappeared, they sat as Judges in the new 
situation and as the new situation was that the new consti­
tutions were the de .jure constitutions they sat as Judges 
under those constitutions.”^
In the light of these decisions, Beadle,C.J#, after 
examining the facts as they existed in Rhodesia in the autumn 
of1968, said, ”... I can now predict with certainty that
44 1968[4] S.A.515, at 522.
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sanctions will not succeed in their objective of overthrowing
the present Government and of restoring the British Government
to the control of the Government of Rhodesia* The use of force
has been excluded, and I can forsee no other factor which, in
the foreseeable future, is in the least likely to enable the
British Government to regain control* I conclude, therefore,
that today I can predict with certainty that the British
Government will not succeed in gaining control* This b e i n g
so, it follows that I must come to the conclusion that the
1961 Constitution has been annulled by the efficacy of the 
4.6change«"
The learned Chief Justice pointed out that, in the case 
before the Privy Council, the Board undertook a factual and 
legal enquiry to determine the status of the rebel regime.
And on the basis of the evidence their Lordships came to the 
conclusion that the regime was unlawful. While on the basis of 
the facts before the court in the instant case, the High Court 
of Rhodesia reached the conclusion that the overthrow of the 
old order had been successful and a new effective order had 
taken its place. So, the approach by the two courts to the 
vital question was the same, though they had come to different 
conclusions* The legality of the new constitution was depen­
dent upon the fact of the successful overthrow of the old 
order and the effectiveness of the new.
45 Ibid.
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After arriving at the conclusion that the old constitu­
tion had been annulled and replaced by the new constitution, 
whether a judge should continue in his office was, according 
to Beadle,C.J., a personal question, a matter of judicial 
conscience* The judges, in the new situation, could not 
function as the old constitution court* If they decide to 
carry on with their functions, they would have to recognise 
the new constitution as the only lawful constitution. On the 
question of choice whether to go or to continue, the learned 
Chief Justice observed, MThe choice which faces a judge in 
Rhodesia today may be an agonising one, but the choice itself 
is straightforward enough. It is simply this : Is it better 
to remain and carry on with the peaceful task of protecting 
the fabric of society and maintaining law and order, or is 
it better to adhere to the old 1961 Constitution and go with 
it ... And considering the consequences that might follow
the resignation of the judges in such a situation, Sir Hugh 
Beadle,C.J., would prefer the first alternative.
The Nigerian Case
In January 1966 a section of the Nigerian Army rebelled, 
put two Regional Premiers to death and captured the Federal 
Prime Minister, who was taken to an unknown destination.His 
body was later discovered. The head of the Nigerian Army,
4-6 Ibid. at p.534.
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however, having rallied his men around him, had heen able 
to put down the rebellion. But the situation created by 
the rebellion and consequent army action resulted in the 
establishment of a Federal Military G-overnment in place of 
the pre-existing constitutional government in Nigeria, This 
was done in an apparent"transfer" of power by the Acting 
President on the "advice" of the Council of Ministers,which 
met without the Prime Minister. The Acting President, in a 
speech braadcast on 16 January 1966, said that the administra­
tion of the country was being voluntarily handed over to the 
Armed Forces of the Republic with immediate effect, and 
called upon all citizens to give their full support and co- . 
operation to the army.
The General Officer commanding the Nigerian Army in a 
broadcast said that "the Government of the Federation of 
Nigeria having ceased to function, the Nigerian Armed Forces 
have been invited to form an interim Military Government for 
the purposes of maintaining law and order and of maintaining 
essential services." The General said that the invitation 
had been accepted and that he had been vested with the : 
authority as the Head of the Federal Military Government, 
and the Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces, The 
Federal Military Government then issued directions suspending 
the provisions of the Federal Constitution relating to the 
offices of the President and the Prime Minister and
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establishment of Parliament, and similar provisions in the 
Regional Constitutions*
In E.O. Lakanmi V Attorney-General(West)f^ the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria was faced with the question whether or not 
the events that took place in Nigeria was a revolution, which 
could be regarded as having annulled the Republican Constitu­
tion of 1963. The case arose out of a Decree issued by the 
Federal Military Government in 1968, which was attacked as 
an exercise of judicial power, reserved &o the judiciary by 
the constitution and not affected by.the events in January, 
1966 or anytime thereafter. It was contended for the petition 
ers that the Armed Forces, on invitation from the Acting 
President, had formed an interim Military Government to 
restore peace and order, and in the process certain provision 
of the constitution of 1963 were suspended. The interim 
Military Government was required to uphold the constitution 
and could only derogate from it, if such derogation was 
justified by necessity.
The respondents, on the other hand, argued that what 
took place in Nigeria in January 1966 was not just an 
ordinary transfer of power to *the army; it was a revolution 
and the Federal Military Government was a revolutionary 
government, which had seized power on J5 January 1966. It, 
accordingly, had an unfettered right from the start to rule
47 Nigeria S.C.58/69,
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by force and by means of decrees; its exercise of power was 
not subject to any provision of the Constitution of 1963. 
Section 3(1) of Decree No.1^ of 1966 gave the Federal 
Military Government an unlimited power of legislation on any 
subject by Decree, which could not be controlled by any part 
of the constitution which had not been suspended;no such 
constitutional provision could be cited to nullify a Decree* 
Once a document purporting to be a Decree was signed by the 
Head of the Federal Military Government, it could not be 
challenged and no court had any jurisdiction to adjudicate 
on its validity,
The court, whose judgment was delivered by Sir Adetokunbo 
Ademola,C.J., went into the events leading to the establish­
ment of the Federal Military Government, and agreed with the 
appellants1 contention that "the invitation to the Armed 
Forces, which was duly accepted, was to form an interim 
Military Government, and it was made clear that only certain 
sectiortfof the Constitution would be suspended. It was evident 
that the Government thus formed is an interim government 
which would uphold the Constitution of Nigeria, and would only 
suspend certain sections as the necessity arises,"
The learned Chief Justice rejected the argument that 
there took place a revolution in Nigeria in January 1966. He 
accepted the dictionary meaning of the word "revolution",
48 Section 3(1) "The Federal Military Government shall have 
power to make laws for peace,order and good government of 
Nigeria or any part thereof with respect to any matter 
whatsoever".
570
which meant "an overthrow of an established government hy 
those who were previously subject to it" or "a forcible 
substitution of a new ruler or form of government," and held 
that neither of these, according to the facts, had happened 
in Nigeria. A rebellion by a:\section of the army caused the 
Acting President to hand over power to the Armed Forces. In 
this context Ademola, C.J.,saw the position thus: "We venture 
to put the attitude of the Acting President and the Council 
of Ministers to the head of the Army thus - your men have 
started a rebellion, which we fear may spread; you have the 
means to deal with them. We leave it to youjto deal with them 
and after this, return the administrative .power of. the govern­
ment to us,"
At this stage the learned Chief Justice.referred to 
Pakistan case, the State V Dosso, and Uganda case, Uganda 
V Commissioner of Prisons, and quoted from the judgment of 
the Pakistan Chief Justice, Muhammad Munir,who had described 
the abrogation of the Pakistan Constitution of 1956 and the 
military take-over in October 1958 as an "abrupt political 
change," But-the situation in Nigeria was different and, 
according to Ademola,C.J.,in Nigeria "it is not a case of 
seizing power by the section of the Armed Forces which 
started a rebellion. The rebellion had been quelled, the 
insurgents did not seize power nor was it handed over, to 
them. In Pakistan the President had issued a proclamation 
annulling the existing Constitution. There was a disruption
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of the Constitution and the national legal order by an abrupt 
political change not contemplated hy the constitution* Such 
a change is a revolution."
Distinguishing thus the Pakistan and Uganda cases, on the 
basis of facts, the learned Chief Justice held that "the Federal 
Military Government is nfit a revolutionary Government* It made 
it clear before assuming power that the Constitution of the 
country still remains in force, excepting certain sections 
which are suspended*" The country was being governed by the 
Constitution and Decrees which, from time to time, were enacted 
when the necessity arose* The Decrees, made out of necessity, 
would prevail, over, the provisions of the Constitution. But 
"the necessity must arise before a Decree is passed oustingany 
portion of the Constitution. In effect, the Constitution still 
remains the law of the country and all laws are subject to the 
Constitution, excepting so far as by necessity the Constitution 
is amended by a Decree." The Federal Military Government was 
not empowered to enact a Decree in excess of "the requirements 
of demands of the necessity of the case*" The court had the 
jurisdiction to examine the "necessity", and any Decree going 
beyond that necessity and inconsistent with the Constitution 
would be declared void.
The judgment of the Supreme Court provoked an immediate 
reaction by the Military Government, which issued the Federal 
Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of powers)Decree,
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m  A 9
1 9 7 0 '  n u l l i f y i n g  " a s  o f  n o  e f f e c t  v / h a t s o e v e r  " a n y  j u d g m e n t  
p u r p o r t i n g  t o  i n v a l i d a t e  a n ^  D e c r e e  o r  E d i c t .  T h e  S u p r e m e  
C o u r t ' s  a t t e m p t  t o  m a k e  t h e  F e d e r a l  M i l i t a r y  G o v e r n m e n t  
s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 6 3  w a s  t h u s  
f r u s t r a t e d  b y  t h e  w i e l d e r  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r ,  w h i c h  a s s e r t e d  
i t s  s u p r e m e  a u t h o r i t y ,  and t h e  j u d i c i a r y  w a s  e x p e c t e d  t o
r e m a i n  s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  w h a t  was allowed by the sovereign
SOp o l i t i c a l  p o w e r .
51D i s c u s s i n g  t h e  i n s t a n t  Nigerian c a s e ,  Abiola. Ojo argued 
t h a t  t h e  c h a n g e s  occurred in Nigeria in January 1 9 6 6  were not 
i n  a c c o r d a n c e  with the principle of legitimacy. They were 
d e l i b e r a t e l y  contrary to it. There were no pretentions on the 
p a r t  o f  the head of the Nigerian array to follow the procedure 
p r e s c r i b e d  by the Constitution of 1 9 6 3 ,  and the Constitution 
p r o v i d e d  neither for a transfer of power nor for a military 
government. The speech of the General Officer commanding the 
a r m y ,  announced his assumption of power without any fetter.
T h e  Federal Military Government could have chosen to set 
a s i d e  the Constitution of 1963 completely and replace it 
w i t h  another, or amend it to suit the new situation which- 
i t  d i d ,  or rule by any constitution whatsoever.
Following Hans Kelsen's theory, Ojo further argued that
49 Decree TTo .28, 'ay 1970#
5 0  c f .  P a k i s t a n  case Mir Hasan v.the State, and the President1 
order, supra p p . *+39*
5 1  A b i o l a  O j o  " T h e  S e a r c h  for a Grundnorm in Nigeria-The 
l a k a n m i  c a s e " ,  T h e International and Comparative law 
Q u a r t e r l y  ( 1 9 7 1 )  V o l . 2 0  p.117.
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a  r e v o l u t i o n  o c c u r r e d  w h e n e v e r  t h e  l e g a l  o r d e r  o f  a  c o m m u n i t y  
w a s  n u l l i f i e d  a n d  r e p l a c e d  b y  a  n e w  o r d e r  " i n  a n  i l l e g i t i m a t e  
w a y ,  t h a t  i s ,  i n  a  w ra y  n o t  p r e s c r i b e d  b y  t h e  f i r s t  l e g a l  
o r d e r  i t s e l f .  T h e  n e w  m e n  w h o  a r e  b r o u g h t  t o  p o w e r  b y  a  
r e v o l u t i o n  w o u l d  u s u a l l y  a n n u l  o n l y  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  
c e r t a i n  l a w s  o f  p a r a m o u n t  p o l i t i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e ,  p u t t i n g  o t h e r  
n o r m s  i n  t h e i r  p l a c e .  A  g r e a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  o l d  o r d e r  w o u l d  
" r e m a i n "  v a l i d ,  b u t  t h e i r  v a l i d i t y  w o u l d  n o w  d e p e n d  n o t  o n  
t h e  " o l d  n o r m " ;  t h e y  w e r e  n e w  l a w s  w h o s e  i m p o r t  c o i n c i d e s  
w i t h  t h a t  o f  t h e  o l d  l a w s .  T h e y  w e r e  n o t  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  t h e  
o l d  l a w s ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e i r  v a l i d i t y  w a s  2i o w  
d i f f e r e n t .  T h i s  v / a s  w h a t  h a p p e n e d  t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 6 3  
a f t e r  t h e  e v e n t s  i n  J a n u a r y  1 9 6 6 .  I t  h a d  l o s t  i t s  c o n s t i t u ­
t i o n a l  a n d  f u n d a m e n t a l  n a t u r e  a n d  i t  o n l y  r e m a i n e d  v a l i d  s o  
f a r  a s  t h e  n e w  r e g i m e  a l l o w e d  i t s  e n f o r c e m e n t  by t h e  c o u r t s .
T h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  o f  N i g e r i a  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  t h e  P a k i s t a n  
a n d  U g a n d a  c a s e s  o n  t h e  g r o u n d  t h a t ,  i n  t h o s e  c a s e s ,  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n s  w e r e  e x p r e s s l y  n u l l i f i e d ,  w h i c h  a m o u n t e d  t o  a n  
a b r u p t  p o l i t i c a l  c h a n g e , w h e r e a s  i n  N i g e r i a  t h e r e  w a s  o n l y  
a  " t r a n s f e r "  o f  p o w e r .  B u t  i n  v i e w r o f  t h e  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  
i n  N i g e r i a  s i n c e  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  M i l i t a r y  
G o v e r n m e n t ,  O j o  c o m m e n t e d  t . h a t  " t h e  g r o u n d  o n  w h i c h  t h e  
S u p r e m e  C o u r t  r e f u s e d  t o  s e e  a  r e v o l u t i o n  i n  1 9 6 6  . . .  w a s  
t h e  t e c h n i c a l  a n d  f i c t i o n a l  e x e r c i s e  o f  t r a n s f e r .  E v e n  t h e n f 
i t  c a n  b e  p l a u s i b l y  a r g u e d  t h a t  a s s u m i n g  i t  i s  a g r e e d  w ri t h
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t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a  ’ v a l i d  t r a n s f e r 1 o f  p o w e r ,
t h i s  s h o u l d  n o t  h e  t a k e n  t o  e x c l u d e  t h e  f a c t  o f  a  r e v o l u t i o n
b e c a u s e ,  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d ,  t h a t  e v e n  w h e r e  t h e r e  w a s  a  v o l u n t a r y
At r a n s f e r ,  w e  a r e  c l e a r l y  i n ; r e a l m  w h e r e  p o w e r  i s  t a k i n g  
a s c e n d a n c y  o v e r  l a w  t o  a  d e g r e e  w h e r e  i t  b e c o m e s  i m p o s s i b l e  
t o  d i s r e g a r d  t h e  a c t u a l  f a c t o r s  o f  p o w e r  a n d  o b e d i e n c e  i n  
d e t e r m i n i n g  l e g a l  v a l i d i t y  i t s e l f . ” '
T h e  G h a n a  c a s e
O n  2 4  F e b r u a r y  1 9 6 6  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  e x - P r e s i d e n t  
N L r u m a h  w a s  t o p p l e d  i n  a  m i l i t a r y  c o u p  d ’ e t a t . T h e  a r m y  a n d  
p o l i c e ,  w h o  a s s u m e d  t h e  b u s i n e s s  o f  g o v e r n i n g  G h a n a ,  f o r m e d  
a  b o d y  c a l l e d  t h e  N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a t i o n  C o u n c i l  f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e .  
T i e  N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a t i o n  C o u n c i l ,  b y  a  p r o c l a m a t i o n ,  s u s p e n d e d  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 6 0 ,  u n d e r  w h i c h  D r .  N k r u m a h  a n d  h i s  
g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  o p e r a t e d .  I n  A p r i l  1 9 7 0 ,  w h e n  t h e  s e c o n d  
R e p u b l i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 69 h a d  a l r e a d y  c o m e  i n t o  e f f e c t ,  
t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  o f  G h a n a  w a s  c a l l e d  u p o n  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  
l e g a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o u p  d ’ e t a t  o n  t h e  p r e - e x i s t i n g  
l e g a l  s y s t e m .  T h e  P a k i s t a n  c a s e  w a s  n o t  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  t h e  
c o u r t ,  b u t  H a n s  K e l s e n ’ s  t h e o r y  o f  ’’c h a n g e  o f  b a s i c  n o r m ” ,
9 2  A b i o l a  O j o  ’’T h e  S e a r c h  f o r  a  G r u n d n o r m  i n  N i g e r i a - T h e  
L a k a n m i  c a s e , ” T h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  a n d  C o m p a r a t i v e  L a w  
Q u a r t e r l y  ( 1 9 7 1 )  V o l . 2 0  p . 1 3 3 .
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w h i c h  f o r m e d  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  P a k i s t a n '  C o u r t ' s  J u d g m e n t ,  w a s
u n s u c c e s s f u l l y  p l e a d e d  b y  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t s .
5 3T h e  c a s e "  a r o s e  o u t  o f  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  a  p r o v i s i o n  
o f  t h e  T r a n s i t i o n a l  P r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  G - h a n i a n  R e p u b l i c a n  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 6 9 .  T h e  p r o v i s i o n  i n  q u e s t i o n  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  
p e r s o n s  a p p o i n t e d  t o  p u b l i c  o f f i c e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  o r  i n  
p u r s u a n c e  o f  t h e  p r o c l a m a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  L i b e r a t i o n  C o u n c i l  o r  i n  p u r s u a n c e  o f  a n y  D e c r e e  o r  
a n y  a u t h o r i t y  e x e r c i s e d  b y  t h a t  C o u n c i l ,  s h o u l d  b e  d e e m e d  t o  
h a v e  b e e n  a p p o i n t e d  f r o m  t h e  d a t e  o f  c o m i n g  i n t o  e f f e c t  o f  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 6 9 ,  f o r  a  p e r i o d  o f  s i x  m o n t h s ,  u n l e s s  
b e f o r e  o r  o n  e x p i r a t i o n  o f  t h a t  p e r i o d  a n y  s u c h  p e r s o n  h a d  
b e e n  a p p o i n t e d  b y  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  h o l d  t h a t  
o f f i c e .  T h e  p l a i n t i f f  r e c e i v e d  a  l e t t e r  t e r m i n a t i n g  h i s  
a p p o i n t m e n t  w i t h  t h e  G h a n a  N a t i o n a l  T r a d i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n  t o  
w h i c h  h e  h a d  b e e n  a p p o i n t e d  i n  O c t o b e r  1 9 6 7 .  T h e  d i s m i s s a l  
w a s  c h a l l e n g e d  o n  t h e  g r o u n d  t h a t  t h e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  a p p o i n t m e n t  
d i d  n o t  f a l l  w i t h i n  t h e  p u r v i e w  o f  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  t h e  
T r a n s i t i o n a l  P r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h o u g h  h e  w a s  
a p p o i n t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  c o n t i n u a n c e  o f  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a l  C o u n c i l ,  t h e  T r a d i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n  i t s e l f  a n d  
t h e  p o s t  h e  w a s  h o l d i n g  w e r e  n o t  c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  C o u n c i l ;  t h e  
C o r p o r a t i o n  w a s  o r i g i n a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1 9 6 1  a n d  w h e n  t h e
' . F .  S a i l a h  v .  T h e  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l ,  C o n s t ,  S . C . 8 / 7 0 ,
D i g e s t e d  i n  1 9 7 0  " C u r r e n t  C a s e s ” .
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c o u p  c a m e  i n  1966, i t  w a s  a l r e a d y  a  l e g a l  e n t i t y .
T h e  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l ,  f o l l o w i n g  H a n s  K e l s e n ,  a r g u e d  
t h a t  t h e  F e b r u a r y  1 9 6 6  c o u p  d T e t a t  d e s t r o y e d  t h e  g r u n d n o r m  
of t h e  p r e v i o u s l y  e x i s t i n g  l e g a l  o r d e r ,  n a m e l y ,  t h e  C o n s t i ­
t u t i o n  o f  1 9 6 0  w i t h  a l l  i t s  p a r a p h e r n a l i a .  " L e g a l  O r d e r "  
f r o m  t h i s  v i e w p o i n t  d i d  n o t  m e a n  m e r e l y  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  
a  s t a t e ,  b u t  i t  m e a n t  t h e  w h o l e  l e g a l  s y s t e m .  O n c e  t h e  l e g a l  
o r d e r  w a s  n u l l i f i e d  a n d  r e p l a c e d  b y  a  n e w  o r d e r ,  i n  a  w a y  
w h i c h  t h e  f o r m e r  h a d  n o t  a n t i c i p a t e d ,  i t  w a s  a  r e v o l u t i o n  i n  
l a w .  A f t e r  s u c h  a  r e v o l u t i o n ,  t h o u g h  a  g r e a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  o l d  
o r d e r  w o u l d  r e m a i n  v a l i d  w i t h i n  t h e  f r a m e  o f  t h e  n e w  o r d e r ,  
i t s  v a l i d i t y  n o w  d e p e n d e d ,  n e t  o n  t h e  o l d  o r d e r ,  b e c a u s e  t h a t  
o r d e r  h a d  b e e n  a n n u l l e d ,  b u t  o n  t h e  n e w  o r d e r ,  w h i c h  h a d  
r e p l a c e d  t h e  o l d .
I t  w a s  a r g u e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  t h e o r y  p r o p o u n d e d  b y  
P r o f e s s o r  H a n s  K e l s e n  t h a t ,  w i t h  t h e  s u s p e n s i o n  o f  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 6 0 ,  t h e  A c t  w h i c h  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e
C o r p o r a t i o n  h a d  a l s o  l o s t  i t s  v a l i d i t y ,  a n d  i t  r e g a i n e d  i t s  
v a l i d i t y  o n l y  w h e n  t h e  N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a t i o n  C o u n c i l ,  b y  i t s  
p r o c l a m a t i o n  o f  F e b r u a r y  2 6 ,  1 9 6 6 ,  p e r m i t t e d  t h e  p r e - e x i s t i n g  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  c o n t i n u e .  T h e  p o s t ,  w h i c h  w a s  b e i n g  h e l d  b y  
t h e  p l a i n t i f f ,  s h o u l d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  b e  r e g a r d e d  i n  t h e  l i g h t  
o f  t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  u n d e r  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a t i o n  C o u n c i l ,  b r i n g i n g  i t  w i t h i n  t h e  p u r v i e w  
o f  t h e  T r a n s i t i o n a l  P r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 6 9 .
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T h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t ,  b y  a  m a j o r i t y ,  r e j e c t e r ! ,  b y  i m p l i c a ­
t i o n ,  t h e  K e l s e n  d o c t r i n e  o f  o n e  t o t a l  l e g a l  o r d e r  b e i n g  
r e p l a c e d  b y  a n o t h e r  i n  G h a n a *  A r c h e r ,  J * A .  , o b s e r v e d  t h a . t ,  
i f  K e l s e n f s  t h e o r y  o f  a  " b a s i c  n o r m "  w a s  a c c e p t e d  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  G h a n a ,  i t  w o u l d  m e a n  t h a t ,  w i t h  t h e  s u s p e n s i o n  o f  • 
t h e  1 9 6 0  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h e  o l d  b a s i c  n o r m ,  a  n e w  b a s i c  n o r m  
h a d  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d .  H e  d e c l i n e d  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  p r o c l a m a t i o n  
.r s  t h e  n e w  c o n s t i t u t i o n ;  i t  l a c k e d  p r e d i c t a b i l i t y ,  w h i c h  w a s  
a  b a s i c  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w h e r e a s  t h e  p r o c l a ­
m a t i o n  w a s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  w i s h e s  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a t i o n  
C o u n c i l .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l e a r n e d  j u d g e ,  w h a t  h a p p e n e d  i n  
G h a n a  o n  2 4  F e b r u a r y  1 9 6 6 ,  w a s  j u s t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  a. 
" r e v o l u t i o n " ,  w h i c h  c u l m i n a t e d  i n  t h e  p r o m u l g a t i o n  o f  t h e  
1 9 6 9  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w h i c h  a n n u l l e d  o r  r e v o k e d  t h e  e a r l i e r  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 6 0 .
T h e  l e a r n e d  j u d g e  m a i n t a i n e d :  " T h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  o r  
n o t  t h e  P r o c l a m a t i o n  c r e a t e d  a  n e w  l e g a l  o r d e r ,  I  a m  a f r a i d ,  
c a n  o n l y  b e  a n s w e r e d  f i r s t  o f  a l l  b y  f i n d i n g  o u t  w h a t  w e  
m e a n  b y  T l e g a l  o r d e r * ?  I s  i t  t h e  l e g a l  s y s t e m  o f  t h e  c o u r t s ?  
I s  i t  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  m a c h n e r y  o r  i s  i t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
o r g a n i s a t i o n ?  T h e  a n s w e r  d e p e n d s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  o n  w h a t  o n e  
m e a n s  b y  " l e g a l  o r d e r " , " L e g a l  o r d e r "  I  u n d e r s t a n d  t o  m e a n  
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  s t a t e .  T h e  P r o c l a m a t i o n  c a n n o t  b e  
c l a s s i f i e d  a s  t h e  n e w  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  G h a n a  o n  2 4  F e b r u a r y
1966."
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T h e  m a j o r i t y ,  i t  w o u l d  s e e m ,  b a s e d  t h e i r  c o n c l u s i o n  o n  
t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  a. s u c c e s s f u l  c o u p  d  ’ e t a t  w o u l d  o n l y  
d e s t r o y  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  w o u l d  
n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  l e g a l  s y s t e m ,  b a s e d  o n  s u b o r d i n a t e  n o r m s .
T ' h i l e  t h e  u p p e r  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e t - u p  w o u l d  
b e  o v e r t h r o w n ,  t h e r e  w o u l d  r e m a i n  a  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  t h e  s u b ­
o r d i n a t e  l e g a l  s y s t e m .  I n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  t h e  n e w  o r d e r  w o u l d  
n o t  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  e s t a b l i s h i n g  o r  c r e a t i n g  a n e w  a l l  t h e  
p r e - e x i s t i n g  l a w s  o f  G h a n a .  T o  p e r m i t  c o n t i n u a n c e  o f  a  l a w  
w a s  t o  a c k n o w l e d g e  i t s  p r e - e x i s t e n c e .  A n i n , J . ,  w h o  g a v e  a  
d i s s e n t i n g  j u d g m e n t ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  a c c e p t e d  t h e  a r g u m e n t  
b a s e d  o n  t h e  K e l s e n ’ s  t h e o r y ,  a n d .  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  c o u p  e s t a b ­
l i s h e d  a  n e w  l e g a l  o r d e r ,  r e p l a c i n g  t h e  o l d ,  a n d  a l l  l a w s ,  
a f t e r  t h e  c o u p » o w e d  t h e i r  v a l i d i t y  t o  t h e  n e w  l a w - c r e a t i n g  
b o d y .  T h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e i r  v a l i d i t y  w a s  n o t  t h e  o l d  c o n s t i t u ­
t i o n  b u t  t h e  n e w  l e g a l  o r d e r  w h i c h  h a d ,  b y  p e r m i t t i n g  t h e m  
t o  c o n t i n u e ,  c r e a t e d  t h e m  a n e w .
I t  m a y  b e  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  n e i t h e r  t h e  m a j o r i t y  n o r  t h e  
d i s s e n t i n g  j u d g m e n t s ,  i n  r e j e c t i n g  a n d  a c c e p t i n g  X e l s e n ’ s  
t h e o r y ,  h a v e  g i v e n  c o n v i n c i n g  r e a s o n s  a n d  a r g u m e n t s  f o r
t h e i r  c o n c l u s i o n s .  C o m m e n t i n g  o n  t h e  m a j o r i t y  j u d g m e n t s ,
5 4S . K .  B a t e - B a h  s a i d  t h a t  ’’c r i t i c a l  r e a d e r s  o f  t h e  j u d g m e n t s  
o f  t h e  t w o  l e a r n e d  j u d g e s  w o u l d  w a n t  t o  k n o w  w h e t h e r  t h e y  
a c c e p t  t h e  K e l s e n i t e  v i e w  o f  h o w  a  l e g a l  s y s t e m  i s  s t r u c t u r e d
5 4  C . K . B a t e - B a h , " J u r i s p r u d e n c e ’ s  B a y  i n  C o u r t  i n  G h a n a ” ,
(197c) 2c i.e.i.: .315.
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b u t  t h i n k  t h a t  a  l e g a l  s y s t e m  c a n  s u r v i v e  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  
of i t s  G r u n d n o r m ,  o r  w h e t h e r  t h e y  t o t a l l y  r e j e c t  t h e  K e l s e n i t e  
view o f  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  t h e  u l t i m a t e  v a l i d i t y  o f  r u l e s  i n  a  
legal s y s t e m . ”
T h e  m a j o r i t y  r e a c h e d  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  
p r o c l a m a t i o n  o f  14- F e b r u a r y  1 9 6 6 ,  w h i c h  s u s p e n d e d  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 & 0 ,  t h e  p r e - e x i s t i n g  l a w s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  
r e m a i n  v a l i d .  B u t  t h e  l e a r n e d  j u d g e s  h a v e ,  n o t  e l a b o r a t e d  
r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e i r  c o n c l u s i o n .  B a t e - B a h  p o i n t e d  o u t  : ” I t  
w o u l d  b e  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  l e a r n e d  j u d g e s  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  a  p o l i c y  i n t e r e s t  i n  m a i n t a i n i n g  c o n t i t n u i t y  i n  l e g a l  
s y s t e m s  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y  t h a t  w h a t e v e r  i s  t h e  t r u e . u l t i m a t e  
s o u r c e  o f  t h e  l e g a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  r u l e s  w i t h i n  a  l e g a l  s y s t e m ,  
i t  i s  s o c i a l l y  d e s i r a b l e ,  a n d  p r a c t i c a l  n e c e s s i t y  d e m a n d s ,  
t h a t  t h e  l a w  s h o u l d  h o l d  t h a t  a l l  r u l e s  w i t h i n  a  l e g a l  
s y s t e m ,  e x c e p t  t h o s e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a b r o g a t e d ,  s u r v i v e  c o u p s  
d  f e t a t . " -
T h e  a b o v e  a r g u m e n t  w o u l d  b e ,  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d ,  i n  l i n e  
w i ' t h  t h e  v i e w  t a k e n  b y  t h e  P a k i s t a n  c o u r t s ,  a f t e r  t h e  c o u p  
d ' e t a t  i n  O c t o b e r ,  1 9 5 8 ,  B u t  t h i s  l i n e  o f  a r g u m e n t  w o u l d  
r e c o g n i s e  t h e  s u p r e m e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  n e w r r e g i m e  b r o u g h t  
t o  p o w e r  b y  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n ,  a n d  r e p l a c i n g  t h e  o l d  o r d e r .  
B e c a u s e  a l l  p r e - e x i s t i n g  l a w s  w o u l d  t h e n  b e  c o n t i n u e d ,
5 5  S . K . B a t e - B a h , ?lJ u r i s p r u d e n c e  f s  B a y  i n  C o u r t  i n  G h a n a ” ,
1 9 7 0  2 0  I . C . h . Q . a t  p . 3 2 1 .
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m o d i f i e d  o r  r e p e a l e d ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  w i s h e s  o f  t h e  n e w  
r e g i m e  a n d  n o t  o n  t h e i r  v a l i d i t y  u n d e r  t h e  o l d  o r d e r .  m h i s  
v i e w ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i n  S a l l a h ’ s  c a s e ,  s e e m s  t o  h a v e
r e c e i v e d  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  G h a n a  S u p r e m e  C o u r t .  I n  a n  e a r l i e r
5 6
Ci s e ;  w h e r e  i t  w a s  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a l  C o u n c i l
D e c r e e ,  w h i c h  a b o l i s h e d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  c o u r t
a g a i n s t  t h e  f i n d i n g  o f  a n  i n q u i r y  C o m m i s s i o n ,  w a s  a g a i n s t  t h e
l e t t e r  a n d  s p i r i t  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t
r e j e c t e d  t h i s  c o n t e n t i o n .  I t  w a s  h e l d  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e
g e n e r a l  j u d i c i a l  p o w e r  w a s  e x p r e s s l y  p r e s e r v e d  d u r i n g  t h e
p e r i o d  o f  m i l i t a r y  g o v e r n m e n t ,  i t  w a s  o n l y  b y  D e c r e e  o f  t h e
N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a l  C o u n c i l . t h a t  t h i s ,w a s  s o ,  a n d .  t h e r e  w o u l d
1 a v e  b e e n  n o  p o w e r  i n  t h e  c o u r t s  t o  s t r i k e  d o w n  D e c r e e s  a s
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d u r i n g  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a l
C o u n c i l .  T h e  c o u r t  a l s o  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f
5 71 9 ° 9  n o  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  e f f e c t .  '
I n  G b e d e m a h ’ s  c a s e  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  r e c o g n i s e d  t h e  
s u p r e m e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a t i o n  C o u n c i l ,  w h i c h  
s u s p e n d e d  t h e  o l d  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  c o u r t  a c c e p t e d  t h e  f u n d a ­
m e n t a l  n a t u r e  o f  D e c r e e s  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  C o u n c i l ,  w h i c h  w e r e  
n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  a n y  o t h e r  s u p e r i o r  n o r m  o r  p r i n c i p l e .  I n  
S a l l a h ’ s  c a s e ,  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  t h e  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l ’ s  a r g u m e n t
5 6  A w o o n o r - V / i  1 1  i a m s  v .  C b e d e m a h  t C o n s t . S . C .  1 / 6 9 ,  D i g e s t e d  
i n  1 9 7 0  C u r r e n t  C a s e s . 
r 7  F o r  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  c a s e ,  s e e  J a m e s  S . R e e d ,  ’’J u d i c i a l  
P o w e r  a n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  G h a n a ” , ( 1 9 7 1 )  3  R e v i e w  o f
G h a n a  L a w .
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t h a t ,  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  F e l s e n T s  t h e o r y ,  e v e r y  l s w ,  e v e r y
i n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  e v e r y  p u b l i c  o f f i c e  a f t e r  t h e  F e b r u a r y , 1 9 6 6
coup, was t o  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  .a n e w  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y
g o v e r n m e n t ,  w a s  p e r h a p s  t o o  m u c h  t o  e x p e c t  f r o m  j u d g e s
t r a i n e d  i n  t h e  c o m m o n  l a w  t r a d i t i o n .  I t  m a y ,  h o w e v e r ,  b e
n o t e d  t h a t  t h e s e  c a s e s  c a m e  b e f o r e  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  a f t e r
the m i l i t a r y  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  c e a s e d  t o  e x i s t  a n d  t h e  n e w
C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 6 9  h a d  c o m e  i n t o  e f f e c t .  I f  t h e  S u p r e m e
C o u r t  h a d  d e c i d e d  a s  i t  d i d  i n  S a l l a h f s  c a s e  d u r i n g  t h e
m i l i t a r y  r e g i m e  1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 9 ,  w h a t  w o u l d  b e  t h e  r e a c t i o n  o f
t h e  r e g i m e  t o  s u c h  a  d e c i s i o n  i s  n o w  a  h y p o t h e t i c a l  q u e s t i o n
58B u t  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s "  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i t  w o u l d
n e t  b e  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  r e g i m e  t o  n u l l i f y  t h e  e f f e c t  o f
t h e  j u d g m e n t  b y  s i m p l y  r e s o r t i n g  t o  a  d e c r e e  i s s u e d  b y  t h e
N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a t i o n  C o u n c i l ,  A n  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e  o f
a n y  k i n d  i s  n a t u r a l l y  a p t  t o  r e a c t  s h a r p l y  t o  t h e  s l i g h t e s t
59a t t a c k  o n  i t s  a u t h o r i t y  f r o m  a n y  q u a r t e r ,  " E f f e c t i v e  a n d  
u n r e s t r i c t e d  e x e r c i s e  o f  p o w e r  w i t h o u t  a n y  v o c a l  o p p o s i t i o n  
i s  i t s  o n l y  c l a i m  t o  g o v e r n  t h e  c o u n t r y .
R e f l e c t i o n s
I n  t h e  a b o v e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  G - r u n d n o r m  c a s e s  i n
5 8  I n  P a k i s t a n  a f t e r  M i r  H a s a n T s  c a s e  i n  1 9 69 , a n d  i n  
N i g e r i a  a f t e r  l a k a n m i  c a s e  i n  1 9 7 0 .
5 9  I n  G h a n a  i n  D e c e m b e r  1 9 64 D r . N k r u m a h  f l o u t e d  t h e  v e r d i c t  
o f  t h e  S p e c i a l  C r i m i n a l  C o u r t  i n  t h e  f a m o u s  t r e a s o n  t r i a l  
a n d  u l t i m a t e l y  d i s m i s s e d  S i r  A r k u  F o r s a h , t h e  C h i e f  J u s t i c  
o f  G h a n a , w h o  p r e s i d e d  o v e r  t h e  S p e c i a l  C o u r t .
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C o m m o n w e a l t h  C o u r t s ,  i t  i s  n o t i c e d  t h a t  i n  U g a n d a  a n d
R h o d e s i a  t h e  c o u r t s ,  l i k e  t h e  P a k i s t a n  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  i n
l e g a l
1 9 5 8 ,  f o u n d ,  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  f a c t s ,  t h a t  t h e  o l d / o r d e r  i n  
t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  c o u n t r i e s  h a d  b e e n  s u c c e s s f u l l y  o v e r t h r o w n  
a n d  r e p l a c e d  b y  n e w  o r d e r s .  C n e e  t h e  c o u r t s  c a m e  t o  t h i s  
c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h e y  g a v e  l e g a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  t h e  n e w  o r d e r  a s  
t h e  n e w  l a v / - c r e a t i n g  o r g a n .  I n  a l l  t h r e e  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  
P a k i s t a n ,  U g a n d a  a n d  R h o d e s i a  -  t h e  c o u r t s ,  i n  r e c o g n i s i n g  
t h e  n e w  l a w - c r e a t i n g  b o d y ,  a p p l i e d  t h e  p o s i t i v i s t  t h e o r y  
o f  P r o f e s s o r  H a n s  K e l s e n  a n d  q u o t e d  e x t e n s i v e l y  f r o m  h i s  
f a m o u s  w o r k  f G - e n e r a l  T h e o r y  o f  L a w  a n d  S t a t e .’ K e l s e n  r s  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  r e v o l u t i o n ,  a  c h a n g e  i n  f t h e  l e g a l  o r d e r  i n  a  
m a n n e r  n o t  p r e s c r i b e d  b y  t h e  p r e - e x i s t i n g  o r d e r  a n d  o u t s i d e  
t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  l e g i t i m a c y ,  h a s  b e e n  a c c e p t e d  
b y  t h e  c o u r t s .  R e f e r r i n g  t o  s u c h  a  c h a n g e  K e l s e n  s a y s  :
" A  r e v o l u t i o n  . . .  o c c u r s  w h e n e v e r  t h e  l e g a l  o r d e r  
o f  a  c o m m u n i t y  i s  n u l l i f i e d  a n d  r e p l a c e d  b y  a  n e w  o r d e r  
i n  a n  i l l e g i t i m a t e  w a y ,  t h a t  i s  i n  a  w a y  n o t  p r e s c r i b e d  
b y  t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  i t s e l f .  I t  i s  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  
i r r e l e v a n t  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h i s  r e p l a c e m e n t  i s  e f f e c t e d  
t h r o u g h  a  v i o l e n t  u p r i s i n g  a g a i n s t  t h o s e  i n d i v i d u a l s  
w h o  s o  f a r  h a v e  b e e n  t h e  ’ l e g i t i m a t e 1 o r g a n s  c o m p e t e n t  
t o  c r e a t e  a n d  a m e n d  t h e  l e g a l  o r d e r .  I t  i s  e q u a l l y  
i r r e l e v a n t  w h e t h e r  t h e  r e p l a c e m e n t  i s  e f f e c t e d  t h r o u g h  
a  m o v e m e n t  e m a n a t i n g  f r o m  t h e  m a s s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e ,  o r  
t h r o u g h  a c t i o n  . ^ r o m  t h o s e  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  p o s i t i o n s ,  ‘R r o m  
a  j u r i s t i c  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  t h e  d e c i s i v e  c r i t e r i o n  o f  a  
r e v o l u t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  o r d e r  i n  f o r c e  i s  o v e r t h r o w n  a n d  
r e p l a c e d  b y  a  n e w  o r d e r  i n  a  w a y  w h i c h  t h e  f o r m e r  h a d  
n i t  i t s e l f  a n t i c i p a t e d .  U s u a l l y ,  t h e  n e w  m e n  w h o m  a  
r e v o l u t i o n  b r i n g s  t o  p o w e r  a n n u l  o n l y  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
a n d  c e r t a i n  l a w s  o f  p a r a m o u n t  p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e , 
p u t t i n g  o t h e r  n o r m s  i n  t h e i r  p l a c e .  A  g r e a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  
o l d  o r d e r  ’ r e m a i n s ’ v a l i d  a l s o  w i t h i n  t h e  f r a m e  o f  t h e  
n e w  o r d e r .  B u t  t h e  p h r a s e  ’ t h e y  r e m a i n  v a l i d ’ , d e e s  n o t
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g i v e  a n  a d e q u a t e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  p h e n o m e n o n .  I t  i s  
o n l y  t h e  c o n t e n t s  o f  t h o s e  n o r m s  t h a t  r e m a i n  t h e  s a m e ,  
n o t  t h e  r e a s o n  o f  t h e i r  v a l i d i t y .  T h e y  a r e  n o  l o n g e r  
v a l i d  b y  v i r t u e  o f  h a v i n g  b e e n  c r e a t e d  i n  t h e  w a . y  t h e  
o l d  c o n s t i t u t i o n  p r e s c r i b e d .  T h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  n o  
l o n g e r  i n  f o r c e ;  i t  i s  r e p l a c e d  b y  n e w  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
w h i c h  i s  n o t  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a l t e r a t i o n  
o f  t h e  f o r m e r . ” 6 0
K e l s e n ,  t h e n ,  o b s e r v e s  : ” N o  j u r i s t  w o u l d  m a i n t a i n  t h a t
e v e n  a f t e r  a  s u c c e s s f u l  r e v o l u t i o n  t h e  o l d  c o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d
t h e  l a w s  b a s e d  t h e r e u p o n  r e m a i n  i n  f o r c e ,  o n  t h e  g r o u n d ,  t h a t
t h e y  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  n u l l i f i e d  i n  a  m a n n e r  a n t i c i p a t e d  b y  t h e
o l d  o r d e r  i t s e l f .  E v e r y  j u r i s t  w i l ^ p r e s u m e  t h a t  t h e  o l d  o r d e r
-  t o  w h i c h  n o  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  a n y  l o n g e r  c o r r e s p o n d s  -  h a s
c e a s e d  t o  b e  v a l i d ,  a n d  t h a t  a l l  n o r m s ,  w h i c h  a r e  v a l i d
w i t h i n  t h e  n e w  o r d e r ,  r e c e i v e  t h e i r  v a l i d i t y  e x c l u s i v e l y
f r o m  t h e  n e w  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t ,  f r o m  t h i s  j u r i s t i c
p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  t h e  n o r m s  o f  t h e  o l d  o r d e r  c a n  n o  l o n g e r  b e
61recognised a s  v a l i d  n o r m s . ”
A  f u r t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  p a s s a g e  f r o m  K e l s e n 1 s  w o r k  h a s  b e e n
c i t e d  b y  a l l  t h e  t h r e e  c o u r t s  w i t h  a p p r o v a l :
” ( D )  C h a n g e  o f  t h e  B a s i c  N o r m :  I t  i s  j u s t  t h e  
p h e n o m e n o n  o f  r e v o l u t i o n  w h i c h  c l e a r l y  s h o w s  t h e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  B a s i c  N o r m .  S u p p o s e  t h a t  a  g r o u p  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  a t t e m p t  t o  s e i z e  p o w e r  b y  f o r c e ,  i n  
o r d e r  t o  r e m o v e  t h e  l e g i t i m a t e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  a  
h i t h e r t o  m o n a r c h i c  s t a t e ,  a n d  t o  i n t r o d u c e  a  
r e p u b l i c a n  f o r m  o f  g o v e r n m e n t .  I f  t h e y  s u c c e e d ,  i f  
t h e  o l d  o r d e r  c e a . s e s ,  a n d  t h e  n e w  o r d e r  b e g i n s  t o  
b e  e f f i c a c i o u s ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  w h o s e  
b e h a v i o u r  t h e  n e w  o r d e r  r e g u l a t e s ,  a c t u a l l y  b e h a v e ,  
b y  a n d  l a r g e ,  i n  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  t h e  n e w  o r d e r ,  t h e n
6 0  H a n s  K e l s e n ,  G e n e r a l  T h e o r y  o f  L a w  a n d  S t a t e , ( 1 9 4 5 ) p . 1 1 7 .
6 1  I b i d . a t  p . 1 1 8 .
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t h i s  o r d e r  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a  v a l i d  o r d e r .  I t  i s  
n o w  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  n e w  o r d e r  t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  
b e h a v i o u r  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  l e g a l  o r  
i l l e g a l .  B u t  t h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  a  n e w  b a s i c  n o r m  i s  
p r e s u p p o s e d .  I t  i s  n o  l o n g e r  t h e  n o r m  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
w h i c h  t h e  o l d  m o n a r c h i c a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  v a l i d ,  b u t  
a  n o r m  a c c o r d i n g  t o  w h i c h  t h e  n e w  r e p u b l i c a n  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  v a l i d ,  a  n o r m  e n d o w i n g  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n ­
a r y  g o v e r n m e n t  v i ' i t h  l e g a l  a u t h o r i t y .  I f  t h e  
r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  f a i l ,  i f  t h e  o r d e r  t h e y  h a v e  t r i e d  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  r e m a i n s  i n e f f i c a c i o u s ,  t h e n ,  o n  t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e i r  u n d e r t a k i n g  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d ,  n o t  
a s  a  l e g a l ,  a  l a w - c r e a t i n g  a c t ,  a s  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
o f  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  b u t  a s  a n  i l l e g a l  a c t ,  a s  t h e  
c r i m e  o f  t r e a s o n ,  a n d  t h i s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  o l d  
m o n a r c h i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  i t s  s p e c i f i c  b a s i c  n o r m . ” 6 2
The c o u r t s 1 a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  K e l s e n 1 s  t h e o r y  i n  a c c o r d i n g
l e g a l i t y  t o  t h e  c h a n g e  " h a s  l e d  t o  h o s t i l e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e i r
63d e c i s i o n s  i n  l e g a l  p e r i o d i c a l s ,  ' I n  a  r e c e n t  a r t i c l e  J . V . . 
H a r r i s  h a s  s u m m a r i z e d ' * "  t h e  c r i t i c i s m s  a d v a n c e d  s o  f a r  
a g a i n s t  t h e  j u d g m e n t s ,  i n  f o u r  c a t e g o r i e s ,  ^ h e y  a r e ,  f i r s t l y ,  
t h e  c o u r t s ,  i n  a c c o r d i n g  v a l i d i t y  t o  t h e  n e w  l e g a l  o r d e r  on
62 Ibid.
63 See, e.g. J  .1 . H e k a l a a r ,  ’’S p l i t t i n g  t h e  C r u n d n o r m ” , ( 19 6 7 )  30 
M.L.R. 156; C l a i r e  P a l l e y , ” T h e  J u d i c i a l  P r o c e s s :  U . D . I . a n d  
the S o u t h e r n  R h o d e s i a n  J u d i c i a r y ” , ( 196?) 30 1 3.L . R . 263; 
S.A.de S m i t h , ’’C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  L a w y e r s  i n  R e v o l u t i o n a r y  
Situations”,(1968)7 V / e s t e r n  O n t a r i o  L . R . 93; L .J . M a c f a r l a n e  
’’P r o n o u n c i n g  o n  R e b e l l i o n : .  T h e  R h o d e s i a n  C o u r t s  a n d
(1968) P u b l i c  L a w  323; C l a i r e  P a l l e y , ’’R e t h i n k i n g  t h e  
J u d i c i a l  R o l e , " ( 1969 )1 Z a m b i a n  L . J  . , 1 ; P . M . B r o o k f i e l d ,
’’The C o u r t s ,  K e l s e n ,  a n d  t h e  R h o d e s i a n  R e v o l u t i o n ” ,
(1969)19 University of Toronto L . J . 326.
64 J . W .  Harris, ’’When and Why does the Crundnorm Change?” 
(1971) 29 Cambridge Law Journal 103, 105.
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t h e  b e  s i s  o f  " e f f i c a c y ” o f  t h e  r e g i m e ,  w e r e  w r o n g ,  i n  a s  
m u c h  a s  K e l s e n  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  e f f i c a c y  w a s  o n l y  a  n e c e s s a r y  
c o n d i t i o n  o f  v a l i d i t y ,  a n d  n o t  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  v a l i d i t y .  
S e c o n d l y ,  i t  w a s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a c c o r d  v a l i d i t y  t o  a  r e c e n t  
r e v o l u t i o n  s i m p l y  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  K e l s e n f s  t h e o r y  o f  e f f i c a c y ,  
r r e e  f r o m  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  T h i r d l y ,  K e l s e n *  s  c o n c e p ­
t i o n  o f  e f f i c a c y  r e f e r r e d  t o  a  " t o t a l "  e f f i c a c y ,  a n d  o n l y  
t h e  c o u r t f s  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  n e w  o r d e r  c o n s t i t u t e d  s u c h  
e f f i c a c y ,  t n d  f i n a l l y ,  K e l s e n ’ s  t h e o r y ,  b e i n g  p u r e l y  d e s c r i p ­
t i v e  o f  l e g a l  s c i e n c e ,  i t  h a d  n o t h i n g  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  r o l e  o f  
t h e  j u d g e  i n  a  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s i t u a t i o n .
H a r r i s ,  i n  a  d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  c r i t i c i s m s ,
s h o w e d  t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  r e l a t i n g  t o  " e f f i c a c y "  o f  t h e  n e w
o r d e r  w e r e  t o  a  g r e a t  e x t e n t  u n f o u n d e d .  H e  a r g u e d  t h a t  '
" e f f e c t i v e n e s s "  o f  a  l e g a l  o r d e r  w a s  a  q u e s t i o n  o f  f a c t  a n d
i t  ' w a s  t r u e  " t h a t  s o o n  a f t e r  t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  a  r e v o l u t i o n ,
t h e y  m a y  b e  f u t u r e  q u e s t i o n s  o f  f a c t ,  b u t  t h a t  d o e s  n o t
m a k e  a p o l i t i c a l  j u d g m e n t s  a b o u t  t h e m  i m p o s s i b l e  o r  i m p r a c t i -
65c a b l e ,  o n l y  m o r e  s u b j e c t  t o  e r r o r . "  T h e  j u d g e T s  d e c i s i o n  
r e l a t i n g  t o  e f f i c a c y  w ' o u l d  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
" I t  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  r e l a t i v e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  h i s  d e c i s i o n  a s  
a g a i n s t  o t h e r  p r e s e n t  a n d  f u t u r e  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  e f f i c a c y  
o f  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  n o r m s .  I f  a  j u d g e  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e  
s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  m a y  t u r n  o n  w h a t  h e  g i v e s  i n  a  
c a s e  b e f o r e  h i m ,  t h e n  c l e a r l y  h e  c a n n o t  d e c i d e  a s  t o  t h e
65 T M d . p.120.
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e f f i c a c y  o f  t h e  c h a n g e  w i t h o u t  f i r s t  m a k i n g  a  p o l i t i c a l
c h o i c e ,  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t o  j o i n  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n .  I f  h e  b e l i e v e s
however, t h a t ,  w h a t e v e r  h e  d e c i d e d ,  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  i s  l i k e l y
t o  s u c c e e d  ( i f  n e e d  b e  b y  h i s  d i s m i s s a l  a n d  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f
a n  a c q u i e s c e n t  j u d g e ) ,  t h e n  h i s  d e c i s i o n  t h a t  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n
ill b e  e f f i c a c i o u s  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  p o l i t i c a l l y  m o t i v a t e d ’.’
R e g a r d i n g  t h e  l a s t  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  j u d g e ' s  r ^ l e  h a s
n o  r e l a t i o n  t o  K e l s e n ’ s  t h e o r y  o f  l e g a l  s c i e n c e ,  H a r r i s
cf
r e f e r r e d  t o  I ' e l s e n ’ s  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  e v e r y  a c t A l a w - a p p l i -  
c a t i o n ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  j u d g e ,  i s  a n  a c t  o f
l a w - c r e a t i o n ,  a n d  a s  s u c h  t h e  j u d g m e n t  o f  a  c o u r t  i s  s i m u l t ­
a n e o u s l y  a n  a c t  o f  a p p l y i n g  t h e  l a w  a n d  a n  a c t  c r e a t i n g  l a w .  
I n  t h i s  s e n s e  j u d g e s  h a v e  a  s o c i a l l y  u s e f u l  a n d  d e s i r a b l e
r o l e  a s  l e g a l  s c i e n t i s t s ;  a n d  l e g a l  s c i e n c e  w i l l  c o n t i n u e
t o  b e  s o c i a l l y  u s e f u l ,  s o  l o n g  a s  t h e  j u d g e s  i n d u l g e  i n  i t .
I f  j u d g e s  p e r s i s t e n t l y  i g n o r e  t h e  h i e r a r c h y  o f  t h e  c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n ,  s t a t u t e s ,  c o n t r a c t s  e t c . ,  t h e  s o r t  o f  l e g a l  s c i e n c e  
d e s c r i b e d  b y  p u r e  t h e o r y  w i l l  b e c o m e  p o i n t l e s s .  H a r r i s  a r g u e d  
’’C o u r t s  f r e q u e n t l y  p r o n o u n c e  u p o n  t h e i r  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s ,  a n d  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e a s o n ,  i n  l o g i c ,  w h y  a  
c o u r t  s h o u l d  n o t  e m b a r k  o n  a n  i n q u i r y  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  
t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  g r u n d n o r m ,  e v e n  t h o u g h ,  
u n t i l  t h e  i n q u i r y  i s  c o m p l e t e d ,  i t  i s  u n c e r t a i n  w h e t h e r  t h e  
c o u r t ’ s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  r e s t s  o n  o l d  g r u n d n o r m  r u l e s  o r  n e w
66 Ibid. at p.122.
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g r u n d n o r m  r u l e s . ”
A c c o r d i n g  t o  H a r r i s  : ” T h e  g r u n d n o r m  c h a n g e s  w h e n  t h e  
l e g a l  n o r m s  e f f e c t i v e  w i t h i n  a  t e r r i t o r y  c h a n g e  i n  s u c h  a  
way t h a t  a  l e g a l  s c i e n t i s t  c a n  o n l y  i n t e r p r e t  t h e m  a s  a  
l o g i c a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  f i e l d  o f  m e a n i n g  b y  p r e s u p p o s i n g  a  n e w  
g r u n d n o r m ,  w h i c h  r e f e r s  t o  n e w  s o u r c e s  o f  l a w .  I t  c h a n g e s  
t h e n  b e c a u s e ,  o n l y  i f  h e  d e s c r i b e s  e f f e c t i v e  l e g a l  n o r m s ,  
d o e s  a  l e g a l  s c i e n t i s t  f u l f i l  h i s  r o l e . ” H e  c o n c l u d e d  T h e  
j u d g e s  i n  P a k i s t a n ,  U g a n d a  a n d  R h o d e s i a  w e r e  a c t i n g  p r o p e r l y  
i n  t h e  r o l e  o f  l e g a l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  w h e n  t h e y  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  r e g i m e s  w e r e  l e g a l ,  b f e c a u s e  t h e y  w e r e  c o n f r o n t ­
e d  w i t h  v e r y  s t r o n g  e v i d e n c e  t h a t ,  w h a t e v e r  d e c i s i o n s  t h e y
6 7r e a c h e d ,  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n s  w o u l d  b e  s u c c e s s f u l . ” '
T h a t  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  a n d  t h e  e f f i c a c y
o f  t h e . p o s t - r e v o l u t i o n  l e g a l  o r d e r  d o  n o t  d e p e n d  o n  t h e
o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  j u d g e s  h a s  b e e n  m a n i f e s t l y  d e m o n s t r a t e d  b y  t h e
t r e a t m e n t  r e c e i v e d  b y  t h e  j u d g m e n t s  o f  t h e  r e c e n t  P a k i s t a n
68c a s e  o f  N i r  H a s a n  v .  T h e  S t a t e , " ' a n d  N i g e r i a n  c a s e  o f
6 9A  a k a n m i  v .  t h e  A t t o r n e . y - O e n e r a l . " I n  t h e  f o r m e r  t h e  c o u r t ,  
w i t h o u t  q u e s t i o n i n g  t h e  v a l i d t y  o f  p o s t - r e v o l u t i o n  r e g i m e  
a n d  t h e  l e g a l  o r d e r ,  a t t e m p t e d  t o  c o n t a i n  i t s  u n l i m i t e d  
e x e r c i s e  o f  e x e c u t i v e  a n d  j u d i c i a l  p o w e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  f r a m e w o r k
6 7  I b i d . a t  p . 1 3 2 .
r . L . D .  1 9 6 9  L a h o r e  7 8 6 ;  s e e  c h a p t e r  X I  P P  
69 ^ i g e r i a . n  S u p r e m e  S o u r t  5 8 / 6 9 ;  s e e  s u p r a .
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o f  t h e  P r o v i s i o n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  O r d e r  p r o m u l g a t e d  b y  t h e  
r e g i m e  i t s e l f .  I n  t h e  l a t t e r ,  t h e  c o u r t ,  r e f s i n g  t o  s e e  a  
- " e v o l u t i o n  i n  t h e  e v e n t s  w h i c h  t o o k  p l a c e  i n  N i g e r i a  i n  1 9 6 6 ,  
a t t e m p t e d  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  F e d e r a l  M i l i t a r y  G o v e r n m e n t  e x e r c i s ­
i n g  p o w e r  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  
1963 e x c e p t  i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  j u s t i c i a b l e  
n e c e s s i t y .  I n  b o t h  t h e s e  c a s e s  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  m i l i t a r y  r e g i m e s  
n u l l i f i e d  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  j u d g m e n t s  b y  e x e c u t i v e  o r d e r s .
I t  w o u l d  b e  u n l i k e l y  f o r  a  r e g i m e ,  f o u n d e d  o n  t h e  d e b r i s  o f  
a n  o l d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o r d e r ,  w i t h  s h e e r  f o r c e  a s  t h e  o n l y  
basis f o r  i t s  a u t h o r i t y ,  t o  a c c e p t  a n y  l i m i t a t i o n  o n  i t s  
e x e r c i s e  o f  p o w e r .  T h e  j u d g m e n t  o f  t h e  l a t e s t  G h a n a  c a s e ,
"' b l a b  v .  t h e  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l , w o u l d  p e r h a p s  h a v e  m e t  t h e  
s a m e  f a t e  i f  i t  h a d  b e e n  d e c i d e d  d u r i n g  t h e  c o n t i n u a n c e  o f  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  r e g i m e .
I t  i s  a  l o n g  e s t a b l i s h e d  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  c o u r t s  f u n c t i o n
w i t h i n  t h e  l i m i t e d  s p h e r e  o f  s t a t e  a c t i v i t y  a l l o c a t e d  t o
t l e m  b y  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  a t  t h e  i n s t a n c e  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e .
’r . e y  a r e  t o  a p p l y  t h e  l a w s  a s  t h e y  a r e ,  w h i c h  ’’p r e s u p p o s e s
a n  e s t a b l i s h e d  g o v e r n m e n t  c a p a b l e  o f  e n a c t i n g  l a w rs  a n d  e n -
7 0f o r c i n g  t h e i r  e x e c u t i o n . ” T h e y  c a n n o t  c r e a t e  l a w  i n  t h e  
s e n s e  i n  w rh i c h  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  o r g a n  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  c a n ,  a n d  
e v e n  t h e n  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n  t o  a p p l y  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  l a v /  i s  
e n t i r e l y  d e p e n d e n t  u p o n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  i f  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s
7 0  b u t l e r  v .  T)o r d e n , ( 1  8 4 9  ) , 7  H o w a r d  I ,  p e r  T a n e y , C . J .
589
a r e  to h a v e  a n y  social utility as distinguished from their
v a l u e . And in an underdeveloped country like Pakistan 
w h e r e  t h e  l o y a l t y  of citizens is not so much towards the 
c o u n t r y  o r  t h e  constitution as it is towards the government,a 
j u d g m e n t  o f  only academic interest would not serve any useful 
p u r p o s e .
This important factor, l o y a l t y  t o w a r d s  g o v e r n m e n t  r a t h e r  
t h a n  towards the constitution w a s  t h e  m a i n  c a u s e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t a b i l i t y  as well as the a u t h o r i t a r i a n  t y p e  o f  r u l e  e x p e r ­
i e n c e d  b y  Pakistan since i t s  i n c e p t i o n .  T h e  w i e l d e r  o f  
political power c o u l d  i g n o r e  w i t h  i m p u n i t y  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
■ n d  legal r e q u i r e m e n t s  w i t h o u t  r i s k i n g  a n y  a d v e r s e  r e a c t i o n  
c m  the people. A n d  t h e  p e o p l e  h a d  l i t t l e  o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  
'pressing their v i e w ' s  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s .
The courts, i n  s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  w ’o u l d  a p p e a r  t o  b e  i n  t h e  
weakest p o s s i b l e  p o s i t i o n  t o  i n s i s t  o n  l e g a l i t y .  T h e y  d i d  n o t  
h a v e  e i t h e r  r e s o u r c e s  o r  t h e  a b i l i t y ,  i n  d i s c h a r g i n g  t h e i r  
judicial duty, t o  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  u s u r p e r s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r .
It would not b e  p r o p e r ,  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d ,  t o  c o m p a r e  t h e  
court's role in S o u t h  A f r i c a  i n  t h e  1 9 5 0 f s  i n  s t a n d i n g  u p  
against Parliament's a t t e m p t  t o  a m e n d  t h e  e n t r e n c h e d  s e c t i o n s  
of the' Constitution A c t ,  w i t h  t h a t  o f  t h e  c o u r t s  i n  p o l i t i ­
cally backward c o u n t r i e s  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h i s  
chapter. In South A f r i c a ,  w h e r e  t h e r e  w a s  n o  r e v o l u t i o n ,  n o  
breach of legal c o n t i n u i t y ,  n o t  e v e n  a  c h a n g e  o f  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
the court could rule t h a t  t h e  r e p e a l  o f  t h e  e n t r e n c h e d
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constitutional p r o v i s i o n ,  r e m o v i n g  $he Ca] Aired voters
rr o m t h e  common roll, was void in so .far as Parliament did
n o t  follow the prescribed procedure required by the Constitu-
7 1t i o n  in such circumstances.'' In the subsequent case that
f o l l o w e d  t h e  court ruled that the Act constituting the ftEigh
C o u r t  of Parliament” which wa.s nothing but the two houses
u n d e r  another name, was invalid, in t h a t  i t  i n t e n d e d  t o
a b r o g a t e  by indirect m e a n s  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  a c c o r d e d  b y  t h e
7 2entrenched s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  A c t .  P u t  w h e n  
Parliament p a s s e d  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  l e g i s l a t i o n  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  
p r e s c r i b e d  p r o c e d u r e ,  t h o u g h  t h e  r e q u i r e d  t v ^ o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  
could o n l y  b e  s e c u r e d  by a p p o i n t i n g  f r e s h  S e n a t o r s ,  t h e  
court h e l d  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  v a l i d .  T h e  c o u r t ,  w h a t e v e r  m i g h t  
h a v e  b e e n  i t s  v i e w s  a b o u t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  p o l i c y  o f  
" a p a r t h e i d ” , w o u l d  n o t  a s s u m e  a n  o v e r t l y  p o l i t i c a l  r o l e  i n  
its j u d i c i a l  c a p a c i t y .  T h e  p o i n t  t o  b e  n o t e d  i n  t h e s e  c a s e s  
is t h a t  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  P a r l i a m e n t  w a s  p u r p o r t i n g  t o  a c t  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  a n d  t h e  c o u r t  p r o p e r l y  u p h e l d  l e g a l i t y  i n  
t h e  f i r s t  t w o  c a s e s .  P u t  w h e r e  t h e  u s u r p e r  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
p o w e r ,  f a r  f r o m  p r e t e n d i n g  t o  a c t  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
a c t s  d e l i b e r a t e l y  c o n t r a r y  t o  i t ,  w i t h o u t  p r o v o k i n g  a n y  
o p p o s i t i o n  w h a t s o e v e r  o u t s i d e  t h e  c o u r t ,  t h e  c o u r t ,  i t  i s
7 1 H a r r i s  v . " S i n i s t e r  o f  t h e  I n t e r i o r  ,1952(2} S .  A . 428.
7 °  ?Ti n i s t e r  o f  t h e  I n t e r i o r  v .  H a r r i s , 1 9 5 2 ( 4 )  S . A . 7 69 .
Hollins v. Minister of the Interior.1957(1) S.A.552.
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s u b m i t t e d ,  i s  b o u n d  t o  g i v e  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  t h e  n e w  p o l i t i c a l
r e a l i t y .
I n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  s t a t u s  a n d  r o l e  o f  t h e  j u d i c i a r y  
in a  g o v e r n m e n t a l  f r a m e w o r k ,  C h i e f  J u s t i c e  B e a d l e  m a d e  
v a l u a b l e  o b s e r v a t i o n s .  H i s  l o r d s h i p  s a i d  : " A  c o u r t  c a n n o t  
derive i t s  a u t h o r i t y  f r o m  a  p i e c e  o f  p a p e r ,  o n  w h i c h  m a y  
be w r i t t e n  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  s o m e  d e f u n c t  o r  s u s p e n d e d  
c o n s t i t u t i o n .  I n  n o r m a l  t i m e s  a  c o u r t  o r i g i n a t e s  e i t h e r  f r o m  
a n  e f f e c t i v e  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a s  w a s  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  High C o u r t  
d e s i a j  b e f o r e  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n ,  o r  f r o m  a  s p e c i a l  
s t a t u t e ,  a s  i s  t h e  c a s e  o f  m a n y  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  Courts, o r  
p e r h a p s  f r o m  e x i s t e n c e  f r o m  t i m e  i m m e m o r i a l ,  a s  w a s  t h e  o l d  
E n g l i s h  C o u r t  o f  A r u n d e l ;  b u t  i t  d e r i v e s  its r e a l  authority 
f r o m  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  p o w e r  r e c o g n i z e s  i t  a s  
c o u r t  a n d  e n f o r c e s  i t s  judgments and orders. Ultimately 
i t  m u s t  d e r i v e  i t s  a u t h o r i t y  from recognition by the govern­
m e n t a l  p o w e r  a n d  f r o m  the fact that the governmental power 
e n f o r c e s  i t s  o r d e r s .  If it w a s  not so recognised, and its 
o r d e r s  n o t  e n f o r c e d ,  its proceedings would have no more 
a u t h o r i t y  t h a n  a  fm o c k  trialT deciding academic questions 
o f  l a w .  This description of the courts' authority a n d  
f u n c t i o n s ,  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d ,  i s  true in a l l  circumstances.
A  j u d g m e n t  devoid of factual reality may be of high academic 
i n t e r e s t ,  but would be of little use to contending parties,
7 4  r,Ta d z i n b a m u t o  v .  h a . r d n e r - B u r k e , 1 9 6 8 (  2 )  S .  A . 2 8 4 ,  a t  pp. 3 2 9 -
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who w a n t  j u d i c i a l  r e d r e s s  o f  t h e i r  g r i e v a n c e s .
I t  m a y  b e  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  w h e n  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  j u d g e ' s  
role i n  a  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h a t  c o n t r o v e r s y  r e g a r d i n g  
i t  i n c r e a s e d  w h e n  t h e  R h o d e s i a n  H i g h  C o u r t  a f t e r  i n i t i a l l y  
g i v i n g  d e  f a c t o  s t a t u s  t o  t h e  S m i t h  r e g i m e ,  u l t i m a t e l y  
a c c o r d e d  t o  t h e  S m i t h  C o n s t i t u t i o n  l e g a l  v a l i d i t y .  I t  w a s  
c o n t e n d e d  t h a t  t h i s  c h a n g e  o f  attitudef a f t e r  o r i g j  l y  
a c c e p t i n g  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  P a r l i a m e n t ’ s  c l a i m  o f  l e g a l  
s o v e r e i g n t y  o v e r  R h o d e s i a ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  B r i t i s h  G o v e r n m e n t  
w a s  e x p r e s s l y  c o m m i t t e d  t o  r e s t o r e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  i n  t h e  
t e r r i t o r y  w a s  i l l o g i c a l .  U l t i m a t e l y  t h e  R h o d e s i a n  H i g h  
C o u r t  f e l t  t h a t ,  b a r r i n g  t h e  u s e  o f  f o r c e , w h i c h  w a s  u n l i k e l y  
t h e  B r i t i s h  G o v e r n m e n t ’ s  o b j e c t i v e  o f  e n d i n g :  r e b e l l i o n  
w o u l d  n o t  s u c c e e d  a n d  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n ,  i n  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  
h a d  b e e n  s u c c e s s f u l .
B u t  t h e  Judicial Committee of the Privy Council found, 
o n  t h e  basis of Rhodesia’s constitutional history and the 
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  United Kingdom Government was committed to 
e n d  t h e  rebellion, that the revolution was not successful 
a n d  t h e  Smith Constitution of 1965 had no legal validity.
L o r d  R e i d ,  giving the judgment of the majority, however, 
a c c e p t e d  the proposition that a constitution establishing 
a  l e g a l  o r d e r  was susceptible of change by extra-constitutiona 
m e t h o d  and that t h e  court would accord validity to such 
c h a n g e .  H i s  l o r d s h i p  o b s e r v e d  : ”It is a historical fact
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t h a t  in many countries - and indeed in many countries which 
are o r  have been under British sovereignty - there are now 
regimes, w h i c h  are universally recognised as lawful but w h i c h  
d e r i v e  t h e i r  origins from revolutions or coups d fetat. The 
l a w  m u s t  take account of that fact. So there may b e  a
7 5i U e ,  t i c n  h o w  o r  at what stage the new r e g i m e  became l a w f u l , ”
On t h e  basis o f  this legal d i c t u m  t h e  B o a r d  a g r e e d  w i t h  t h e  
d e c i s i o n s  o f  Pakistan and U g a n d a  c a s e s .
I t  w o u l d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  s e e m  c l e a r  t h a t  c o u r t s  g e n e r a l l y  
a c c e p t  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  e v e r y  c o n s t i t u t i o n  m a y  b e  o f
r} S’
e x t r a - l e g a l  o r i g i n ,  ' a n d  i n  a  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s i t u a t i o n  t h e  
court a t  s o m e  s t a g e  w i l l  r e c o g n i s e  t h e  n e w  l e g a l  o r d e r  a s  
l a w f u l .  I n  t h e  g r u n d n o r m  c a s e s  t h e  c o u r t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
P r i v y  C o u n c i l ,  a s s e r t e d  t h e i r  c o m p e t e n c e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  
l e g a l i t y  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  h e l d  t h a t ,  w h e n  t h e y  w e r e  
s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  t h e  n e v ;  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  f i r m l y  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  
t h e y  w o u l d  r e c o g i s e  i t  a s  l a w f u l .  I t  i s  o n  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e ,  
h i c h  i s  a c c e p t e d  b y  o t h e r  C o m m o n w e a l t h  C o u r t s ,  t h a t  t h e  
i l i s t a n  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  i n  O c t o b e r , 1 9 5 8 ,  f o u n d  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  
s u c c e s s f u l  a n d  e f f e c t i v e ;  t h e r e  b e i n g  n o  r i v a l  w h a t s o e v e r  
g a v e  i t  t h e  l e g a l  v a l i d i t y .  W h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  a b r o g a t i o n  
o f  t h e  p r e - e x i s t i n g  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 5 6  w a s  p o l i t i c a l l y  
J u s t i f i e d ,  i t  w a s  n o t  f o r  t h e  c o u r t  t o  d e c i d e .  B y  g i v i n g
7 7  . l a d z i m b a m u t o  v .  h a r d n e r - B u r k e , (  1 9 6 8 ) 5  A l l  U . R . 5 6 1 (P.C . }, 
a t  p . 5741
See Sir John Salmond,” J u r i s p r u d e n c e ” ( 1 2 t h  e d i t i o n , 1 9 6 6  b y  
T  . ^itzgerald)pp . 8 4 - 8 5 ;  C . W . B a t o n ,  ” A  T e x t  — o o k  o f
Jurisprudence” ,(2nd.edition. 1 9 5 1  ) p . 1 " .
l e g a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  t h e  n e w  o r d e r ,  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  
a c c e p t e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  t h a t  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  r e g i m e ,  
w h i c h  h a d  o v e r t h r o w n  t h e  o l d  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w a s  n o w  t h e  n e w  
l a w - c r e a t i n g  o r g a n  o f  t h e  s t a t e .
Ad h a s  b e e n  s a i d  e a r l i e r ,  o n c e  a  j u d g e  c o m e s  t o  t h e  
c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  o l d  o r d e r  u n d e r  w h i c h  h e  w a s  a p p o i n t e d  
h a s  b e e n  s u c c e s s f u l l y  o v e r t h r o w n ,  i t  i s  h i s  p e r s o n a l  d e c i s i o n  
e i t h e r  t o  c o n t i n u e  i n  o f f i c e  o r  t o  g o  w i t h  t h e  o l d  c o n s t i t u ­
t i o n .  m h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  n e w  o r d e r  w o u l d  n o t  d e p e n d  o n  h i s  
p e r s o h a l  v i e w s  a b o u t  t h a t  o r d e r .  I t  h a s  b e e n  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  
' h e  R h o d e s i a n  j u d g e s  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  U . D . I . o n  t h e i r  
o w n  p o s i t i o n .  B e a d l e , C . J . ,  a f t e r  a  s t u d y  o f  A m e r i c a n  c a s e s  
a n d  t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e  c a l i b r e  o f  p e r s o n s  w h o  m i g h t
replace t h e  j u d g e s  i f  they went, decided to continue in
7 7o r d e r  Mto s a v e  the machinery of justice.” But later two 
j u d g e s ,  M r ,  Justice Fieldsend and Mr. Justice Bandy Young,
' • e s i g n e d  in 1 9 6 8 .  But their resignations did not have any 
? f f e c t  o n  the Rhodesian situation and their brother judges 
t h o u g h t  it proper on their part to continue under the Smith 
C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  Analysing in this context the situation in 
Pakistan in 1 9 5 8 ,  the judges of the Supreme Court,of Pakistan, 
i t  i s  submitted, acted properly in according legality to the 
n e w  l e g a l  o r d e r .
77 C l a i r e  P a l l e y ,  ’’The Judicial Process : U.B.I. and the
S o u t h e r n  R h o d e s i a n  Judiciary” , ( 1967) 30 T.r.L .R . 263,
a t  p . 2 6 9 .
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In the foregoing chapters we have discussed three 
major constitutional breakdowns that occurred in the short 
constitutional history of Pakistan. In discussing those 
episodes separately, we have attempted to describe the 
political backgrounds leading to the crises, in so far as 
they are relevant to our purpose, and analysed them to 
show the justification of and objections to the measures 
taken on those occasions. As has been seen, on at least 
two occasions the measures were impugned in the highest 
Court of the country, and the Court, after full deliberation, 
gave legal validity to the action taken. In the third, 
the action itself was not questioned bu tthe court1s attempt 
to restrict the regime's exercise of power within a pres­
cribed limit was frustrated by a martial law order. In 
the present chapter it remains for us to make a summary of 
the conclusions already reached in the course of our deli­
berations and to add new points wherever necessary. At 
the risk of repeating things already written, it is thought 
necessary for a clear perception of the events considered 
to give a summary of the conclusions, and to comment on the 
future of constitutionalism and democracy in the country.
In October 1954- the Governor-General of Pakistan, 
Ghulam Muhammad proclaimed a state of emergency throughout 
the country on the plea that "the constitutional machinery
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has broken down”* The proclamation said that the Con­
stituent Assembly having lost the confidence of the people 
"can no longer function11.^ The proclamation of the Governor- 
General dissolved the first Constituent Assembly which, 
after seven long years of protracted deliberations, was 
about to enact a constitution for the country. In less 
than two years this was Ghulam Muhammad’s second strike 
against constitutional rule in the country. In April 1953 
he had dismissed the Government of Khawaja Nazimuddin, with­
out assigning any specific reason for such an extraordinary
p
action. He appointed as Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of 
Begra, who was not even a member of the legislature at the 
time of his appointment! Ghulam Muhammad's action in 
April 1953 showed that political power in Pakistan was no 
longer in the hands of the members of the legislature. It 
was being effectively wielded by the bureaucrats, headed by 
the Governor-General himself and supported by the armed 
forces.
The dismissal of the first Constituent Assembly 
was challenged by its President in the Sind Chief Court, 
which unanimously held that the Governor-General had no 
power to dissolve the Assembly. But on appeal the Federal
1. See Chapter III supra and Appendix I for the Proclamation.
2. See Chapter IV, pp* |i7-Mg ^ supra.
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Court, without going into the merits of the case, held that 
section 223 A of the Government of India Act, 1935* under 
which the Sind Chief Court purported to exercise writ juris­
diction, had not received the assent o£ the Governor-General,
7
and, therefore, was not a valid law.-' The unanimous 
decision of the Sind Chief Court was thus reversed. The 
Chief Justice, Muhammad Munir, who gave the principal judg­
ment of the Court, found that Pakistan, being a Dominion 
within the British Commonwealth, having an interim consti­
tution of the Commonwealth type, must follow the practice 
followed in other Commonwealth countries. The Governor- 
General, as the representative of the Crown, had the authority
to assent to all laws passed by the Constituent Assembly,
Zl
including constitutional laws. In a subsequent case, in 
its advisory jurisdiction the Federal Court held that, 
though the Governor-General had no statutory power to dissolve 
the Constituent Assembly, his prerogative power, as the rep­
resentative of the Crown, to dissolve it had revived on the 
nfailure11 of the Assembly to frame a constitution in over 
seven years. The Governor-General had, therefore, legal 
power under section 5 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 
to dissolve the Assembly.
3* Federation of Pakistan v. Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, 
IP.L.t). 1955 F.C. 240; see Chapter ill, pp.77-&>.
4. Reference "by H.E. the Governor-General»
P.L.D. 1955 P.O. 43$; Chapter III, pp.£8-90.
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These decisions of the Federal Court have met 
with a mixed reception from academic commentators* While 
Professor K.C. Wheare regards the Federal Court’s finding 
regarding assent of the Governor-General to constitutional 
laws as "correct",^ Professor S.A. de Smith regards these 
decisions as "not very well disguised acts of political 
judgment". According to Professor de Smith "it was very 
important for the Court not to come to a conclusion adverse 
to the Governor-General on the main issues"• Professor
Alan Gledhill, taking into consideration the Court’s 
endeavour "to hold the balance fairly between the Executive 
and the Assembly" does not regard the judgments "as political 
decisions".7
The Chief Justice, Muhammad Munir, in finding the 
Governor-General's assent necessary to all Bills passed by 
the Constituent Assembly, refused to accept the traditional 
and contemporary interpretation of the relevant provisions 
of the Independence Act, on the ground that there was no 
doubt about the meaning of the statutory provisions, which 
were in clear and unambiguous terms. But since indepen­
dence both India and Pakistan had acted on the assumption
5. K.C. Wheare, "The Constitutional Structure of the 
Commonwealth’S p. lOQ.
6 . S.A. de Smith, "Constitutional Lawyers in Revolutionary 
Situations", (1968) 7 Western Ontario Law Review, p. 93*
7* A. Gledhill, ’’The Constitutional Crisis in Pakistan (1954- 
§5)% Indian Tear Book of International Affairs 1955* 
Reprint, p. 2l.
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that the Governor-General1s assent was only essential for 
Bills passed by the Assembly, acting as the Federal Legis­
lature, and no such assent was necessary to constitutional 
legislation passed by the Constituent Assembly acting as 
such, because it was a self-contained sovereign body when 
making provisions for the constitution of the country*
The Pakistan Constituent Assembly, as early as May, 194-8, 
adopted a resolution regarding constitutional bills which 
read "when a Bill is passed by the Assembly, a copy thereof 
shall be signed by the President, and it shall become law
on being published in the Official Gazette of Pakistan
8under authority of the President." During the hearing of 
Tamizuddin Khan1s case it was revealed to the Court that 
the law Ministry had advised in 194-8 that, even in Consti­
tutional Bills, the assent of the Governor-General was 
necessary* But nobody acted on that advice. Sir Ivor 
Jennings said that it was not explained why the advice was 
overruled but "it seems possible that the fact that [Jinnah] 
was both Governor-General and President of the Constituent
Q
Assembly was a material factor."*7 Jennings seems to imply 
that what really mattered was the signature of Jinnah to a
8 . Rule 62 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constituent 
Assembly of Pakistan.
9* Sir Ivor Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan, 
p. 24-.
- 600
Bill, and not whether he signed it as the Governor-General 
or the President of the Assembly. But Jinnah, who was 
strictly legalistic in all matters, cannot be expected to 
have acted on so specious an assumption. However, Jinnah 
died in September, 194-8 and was succeeded in the two 
offices by two different persons. But the practice followed 
during the lifetime of Jinnah continued and state functions 
were carried out on the authority of constitutional 
statutes passed by the Constituent Assembly without the 
assent of the Governor-General. As Cornelius, J., as he
then was, pointed out, in his dissenting judgment, the 
Constituent Assembly's actions in disregard of Law Ministry's 
advice emphasised the fact that the Assembly deliberately 
rejected it, when making Rule 62 of the Rules of Procedure.
Munir, C.J., in his judgment observed that the 
Constituent Assembly wrongly and "thoughtlessly" assumed 
the role of a sovereign legislature and the Court was not 
concerned with the resultant "disaster" that might fall 
upon the country when the Court assumed a legal position 
contrary to the traditional interpretation. But as 
Professor Gledhill pointed out, "in attributing responsibility 
for the crisis exclusively to the Constituent Assembly, the 
Court has overlooked the contributions of other organs of 
the State. The executive, until the crisis, not only
10. A. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 21.
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initiated important legislation on the assumption that the 
Assembly*s view was correct, but actually asserted that 
assent to constitutional Bills was unnecessary• It was 
on the basis of arguments put forward by counsel for the 
Federation that Agha, J. held^ in 1950 that the assent of 
the Governor-General was not necessary to constitutional 
laws* In this case the appellant*s main contention was 
that the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) 
Act, 194*9» passed by the Constituent Assembly, was void 
for want of assent of the Governor-General.
After the Sind Chief Court had held positively
that assent was not necessary in constitutional laws, the
question was indirectly raised in the Federal Court in at
12least two cases. In these cases it was contended that 
the statutes in question should have been passed by the 
Federal Legislature and should, therefore, have the assent 
of the Governor-General, without which they had no legal 
effect. But the Federal Court accepted the submission 
made on behalf of the Federation that they were constitutional 
laws and so were fully valid without the assent of the 
Governor-General. It was, therefore, clear, before the 
Federal Court heard Tamzuddin Khan*s case, that since the
11. M.A. Khuhro v. Federation of Pakistan,
P.L.D. 1950 Sind 49*
12. Khan of Mamdot v. Crown, P.L.D. 1950 F.C. 15; 
Akbar Khan v. Crown, P.L.D. 1954- F.C. 87#
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inception of Pakistan, the legislature passed laws, the 
judiciary enforced them, and the executive acted upon them 
on the conscious belief and full understanding that the 
Governor-General1s assent was not necessary to consti­
tutional legislation. (This was a sufficiently strong ground
for the Court to apply the principle of contemporaneous 
13exposition. ^ As Maxwell has said
f!It is said that the best exposition of a statute 
or any other document is that which it has 
received from contemporary authority. Optima 
est legum interpres consuetudo. Contemporanea
exposit10 est optima et fortissima in lege.
Where this has Seen given by enactment or judicial 
decision, it is of course to be accepted as con­
clusive •" 14
The illustrious author then gives authorities in which the
courts interpreted the statutes upholding the meaning given
by 'usage', and said
"In all these cases, a contrary resolution would 
••• have been an overruling of the justice of 
the nation for years past. The understanding, 
which is accepted as authoritative on such 
questions, however, is not that which has been 
speculative merely, or floating in the minds of 
professional men. It must have been long acted 
on in general practice, and publicly." 15
The unbroken public practice by all the organs of the State
in Pakistan that assent was unnecessary in constitutional
legislation consciously for a long period of time was
15* See A. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 20.
14. Sir P.B. Maxwell, The Interpretation of Statutes 
(Llth ed.), p. 296.
15* Ibid., p. 500.
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perhaps more than what was required to justify the Court 
in upholding such practice.
The Federal Court then found that, as the 
Constituent Assembly had "failed" to frame a constitution 
for the country in seven years, the Governor-General had the 
legal authority to dissolve it. Munir, C.J., on the basis 
of facts supplied to the Court in the Reference by the 
Governor-General, declined to enquire into those facts, 
though they were challenged in the counter-affidavits sub­
mitted by the respondents. The Chief Justice said "The 
Governor-General has taken the responsibility of asserting 
certain facts and has merely asked us to report to him 
what the legal position is, if those facts are true."
But the Chief Justice, in the course of his judgment, gave 
16a table - containing statistical information about the time 
taken to frame constitutions by some twenty countries.
This shows that the Chief Justice himself was convinced and 
tried to demonstrate that the Pakistan Constituent Assembly 
had in fact failed to frame a constitution. This contention 
is true, if one regards the situation as it stood on October 
24, 1954-• It is true that the Assembly had not adopted 
the constitution formally and the country was still being
16. Reference by the Governor-General, 
P.t.D. 1955 F.d. at pp. 466-467.
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governed by the interim constitution. But, as Sir Ivor 
Jennings, who was at that time closely involved in con­
stitution-making in Pakistan, has said "A Draft Constitution 
prepared on the instructions of the Drafting Committee 
would have been ready for signature on 25 October and would 
have been reported to the Assembly on 27 O c t o b e r N o t  
only that, the Prime Minister had already declared that the
new constitution would come into effect on December 25,
181954-, the birth-anniversary of Jinnah. The Constituent
Assembly had no doubt taken a long time to reach that stage.
But it had to tackle intricate issues, that were unique in
the constitutional history of any country. When it was
dissolved, it had reached unanimity on the complicated
question of the place of religion in the Constitution, and
full agreement was reported on the issue of representation
at the centre, by a novel device based on what is known as
the "Mohammed Ali Formula". The whole country was anxious
to receive the constitution which, it was thought, would
give political direction to the nation. But Ghulam
Mohammad did not allow this to happen.
It has been said that Ghulam Mohammad dissolved
the Constituent Assembly, not because it failed to produce
19a constitution, but because it was about to produce one. '
17. Sir Ivor Jennings, op.cit., p. 5*
18. See Chapter II supra. «
1 9# See S.A. de Smith., The New Commonwealth and its Consti 
tut ion, p. 219* n.J* Newman, "The Constitutional 
____________________ [__________/nontinued over
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What really happened was that the draft constitution, 
which had been adopted by the Assembly, was not to the 
liking of Ghulam Muhammad, who particularly resented its 
provisions which made the Head of the State merely a 
constitutional head. Moreover, his own future position, 
once the constitution came into force, was uncertain.
Because of his record as the Governor-General, who dis­
missed with impunity the bona fide Government of Khawaja 
Nazimuddin in 1955* the Muslim League Parliamentary Party 
in the Constituent Assembly was reluctant to give any 
assurance of his election as the Head of the State under 
the new Constitution. The Governor-General, therefore, was 
planning to take similar action against Mohammed Ali's 
Government, which had led the Constituent Assembly to curtail 
the Governor-General's discretionary powers in the previous 
month. A vicious struggle for supremacy was going on 
between the Constituent Assembly, composed of people's 
representatives and the autocratic Governor-General who, 
because of his own ambitious designs, indulged in power 
politics. With the support of the civil servants and the 
armed forces, Ghulam Muhammad triumphed over the Assembly, 
which was summarily dissolved on October 24, 1954-• The 
Governor-General, no doubt, had the support of a group of
Footnote 19 continued from previous page.
Evolution in Pakistan"
(1962) 58 International Affairs, p. 555*
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Punjabi politicians. But Ghulam Muhammad'1 s personal 
ambition weighed predominantly in his action and the poli­
ticians, who were dissatisfied with some provisions of 
the draft constitution, only played into his hands.
Now, a Governor-General, assuming he has the
authority to dissolve an Assembly, can resort to dissolution
on his own initiative only under certain conditions. E.A.
Forsey on this subject has said
?.It is probably safe to say that, under modern 
conditions, forced dissolutions will take place 
only if the Crown considers them necessary to 
protect the Constitution or to ensure that major 
changes in the economic structure of society shall 
take place only by the deliberate will of the 
people. In other words, the power to force 
dissolution is now likely to be used only negatively, 
preventively; never as a means of bringing about 
some positive end desired by the King himself or 
his representative.11 20
And yet, as will be seen presently, it was exactly for the
"positive end desired" by the Governor-General that he
dissolved the Constituent Assembly.
The Governor-General's proclamation effecting the 
dissolution of the Assembly declared that elections would be 
held soon. But once Ghulam Muhammad, had consolidated his 
own position with the support of the civil servants, and had 
the backing of the army, the commander-in-chief of the army 
General ^yub Khan, was appointed the Defence Minister, the
20. E.A. Forsey, The Royal Power of Dissolution of Parliament 
in the BritisH Commonwealth, p. 270.
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Governor-General apparently forgot about the election.
He had his own ideas about the constitution, which should
preserve effective powers for the Head of the State. These
were publicly propagated by his Minister of the Interior,
General Iskander Mirza, and at one stage it was reported
21that the constitution had already been drafted. It was
anticipated that the constitution would be promulgated by
the Governor-General1s decree. This fear was strengthened
by the language used in the Preamble and section 10 of the
22Emergency Power Ordinance, 1955* which was issued after 
the Pederal Court's decision in Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan's 
case. The Ordinance empowered the Governor-General to make, 
by order, such provisions as appeared to him to be necessary 
or expedient for the future constitution of Pakistan. It 
was the strong criticism of Chief Justice Munir in Usif 
Palel's case, which dissuaded the Governor-General from 
exercising the powers under the Ordinance, and compelled 
him to issue a subsequent Ordinance, providing for the con­
vening of the second Constituent Assembly to make a consti­
tution. There is, therefore, strong evidence that the 
Governor-General and his supporters wanted to give the 
country a constitution of their own choice without regard for
21. See Chapter III, pp.tty-^, supra#
22. Ordinance IX of 1955»
P.L.D. 1955 Central Statutes 66.
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popular feeling and aspirations. In dissolving the first 
Constituent Assembly, Ghulam Muhammad had no intention of 
establishing another Assembly to take the place of the 
previous one.
The proclamation also said that the Assembly, as at 
that time constituted, had lost the confidence of the people. 
It is true that, after the provincial elections in East 
Bengal in February, 195^ there were demands for the dis­
solution of the Constituent Assembly. But these demands 
were rejected on the ground that the Assembly had a mandate 
to give the country a constitution, and that an election 
should not affect the composition of the Constituent Assembly* 
About six months later, however, the Governor-General found 
that it had Mlost the confidence of the people11 • Professor 
G.W. Choudhury on this point argued
"If it had been dissolved immediately after the 
election in East Pakistan, there might have been 
some justification, but its dissolution after its 
attempt to curb the undemocratic and arbitrary 
powers of the Governor-General seems to indicate 
that the real motive of the Governor-General in 
dissolving the House was personal rather than any 
regard for democratic principles or traditions.
His subsequent attempt to give the country a con­
stitution by decree rather than by Constituent 
Assembly seems also to substantiate his personal 
motive rather than any concern for the people's 
representation or rights." 23
The Constituent Assembly was dissolved, it is submitted, not
because it had "lost the confidence of the people", nor
23* G.W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, p. 75*
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because it "failed11 to frame a constitution for the country, 
but because in October, 1954*, it was most certainly going 
to adopt a constitution which ran counter to the wishes of 
the Governor-General. Ghulam Muhammad, an autocrat by 
nature and training, would rather flout all standards of 
constitutionalism than allow the adoption of a constitution 
based on principles different from his own authoritarian 
ideas.
The second major crisis in constitutional develop­
ment in Pakistan was the abrogation of the Constitution of 
1956 and the declaration of "martial law" throughout the 
country by President Iskander Mirza, in October, 1956*
The President considered the Constitution, which was adopted 
by the second Constituent Assembly in March, 1956, after 
nine years of toil and turmoil, as "full of dangerous com­
promises". He came to this conclusion even before a single 
general election could be held under the Constitution. In 
his proclamation abrogating the Constitution, the President 
referred to the deteriorating political condition in the 
country and said that "to rectify them, the country must 
first be taken back to sanity by a peaceful revolution".
By abrogating the Constitution, under which Iskander Mirza 
held the office of president, he initiated the "revolution" 
and put the country under "martial law".
This was a unique action taken by any head of the 
state in any country within the British Commonwealth.
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Because, though martial law as an emergency measure was not 
unknown in the Commonwealth, the special feature of the 
President's action was the abrogation of the Constitution 
itself, with the object of providing another constitution 
11 suitable" to the genius of the people. "Martial law", 
declared by Iskander Mirza, was only a means to achieve 
that objective. At a very early stage of "martial law"!
! the Supreme Court of Pakistan was called upon to determine
| the legality of the President's action, and held that the
old legal order, under the Constitution of 1956, had been 
successfully overthrown by the President's abrogation of the 
Constitution and a new legal order established in its place
f ........................................................
i by the "success" of the revolution. This decision of the
| Supreme Court is sometimes misconceived as upholding the
( declaration of martial law when there were no circumstances
| justifying its imposition. But the Supreme Court, it may
L
I be pointed out, found in essence that the old legal order
i had been destroyed, and gave legal validity to the newlyj
established order, which happened to be a military regime
[ ruling the country under "martial law".
6
i
The imposition of martial law in October, 1958 
was, it is submitted, totally unjustified by the prevailing
24. The State v. Dosso, P.L.D. 1958 S.C. 535; 
Chapter Vi, pp. supra.
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condition of Pakistan at that time* The country was in a 
state of peace and tranquillity under the constitutional 
government and was preparing for the first general election 
ever to be held in the country since independence, in 
February, 1959• Political crisis, which the President put 
forward as the ground for his action, had never been recog­
nised as a reason for the imposition of martial law in any 
part of the Commonwealth.
Martial law, as is generally understood in the 
Commonwealth, is 11 the common law right of the Crown and its 
servants to repel force by force in the case of invasion,
insurrection, riot or generally of any violent resistance 
25to the law11* This concept of martial law has been recog­
nised in every part of the Commonwealth as "the law of 
self-defence or the law of necessity" put in force in times 
of public danger "when in consequence it becomes necessary 
for the military authorities to assume control and to take 
the law into their own hands for the very purpose of preser­
ving that constitution which is the foundation of all the
26rights and liberties of its subjects"* When there is
"actual war" not "mere riot or disturbance neither so serious
27nor so extensive"; ' where there is a "deliberate organised
25* A.V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, p* 288.
26. Queen v. Bekker, Queen v. Naude,
(l9&<5) 17 £.C. 340 (£.C. of cape of Good Hope).
27• D.F. Marais v. General Officer Commanding, ex parte Marais* 
(l$o£) A.C. 109.
612
resistance by force and arms to the laws and operations of
QC
tbe lawful Government, amounting to a war or armed rebellion",
that tbe operation of martial law is justified,
"Martial law cannot arise from a threatened
invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the
invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and
pq
the civil administration,11 J That martial law would not be
justified in a territory where the courts were open and
functioned normally, as enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in ex parte Milligan, and which later found
support in the Irish court in L  v, Military Governor, was
rejected by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
when it said "The fact that for some purposes some tribunals
had been permitted to pursue their ordinary course is not
*50conclusive that war was not raging,"^ But the Board 
asserted that there must be "actual war" raging in the realm 
to justify a declaration of martial law, and the necessity 
of the declaration would be justiciable in the ordinary 
court of law. When martial law is necessitated by the 
circumstances, namely war caused by attack from external
28, The King v. The Military Governor, 
J j m T l  Irish keporis ^ 2,
29* Ex parte Milligan (1866) 4 Wallace 2; 
'(1856) ?1 U.8 . Reports.
50, Ex parte Marais, (1902) A*C, 109, 114.
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enemy or by internal rebellion, a formal proclamation of
martial law is not essentialkfor its operation. As has
been observed "A proclamation of martial law is not ,,. in
any way essential to tbe exercise of these powers: it is a
convenient notification to the inhabitants that the commander
has assumed control of the district, but it in no way affects
31the legality or illegality of his a c t i o n , L e g a l  justi­
fication of the exercise of power under martial law must be 
found in the necessity of the circumstances; its exercise
"requires to be justified on every occasion by necessity of 
32the cases".
The concept of martial law as a part of the common
law of necessity was well-known to the court of the Indo-
Pakistan sub-continent. During the period of British rule
33in a series of cases^ arising out of emergencies declared 
in areas disturbed by riots and insurrection, the courts 
recognised the legality of a declaration of martial law
31. H.E. Richards, "Martial Law",
(1902) 18 Law Quarterly Review 133* 139; see also 
Tilonko v . Atto rney-General, T1907] A.C. 93*
32. Sir Frederick Pollock "What is Martial Law?",
(1902) 18 Law Quarterly Review 152, 153*
33• Elphinstone v, Bedreechand, [1830] 12 English Reports,
1 Knapp P.C.; Bugga v. Emperor, [1920] 47 I#A, 128; 
Kalinath Roy v. Emperor, Ll92oJ 48 I.A* 96;
Govindan Nair v. llmpeTor, A*I.R. 1922 Madras 499? 
Chanappa v. Emperor, A.j.R. 1931 Bombay 57*
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and examined the circumstances alleged to justify the exer­
cise of powers under martial law having regard to the con­
ditions prevailing at the material times* After independence 
the Pakistan courts had to deal with the situation following 
the declaration of martial law in Lahore in March, 1953* 
According to the High Court of Lahore, martial law meant 
"the rights and obligation of the military, under the common 
and statute law of the country, to repel force by force,
while assisting the civil authorities to suppress riots,
34-insurrections or other disorders in the land."-' But while
the armed forces exercise unlimited powers during the
period of martial law,
"the legality or excusability of any action taken 
by the military will be judged by 'necessity1 
and * *• such judgment will lie with the civil 
courts ex jpost facto. Thus martial law is the 
law of military necessity, actual or presumed 
in good faith*" 35
The Federal Court gave a similar definition of martial law
when the military forces exercised their discretion in dealing
with abnormal situations. In Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi v.
36The Crown^ it was observed that
"under the general principles of constitutional law, 
the right of the military to take measures to
34-* Muhammad Umar Khan v. Crown, 
P.L.D. 1953 Lahore 528.
55* Ibid *, p. 539* per Munir, C.J.
36. P.L.D. 1954 F.C. 187.
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protect others and themselves against the harmful 
activities of the civil population cannot be 
doubted; there must be given some discretion and 
liberty of action to the military when the martial 
law is in force. Indeed, the right to repel 
force by force for the purpose of suppressing 
riots, disturbances and insurrections is a part 
of the civil law and no exception can be taken to 
it."
So, when the Pakistan Supreme Court in 1958 was 
called upon to examine the validity of the new regime estab­
lished in consequence of the Presidents proclamation of 
October 7* it cannot be said that the judges were in any 
doubt as to the nature of "martial law" that came into force 
on the abrogation of the Constitution. It was not martial 
law simpliciter, as recognised by the Pakistani Courts in 
1953* It was a change of the legal Order by a successful 
and effective military coup, and according to the fathers of 
the coup there was no going back to the old Order, no 
restoration of the Constitution of 1956, which had been 
abandoned forever as unsuitable for the country. In such 
circumstances the Supreme Court of Pakistan had to recognise 
the "abrupt political change" and the consequent new law-
37creating body in the context of the new political situation.
The decision of the Supreme Court in according 
validity to the new regime has been criticised on the ground 
that the Court should not have given validity to the Presidents
37• See the preceding chapter for detailed discussion of 
the subject.
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action in abrogating the Constitution, which he had 
absolutely no authority to do* But the Court, it is sub­
mitted, never held that the president had power to abrogate 
the Constitution. What the Court recognised was the fact 
that, after the Presidents action, the Constitution of 
1956 had lost its validity and force, and that it had been 
replaced by an effective new legal order. Whether there 
was any justification for the Presidents extraordinary 
action was a question not for the Court to decide. Such a 
question must be debated and settled outside the Court. In 
a newly independent country even in normal times the judiciary 
is in a delicate position when enforcing limitations on 
governmental powers. As has been observed
"In virtually every new nation, independence was 
granted to a government endowed with massive 
popular support. Under the circumstances, courts 
charged with enforcing limitation on governmental 
power, having no comparable popular support of 
their own, were cast in an exceedingly delicate 
role ... [and] it would have been a foolish 
judicial strategist who would have urged the 
courts of the new nations into decisive confron­
tation with the politicans in these early years 
of independence •11 38
In the abnormal situation of a revolution, the courts cannot
be expected to take a stand against the revolutionaries.
"To debate whether a revolution is unconstitutional is
pointless sophistry, and a political, and not a legal answer
38. Thomas M. Pranck, Comparative Constituting! Process:
Cases and Materials, Introduction, pp. XXXII - 3ffl£lII.
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39can be given11-" to the question of justification of the 
revolution and its effects on the legal norms.
The events in Pakistan in October, 1958 created a 
unique situation, never before adjudicated on by any Common­
wealth court. If the judges of the Supreme Court had 
adhered to strict legality and ignored the political fact 
of change, they might have faced dismissal by the new 
regime. The courts, in that event, would have been filled 
with military judges and supporters of the regime, which 
would have provided little protection for the rights and 
liberties of the people against a government with absolute 
power. On the other hand the Supreme Courts recognition 
of the effect of the revolution of October 7 enabled the 
judiciary to maintain its position and authority under the 
martial law regime. The presence of an organisation like 
the Supreme Court, with an established hierarchy of sub­
ordinate courts with a high judicial reputation was itself 
an effective check on the indiscriminate exercise of State 
power. The Courts were able, by judicial interpretation 
of martial law instruments, to define and restrict the 
powers of the martial law authorities, and to develop a 
martial law ,1 constitutionalism11 • This was a valuable
39* Ibid., p. 22.
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contribution made by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to the 
concept of a court's function to uphold judicial review in 
abnormal circumstances. As has been seen in the preceding 
chapter, other Commonwealth Courts followed the precedent 
in dealing with similar situations,
4-0In the political sphere it has already been seen 
that the coup came at a time when the country was preparing 
for the first general election to be held under the Con­
stitution, It was never claimed that the Constitution of 
1956 was absolutely perfect and immune from criticism.
But there is no such thing as a perfect constitution and 
every constitution is subject to amendment. By the time 
the Constitution had been abrogated, almost all the issues 
which retarded the framing of the Constitution for nine 
long years had been settled. Even the controversial 
electorate issue, left undecided by the Constituent Assembly, 
had been resolved satisfactorily. All the existing 
political parties with the exception of Jamaat-i-Islami 
had already held office under the Constitution, and were 
fully committed to participate in the ensuing election.
And the Jamaat-i-Islami had hailed the Constitution as being
41sufficiently Islamic in character, and, therefore,
40, Chapter VII supra.
41. S.A.A. Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, see 
Appendix IV at p. 405 for the resolution adopted by the 
Majlis-e-Shura.
- 619
acceptable to its members. In the circumstances, it is
evident that everybody concerned was committed to work the
Constitution of 1956, which was to be fully implemented by
the first general election.
But President Iskander Hirza was not happy about
the way things were going. Anxious to be re-elected to
the office of the President, he could find no political
party or group to support his candidature. In the period
of over three years during which he had been Head of State,
he had exploited each and every political party to his own
advantage and alienated all of them by his political in- 
42trigues. In spite of their own differences, all the
political factions of the country were agreed at least on
one point, that Mirza should not be allowed to continue as
Head of State after the general election. The President,
in the circumstances, moved by his inherent love of power,
became desperate and ready to go to any length to secure
his own position. He was looking for a "suitable oppor- 
43tunity" ^ to abrogate the Constitution. That opportunity 
came when General Ayub Khan, then Commander-in-Chief of the 
army, gave support to the President's design. Ayub Khan 
himself was also not happy with the Constitution of 1956.
He had already drawn up an outline of a constitution in
42. See Chapter VII, pp. A30-A39 ' supra.
43. M. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 57•
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1954, which was different from the existing Constitution, 
and apparently was not acceptable to the politicians who 
dominated the Cabinet at that time* Ayub Khan might have 
been genuinely dissatisfied with the Constitution, and in 
Iskander Mirza*s scheme he probably saw an opportunity to 
implement his own ideas about the nature of a viable 
constitution. The personal ambition of President Iskander 
Mirza supported by the army chief was, therefore, the real 
cause for the overthrow of the Constitution.
Bearing in mind thfe background and considering the 
subsequent political development in the country one can say 
that the President's action in abrogating the Constitution 
Of 195^ was absolutely without justification. If there 
had been any genuine necessity for a change in the Consti­
tution, that could have been effected by the normal procedure 
for amendment of the Constitution. The political crisis to 
which Mirza referred could have been settled by the ordinary 
law-enforcement machinery. Contrary to Mirza!s allegation 
that the election would not have improved the situation, 
there were healthy signs of understanding between different 
political parties and groups, which could have resulted in 
political stability after the election. Professor K.J. 
Newman in the context of constitutional crisis in 1954
44. Ibid., pp. 186-191* "A short appreciation of present 
and future problems of Pakistan".
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in 1958 commented
"It happened in 195^, when the first Constituent 
Assembly was dissolved, not because it failed to ' 
produce a constitution, but because it was about 
to produce one* It happened again in 1958, not 
because the Constitution, of 1958 was unworkable, 
but because it was to be fully implemented by the 
first elections in the country." 45
President Iskandar Mirza and his supporters, for their own 
ambitious designs did not want the Constitution to take root 
by the success of the general election. Apprehending frus­
tration of his own ambitions, Mirza struck against the Con­
stitution which, as President, he was bound by his oath to 
protect. His reference to the unworkability of the Consti­
tution and a political crisis in the country were without 
any factual basis, which would justify the extreme action he 
took in October 1958. The President*s action, which he 
alleged was intended to overcome the political instability in 
the country, landed Pakistan in a situation of continuous 
political uncertainty. After four years of "martial law" 
rule, President Ayub Khan, who replaced Iskandar Mirza just 
after three weeks of the "revolution", gave the nation a 
constitution of a presidential type, which proved unaccep­
table to the people, and had to be abrogated in March, 1969* 
After the abrogation of the Constitution of 1962, it was 
generally agreed that the country should revert to the
45. K.J. Newman, "The Constitutional Evolution in Pakistan",
(1962) 58 International Affairs 353*
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parliamentary system enshrined in the Constitution of 1956 
but abandoned because President Mirza said it was unsuitable
i
for Pakistan. Iskander Mirza*s action in October, 1958 
must, therefore, be viewed as the most ruthless action ever 
taken against democracy by a constitutional head of a state, 
and is the basic cause of the acute constitutional and politi­
cal crises which Pakistan faces today.
The last constitutional breakdown we have discussed 
in the preceding chapters was the abrogation of the second 
Constitution of 1962 on March 25» 1969» and the declaration 
of martial law throughout the country. Unlike what 
happened in 1958, the action in the spring of 1969 was the 
result of a nationwide mass movement against the political 
system introduced in the country by the Constitution of 1962. 
This Constitution had been promulgated by President Ayub 
Khan, because he thought it more consonant with the tra- 
ditions of the people and therefore congenial to their genius. 
The Constitution of 1956, which provided for a parliamentary 
form of government was, according to his school of thought, 
alien to the Pakistani tradition and too sophisticated to 
be understood and worked by the people. But the irony of 
the situation was that the mass movement, which began in 
November, 1968 as a student agitation against some academic
46. For a discussion of the Constitution of 1962 see
Chapter IX supra♦
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grievances, developed into a violent political movement 
throughout the country, demanding a return to the parlia­
mentary system. This unanimous popular demand was conceded 
by President Ayub Khan before his abdication in March, 1969* 
Whether a parliamentary constitution will work well in 
Pakistan is a different question. But the President and 
other exponents of the presidential system were convinced 
by the unprecedented countrywide movement that the type of 
constitution given to the nation in 1962 was not acceptable 
to the people of Pakistan.
The mass movement of 1968-1969 was a direct reaction 
against the authoritarian system introduced by the Consti­
tution of 1962. From the very beginning the political 
opposition demanded the liberalization of the system by an 
entente between the Government and the Opposition, but
President Ayub Khan and his supporters were unwilling to pay
iin
any heed to these demands. ' The opposition tried to effect 
liberal reforms through the legislatures but due to the 
intransigent attitude of the Government, their attempts 
proved futile. The presidential and assembly elections of 
1965 convinced the Opposition that any attempt to make 
effective constitutional changes by means provided in the 
Constitution or to induce the regime to change its intransigent
47. See Chapter X supra.
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attitude or to vote President Ayub Khan and his adherents 
out of office was futile. After the landslide vfctovy in 
the elections of President Ayub Khan and his party the 
opposition believed that only a mass movement could effect 
desirable constitutional reforms. The opposition political 
leaders, therefore, seized the opportunity created by the 
students* agitation in the later part of 1968, and exploited 
it to their advantage, with the result that President Ayub 
Khan was compelled to concede their political demands.
But when President Ayub Khan was willing to concede 
any agreed opposition demand, the same old factionalism, 
mutual distrust and group-interest appeared among the poli­
ticians. They failed miserably to consolidate the victory 
they had won through the mass movement in compelling the 
Ayub regime to abdicate. Though preparations were under 
way to give effect to points agreed at the round table con­
ference by constitutional amendments, individual political 
parties both in East and West Pakistan started pressing 
regional demands. Instead of an abatement of agitation 
after the round table conference, which ended on March 13, 
1969* the situation deteriorated daily. The administration 
throughout the country was reduced to a standstill; there 
was no security for life and property; there was an almost 
anarchic situation. Though some people professed to see 
signs of a gradual abatement of lawlessness, the majority 
regarded the situation as hopeless and thought that drastic
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action was essential to restore normality. The President, 
in such a desperate situation, resigned and handed over the 
administration of the country to the commander-in-chief of 
the army, who, on assumption of power, declared martial law 
throughout the country. The declaration of martial law on 
March 25* 1969 was, it is submitted, justified by the 
necessity of the circumstances prevailing in the country at 
that time.
The nature of the "martial law’1 declared in March, 
1969 was not different from that generally recognised in 
the Commonwealth. The object was to suppress insurrection 
and violent disturbances, to protect life and property, 
and to establish the authority of law. But the declaration 
differed from the ordinary promulgation of martial law in 
that it also abrogated the Constitution of the country. 
Normally a martial law authority xrould, after suppressing 
lawlessness, restore constitutional rule in the country.
But the situation in which martial law had to be declared 
in Pakistan was different from that recognised elsewhere in 
the Commonwealth as justifying it. The movement for 
political reforms which took a violent turn early in 1969* 
though it warranted the declaration of martial law, was 
primarily directed against the Constitution itself. The 
main purpose of the movement, was to demonstrate that the 
Constitution of 1962 was unacceptable to the people at large, 
and that it must be replaced by a new one. This could have
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been done through the process of amendment in the existing 
constitution, if there were mutual understanding and good­
will among the politicians. But owing to their differences 
on basic issues, it became evident that a peaceful tran­
sition from the Constitution of 1962 to another one broadly 
acceptable to all parties, was impossible. Hence it was 
necessary that the Constitution, against which there was 
universal opposition in the country, should be abrogated.
Some constitutional progress was made under the 
martial law regime till March, 1971* The West Pakistan 
demand for dismemberment of West Pakistan Province, and the 
East Pakistan demand for representation in the Central 
legislature on the basis of population instead of parity 
between the two wings had been accepted and implemented.
The first general election in the country since independence 
was held in December, 1970, and it was intended that the 
National Assembly should frame the new constitution. But
the old issue of regional autonomy stood in the way. The
disagreement among the political leaders and military rulers 
on the extent of the autonomy to be accorded to the provinces 
resulted in the apparent frustration of the constitutional 
progress so far made, and forced the country into a state of 
unprecedented misery with an unpredictable constitutional 
future.^
48. See Chapter XI, supra.
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Pakistan, after twenty-four years of independence, 
is without a constitution* The country is still under 
"martial law"* In all these years there has been no progress 
towards a viable democratic constitution. Starting at the 
same time India was able to launch her new constitution 
in January, 1950, Pakistan failed to agree on a constitution 
till the later part of 1971* It is true that since it came 
into existence, Pakistan had had to face enormous problems 
even to secure its bare survival, and complicated consti­
tutional issues have remained unsettled in the constitutional
&q
debate throughout this period. y But it must be admitted
that the story of constitutional crises and deadlock in
constitutional progress in Pakistan is lamentable and the
failure of political leadership in the country is deplorable..
After Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, there was no-one who
could command such authority over and respect from the
nation as was essential for national unity and political
understanding between the opposing interest-groups. Por
the politicians "almost from the beginning there was no
50clear sense of purpose or direction". Owing to the 
extreme weakness of political leadership, the bureaucracy 
usurped political power. The persons appointed to political
49. See S.A. de Smith, The New Commonwealth and its 
Constitutions, pp. 218-219.
50. Ibid*, p. 217*
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offices, being merely experts in technical fields, started 
exploiting the weakness of the political leadership to their 
own advantage. The politicians were unable to thwart the 
bureaucratic ascendancy and became easy victims of bureau­
cratic manoeuvres.
This official clique, since the death of Liaquat 
Ali Khan in 1951* proved to be a stumbling block to progress 
towards constitutional and democratic rule in the country. 
The dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin Government in April,
1953* the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in 
October, 1954- by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, and the 
abrogation of the Constitution in October, 195$ "by President 
Iskander Mirza were the results of bureaucratic conspir­
acies, hatched by occupants of the highest offices of the 
State. These two bureaucrat-politicians exploited the weak 
ness of the political leadership to the fullest extent and 
resorted to extremely unconstitutional measures without any 
consideration for the country's constitutional future.
They took action on the plea that democratic rule had failed 
but the situation was otherwise; throughout the period 
frustrating executive action came whenever there was a pros­
pect of popular and constitutional rule. It has been 
remarked that "the ailment of Pakistan was not democracy but 
the attempts to block it."^ Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander
51* D.P. Singhal, "Democracy with Distrust",
(1962) 8 Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
pp. 200, 209; see also O.B. Marshall, "Reflections on
/Continued over
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Mirza1s designs were based on their personal ambition and 
distrust of the people.
In analysing the causes of political instability in 
the country up to 1958> the failure of politicians are, it 
is submitted, often overemphasised. The politicians, no 
doubt, were not free from blame. But the evil effects of 
the role played by the bureaucrats generally and by those 
who were placed in the highest offices of the State cannot be 
underestimated. They certainly had a duty towards the 
constitution and to respect and support constitutional rule, 
which they designedly failed to discharge. Their contempt 
for popular rule grew out of the tradition left by the civil 
servants of the colonial period in which the "administration" 
and popular aspiration were unreconcilable. The bureau­
crats and the nationalist politicians viewed each other with 
antagonistic attitude. This state of affairs continued 
after independence and could not be corrected because of 
failure on both sides. Suhrawardy, in analysing the 
political condition as it stood in 1957 &n<3- the prospect of 
democracy in Pakistan, said "Administration must -unlearn its 
scorn of politics. Politics must overcome its hostility to 
administration. Only in this way can a government and the 
people governed communicate confidence to each other and
Footnote 51 continued from previous page.
a Revolution in Pakistan”,
(1959) 57 Foreign Affairs 247.
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learn that they can count on each other. This obser­
vation is a lucid exposition of the tension that existed 
in the relationship between the bureaucrats and the politi­
cians. Not only did both sides fail to discharge their 
constitutional duties but the administration maintained its 
contempt for politics and always endeavoured to discredit 
politicians. This attitude certainly did not help the 
growth of healthy politics or inspire respect for the poli­
tical process among the people.
Failure to hold a general election was another factor, 
which largely contributed towards the people's lack of en­
thusiasm and confidence in the politicians and their rule. 
During the long period of over a decade there had been 
frequent changes of government at the centre. These changes 
were effected, not on the basis of any popular mandate, but 
solely on the basis of parochial and group interests among 
the politicians, and mainly at the whim and instance of the 
Head of the State. In such circumstances the people became 
bored with seeing the same faces again and again at the helm 
of the ship of State, irrespective of their success or failure 
as administrators; there seemed to be no instrument which 
would enable the people to replace them. This resulted in
52. H.S. Suhrawardy, "Political Stability and Democracy in 
Pakistan", (1957) 55 Foreign Affairs 4-22.
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the alienation of the .politicians from the masses and kept 
them in ignorance of the trends of popular thought. It 
is true that the delay in adopting a constitution had a 
direct effect on the postponement of the general election.
But it was a failure on the part of politicians, who could 
not appreciate the danger which lay in suspending the oppor­
tunity for the expression of popular will on national issues 
for an unlimited period of time. Absence of the process 
of accountability of government to the people for so long 
a time induced frustration in the minds of the people, and 
did not inspire that sense of participation which is the 
main basis of a democratic system.
The prospect of democracy and popular rule in 
Pakistan, due to various factors discussed above, has never 
been bright. The illiteracy of the common masses has been 
suggested as the main reason for the failure of democracy in 
the country. But if the problem is regarded from a prac­
tical angle, it is manifest that the people who have been 
directly responsible for the government of the country and 
who were not illiterate by any standard - the politicians - 
have lamentably failed to perform their functions and 
duties* It is true that unscrupulous men at the top have 
been able to resort to undemocratic measures without any 
fear of popular recrimination, mainly because of the absence 
of any organised and effective public opinion in the country. 
But the fact is that the people have rarely been given an
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opportunity to express their will; and on a few occasions 
when they have had such an opportunity, the people cannot 
he said to have shown ignorance or lack of realisation and 
understanding of the issues. It is clear, therefore, that 
the men who were entrusted with the task of erecting a 
sceptre of democratic government failed because of the lack 
of will to work it and their lack of political understanding 
and failure to engender mutual trust and goodwill.
The political condition obtaining in Pakistan in 
late 1971 does not encourage hopes of the restoration of 
democratic rule in the country. The crisis in East Pakistan 
appears to have overwhelmed plans for immediate consti­
tutional rule in the country. But considering the popular 
feeling and the public commitments of the military regime, 
military rule cannot continue for an unlimited period.
One can say that, once a satisfactory political solution to 
the existing desperate crisis is found, the future of demo­
cracy itself should not be gloomy. In this connection the 
observation made in 1962 by Professor D.P. Singhal, when 
commenting on the future of democracy after the promul­
gation of the Constitution of 1962 is noteworthy. He said 
that, though democracy had been having a rough time in 
Pakistan, due to various reasons, its future in the country 
was not so gloomy, because the politically conscious section 
of the population wanted democracy as the basis of govern­
ment. "Hope is sustained by a variety of historical
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reasons, above all by tbe fact that the validity of the 
doctrine itself has not been seriously disputed, and that 
attempts to restore representative institutions have been 
made in [the country] • This hope is still sustained in 
the face of the grave political crises, because President 
Yahya Khan has promised more than once that power would be 
transferred to the people's representatives as soon as cir­
cumstances allowed such transfer, and also because no voice 
has yet been heard which opposes the restoration of 
popular rule or now says that democracy is unsuited to the 
people of Pakistan* With almost the same background and 
political traditions, the people of India have been able, 
so far, to work democracy* The democratic system there 
seems to be strong enough to successfully absorb the strains 
of grave political and economic crises, common to all under­
developed countries. Given the political will on the part
*
of the leaders, there seems no reason, therefore, to think 
that the people of Pakistan will lag behind and will not 
be able to work democracy.
The establishment of democratic rule will, how­
ever;, depend on the political goodwill and understanding 
between persons representing regional or group interests. 
Constitutional and political issues will have to be solved
53* D.P. Singhal, "Democracy with Distrust",
(1962) 8 Australian Journal of Politics and History 200.
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by discussion among political leaders and military rulers, 
who must display more willingness to compromise than has 
been manifest in the past. The military has been directly 
involved in ruling the country for the last thirteen years 
and cannot be expected to remain isolated and play the 
role of a neutral observer in any constitutional arrangement 
in the country. In the present state of affairs, the views
A
of the armed forces will obviously get predominance. But
every party would do better if it realised that only through
mutual understanding by the process of persuasion can the
goal of peaceful constitutional rule be achieved. As
Thomas Franck has observed:
"The few African and Asian governments which have 
tried to create unity through force, rather than 
through persuasion and compromise have found that 
force turned inward upon themselves. Even, or 
particularly, the military revolutionaries in the 
new nations are coming to realise that Africa 
and Asia cannot compel itself to progress; but 
perhaps it can persuade itself.” 54-
If the leaders of Pakistan determined to find 
satisfactory political solutions of the political problems 
facing the country, and genuinely desire to work democracy, 
they will certainly find the people willing to give them 
support and cooperation. What needs emphasis here is that 
the will on the part of the masses to participate in the 
democratic process is not lacking. Lastly, the type of
54-. Thomas H. Franck, Comparative Constitutional Process: 
Cases and Materials, Introduction, p. XXXllH
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democratic constitution which would be suitable for Pakistan 
is no longer a question for controversy* Through the 
country-wide mass movement during 1968-69 the people have 
most clearly demonstrated that only a parliamentary form of 
government is acceptable to them* A crisis-free political 
atmosphere and the will to work democracy among the leaders 
are essential for the establishment of popular rule, its 
continuance and success in the future.
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Appendix I 
Proclamation fry Governor-General
The following Proclamation was issued by the 
Governor-General on 24th October 1954.
The Governor-General having considered the political 
crisis with which the country is faced, has with deep regret 
come to the conclusion that the constitutional machinery 
has broken down. He therefore has decided to declare a 
state of emergency throughout Pakistan. The Constituent 
Assembly as at present constituted has lost the confidence of 
the people and can no longer function.
The ultimate authority vests in the people who 
will decide all issues including constitutional issues through 
their representatives to be elected afresh. Elections vri.ll 
be held as early as possible.
Until such time as elections are held, the adminis­
tration of the country will be carried on by a reconstituted 
Cabinet. He has called upon the Prime Minister to reform 
the Cabinet with a view to giving the country a vigorous and 
stable administration. The invitation has been accepted.
The security and stability of the country are of 
paramount importance. All personal, sectional and provincial 
interests must be subordinated to the supreme national 
interest.
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Appendix II 
Proclamation
[Dated 7^10. October 1958 made by the President of Pakistan]
"Por the last two years, I have been watching, 
with the deepest anxiety the ruthless struggle for power, 
corruption, the shameful exploitation of our simple, honest, 
patriotic and industrious masses, the lack of decorum and 
the prostitution of Islam for political ends* There have 
been a few honourable exceptions. But being in a minority, 
they have not been able to assert their influence in the 
affairs of the country.
"These despicable activities have led to a dic­
tatorship of the lowest order. Adventurers and exploiters 
have flourished to the detriment of the masses and are 
getting richer by their nefarious practices.
"Despite my repeated endeavours, no serious attempt 
has been made to tackle the food crisis. Pood has been a 
problem of life and death for us in a country which should 
be really surplus. Agriculture and land administration 
have been made a hand maiden of politics so that in our 
present system of government, no political party will be 
able to take any positive action to increase production.
In East Pakistan, on the other hand, there is a well organized 
smuggling of food, medicines and other necessities of life.
The masses there-suffer due to the shortages so caused in and
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the consequent high prices of, these commodities. Import 
of food has been a constant and serious drain on our foreign 
exchange earnings in the last few years, with the result 
that the Government is constrained to curtail the much needed 
internal development projects.
"Some of our politicians have lately been talking 
of bloody revolution. Another type of adventurers among 
them think it fit to go to foreign countries and attempt 
direct alignment with them which can only be described as 
high treason.
"The disgraceful scene enacted recently in the 
East Pakistan Assembly is known to all. I am told that 
such episodes were common occurrences in pre-partition Bengal. 
Whether they were or not, it is certainly not a civilized 
mode of procedure. You do not raise the prestige ofyDur 
country by beating the Speaker, killing the Deputy Speaker 
and desecrating the National Plag.
"The mentality of the political parties has sunk 
so low that I am unable any longer to believe that elections 
will improve the present chaotic internal situation and 
enable us to form a strong and stable Government capable of 
dealing with the innumerable and complex problems facing us 
today. We cannot get men from the Moon. The same group of 
people who have brought Pakistan on the verge of ruination 
will rig the elections for their own ends. They will come 
back more revengeful, because, I am sure that the elections
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will be contested, mainly, on personal, regional and sec­
tarian basis. When they return, they will use the same 
methods which have made a tragic farce of democracy and axe 
the main cause of the present widespread frustration in the 
country. However much the administration may try, I am 
convinced, judging by shifting loyalties and the ceaseless 
and unscrupulous scramble for office, that election will 
neither be free nor fair. They will not solve our diffi­
culties. On the contrary, they are likely to create greater 
unhappiness and disappointments leading ultimately to a 
really bloody revolution. Recently, we had elections for 
the Karachi Municipal Corporation. Twenty per cent, of 
the electorate exercised their votes, and out of these, 
about fifty, per cent, were bogus votes.
"We hear threats and cries of civil disobedience in 
order to retain private volunteer organisations and to break 
up One Unit. These disruptive tendencies are a good indi­
cation of their patriotism and the length up to which politi­
cians and adventurers are prepared to go to achieve their 
parochial aim.
"Our foreign policy is subjected to unintelligent 
and irresponsible criticism, not for patriotic motives, but 
from selfish view of points, often by the very people who 
were responsible for it. We desire to have friendly 
relations with all nations, but political adventurers try 
their best to create bad blood and misunderstanding between
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us and countries like the U.S.S.R., the U.A.R., and the 
Peoples Republic of China. Against India, of course, they 
scream for war, knowing full well that they will be nowhere 
near the firing line. In no country in the world, do 
political parties treat foreign policy in the manner it is 
done in Pakistan. To dispel the confusion so caused, I 
categorically reiterate that we shall continue to follow a 
policy which our interests and geography demand and that we 
shall honour all our international commitments, which, as 
is well known, we have undertaken to safeguard the security 
of Pakistan and, as a peace loving nation, to play our part 
in averting the danger of war from this troubled world.
flPor the last three years, I have been doing my 
utmost to work the Constitution in a democratic way. I have
laboured to bring about coalition after coalition, hoping 
that it would stabilise the administration and that the 
affairs of the country would be run in the interests of the 
masses. My detractors, in their dishonest ways, have on 
every opportunity, called these attempts as Palace intrigues. 
It has become fashionable to put all the blame on the Presi­
dent. A wit said the other day. !If it rains too much it 
is the fault of the President and if it does not rain it is 
the fault of the President.1 If only I alone was concerned 
I would go on taking these fulminations with the contempt they 
deserve. But the intention of these traitors and unpatriotic
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elements is to destroy the prestige of Pakistan and the 
Government by attacking the Head of the State, They have 
succeeded to a great extent, and, if this state of affairs 
is allowed to go on, they will achieve their ultimate pur­
poses,
"My appraisal of the internal situation has led 
me to believe that a vast majority of the people no longer 
have any confidence in the present system of Government and 
are getting more and more disillusioned and disappointed and 
are becoming dangerously resentful of the manner in which 
they are exploited. Their resentment and bitterness are 
justifiable. The leaders have not been able to render them 
the service they deserve and have failed to prove themselves 
worthy of the confidence the masses had reposed in them.
,fThe Constitution which was brought into being on 
23rd March 1956, after so many tribulations, is unworkable.
It is full of dangerous compromises that Pakistan will soon 
disintegrate internally if the inherent malaise is not 
removed. To rectify them, the country must first be taken 
to sanity by a peaceful revolution. Then, it is my intention 
to collect a number of patriotic persons to examine our 
problems in the political field and devise a Constitution 
more suitable to the genius of the Muslim people. V/hen it 
is ready, and at the appropriate time, it will be submitted 
to the referendum of the people.
"It is said that the Constitution is sacred. But
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more sacred than the Constitution or anything else is the 
country and the welfare and happiness of its people. As 
Head of the State, my foremost duty before my God and the 
people is the integrity of Pakistan. It is seriously 
threatened by the ruthlessness of traitors and political 
adventurers, whose selfishness, thirst for power and un­
patriotic conduct cannot be restrained by a government set up 
under the present system. Nor can I any longer remain a 
spectator of activities designed to destroy the country.
After deep and anxious thought, I have come to the regret­
table conclusion that I would be failing in my duty, if I did 
not take steps, which in my opinion, are inescapable in 
present conditions, to save Pakistan from complete disruption 
I have, therefore, decided that:-
(a) The Constitution of the 23rd March 1956 will 
be abrogated.
(b) The Central and Provincial Governments will 
be dismissed with immediate effect.
(c) The National Parliament and Provincial Assem­
blies will be dissolved.
(d) All political parties will be abolished.
(c) Until alternative arrangements are made,
Pakistan will come under Martial Law. I hereby appoint 
General Mohammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army 
as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and place all the 
Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command.
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"To the valiant Armed Forces of Pakistan, I have to 
say, 'That having been closely associated with them since 
the very inception of Pakistan, I have learnt to adsixe 
their patriotism and loyalty. I am putting a great strain 
on them. I fully realise this hut I ask you Officers and 
men of the Armed Forces on your services depends the future 
existence of Pakistan as an independent Nation and a bastion 
in these parts of the Free World. Do your job without fear 
or favour and may God help you . 1
"To the people of Pakistan, I talk as a brother 
and fellow compatriot. Present action has been taken with 
the utmost regret but I have had to do it in the interests 
of the country and the masses finer men than whom it is 
difficult to imagine. To the patriots and the law abiding,
I promise you will be happier and freer. The political 
adventurers, the smugglers, the black-marketeers, the hoarders 
will be unhappy and their activities will be severely res­
tricted. As for the traitors, they had better flee the 
country if they can and while the going is good."
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Appendix III 
Typical Martial Law Regulations
1958
H,L.E. No. 6. If with intent to help the recalcitrants any 
person does any act which is designed or is likely to give 
assistance to the operations of the recalcitrants, or to impede 
operations of Pakistan forces, or to endanger life, he shall 
suffer death and no less punishment.
[The word 'recalcitrant1 being defined in Regulation No. 3 as 
to include "any external enemy of Pakistan and mutineers or 
rebels or rioters and any enemy agent, ..."]
M.L.R. No. 13* Any person who attacks, resists or injures, 
or causes to be attacked, resisted or inju.red any member of 
the forces, whether civil or military under my command or any 
civil official, shall be punishable. Maximum punishment 
death.
M.L.R. No. 15» No person shall damage, tamper with or 
interfere with the working of roads, railways, canals, aero­
dromes, telegraph, telephone, wireless installations or with 
any other government property. Maximum punishment death.
M.L.R. No. 18. Every person shall when required to do so 
give his correct name and address e^ nd produce his permit or
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pass to any military or civil officer or any soldier or 
policeman. Failure to comply shall he punishable. Maximum 
punishment death.
M.L.R. No. 19* No person shall wilfully give false evidence 
or refuse to give evidence in any investigation or trial held 
under these regulations. Maximum punishment death.
M.L.R. No. 21. No person or syndicate or firm shall hoard 
foodgrain in violation of existing orders and any orders 
issued under these regulations. Maximum punishment death.
M.L.R. No. 22. Wilful adulteration of all kinds of food 
shall be punishable. Maximum punishment 14 years R.I.
M.L.R. No. 24. No one by word of mouth, or in writing or by 
signals, or otherwise will spread reports, calculated to 
create alarm or despondency amongst the public, or calcu­
lated to create dissatisfaction towards the Armed Forces and 
Police, or any member thereof. Maximum punishment 14 years 
R.I.
M.L.R. No. 27. Smuggling of all kinds is prohibited. Any 
one caught in the act of smuggling or found helping a 
smuggler with money, goods, shelter, food, drink, trans­
portation or with any other type of assistance or withholds
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any information about the smugglers or fails to pass on 
such information without delay to military and civil 
authorities shall be punishable. Maximum punishment death.
M.L.R. No. 28* Child lifting and abduction of women is an 
offence. Maximum punishment death.
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M.L.R. No. 6. No person shall by word, either spoken or 
written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or other­
wise, criticise the imposition or operation of Martial Law or 
bring or attempt to bring into hatred or contempt or excite 
or attempt to excite disaffection towards the Chief Martial 
Law Administrator or any Martial Law Authority. Maximum 
punishment 10 years R.I.
M.L.R. No. 7. If with intent to help the recalcitrants any 
person does any act which is designed or is likely to give 
assistance to the operations of the recalcitrants, or to 
impede operations of Pakistan Forces, or to endanger life, 
he shall suffer death or such less punishment as provided in 
Regulation No. 4.
In this Regulation (a) the word 'recalcitrant1 
includes any external enemy of Pakistan and mutineers or rebels 
or rioters and enemy agents ...
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M.L.R. No* 10* No person shall assist or harbour any recal­
citrant by giving him information or by supplying him with 
shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, weapons, ammunitions, 
stores, forage or means of conveyance, or by assisting him in 
any way to evade apprehension* Maximum punishment death.
M.L.R. No* 12* Any person who attacks, resists or injures, 
or causes to be attacked, resisted or injured any member of 
the forces, whether civil or military under my command or 
any civil official, shall be punished. Maximum punishment 
death.
M.L.R* No*■ 15* No person shall wilfully give false evidence 
or refuse to give evidence in any investigation or trial held 
under these Regulations. Maximum punishment 14 years R.I.
M.L.R. No. 17* No one by word of mouth, or in writing or 
by signals, or otherwise will spread reports, calculated to 
create alarm or despondency amongst the public, or calcu­
lated to create dissatisfaction towards the Armed Forces 
and Police, or any member thereof. Maximum punishment 14- 
years R.I.
M.L.R. No. 21. No person shall organize or convene any 
meeting or procession without prior permission of the local 
Martial Law Administrator. This permission will be obtained
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in writing.
No person will attend or take part in any meeting 
or procession which has not been sanctioned by the Martial 
Law Authority concerned. Maximum punishment 7 years R.I.
M.L.R. No. 23* Smuggling of all kinds is prohibited. Any 
one found guilty of smuggling or of helping a smuggler with 
money, goods, shelter, food, drink, transportation or with 
any other type of assistance or who withholds any information 
about the smugglers or fails to pass on such information 
without delay to military and civil authorities shall be 
punishable. Maximum punishment death.
M.L.R. No. 29» Whoever uses, behaves, or tries to use his 
official position to bestow patronage or favours to the advan­
tage of a person or persons, relatives or friends, trading 
firms or concerns or other agencies in such a manner as to 
the disadvantage of the State or by such act of nepotism, 
deprives legitimate right or rights of other person or 
persons shall be punished with R.I. which may extend to 14- 
years.
M.L.R. No. 39* Whoever kidnaps from lawful guardianship any 
minor under fourteen years of age, if a male, or under sixteen 
years of age, if a female, shall be punished. Maximum 
penalty death.
649
Appendix IV 
Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 
[10th October, 19583
In pursuance of the Proclamation of the 7th October 
1958, and of all powers enabling him in that behalf the 
President is pleased to make and promulgate the following 
Order:-
1. (1) This Order may be called the Laws (Conti­
nuance in Porce) Order, 1958*
(2) It shall come into force at once and be deemed 
to have taken effect immediately upon the making of the Pro­
clamation of the seventh day of October 1958, hereinafter ref­
erred to as the Proclamation.
(3) It extends to the whole of Pakistan.
2. (1) Notwithstanding the abrogation of the Con­
stitution of the 23rd March, 1956 hereinafter referred to as 
the late Constitution, by the Proclamation and subject to any 
Order of the President or Regulation made by the Chief Adminis 
trator of Martial Law the Republic, to be known henceforward 
as Pakistan, shall be governed as nearly as may be in accor­
dance with the late Constitution.
(2) Subject as aforesaid all Courts in existence 
immediately before the Proclamation shall continue in being 
and, subject further to the provisions of this Order, in
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their powers and jurisdictions*
(3) The law declared by the Supreme Court shall 
be binding on all Courts in Pakistan*
(4) The Supreme Court and the High Courts shall 
have power to issue the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, 
prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari*
(5) Ho writ shall be issued against the Chief Admin­
istrator of Martial Law, or the Deputy Chief Administrator of 
Martial Law, or any person exercising powers or jurisdiction
under the authority of either.
\
(6) Where a writ has been sought against an 
authority which has been succeeded by an authority mentioned 
in the preceding clause, and the writ sought is a write pro­
vided for in clause (4-) of this Article, the Court notwith­
standing that no writ may be issued against an authority so 
mentioned may send to that authority its opinion on a question 
of law raised*
(7) All orders and judgments made or given by the 
Supreme Court between the Proclamation and the promulgation 
of this Order are hereby declared valid and binding on all 
Courts and authorities in Pakistan, but saving those orders 
and judgments no writ or order for a writ issued or made 
after the Proclamation shall have effect unless it is pro­
vided for by this Order, and all applications and proceedings 
in respect of any writ which is not so provided for shall 
abate forthwith.
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3. No Court or person shall call or permit to “be 
called in question -
(1) the Proclamation;
(ii) any Order made in pursuance of the Proclamation 
or any Martial Law Order or Martial Law Regulation;
(iii) any finding, judgment or order of a special 
Military Court or a summary Military Court*
4. (1) Notwithstanding the abrogation of the late 
Constitution, and subject to any Order of the President or 
Regulation made by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law,
all laws, other than the late Constitution, and all Ordinances, 
Orders-in-Council, Orders other than Orders made by the Presi­
dent under the late Constitution, such Orders made by the 
President under the late Constitution as are set out in the 
Schedule to this Order, Rules, by-laws, Regulations, Notifi­
cations, and other legal instruments in force in Pakistan 
or in any part thereof, or having extra-territorial validity, 
immediately before the Proclamation, shall, so far as appli­
cable and with such necessary adaptations as the President 
may see fit to make, continue in force until altered, repealed 
or amended by competent authority*
(2) In this Article a law is said to be in force 
if it has effect as law whether or not the law has been 
brought into operation.
(3) No Court shall call into question any adaptation 
made by the President under clause (1).
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5* (1) The powers of a Governor shall he those 
which he would have had had the President directed him to 
assume on behalf of the President all the functions of the 
Government of the Province under the Provisions of Article 
195 of the late Constitution and such powers of making Ordi­
nance as he would have had and within such limitations had 
Article 106 and clauses (1) and (3) of Article 102 of the 
late Constitution been still in force*
(2) In the exercise of the powers conferred by 
the previous clause the Governor shall act subject to any 
directions given to him by the President or by the Chief 
Administrator of Martial Law or by any person having authority 
from the Chief Administrator*
(3) Nothing in this Article shall prejudice the 
operation of any Regulation made by the Chief Administrator 
of Martial Law or by any person having authority from the 
Chief Administrator of Martial Law to make martial Law 
Regulations and where any Ordinance or any provision thereof 
made under clause (1) of this Article is repugnant to any 
such Regulation or part thereof the Regulation or part shall 
prevail•
6* All persons who immediately before the Procla­
mation were in the service of Pakistan as defined under 
clause (1) of Article 218 of the late Constitution and those 
persons who immediately before the Proclamation were in office
653
as Governor, Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court, 
Comptroller and Auditor General, Attorney-General or 
Advocate General, shall continue in the said service or in 
the said office on the same terms and conditions and shall 
enjoy the same privileges, if any*
7* Any provision in any law providing for the 
reference of a detention order to an Advisory Board shall he 
of no effect*
SCHEDULE
1. The Karachi Courts Order, 1956*
2. The Federal Capital (Essential Supplies) Order, 1956*
3« The Adaptation (Security Laws) Order, 1956 (except so 
far as concerns the reference of a detention order, to an 
Advisory Board).
4. The Stamp Act (Amendment) Order, 1956.
5. The Essential Services Maintenance (Adaptation) Order, 1956.
6. The Hoarding and Black Market Order, 1956*
7. The Karachi Courts (Amendment) Order, 1956.
8. The Karachi Rent Restriction Act (Amendment) Order, 1956.
9* The Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Order, 1956.
10. The University of Karachi (Amendment) Order, 1956*
11. The High Courts (Bengal)(Adaptation) Order, 1957*
12. The Karachi Development Authority Order, 1957*
13• The Karachi Development Authority (Amendment) Order, 1956*
14. The High Court Judges (Daily Allowances) Order, 1956.
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15. The Federal Capital (Powers and Duties of the Chief 
Commissioner) (Declaration) Order, 1958 •
16. The Federal Capital (Essential Supplies) (Amendment) 
Order, 1958*
17• The Gwadur (Government and Administration) Order, 1958 
except clause (2) of Article 2.
18. The Gwadur (Government and Administration) (Application 
of Laws) Order, 1958*
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Appendix V 
Six-Point Programme
1. The Constitution should provide for a Pederation 
of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of Lahore Reso­
lution, and Parliamentary form of Government with supremacy 
of Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal 
adult franchise,
2. Pederal Government shall deal with only two subjects 
viz. Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary 
subjects shall vest in the federating states.
3. A. Either, two separate but freely convertible 
currencies for two wings may be introduced, or
B. One currency for the whole country may be main­
tained. In this case effective constitutional provisions 
are to be made to stop flight of capital from East to West 
Pakistan. Separate Banking Reserve is to be made and sep­
arate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East 
Pakistan.
4-. Power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest
in the federating units and the Federal Centre will have no 
such power. The Federation will have a share in the state 
taxes for meeting their required expenditure. The Consoli­
dated Federal Fund shall come out of a levy of certain per­
centage of all state taxes.
5. (i) There shall be two separate accounts for foreign
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exchange earnings of the two wings,
(ii) Earnings of East Pakistan shall he under the 
control of East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan 
under the control of West Pakistan Government.
(iii) Foreign exchange requirement of the Eederal 
Government shall he met hy the two wings either equally or 
in a ratio to he fixed.
(iv) Indigenous products shall move free of duty 
between two wings.
(v) The Constitution shall empower the unit Govern­
ments to establish trade and commercial relations with, set 
up trade missions in, and enter into agreements with foreign 
countries. •
6. A militia or a para-military force he set up for
East Pakistan.
[Prom an article by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman entitled "Six- 
Point Formula" published in the Horning News, Dacca (Special 
Supplement) January 3, 1971•]
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Appendix VT 
Proclamation of Martial Law 
[25th March. 19693
Whereas a situation has arisen in the country in 
which civil administration cannot effectively function;
And whereas in the interest of national security 
it has become necessary to place the country under Martial 
Law,
Now, therefore, I, General AGHA MUHAMMAD YAHYA KHAN, 
H. PK., H. J., do hereby declare that the whole of PAKISTAN 
shall be under Martial Law with immediate effect and assume 
the powers of the Chief Martial Law Administrator and the 
command of all the Armed Porces of PAKISTAN.
f. Martial Law Regulations and Orders shall be 
made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator or any officer 
or authority empowered by him and shall be published in such 
manner as is convenient.
2. Any person contravening Martial Law Regulations 
or Orders shall be liable to such penalties as may be pres­
cribed by the Regulations.
3. Martial Law Regulations may -
(a) provide for setting up Military Courts for the 
trial and punishment of any offence for the contravention of 
Martial Law Regulations or Orders and of offences under the 
ordinary law,
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(b) prescribe any special penalties for offences 
■under the ordinary law,
(c) authorise ordinary Courts to try and punish 
the contravention of any Martial Law Regulation or Order,
(d) bar the Jurisdiction of ordinary Courts from 
trying any offence specified in this behalf*
4* (1) The Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of PAKISTAN, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, 
shall stand abrogated.
(2) The persons holding office as President,
Members of the President's Council of Ministers, the 
Governors of the Provinces and Members of their Council of 
Ministers shall cease to hold office with immediate effect.
(3) The National Assembly and the Provincial Assem­
blies shall stand dissolved.
5* Notwithstanding the abrogation of the Constitution 
and subject to Regulations or Orders made by the Chief Martial 
Law Administrator -
(a) all laws, including Ordinances, Martial Law
Regulations, orders, rules, bye-laws, regulations, notifi-
*
cations and other instruments, in force immediately before 
the abrogation of the Constitution shall continue in force,
(b) all courts and tribunals in existence immed­
iately before the abrogation of the Constitution shall con­
tinue and exercise all their powers and Jurisdiction which
they would have exercised had the Constitution not been
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abrogated;
(i) no court shall call in question any Martial 
Law Regulation or Order or any finding, judgment or order 
of a Military Court; and
(ii) no writ or other order shall he issued against 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator or any person exercising 
powers or jurisdiction under the authority of the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator.
(c) all persons who, immediately before the abro­
gation of the Constitution, were in office as the Chief 
Justice or a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a.High Court, 
the Comptroller and Auditor-General, the Attorney-General
or Advocate-General or were in service of PAKISTAN as defined 
in the Constitution shall, unless the Chief' Martial Law 
Administrator otherwise directs, continue in the said office 
or in the said service on the terms and conditions as were 
applicable to them before such abrogation and shall continue 
to exercise their powers and perform their functions;
(d) unless the Chief Martial Law Administrator 
otherwise directs, all other officers and authorities 
appointed, constituted or established under the Constitution 
shall continue and shall exercise and perform all powers and 
functions which they would have exercised and performed had 
the Constitution not been abrogated.
A.M. YAHYA KHAN,
General,
Rawalpindi, 31st March 1969* Chief Martial Law Administrator«
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